JUDGMENT Mahesh Chandra, J. - This First Appeal from Order arises out of an order for remand made by the first appellate Court of II Additional Civil, Judge Allahabad. 2. A suit was filed by Smt. Ganga Devi and Parma Nand for ejectment of Vijai Kumar Tandon, defendant-appellant, from the upper portion of house No. 220, Gariwan Tola, Allahabad city. The respondents claimed arrears of rent, electric charges and damages. The respondents alleged that they were the exclusive owners of the premises in dispute and that for all practical purposes Smt. Ganga Devi, respondent No. 1, was the landlord and used to let out the house, realise rent and manage the property. According to them, the defendant-appellant was their tenant and had paid no rent and electric charges from 1.1.1962 onwards inspite of notice of demand. 3. The defence was that the plaintiffs-respondents had no right to sue; that the notice was invalid and that the suit was bad for non-joinder of one Kali Charan, step son of respondent No. 1, Smt. Ganga Devi as he was also a heir of the deceased landlord Shyam Krishna. It was further contended that the entire rent had been paid to Kali Charan. 4. The trial Court found that Kali Charan was also the landlord and the plaintiff-respondents had consequently no right to sue. Notice was also held to be illegal on the same ground. The suit was accordingly dismissed without deciding any other issue. The first appellate Court held that Srimati Ganga Devi was managing the premises in dispute and was competent to give notice to terminate the tenancy without getting it signed by Kali Charan and that the termination of tenancy was valid, and that the suit was accordingly maintainable. 5. It is concluded by a finding of fact of both the Courts below that the house in dispute was let out by Shyam Krishna. It is also found by both the Courts below that Kali Charan as a son of Shyam Krishna was also a co-owner of the house in dispute. He was thus a co-landlord also, as the house in dispute was let out by the Shyam Krishna deceased, who was the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs-respondents as well as Kali Charan. 6. It is also found by both the Courts below that Kali Charan as a son of Shyam Krishna was also a co-owner of the house in dispute. He was thus a co-landlord also, as the house in dispute was let out by the Shyam Krishna deceased, who was the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs-respondents as well as Kali Charan. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the notice by Smt. Ganga Devi alone was consequently invalid and that the suit was not maintainable as held by the trial Court. It is no doubt true that in England any joint tenant may put an end to his lease, as for as it operates on his own share is concerned, whether his companions join him in putting an end to the whole lease or not. But according to the Indian decisions the relation created by contract with joint landlords continues until there exists a new and complete volition to change it. The rule may be different in the case of trespassers. In such a case a co-sharer can sue to eject the trespasser. In the case of tenant also when actual possession is not sought for, it may be possible to bring a suit. But where the relationship of joint land-holders continues, it would seem the tenancy of the lessees cannot be put an end to except by all the lessors acting together. If in this case the tenancy had been determined by all the lessors, and the lessees deprived of their character of tenants and reduced to that of trespassers, the plaintiffs would certainly, have been entitled to the relief they ask for. But, as the lessors (i.e. all the lessors have not in the terms of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act) shown their intention to determine the lease, they cannot succeed. Vide Gopal Ram Mohari v. Dhakeshwar Parshad Narain Singh, ILR XXXV Calcutta p. 807. 7. This view was also taken in Vagha Jusing v. Manilal Bhogilal Desai, AIR 1935 Bombay 262. In that case it was held : "Where the landlord's rights belonged jointly to several persons, a suit to eject can only be brought by all the co-owners;" Broomfield, J., further held "it makes no difference whether the suit be technically one for enhancement of rent or to recover rent on a new basis of calculation." 8. In that case it was held : "Where the landlord's rights belonged jointly to several persons, a suit to eject can only be brought by all the co-owners;" Broomfield, J., further held "it makes no difference whether the suit be technically one for enhancement of rent or to recover rent on a new basis of calculation." 8. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that Smt. Ganga Devi was acting as Manager for all the lessors. This contention without force. In the notice given by her as well as in paragraph 1 of the plaint she asserted that she and her son plaintiff-respondent No. 2 were the exclusive owners of the property in dispute. She cannot be permitted now to turn round and take up an entirely contradictory case that she was the manager of the person whose title was expressly denied by her when she claimed that only she and her sons exclusively were the owners of the property and no third person had any right to it. In Smt. Chhoti Dai v. Gangadhar, AIR 1953 Orissa 245, Mohpatra, J., observed :- "In my opinion, when the fact remains that the three brothers are denying the rights of the widow all along and in view of the position that even in the petition Satyendra did not acknowledge the rights of the widow, he cannot really represent the rights of the widow." With respect I agree with that view. Mohapatra, J., went on further to observe that where notice is given by brothers without joining their mother who had interest in the property at the time of the notice, the notice is invalid. 9. Thus, the tenancy was never determined. The appellants then continued to be a tenant. As held in Vaghu Jesing's (supra) case a suit to eject a tenant cannot be brought about only by some of the co-owners a party to this suit. In the present case, Kali Charan, who was a co-owner and co-landlord did not join in the notice. Nor could he be deemed in law to have joined in a notice given by a person who denied his title. Nor was he made even a proforma defendant to the suit. The suit was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the trial Court so far as ejectment is concerned and is not maintainable for ejectment. 10. Nor could he be deemed in law to have joined in a notice given by a person who denied his title. Nor was he made even a proforma defendant to the suit. The suit was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the trial Court so far as ejectment is concerned and is not maintainable for ejectment. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent then contends that even though a suit for ejectment is not maintainable they could get their share of the rent due from the appellant and also their share of the electric charges. For this contention he relies on Ram Ratan Prasad v. Jang Bahadur Singh, 62 IC 47. It was held therein that the co-sharer was entitled to bring a suit for the entire rent due to him and the other co-sharer, when the others did not join in the suit. It was further held in that very case that a co-sharer could not maintain the suit for his share only in the absence of proof of such an arrangement between himself and his co-sharers and the tenant. In a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Ghani Mohammad v. Maran and Dongre Prasad Mytse v. Joy Narain Hazra, ILR 4 Calcutta 96, it was held that in the absence of an arrangement between the co-sharers of an estate and their tenant that he shall pay each co-sharer his proportionate share of the entire rent a suit by one co-sharer of his share of rent is not maintainable. There is no evidence of any arrangement of the kind between the plaintiff-respondent and the tenant and the other co-sharer Kali Charan, who is not a party to this suit. Nor could such an arrangement be pleaded when the plaintiff-respondents came to Court with the allegation that they were the exclusive owners of the property in dispute and throughout the trial their case was that Kali Charan had no interest whatsoever in the property in dispute. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents then relied on the Privy Council decision reported in Pramada Nath Roy v. Ramani Kant Roy, ILR 5 Calcutta 331. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents then relied on the Privy Council decision reported in Pramada Nath Roy v. Ramani Kant Roy, ILR 5 Calcutta 331. In that case it was held by Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that by the express terms of the Bengal Tenancy Act in the event of rent being unpaid the owners of the Zamindari interest are entitled by suit under that Act to bring a patni to sale with the consequences prescribed by the Act. They further held that it was a general rule not derived from the Bengal Tenancy Act but from the general principles of local procedure that a sharer whose co-sharers refuse to join him as plaintiffs can bring them into the suit as defendants and sue for the whole rent of the tenure. So far as the Bengal Tenancy Act is concerned the present suit is not governed by that Act. As for the general rule, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have held that one co-sharer can sue for the whole rent of the tenure but that would be so if the other co-sharers refuse to join him as plaintiff and he brings them into suit as defendants. The plaintiff-respondents are therefore not entitled to a decree for the entire rent in this suit because they did not join third co-sharer Kali Charan as a defendant, having taken up the case that he had no share in the property. This decision also will not therefore, help the plaintiff-respondent. In the absence of the third co-sharer, the plaintiff-respondents are not therefore, entitled to a decree either for the arrears of rent due to all co-sharers or for the plaintiffs-respondents, share of the rent. 12. The result is that the appeal is allowed. The order of remand of the Court below is set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.