JUDGMENT : B.N. Jha, J. 1. These two applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are directed against an ORDER :of the Transport Minister, Government of Bihar, Patna (Annexure C) dated January 25, 1967, and the ORDER :dated May 4, 1966, of North Bihar Regional Transport Authority (Annexure A) granting permit of the service of Chapra-Masrakh-Sewan-Gopalganj route covering a distance of 80 miles (hereinafter referred to as the route) to respondent Dhani Devi, widow of Ram Bichar Singh. Applications were invited for the grant of a permanent stage carriage permit for the route, and June 15, 1963, was fixed as the last date for receiving applications. The petitioners of the two applications and others including one Ram Bichar Singh, husband of respondent Dhani Devi, filed applications for the same. In accordance with the provisions of Section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and rule 46 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), the aforesaid applications were published in the Gazette. So far as respondent Dhani Devi is concerned, she did not file any application in her own right and her name was never published in the list of the applications for the grant of the permit. 2. Thereafter Ram Bichar Singh died on April 22, 1965, leaving behind several heirs including Dhani Devi. Deceased Ram Bichar Singh also held several permits for other routes. Under Section 61 (2) of the Act the Transport Authority transferred the permits held by Ram Bichar Singh to respondent Dhani Devi. 3. After observing necessary formalities' the matter for grant of permit for the route came for consideration before the Bihar Regional Transport Authority on May, 4, 1966. No application for substitution of the name of respondent Dhani Devi in place of her husband Ram Bichar Singh was filed before the authority. Nor did the authority substitute her name in place of her husband. Further, the Regional Transport Authority by its ORDER :dated May 4, 1966 (annexure A) decided to grant permit for the route to respondent Dhani Devi. Nor did the authority substitute her name in place of her husband. Further, the Regional Transport Authority by its ORDER :dated May 4, 1966 (annexure A) decided to grant permit for the route to respondent Dhani Devi. The petitioners along with two other persons filed an appeal before the Appeal Board which by its ORDER :dated the 20th August, 1966 (annexure B) set aside the ORDER :of the Regional Transport Authority granting permit to respondent Dhani Devi and granted permit of the route to Sant Bihari Sharma (petitioner of C W J C 235 of 1967) on certain terms and conditions failing which to Chandrakirti Singh (petitioner of C W JC 287 of 1967) on the same terms and conditions. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid ORDER :of the Appeal Board, respondent Dhani Devi, petitioner Chandrakirti Singh and one Rajeshwari Prasad Singh filed applications before the State Government under Section 64A of the Motor Vehicles (Bihar) Act. The three applications were heard together. The application of respondent Dhani Devi succeeded and the ORDER :of the Appeal Board granting permit to petitioner Sant Bihari Sharma was set aside and the ORDER :of the Transport Authority granting permit to respondent Dhani Devi was restored. The applications of petitioner Chandarakirti Singh and Rajeshwari Prasad Singh were dismissed. Hence the petitioners in the two cases have filed the applications for quashing the ORDER :of the Transport Minister granting permit to respondent Dhani Devi. Petitioner Chandrakirti Singh has also challenged the ORDER :of the Appeal Board granting permit to Sant Bihari Sharma on the ground that his appeal was barred by limitation. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged before us that the impugned ORDER :contains several errors of record. It was pointed out that no application for substitution of the name of respondent Dhani Devi in the application for permit by her husband was filed before the Transport Authority and her name was not substituted. This allegation is not denied by respondent Dhani Devi in her counter affidavit. Hence the Minister committed an error of record in holding that respondent Dhani Devi, wife of Ram Bichar Singh, applied to the Transport Authority for substituting her name in place of her husband deceased Ram Bichar Singh and the Transport Authority accordingly substituted her name. Learned counsel is not right in his submission. Hence the Minister committed an error of record in holding that respondent Dhani Devi, wife of Ram Bichar Singh, applied to the Transport Authority for substituting her name in place of her husband deceased Ram Bichar Singh and the Transport Authority accordingly substituted her name. Learned counsel is not right in his submission. What is stated in the ORDER :is that Ram Bichar Singh held some other permits within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority and he died on the 2nd April, 1965, and respondent Dhani Devi, wife of the deceased Ram Bichar Singh, being the legal successor to all rights and interest of the deceased, applied to the Regional Transport authority for substituting her name in place of her deceased husband Ram Bichar Singh and accordingly it substituted her name. This position is almost accepted by all the parties concerned. Therefore, the uncon-troverted fact is that no application by respondent Dhani Devi was filed for substitution of her name nor did the Regional Transport Authority substitute her in place of her husband. In the impugned ORDER :it not stated that any such application for substitution was made. A counter affidavit was filed on the 16th January, 1966, on behalf of Chandrakirti Singh along with a letter (annexure A) from the North Bihar Regional Transport Authority dated the 8th January, 1966, stating that no application for substitution of the name of respondent Dhani Devi in place of her husband was filed by her. In such circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioners in both the cases contended that the right to apply for the grant of permit was a personal right which ended with the death of the applicant and as such respondent Dhani Devi had no right to claim the grant of permit simply because her husband had filed an application for it. Learned counsel for respondent Dhani Devi asserts that she had a right to be substituted for the grant of permit in place of her husband, who had already made an application for the same. 5. The main question for consideration is whether Ram Bichar Singh applicant, has acquired some right, which could be transmitted to her widow respondent Dhani Devi after his death. The scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act does not support the accrual of such a right in the heir of the applicant. 5. The main question for consideration is whether Ram Bichar Singh applicant, has acquired some right, which could be transmitted to her widow respondent Dhani Devi after his death. The scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act does not support the accrual of such a right in the heir of the applicant. Section 57 of the Act and Rule 46 made Under the Act provide complete procedure for making an application and its consideration for the grant of a stage carriage permit. No provision for substitution is made in case the applicant dies before the grant of permit. After the applications are filed, they are published in the Official Gazette: and representations and objections are invited within certain time. Thereafter, the applications for objections are heard and finally decided and then permit is granted to a suitable person. Long before the final hearing of the applications on May 4, 1966, Ram Bichar Singh died on April 22, 1965; and if respondent Dhani Devi be treated as an applicant in place of her husband, there was no occasion for making any representations or objections against her application and their consideration at the time of hearing before the Regional Transport Authority. It was contended on behalf of respondent Dhani Devi that since her husband was dead and his other permits had been transferred to her, she should be considered for that permit in view of the fact that the applicant was an experienced and displaced operator having lost 40 miles Chapra-Sewan route due to nationalisation and had not been compensated. The Regional Transport Authority without examining the fact whether she was an experienced operator or not, granted permit to her on the fulfilment of certain conditions. The Regional Transport Authority perhaps thought that the widow of Ram Bichar Singh was entitled to get the permit as a matter of right in place of her husband because in Annexure A the name of the applicant was mentioned as Sri Ram Bichar Singh and his past history of the previous four years was also mentioned as a displaced operator, Chapra-Sewan (40 miles) of the route, Chapra-Sewan-Gopal-ganj-Semar Bazar and held three permits which were transferred in the name of his wife after his death. The displaced operator was Ram Bichar Singh. The displaced operator was Ram Bichar Singh. He might be an experienced operator but there was nothing before the Regional Transport Authority to assume that because Ram Bichar Singh was an experienced operator, the widow of Ram Bichar Singh should be so held and permit should be granted to her. Admittedly, Dhani Devi is an old and illiterate lady. There is no denial of the fact that she is a pardanashin lady. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that she was an experienced operator. The business requires special knowledge and experience which she could not be expected to possess. 6. The other permits were transferred to her under the special provisions of Section 61 of the Act, which provides for the transference of the permits to the person succeeding to the possession of the vehicle covered by the permit after the death of the holder of the permit. It is remarkable to note that the Section does not take into consideration the legal title of the heirs to the vehicle but to possession only. The sole purpose of the provision is that the public may not suffer and the vehicles may not be rendered useless on account of the death of the holder of the permits. Hence the person who succeeds to the possession gets the permits to ply the vehicles for the un-expired period of the permits, This Section itself shows that no such right of inheritance is provided in case of the death of the holder of the permit, who had a right to the route. No provision is made in the Act for the consideration of the claim of the heir for the grant of permit in case when the applicant dies after filing the application and before its hearing. The substitution could be made to continue an action only in a case where there is a pre-existing right in the applicant and as such the heir could not claim to be considered in place of the deceased applicant for the grant of permit. 7. The substitution could be made to continue an action only in a case where there is a pre-existing right in the applicant and as such the heir could not claim to be considered in place of the deceased applicant for the grant of permit. 7. Section 59 of the Act runs as follows: "General conditions attaching to all permits: (1) Save as provided in Section 61, a permit shall not be transferable from one person to another except with the permission of the transport authority which granted the permit and shall not without such permission operate to confer on any person to whom a vehicle covered by the permit is transferred any right to use that vehicle in the manner authorised by the permit." Rule 66 of the Rules provides a complete procedure as to how the transfer of a permit can be made. It also authorises the Regional Transport Authority to summon the transferor to appear before it and if it deems fit to deal with the application as if it were a first application for a permit. Hence, Section 59 read with Rule 66 shows that a permit is not transferable and nobody else other than the permit holder is entitled to carry on the business of motor transport expect under the conditions laid down in the permit. Thus a permit, could not be said to be heritable under Section 61 or freely transferable under Section 59 of the Act. After the permit is granted, the permit holder acquired the right in the route. But the question is whether the applicant for a permit acquires any right before the permit is granted, which could be exercised by his heir if the applicant dies before the grant of the permit. Section 61 makes provision for the use of the permit by a person who succeeds to the possession of the vehicle after the death of the permit holder. The provision of Section 59 makes it clear that Section 61 does not deal with a case of inheritance of a permit, but it is special provision for transfer of a permit after the death of the holder of the permit. I fail to understand how the application for a permit when the applicant has no right, could be heritable, when the right under a permit itself is not heritable. I fail to understand how the application for a permit when the applicant has no right, could be heritable, when the right under a permit itself is not heritable. No provision is made under Section 57 of the Act or in any of the rules framed by the State of Bihar under the Act for the substitution of the names of the heirs in place of the deceased applicant. The absence of such provision shows that the legislature thought that the applicant before the grant of permit had no right which could be exercised by his heir if the applicant dies before the grant of permit. Therefore, respondent Dhani Devi could not be clothed with any right to claim the permit after her husband's death. 8. Respondent Dhani Devi could have also filed an application for the grant of permit in respect of the route in question in her own right as Ram Bichar Singh did. Her application could have also been considered along with other applications. The right to apply is the personal right which the applicant was entitled to exercise. It does not create any right in the subject matter of the application in favour of the applicant. The applicant can only expect that his application at best could be considered favourably as there was no certainty that the consideration would result in his favour. Hence, after the death of applicant Ram Bichar Singh, no right could be left to be claimed by respondent Dhani Devi as an heir of Ram Bichar Singh. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners drew our attention to a decision of the Privy Council in Director of Public Works v. Sang, (Ho Po), 1961 A. C. 901. In that case before the grant of a rebuilding certificate by the Governor in Council could materialise after hearing the applicant and the objectors under Interpretation Ordinance, the Ordinance itself was repealed. There was a provision in the repealing Act, which read as follows: "The repeal of any enactment shall not . . . . .(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed, or anything duly done or suffered under any enactment so repealed or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed . . . . . . . .(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed, or anything duly done or suffered under any enactment so repealed or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed . . . . (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right." Therefore, the question arose whether the applicant had acquired some legal right to enforce even after the repeal. The Privy Council observed as follows: "At the time of the repeal all the procedure under Sections 3A and 3B had been followed and it can properly be said that the stage had been reached when the lessee could expect and was entitled to have the petitions and cross-petition considered in due course by the Governor in Council and to have a decision reached. Could such expectation or entitlement be regarded as a right or a privilage, either acquired or accrued, within the meaning and intendment of the Interpretation Ordinance? Or was such expectation or entitlement something that necessarily came to an end at the time of the repeal? Was the lessee therefore possessed on April 9 of a 'right' (or privilege) within the meaning of the Interpretation Ordinance? In their Lordships' view the entitlement of the lessee in the period prior to April 9 to have the petitions and cross petition considered was not such a 'right'. On April 9 the lessee was quite unable to know whether or not he would be given a rebuilding certificate, and until the petitions and cross-petition were taken into consideration by the Governor in Council no one could know the question was open and unresolved. The issue rested in the future. The lessee had no more than a hope or expectation that he would be given a rebuilding certificate even though he may have had grounds of optimism as to his prospects." The above observation applies to the facts of the present case. Before Ram Bichar Singh's application could be disposed of, he had no right to the route in question. Therefore, his widow Dhani Devi could not claim a right in the route to be considered in place of her husband by virtue of being his heir on the basis of his application which ended with the death of Ram Bichar Singh. 10. Therefore, his widow Dhani Devi could not claim a right in the route to be considered in place of her husband by virtue of being his heir on the basis of his application which ended with the death of Ram Bichar Singh. 10. This view of mine also finds support from a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ratan Lal Gupta v. State Transport Authority, AIR 1957 All 471 . In that case a person applied for the grant of permit which was not granted to him, but to others. He appealed against the ORDER :refusing to grant him a permit, but died during the pendency of the appeal. The son wanted to be substituted in place of his deceased father and continue the appeal. The matter came before the Allahabad High Court. The learned Judge observed as follows: "We express no opinion as to whether the right of a permit holder is or is not heritable as the decision of this point is not material in this special appeal. So far as the right of a person only to make an application for the grant of a permit is concerned there can be no doubt that such a right is neither transferable nor heritable and it does not survive on the death of the person who had originally made the application for the grant of a permit." I respectfully agree with the above observation. 11. However, a contrary view was taken by the Mysore High Court in Meenakshi v. Presiding Officer, Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal AIR 1963 Mys 276. In that case one Gopalasetty along with others made an application for the grant of a permit for the operation of a stage carriage on a route. It was granted to a person. The aggrieved persons except Gopalasetty filed appeals against the grant of the permit. During the pendency of the appeal Gopalasetty died. Long after that the Appellate Transport Authority allowed the appeals and remanded the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for fresh disposal. After the remand, when the matter went to the Regional Transport Authority, the Secretary returned all the applications which had been presented by the various applicants to them for refiling after necessary rectifications therein. The application of Gopalasetty was also returned to Manjunatha Motor Service, which was the name and the style under which Gopalasetty was operating his transport service. After the remand, when the matter went to the Regional Transport Authority, the Secretary returned all the applications which had been presented by the various applicants to them for refiling after necessary rectifications therein. The application of Gopalasetty was also returned to Manjunatha Motor Service, which was the name and the style under which Gopalasetty was operating his transport service. The widow of Gopalasetty represented the application presented by Gopalasetty along with another which was presented describing herself therein as ''successor" of her husband. The other applicants to whom the applications had been returned also refiled them. The Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority published those applications once again under the provisions of Section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act for the reason that the publication which had been previously made was a defective publication and then the matter was considered afresh and the widow of Gopalasetty was granted the permit. This grant was challenged in the High Court in a writ petition on the ground that the widow had no right to continue the application after the death of her husband The learned judges of the court held that the widow was entitled to continue the application for the grant of permit under the Motor Vehicles Act. They proceeded on the footing that under the Motor Vehiclei Act a permit is transferable under Section 59 and heritable under Section 61 of the Act. They further relied on Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. For the reasons stated above, I do not concur with the view that the permit is transferable or heritable like any other property under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and as such the heir of the applicant also inherits the right to continue the application after his death. The learned judges proceeded on the assumption that some kind of right vested in the applicant which, in fact there was none, before the grant of permit. 12. The learned judges proceeded on the assumption that some kind of right vested in the applicant which, in fact there was none, before the grant of permit. 12. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act lays down as follows: "All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any Section or special proceeding' existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease survive to and against his executors or administrators except cause of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory." This Section always contemplates a case of pre-existing rights for which action was brought by the deceased. The right to continue the action vested in the executors or administrators, as the case may be, and not in the heirs of the deceased. I have already held above that the applicant had no pre-existing right in the matter of the grant of the permit before the permit is granted. Therefore, the principles of this Section could not be stretched to a case of this kind and the heir could not be allowed to continue such application. I regret I am unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Mysore High Court in this case. 13. For the reasons stated above I would rather prefer to follow the view held by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1957 All 471 and hold that the respondent Dhani Devi had no right to be considered for the grant of permit after the death of her husband when she was not herself an applicant in her own right. The ORDER :of the Regional Transport Authority (annexure A) and that of the Minister (annexure C) granting permit to respondent Dhani Devi are bad in law and must be quashed. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner of CWJ. The ORDER :of the Regional Transport Authority (annexure A) and that of the Minister (annexure C) granting permit to respondent Dhani Devi are bad in law and must be quashed. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner of CWJ. C, 287 of 1967 contended before us that the appeal preferred by Sant Bihari Sharma before the Appellate Court was barred by limitation as having not been filed within thirty days from the date of the ORDER :of the Regional Authority Though this ground was taken in his petition and it is said that the point was argued before him, the Minister has not considered and decided the point. It appears that he perhaps did not think it necessary to decide the point in view of the fact that as he allowed the application of respondent Dhani Devi and granted her the permit. I would express no opinion on this point in view of the ORDER :I propose to pass in this case. 15. For the reasons stated above, I would quash the ORDER :of the Transport Minister granting permit to respondent Dhani Devi (annexure C) and remand the case to him to consider the application of Chandra-kirti Singh (petitioner of C. W. J. C. 287 of 1967) according to law. This ORDER :, however," will not affect the dismissal of the petition of Rajeshwari Prasad Singh, which has not been challenged before us. Respondent Dhani Devi must pay the costs to the petitioners Hearing fee: Rs. 100 in each case Narasimham, C.J. 16. I agree.