JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The plaintiff appeals. He came to court for damages for wrongful confinement. 2. It appears that for the assessment year 1957-58, a sum of Rs. 4,622.50 P. was due as arrears of sales tax from firm Hira Lal Bimal Prakash. This firm had two partners, Hira Lal and Jawahar Lal. It has been found affirmatively by both the courts below that the plaintiff-appellant, Bimal Prakash, though a son of Jawahar Lal, was himself not a partner in this firm. The Sales Tax Officer issued a recovery certificate directing that the arrears of the sales tax be recovered from Hira Lal. In the course of the recovery proceedings, the respondents took into custody the plaintiff, namely, Bimal Prakash. They demanded jaayment of the arrears of Sales Tax from him. On refusal to pay on the ground that he was not liable because he was not a partner of the firm, they took him in custody and put him in the civil lock-up. Ultimately. the arrears were paid that very day, and, thereafter, in the evening, he was released from custody. 3. The trial court found that the plaintiff, Bimal Prakash was not liable to pay the an-ears of sales tax, and he could not be arrested in proceedings to recover the same. His arrest and confinement were, therefore, wrongful. It was further found ,,that the persons, who made the arrest, acted in good faith, and were not personally liable, but, in view of the decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court, the State was liable vicariously. On a consideration of the evidence, it fixed the amount of damages at Rs. 150/-, and decreed the suit for that sum only. The appellate court confirmed the findings that the plaintiff was not a partner of the firm, that the recovery certificate was issued against Hira Lal only and that the plaintiff was not liable to pay the arrears of the sales tax, but was arrested illegally. It also upheld ,the finding that the various defendants, who participated in the arrest and the lockup of the plaintiff, acted bona fide and in good-faith, but the State was, in law, liable vicariously. It also held that the plaintiff would be entitled to Rs. 1,100/-. But since all the defendants were found to have acted in good faith, the suit was dismissed. 4. It also held that the plaintiff would be entitled to Rs. 1,100/-. But since all the defendants were found to have acted in good faith, the suit was dismissed. 4. For the plaintiff-appellant, it was urged that. in cases of illegal arrest by persons in authority, malice in fact is not required to he established. Malice in law is sufficient to a claim for damages or compensation. But, for the respondents, Section 334 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was pressed in service, which protects the officers and servants of the Government for acts clone in good faith and in the course of execution of the duties and discharge of functions imposed by or under this Act, against any liability civil or criminal. If this provision were to apply, the authorities would not be liable, provided the act was done in good faith. The courts below have found that the respondents acted in good faith. Prima facie, they would be protected, and would not be liable to any damages. But, it seems to me that this provision would not apply to the present case. The firm Hira. Lal Bimal Prakash, which was in arrears, was situate in the town of Farrukhabad. The partners of that firm as well as the plaintiff were residents of that town. The arrest and confinement of the plaintiff took place within the town of Farrukhabad. It is well known that Farrukhabad is a Municipal area. Under Section 339 (c) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 shall be deemed to be amended to the ex-tent mentioned in column 3 of List II of Schedule III of the Zamindari Abolition Act, in its application to such areas to which the Zamindari Abolition Act extends. Serial No. 28 of the aforesaid List II re-peals Sections 58 to 188 of the Land Revenue Act (which are in Chapter V to VIII) , which dealt with procedure for recovery of land revenue. So, the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, in so far as they provided for recovery of land revenue, stand repealed and do not extend to areas to which the Zamindari Abolition Act applies. They continue to remain in operation in respect of other areas of the State. The Zamindari Abolition Act by sub-sec. So, the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, in so far as they provided for recovery of land revenue, stand repealed and do not extend to areas to which the Zamindari Abolition Act applies. They continue to remain in operation in respect of other areas of the State. The Zamindari Abolition Act by sub-sec. (2) of Section 1, provides that it extends to the whole of Uttar Pradesh except the area, which on the 7th day of July, 1949, were included in a Municipality or a Notified area under the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, or a Cantonment under the Cantonment Act, 1924, or a Town Area under the U. P. Town Areas Act, 1914. Fan-ukhabad being a Municipality governed by the U. P. Municipalities Act, the Zamindari Abolition Act would not apply to the area constituted as the Municipality of Farrukhabad. In R.S. Vaish v. State of U.P., 1968 ALJ 106. I held that attachment of properties situate within Municipal areas in proceedings for recovery of tax as an arrears of land revenue, would not be governed by the provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act, but could be done only under the U. P. Land Revenue Act. In my opinion, if proceedings for recovery of arrears of land revenue are conducted in an area to which the Zamindari Abolition Act does not extend, the proceedings could not, in law, be governed by the provisions of that Act. They would be deemed to be under the U. P. Land Revenue Act. Even though, in the present case, no property was proceeded against, but the proceedings for recovery were enforced by the arrest of an individual person, yet, since the proceedings took place in a Municipal area, they could not, in law, be deemed to be proceedings under or in virtue of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act. They could, in law, be conducted only under the U. P. Land Revenue Act. Section 334 of the Zamindari Abolition Act applies to any act done or purported to be done under that Act or the Rules made thereunder. It would not govern the acts done or purport. ed to have been done under any other enactment. That section would, therefore, not be applicable to the present case. 5. The learned Standing Counsel invited my attention to clause (m) of Section 233 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. It would not govern the acts done or purport. ed to have been done under any other enactment. That section would, therefore, not be applicable to the present case. 5. The learned Standing Counsel invited my attention to clause (m) of Section 233 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act. Under it, no person can institute a suit in a civil court with respect to claims connected with, or arising out of the collection of revenue or any process enforced on account of an arrears of revenue or on account of any sum which is, by this Act or any other Act, realisable as revenue. This provision bars the jurisdiction of the civil court in certain matters, on the basis that these matters can be agitated only in the revenue court. Section 233 does not afford any protection to officers or servants of the State in relation to their acts done or purported to have been done in the supposed exercise of powers conferred by the Land Revenue Act. It is not a Section pari materia to Section 334 of the Zamindari Abolition Act. It has not been, and is not the case of the State respondent that a suit of the present nature was cognizable by the revenue court. Section 233 (m) of the Land Revenue Act is, therefore, not relevant. The respondents, cannot claim any statutory protection. 6. The principles of common law applicable to false imprisonment are well-known. Salmond on Torts, 13th Edition, at page 304, states that wrong or false imprisonment consists in the act of arresting or imprisoning any person without lawful justification. At page 305, it states that to constitute the wrong, there need not be an actual imprisonment in the ordinary sense, i.e., incarceration. It is enough that the plaintiff has been in any manner wrongfully deprived of his personal liability. A mere unlawful arrest amounts in itself to a false imprisonment. Then at page 308, it states that in an action for false imprisonment, just as in all other cases of trespass to person or property, liability is created even by honest and inevitable mistakes. A mere unlawful arrest amounts in itself to a false imprisonment. Then at page 308, it states that in an action for false imprisonment, just as in all other cases of trespass to person or property, liability is created even by honest and inevitable mistakes. Referring to Austin v. Dowling, 1870 IR 5 CP 534 at 540, it was stated that if the plaintiff has been wrongly arrested without warrant and taken before the Magistrate who remands him in 'custody, he must sue in respect of the imprisonment before the remand, in an action for false imprisonment, but in respect of, that which is subsequent to the remand, in an action for 'malicious prosecution. 7. In Shearer v. Shields, 1914 AC 808, Viscount Haldane observed :- "Between malice in fact and malice in law there is a broad distinction which is not peculiar to any particular system of jurisprudence. A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is taken to know the law and he must act within the law. He may therefore be guilty of malice in law, although so far as the state of his mind is concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that sense innocently. Malice in fact is quite a different thing; it means actual malicious intention on the part of the person who has done the wrongful act, and it may be, in proceedings based on wrongs independent of contract, a very material ingredient in the question whether a valid cause of action can be stated." 8. It is clear, therefore, that in a case of false imprisonment, malice in fact is irrelevant. The act of imprisonment without lawful justification imports malice in law and ipso facto creates liability. The question whether the defendants acted in good faith, and not with any malicious intention, was not relevant to the determination of their liability for what was admittedly the imprisonment of the plaintiff-appellant without any lawful justification. The State was, therefore, liable for such illegal act of its officers. The finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is that the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree of Rs. 1,100/- as damages. 9. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The decree is set aside, and the suit is decreed for Rs. The State was, therefore, liable for such illegal act of its officers. The finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court is that the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree of Rs. 1,100/- as damages. 9. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The decree is set aside, and the suit is decreed for Rs. 1,100/- against defendant No. 1, the State of U. P. only. The parties will pay and receive costs in proportion to their success and failure. Appeal allowed.