S. N. Andley, J. ( 1 ) IN pursuance of a notice dated 12/5/1967, purporting to have been issued in exercise of the powersconferred by clause (j) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules,the petitioner, a permanent Director in the Central Water andpower Commission (Power Wing), New Delhi, was retired fromservice with effect from 15/08/1967. It is this retirementwhich has been challenged by the petitioner on two main grounds,namely, (1) that Fundamental Rule 56 (j) was ultra vires clause (2)of Article 311 and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution ofindia and (2) thar of retirement was malafide and without application of mind to the relevant circumstances of thecase. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was serving as an Electrical Engineer in thesimla Electricity Undertaking until 1949. On 7/09/1949, he was selected by the Union Public Service Commissionfor the Class I (Senior Scale) post of a Project Officer in the Central Electricity Commission and was confirmed and became permanent on 6/10/1950. In 1950-51 the Central Electricitycommission was redesignated as the Central Water and Powercommission (Power Wing) and the post of Project Officer wasredesignated as Deputy Director. On 26/03/1955, the petitioner became a Director after having been given two promotionsand he was confirmed as a permanent Director in April, 1963with effect from 5/08/1960. In this petition, the petitionerhas admitted that in respect of his performance in the years 1964and 1965, two adverse entries were made in the Annual Confidential Reports. In the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of therespondents, it was stated that adverse entries were recorded inthe Annual Confidential Reports of the petitioner for the year1955, 1958, 1959, 1960 and 1962 also and these were communicated to the petitioner from time to time. Makingf theseadverse entries between 1955 and 1962 has not been denied bythe petitioner in his affidavit in rejoinder. But his contention isthat by reason of his confirmation as permanent Director witheffect from 5/08/1960, "these adverse entries had been foundas false by the Departmental Promotion Committee. " I mayonly state that with his affidavit in rejoinder, the Petitioner hasfiled a statement (annexure m ) quoting these adverse entries. ( 3 ) IT appears that the Departmental Promotion Committee, on 30/05/1965 found the petitioner unfit for promotion and thecomplaint of the petitioner is that the adverse entry made forthe year 1964 was placed before the Departmental Promotioncommittee even before it has been communicated to the petitioner in September, 1965. ( 3 ) IT appears that the Departmental Promotion Committee, on 30/05/1965 found the petitioner unfit for promotion and thecomplaint of the petitioner is that the adverse entry made forthe year 1964 was placed before the Departmental Promotioncommittee even before it has been communicated to the petitioner in September, 1965. After receiving the communicationin respect of the adverse entry for the year 1964, the petitionerasked for particulars of specific incidents, by his letter dated 26/10/1965. Particulars were -not supplied and, therefore, the petitioner filed Civil Writ No. 608-D of 1966 in thecircuit Bench of the Punjab High Court on 5/08/1966 forquashing the aforesaid adverse entry. After this writ had beenfiled, the adverse entry for the year 1965 was communicated tothe petitioner and because the petitioner was aggrieved by thisadverse entry also, he filed civil Writ No. 607-D of 1966 in thecircuit Bench of the Punjab High Court on 5/08/1966. Itwas during the pendency of these two writs that the impugnednotice dated 12/5/1967, retiring the petitioner was issuedand Civil Writ No. 526 of 1967 was filed in this Court challengingthe petitioner s retirement. These three writs had come up forhearing before us on 26/10/1967. For the reasons statedin the order of that date Civil Writ No. 525 of 1967 was dismissedas withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh writ petition and it wasthen that the present writ petition was filed. ( 4 ) THE notice (annexure a ) dated 12/05/1967 states: NO. 2/4/66-Adm. I GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF IRRIGATION and POWER NEW Delhi, the 12/05/1967 ( 5 ) THIS notice was received by the petitioner on the same date. It has been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (j) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules. It is necessary to setout the necessary clauses of this Rule and these clauses are : "56 (A) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, everygovernment servant shall retire on the day he attains theage of fifty-eight years. (D) A Government servant to whom clause (a) apphes. . . . . . . . . . may be granted extension of service after heattains the age of fifty-eight years with the sanction ofthe appropriate authority if such extension is in the publicinterest and the grounds therefore are recorded in writing : PROVIDED that no extension under this clause shallbe granted beyond the age of sixty years except in veryspecial circumstances. . . . . . . may be granted extension of service after heattains the age of fifty-eight years with the sanction ofthe appropriate authority if such extension is in the publicinterest and the grounds therefore are recorded in writing : PROVIDED that no extension under this clause shallbe granted beyond the age of sixty years except in veryspecial circumstances. (J) Notwithstanding anything contained in thisrule, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinionthat it is in the public interest to do so, have the absoluteright to retire any Government servant after he has attained the age of fifty-five years by giving him noticeof not less than three months in writing. " ( 6 ) THE Scheme of this Rule seems to be that the age of superannuation has been fixed at fifty-eight years by clause (a) but thisfixation is "except as otherwise provided in this rule. " In exerciseof the power conferred by clause (d) of this Rule, an extensionof service can be given to a Government servant on attaining theage of fifty-eight years but such extension is to be granted by theappropriate authority if it is in the public interest to do so andthe grounds therefore are recorded in writing. Clause (j) whichstarts with the non-obstante clause gives an absolute right toretire any government servant after he has attained the age offifty five years by giving him notice of not less than three monthsprovided the appropriate authority is of the opinion that it isin the public interest to do so. Therefore, while the age ofsuperannuation or the normal age of retirement has been fixedat fifty-eight years, such fixation is subject to extension underclause (d) and curtailment under clause (j) provided it is in thepublic interest to do so. In fact the power of retiring at the ageof fifty-five years-in other words the power to retire compulsorily-if it is exercised for the reasons and in the manner mentionedin clause (j) over-rides the right of the Government servant toremain in service until he attains the age of fifty-eight years. In fact the power of retiring at the ageof fifty-five years-in other words the power to retire compulsorily-if it is exercised for the reasons and in the manner mentionedin clause (j) over-rides the right of the Government servant toremain in service until he attains the age of fifty-eight years. ( 7 ) THE validity of clause (j) of the Rule in so far as challenge toit on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution is concerned, isquestioned on the ground that this clause gives arbitrary powerto the appropriate authority because the expression "in the publicinterest" has not been defined and, therefore, there are no welldefined limits within which this power can be exercised. Thefact that the power to retire compulsorily can be exercised onlyif it is in the public interest to do so is a sufficient safeguard againstthe arbitrary exercise of this power. Public interest is not anew concept. It is true that it has not been defined but the reasonfor that is that it is incapable of precise definition. Nevertheless,it is not possible to say that it is a vague concept. What is included in public purpose may differ from time to lime and fromplace to place. In the context in which it has been used. it meansthe proper functioning of the public service. I, therefore, donot find any substance in the plea that clause (j) of Rule 56 confers arbitrary power which is repugnent to Article 14 of theconstitution. ( 8 ) NO argument was addressed to us as to how clause (j) ofthis Rule is hit by Article 16 of the Constitution nor are anygrounds relevant to Article 16 mentioned in the petition and. therefore, nothing more need be said in so far as the bare challengeon the ground of Article 16 is concerned. ( 9 ) IN so far as the challenge under Clause (2) of Article 311 isconcerned, the first argument is that the curtailment, by compulsory retirement, of the age of retirement fixed under clause (a)of this rule, amounts to dismissal or removal and, therefore,clause (j) of this Rule is unconstitutional. This argument has nosubstance in view of the various decisions of the Supreme Courtwhich were considered in Deka s case reported in ATR 1964sc 600. This argument has nosubstance in view of the various decisions of the Supreme Courtwhich were considered in Deka s case reported in ATR 1964sc 600. With regard to the decision in Sham Lal s case (AIR1954 S. C. 369), it was observed "confining itself to the special features of compulsory retirement which was effected under Articles 465-Aand Note I appended thereto, the Court came to the conclusion that compulsory retirement was not removal. We may add that subsequent decisions show that thesame view has been taken in respect of compulsory retirement throughout and so, that branch of the law mustbe held to be concluded by the series of decisions to whichwe shall persently refer. " ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court then considered another of its decisionsrelating to compulsory retirement reported in Re: State ofbombay v. Sauleha Chand M. Desai In this case Venkatarama Aiyar J. had observed : "question of the said character could arise onlywhen the rules fix both an age of superannuation and anage for compulsory retirement and the services of a Civilservant are terminated between these two points of rime. But where there is no rule fixing the age of compulsoryretirement, or if there is one and the servant is retiredbefore the age prescribed, therein then that can be regarded only as dismissal or removal within Art. 311 (2 ). " ( 11 ) WITH regard to this observation, it was stated : IT would be noticed that the rule providing for compulsory retirement was upheld on the ground that suchcompulsory retirement does not amount to removalunder Art. 311 (2) because it was another mode of retirement and it could be enforced only between the periodof age of superannuation prescribed and after the minimum period of service indicated in the rule had been putin. If, however, no such minimum period is prescribedby the rule of compulsory retirement, that according tojudgment, would violate Art. 311 (2) and though the termination of a servant s services may be described as compulsory retirement, it would amount to dismissal or removal within the meaning of Art. 311 (2 ). With respect,we think that this statement correctly represents thetrue position of law. With respect,we think that this statement correctly represents thetrue position of law. IT is needless to refer to the other cases noticed in Deka s case andit will be quite enough to state that the ultimate conclusion atwhich the Supreme Court arrived was that compulsory retirement does not per se amount to dismissal or removal. Thereis, therefore, no force in the broad contention of the petitionerthat the mere fact that the normal period of service is curtailedby compulsory retirement amounts to dismissal or removal. ( 12 ) THE second argument in this connection which has beenurged by the petitioner is based upon the following observationof the Supreme Court in Deka s case : "apart from date, we think that if any Rule permitsthe appropriate authority to retire compulsorily a civil servant without imposing a limitation in that behalf thatsuch civil servant should have put in a minimum periodof service, that Rule would be invalid and the so-calledretirement ordered under the said Rule would amount toremoval of the civil servant within the meaning of Art. 311 (2 ). " AND the argument is that since no limitation has been imposedin clause (j) of Rule 56 that the civil servant concerned shouldhave put in a minimum period of service, it is ultra vires clause (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution. According to the petitioner,the fixation of the age at which compulsory retirement can beordered does not amount to fixation of the "minimum period ofservice" and what was required was to specify the number ofyears of service. The argument of the learned Solicitor Generalon the other hand is that fixation of the age of compulsory retirement is specification of the minimum period of service and theonly safeguard that has to be observed is that such age shouldnot be fixed at a very early stage of the career. He relies uponthe following observation of the Supreme Court in Deka s case : "at this stage, we ought to make it clear that in thepresent appeals, we are not called upon to consider whether a rule of compulsory retirement would be valid, if,having fixed a proper age of superannuation it permits apermanent servant to be retired at a very early stage ofhis career. " IT has to be remembered that the age of 55 years for compulsorilyretiring a civil servant which has been fixed by clause (j) of Fundamental Rules 56 was the age of superannuation fixed by Fundamental Rule 56 (a) prior to its amendment in 1965. Priorto its amendment this rule provided : "except as otherwise provided in the other clausesof this rule the date of Compulsory retirement of a Government servant, other than a ministerial servant, is the dateon which he attains the age of 55 years. He may beretained in service after the date of compulsory retirement with the sanction of the Local Government on publicgrounds, which must be recorded in writing, but he mustnot be retained after the age of 60 years except in veryspecial circumstances. " THE scheme of the pre-existing Rule was that every Governmentservant must retire on attaining the age of 55 years and powerwas given to the Local Government to retain him up to the ageof 60 years on public grounds. The scheme of the amendedrule 56 is that the age of superannuation or retirement for everybody is fixed by clause (a) at 58 years and it is subject to extensionunder clause (d) and to curtailment under clause (j ). Takingthis historical background into consideration, it is not possibleto accept the contention that fixation of the age of compulsoryretirement at 55 years as has been done by clause (J) of Fundamental Rule 56 would be retirement at a very early stage of thecareer of a Government servant. ( 13 ) I may here refer to another decision of the Supreme Courtreported in T. G. Shivacharana Singh and others v. The Stateof Mysore Their Lordship of the Supreme Court consideredrule 95 (a) and Note 1 to rule 285 of the Mysore Civil Servicesrules, 1958, provided that the date of Superannuationof a Government servant would be the date on which heattains the age of 55 years and it authorised the Government toretain the Government servant in service even after the date ofsuperannuation if he was physically fit and if his continuance in:government service was found to be in public interest. Rules285 dealt with retiring pension and provided that a retiring pension would be granted to a Government servant who was permitted to retire after completing qualifying service for 30 yearsor such less time as may be prescribed. Rules285 dealt with retiring pension and provided that a retiring pension would be granted to a Government servant who was permitted to retire after completing qualifying service for 30 yearsor such less time as may be prescribed. Note I to this Ruleprovided, inter alia, that Government may, in special cases, require any Government servant to retire any time after he hadcompleted 25 years qualifying service or on attaining 50 yearsof age if such retirement was considered necessary in the publicinterest and provided that the appropriate authority wouldgive a notice in writing at least three months before the dateon which the Government servant was required to retire. Itwill, therefore, be seen that power was given to the Governmentby Note I to Rule 285 to compulsorily retire a Government servantbefore the age of superannuation fixed at 55 years if he hadcompleted 25 years qualifying service or on attaining 50 yearsof age. The validity of Note I to Rule 285 was challenged uponthe ground that it contravened Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. It was observed by the learned Chief Justice.- ( 14 ) "mr. Venkataranga Iyengar contends that thisrule is invalid, because it contravenes Art. 14 as well asart. 16 (1) of the Constitution. In our opinion, thiscontention can no longer be entertained; becaust itis concluded by a long series of decisions of this Court. Recently, a Special Bench of this Court had occasion toconsider the valdity of Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) contained in the Indian Railway Establishment code in Motiram Deka V. General Manager, North East Frontier. Railway, Civil Appeals Nos. 711 to 713 of 1962 ; 714 of1962 and 837 to 889 of 1963-D/5-12-1963; (AIR 1964sc 600 ). In dealing with the problem raised in thatcase, this Court has made it perfectly clear that so faras the question of compulsory retirement is concerned,it must be taken to be concluded by several decisions ofthis Court. This Court then examined the relevant decisions on this point beginning with the case of Shyamlal v. State of U. P. 1955-1 SCR 26 : ( AIR 1954 SC 369 )and it was observed the law in relation to the validity ofthe Rules permitting compulsory premature retirementof government servants must be held to be well-settledby those decisions and need not be reopened. Theonly exception the majority judgment made in that behalfwas that it may be necessary to consider whethersuch a rule of compulsory retirement would be valid ifhaving fixed a proper age of superannuation, it permitsa permanent servant to be retired at a very early stageof his career. This consideration does not arise in thepresent case, because, as we have already seen, note I tor. 285 requires that the government servant againstwhom an order of compulsory retirement is proposed tobe passed must have completed either 25 years of activeservice or attained 50 years of age. We are, therefore,satisfied that the point which Mr. Venkataranga Iyengarwants to raise before us in the present petition is clearlyconcluded by the decisions of this Court and cannotbe allowed to be reopened. " THE contention, therefore, that specification of the age of compulsory retirement without indicating the number of years ofservice is not specification of the "minimum period of servicecannot be entertained. In my opinion all that has to be seenis whether the right to compulsorily retire can be exercised at very early stage of the career and it cannot be said with anjustification that when the age of superannuation is fixed at 58years, the compulsory retirement at the age of 55 years would beretirement at a very early stage of the career. The previousdecisions of the Supreme Court were again reaffirmed in regurdev Singh Sindhu v. The State of Punjab and another whengajendragadkar, C. J. , speaking for the Court has observed "it is hardly necessary to emphasize that for theefficient administration of the State, it is absolutely es-sential that permanent public servants should enjoy asense of security of tenure. The safeguard which Art,311 (2) affords to permanent public servants is no morethan this that in case it is intended to dismiss, removeor reduce them in rank, a reasonable opportunity shouldbe given to them of showing cause against the actionproposed to be taken in regard to them. It seems thatonly two exceptions can be treated as valid in dealingwith the scope and effect of the protection afforded byart. 311 (2 ). If a permanent public servant is asked toretire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, Art. 341 (2)does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor removal of the public servant. 311 (2 ). If a permanent public servant is asked toretire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, Art. 341 (2)does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor removal of the public servant. If a permanent public servant is compulsorily retired under therules which prescribe the normal age of superannuationand provide for a reasonably long period of qualifiedservice after which alone compulsory retirement can beordered, that again may not amount to dismissal or removal under Art. 311 (2) mainly because that is the effectof a long series of decisions of this Court. " THE next argument of the petitioner is that even clause (j)of Fundamental Rule 56 is not ultra vires, the compulsory retirement of the petitioner in the circumstances of this case was malafide and, therefore, amounted to a punishment within themeaningof clause (2) of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. So far as thiscontention is concerned, the respondents, in their counter affidavit,took the stand that it is for the appropriate authority to decidewhether or not it was in the public interest to compulsorily retirea Government servant ; that its opinion on the point cannot bechallenged before a Court of law and since satisfaction had to bemerely subjective, it was not necessary for the Government tospecify the grounds on which the satisfaction was founded andthat the matter of satisfaction was not justiciable. During thecourse of arguments, however, the learned Solicitor General didnot rightly urge this extreme contention. All that he arguedwas that clause (j) of Fundamental Rule 56 provides a subjectivetest and an order of compulsory retirement cannot be challengedunless it is shown to be mala fide or made without applicationof mind. This stand is in accord with the view which has beenexpressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Barium Chemicalsltd. , and another v. Company Law Board and others (4) whereit has been held that if it is shown that the circumstances did notexist or that they were such that it was impossible for any one toform an opinion therefrom suggestive of the aforesaid things, theopinion was challengeable on the ground of non-application ofmind or perversity or on the ground that it was formed on collateral grounds and was beyond the scope of the statute. It hasalso been held that though an order passed in exercise of powerunder a statute cannot be challenged on the ground of proprietyor sufficiency, it is liable to be quashed on the ground of malafides, dishonesty or corrupt purpose or on grounds which aresuch that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. ( 15 ) NOW, annexure g to the petition is a statement of malafides relating, inter alia, to this petition. This statement contains vague and general allegations which have been deniedby the respondents and in respect of which the petitioner hasnot been able to produce any evidence in support. His maincomplaint is that although he was a very well-qualified personand had done good work he had been superseded by one Mr. Aswath and other persons who were junior to him. The respondents have, on the other hand, contended that appointments tothe post of Director (Selection Grade) ; Deputy Chief Engineerand Chief Engineer are selection posts, promotions to whichare made on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority. It is further contended that the post of Member is filled by selection by the Union Public Service Commission on an All Indiabasis and that the petitioner was considered along with othereligible candidates. In paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit, therespondents have submitted that before retiring him, the entirerecord of service of the petitioner was taken into considerationright from his appointment to the Simla Municipal Committeein 1949. It is averred that it is apparent from his record ofservice that he is not amenable to discipline; that there havebeen adverse entries against him for the years 1953 to 1955;1958 to 1960; 1962; 1964 and 1965 which have been made,during this period, by nine different officers and that these adverseentries were based on an objective assessment of his work andconduct by his superior officers. No other material has been disclosed by the respondents as they had contended in their counteraffidavit that the reasons for the decision to retire compulsorilywere not justiciable. However, with his affidavit in rejoinderthe petitioner has filed annexure m quoting the adverse entrieswhich were made in his Annual Character Roll in the year 1955,1958, 1959, 1962, 1964 and 1965. These entries are : "1955: Officer of below average capacity. Hisrelations with the colleagues are not happily. Notesprepared are unnecessarily long, indicating confusedthinking, considerable improvement is called for in hiswork. These entries are : "1955: Officer of below average capacity. Hisrelations with the colleagues are not happily. Notesprepared are unnecessarily long, indicating confusedthinking, considerable improvement is called for in hiswork. " 1958: (received in 1960): "his personal contribution has had hardly been to few drafts received from thisdirectorate on the codes of practice on generation andtransmission on the plea that he is still engaged on the studyof the various literatures on the subject at which he hasbeen for long over a year or so. AN Officer of average ability, with set ideas. Hisrelation with his colleagues could be happier. " "1959 : (i) It has not been found easy to deal withhim because of the lack of his adapatability, mainly dueto pre-set ideas. (II) He is inclined to making representations againstorders issued in the interest of work. " "1962 : His relations with his colleagues and subordinates could have been happier. " "1964 : A problem Director-in that it falls to theinevitable lot of some member to have him under hischarge and manage as far as practicable. . . . . . . . " "i agree with the above even though the officer isintelligent and capable of good work if he wishes toapply himself whole-heartedly. " "1965 : He did not show any improvement in regardto the defects mentioned in the previous confidentialreport. ( 16 ) HIS work during the year was below average, considering his senior position in the Director s grade. . . . . . Shri Butail can do good work if he likes to do so. " THE contention of the petitioner is that the adverse entries upto1962 could not be taken into consideration because by reasonof his confirmation in April, 1963 as permanent Director witheffect from 5/08/1960, these adverse entries had been, as itwere, washed off. He further contends that the adverse entriesfor 1964 and 1965 also could not be taken into consideration forthe purpose of his compulsory retirement because they had beenmade without complying with the procedure contained in the Homeministry instructions dated 31/10/1961. ( 17 ) THE mere fact that the petitioner was confirmed as a permanent Director in spite of the adverse entries made prior to 1963cannot lead to the conclusion that those adverse entries had ceasedto exist. The confirmation to the post of permanent Directorwas as a matter of course because up to that post, promotionwas not by selection. ( 17 ) THE mere fact that the petitioner was confirmed as a permanent Director in spite of the adverse entries made prior to 1963cannot lead to the conclusion that those adverse entries had ceasedto exist. The confirmation to the post of permanent Directorwas as a matter of course because up to that post, promotionwas not by selection. It is in evidence that the petitioner hadchallenged the adverse entries made against him between 1955 and1962 by filing a writ petition. Civil Writ No. 188-D of 1965 in thecircuit Bench of the Punjab High Court, This writ petitionwas dismissed by the High Court in limine and the petitionerwas not granted special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the petitioner himself treated these adverse entriesas being alive. ( 18 ) WITH regard to the adverse entries for the years 1946 and1965, it is in evidence that the petitioner made representationsagainst them which were rejected. But, the complaint of thepetitioner is that the adverse entries for the years 1964, and 1965were not made in accordance with the procedure that has beenprescribed by the office mmemorandum dated 31/10/1961,issued by the Ministry of Home affairs. This memorandumprovides, inter alia that where an adverse entry is made whetherit relates to a remediable or to an irremediable defect, it shouldbe communicated , but while doing so, the substance of theentire report, including what may have been said in praise of theofficer should be communicated. This memorandum also provides that confidential reports should make a reference to specificincidents by way of illustration to support adverse commentsof a general nature e. g. , inefficiency, dilatoriness. lack of initiative or judgment, etc. Further a right is given to the Government servant concerned to make representations against theadverse entries. It is contended that the adverse entry madefor the year 1964 was not communicated to the petitioner untilseptember, 1965, before which the Departmental Promotion Committee had already, on 30/05/1965 declared the petitioner unfitfor promotion on the basis of this adverse entry. Further a right is given to the Government servant concerned to make representations against theadverse entries. It is contended that the adverse entry madefor the year 1964 was not communicated to the petitioner untilseptember, 1965, before which the Departmental Promotion Committee had already, on 30/05/1965 declared the petitioner unfitfor promotion on the basis of this adverse entry. It is contended that the adverse entry for the year 1964 and the adverseentry for 1965 could not, therefore, be taken into considerationfor the purposes of compulsory retirement of the petitioner asthe aforesaid entries have been made in breach of the termsof the memorandum dated 31/10/1961, and since theywere taken into consideration, the compulsory retirement amountsto a major penalty under Rule 11 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Rule II provides that compulsory retirement is one of the major penaltiesbut the explanation to this Rule says, inter alia, that compulsoryretirement of a Government servant shall not amount to a penaltyif it is in accordance with the provisions relating to his superannuation or retirement. This argument also has no substancebecause I have already expressed the view that the compulsoryretirement was in accordance with clause (j) of Fundamentalrule 56 and the aforesaid memorandum dated 31/10/1961is not relevant in so far as the compulsory retirement of thepetitioner is concerned. ( 19 ) IT is, therefore, not possible to say that the adverse entriesfor the years 1964 and 1965 constitute extraneous or irrelevantmatter in so far as the satisfaction for the purposes of compulsory retirement is concerned. In my opinion, it is a relevantconsideration and it is not possible to say that if these adverseentries are taken into consideration, it is not possible for anyperson to come to the conclusion that it would be in the publicinterest to compulsorily retire the petitioner. ( 20 ) I, therefore, do not find any substance in this petition whichi hereby dismiss. In the circumstances of the case I will makeno order as to costs. ( 21 ) I agree.