JUDGMENT : Ray, J. - The first party members have filed this application to revise the order passed by Sri P.R. Negi, Magistrate, 1st. Class, Sonepore, in Criminal Vase No. M. 135 of 1963/T.R. 95 of 1965 in a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, in which some of the properties in dispute have been declared to be in possession of the second party members and one plot there of is declared to be in possession of third party members. 2. The first party filed a Title Suit No. 21 of 1966 against the second party members for redemption and recovery of possession of the properties which are the subject-matter of the 145 proceeding. It was necessary to file the suit as the second party refused to accept the mortgage dues offered by the first party and release the properties. The suit was decreed on 10-9-1957. The second party members carried it by way of appeal to the first appellate Court and also went to the High Court in second appeal and in all these stages of litigation, they have lost. The High Court delivered its judgment in second appeal No. 373 of 1960 on 17-4-1962. 3. The Petitioners thereafter continued execution proceeding in Execution Case No. 57 of 1957 which had been started earlier but had been stayed during the pendency of the second appeal. The Petitioners were deliverd possession through the executing Court on 24.8-1962. 4. On 22-10-1963, the first party filed an application u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure for issue of a prohibitory order against the members of the second party on the allegations that they were in peaceful cultivating possession of the properties in dispute, since they got delivery of the same through Court by raising paddy crops thereon, but the members of the second party gaining a sense of strength from their superiority in numbers were threatening to forcibly cut and carry away the paddy crops and thereby disturbed their possession. 5. The disputed lands relate to holding No. 11/2 of third settlement of village Nandamal comprising an area of 23 acres and 88 decimals. The second party members who probadly being forewarned of the proceeding u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure immediately appeared in Court and alleged that they had their orchard and houses on a part of the disputed land. The disputed lands relate to holding No. 11/2 of third settlement of village Nandamal comprising an area of 23 acres and 88 decimals. The second party members who probadly being forewarned of the proceeding u/s 144 Code of Criminal Procedure immediately appeared in Court and alleged that they had their orchard and houses on a part of the disputed land. The Sub-divisional Magistrate after getting this allegation of the second party, verified through a Revenue Inspector and being satisfied that those allegations were true deleted plot No. 69 of third settlement from the preliminary order. The area of lands so excluded will be 7.34 acres. The balance area which is the subject-matter of 145 proceeding is 1654 acres. After initiation of this proceeding, the third party members intervened and sought for permission to he added as parties and to fight out their claim in regard to plot No. 241 of the third settlement. They were allowed to be impleaded and they filed their written statements and affidavits in support of their claim. In this claim of theirs, the third party-members are supported by the second party. 6. It is not disputed that the suit properties originally belonged to the Petitioners who had mortgagees the same along with the excluded portion comprised in plot No. 169 to the second party members who, by reason of the mortgage, were in possession of the same. The second party continued ill possession as mortgagees till 12-1-1954 when the Petitioners sought to redeem the same, by offering the principal loan and other dues under the mortgage-transaction. On their refusal to allow redemption the Petitioners, instituted the title suit referred to above, for redemption and for recovery of possession. As earlier stated above, they succeeded in an stages of litigation and ultimately got delivery of possession through Court against the second party-members on 24.9.1962. The case of the second party is that these lands in dispute form part of the Bhogra lands of the village and after the abolition of the Gounti system, the collector of the district settled the same on royati basis with them as they were found to be in possession. This settlement was challenged by the Petitioners before the R.D.C., but with no Success. Though they admit delivery of possession by the Court, they say that such delivery was merely symbolical and that there has been no disturbance in their previous possession. This settlement was challenged by the Petitioners before the R.D.C., but with no Success. Though they admit delivery of possession by the Court, they say that such delivery was merely symbolical and that there has been no disturbance in their previous possession. They raised paddy and other cereals over the lands in question in the year 1963-64. The third party placed their claim through one Malati Pandiani who is sairi to have been originally recorded in respect of plot No. 241. This Malati having died after executing and registering a will bequeathing this plot to her daughter Jagadish Pujharini, the letter possessed it and upon her death, the two members of the third party one of whom is her daughter and the other is her husband have inherited the properties and are in possession thereof. They intervened in this proceeding as their plot was attached and prayed for its release in their favour though there was no allegation of apprehension of breach of peace in regard to this land between them and the Petitioners. 7. The proceeding u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, was converted into one u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure by order dated 25.11-1963. In the final order dated 16-1-1967 the magistrate has found that the delivery of possession through Civil Court has been amply proved by the writ of delivery of possession, the report of Amin (Exts. 1 and 2) as well as by the affidavits of the Civil Court amin who demarcated the land and of the Civil Court bailiff' and the attesting witnesses to the writ. 8. The contention of the second party is that this delivery of possession by the Civil Court was symbolical and not actual and their previous possession continued uninterrupted. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioners that once the civil Court has declared their title to the lands in dispute, against the 2nd party members in a recently contested litigation between them and has put them in possession of the same by evicting the second party members in due process of law, initiation of a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure subsequent to such delivery of possession in absence of any allegation of fresh dispossession, is unwarranted in law. This is well founded both on sound reason and principles of public policy inherent in Chapter XII of the Code of Code of Criminal Procedure where under the Civil Court is assigned the prominent jurisdiction to the final pronouncement as regards right, title, and possession of the property which the criminal Courts must obey and must always attempt to act in consonance therewith. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the delivery of possession effected by the Civil Court would amount to actual physical possession of the Petitioners within the meaning of Section 145(1), Code of Criminal Procedure. It would be appropriate to quote a passage from Mahabir Singh and Others Vs. Emperor in this regard which runs as follows: In both cases there are two modes of delivery of possession dependent upon the nature of the possession of the judgment-debtor, who is being dispossessed from the property. If the property is in occupation of the judgment-debtor or of some person on his behalf, etc, the Court is to give possession to the decree-holder or auction-purchaser or somebody authorized on his behalf and if necessary remove any person who refuses to vacate the same. If, on the other hand, the property is not in occupation of the judgment-debtor, but is in occupation of some tenant or other person entitled to remain in the occupation of the same, the delivery of possession is to be given by proclaiming to the occupant by beat of drum or other customary mode. For the sake of brevity the first mode of delivery of possession may be called, if one likes to do so, "actual" and the other "symbolical", but the effect of both as against a judgment-debtor is exactly the same. In the instant case, the Civil Court delivered possession of the properties which are agricultural lands, to the first-party-Petitioners against the second party members who were respectively decree-holders and judgment-debtors in that proceeding, and such delivery of possession must be taken as 'actual'. In view of this delivery of possession by the Civil Court the plea of the second party that notwithstanding such delivery, they continued in possession cannot on countenanced. There may be cases where the dispossessed judgment-debtor might come back into possession either wrongfully or by amicable arrangement. But the plea taken by the second party is not such a one. 9. There may be cases where the dispossessed judgment-debtor might come back into possession either wrongfully or by amicable arrangement. But the plea taken by the second party is not such a one. 9. It has been held by this Court as well as by the Patna High Court, that a Magistrate in exercise of the jurisdiction under the section cannot reagitated a dispute that has been settled by a competent Court and give a declaration in favour of a party whose claim to title and subsisting possession has already been negatived in a very recent contested litigation, since starting of proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in such circumstances would tantamount to encouragement of defiance to the decrees of Civil Court and paralyse the administration of justice,. This principle has been laid down in Jang Bahadur Singh Vs. Nazimul Haque and Others Banamali Mohapatra Vs. Bajra Nahak and Others and Mahabir Singh v. Emperor. Of course, in all these decisions, exception to this principle has been laid down, viz, are the cases where the Civil Court decision is old enough making room for possibilities of subsequent disturbance of the state of things found and pronounced to have been once existing. To bring the case within the ambit of this exception, the party who claims possession contrary to the delivery of possession through Civil Court must allege and prove the circumstances under which be has acquired possession subsequent to the decree of the Civil Court. 10. As a matter of rule, it shall be the duty of Magistrates to act in compliance with the decrees and orders of Civil Court and to respect the delivery of possession effected by it. Once a dispute as to possession has been determined by a Civil Court, there would no longer exist a 'dispute' within the meaning of Section 145(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of which a Magistrate can take cognizance or which would invoke his jurisdiction. It is true, the words dispute concerning any land' in Sub-section (1) of Section 145 is preeminently a dispute relating to possession. Therefore, where such dispute is laid to rest by the Civil Court in adjudicating upon the title to the land and putting the real title-holder in possession, the nature of dispute contemplated in Sub-section (1) of Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, is thereby extinguished. Therefore, where such dispute is laid to rest by the Civil Court in adjudicating upon the title to the land and putting the real title-holder in possession, the nature of dispute contemplated in Sub-section (1) of Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, is thereby extinguished. Therefore, on the basis of the old dispute, which has been settle in a Civil Court not only by declaration of title but by delivery of actual physical possession, the Magistrate acquires no jurisdiction to proceed under hit. If the decree or order only decides a Question of title without referring to possession, then the Magistrate would have full jurisdiction to proceed u/s 145(1) Code of Criminal Procedure, even though such a decree is a very recent one, because the Civil Court has refrains from deciding as to the question of possession, provided the other condition of apprehension, of breach of peace exists. In such oases, Magistrates must remember two things, viz, that the presumption of continuity of possession arising from act of delivery of possession would operate in favour of successful party in the civil litigation and the second thing is that no vanquished party in the Civil Court shall be permitted to raise a plea that he never lost possession despite the decree and that his enjoyment of such possession anterior to the decree remained unaffected by the Civil Court delivery. If any evidence is given in favour of such a plea the same must be discouraged as being discredited by proof of the act of delivery of possession by the Civil Court whose value is sacrosanct. It is, however, open to the Magistrate to take note of events and circumstances of state of things which come into existence subsequent to the delivery of possession to give a finding of possession in favour of the vanquished party provided he has obtained possession either amicably from the winning party or if forcibly and wrongfully obtained, he must have been in such possession for more than two months next preceding the date of the preliminary order. Subject to these narrowly encompassed exceptions, the Magistrate has to act u/s 145 in consonance with the Civil Court decree between the same parties and relating to the same land, deciding rights and giving delivery of possession. 11. There is ample support for this view. Subject to these narrowly encompassed exceptions, the Magistrate has to act u/s 145 in consonance with the Civil Court decree between the same parties and relating to the same land, deciding rights and giving delivery of possession. 11. There is ample support for this view. It is held by Mukherjee, J. in a full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Agni Kumar Das v. Mumtaz Uddin ILR 1956 Cal. 290, as appears from the headnote of the decision that: The words "actual possession" in Sub-section (1) of Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure mean actual physical possession, even though wrongful e.g., that of a recent trespassor in actual possession at the time of the proceedings u/s 145, but where dispute as to possession has been determined by a Civil Court, there is no longer a dispute of which a criminal Court need take any notice under that section. The words "dispute concerning land etc.," are to be understood not quite literally, but as a dispute relating to actual possession. For a dispute as to actual possession, to be effectively determined, it is not enough that there' has been a decree determining the rights of the parties, unless it is a decree by which a suit for declaration of right and recovery or confirmation of possession has been dismissed, thus putting an end to the Plaintiff's right and claim for possession for ever and beyond all controversy. In cases of decrees which merely determine the rights of parties even if they decide that one party is entitled to possession the dispute still remains, and it is only by delivery of possession in execution of such a decree and in favour of one party as against another that the dispute can be said to be determined beyond any controversy. If an these requisites fire present, there is no dispute in the eye of law, though in point of fact there may be one. In AIR 1938 Pat 1055, Manoharlal J. has observed at page 106 of the report, as follows: The learned Magistrate ought to have kept in view the often-repeated observation of this Court that it is the bounden duty of a criminal Court to obey the orders of the civil Court and to respect the Dakhaldehani given by the Civil Courts. In AIR 1938 Pat 1055, Manoharlal J. has observed at page 106 of the report, as follows: The learned Magistrate ought to have kept in view the often-repeated observation of this Court that it is the bounden duty of a criminal Court to obey the orders of the civil Court and to respect the Dakhaldehani given by the Civil Courts. It is often no doubt to the Magistrates to take notice of events subsequent to the Dakhaldehani and it is also true, as pointed out by my brother Rowland in 13 P.L.T. 178 that a Magistrate does not exceed his jurisdiction if he draws up proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure even though a recent writ of delivery of possession in execution of the Civil Court decree is produced by the opposite party but in such cases it may be a decision so grossly erroneous that this Court would have no option but to interfere in revision. The decision reported in Jang Bahadur Singh Vs. Nazimul Haque and Others, and Banamali Mohapatra Vs. Bajra Nahak and Others in holding that the Magistrate acts illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in reagitating a dispute that has been settled by a competent Court by declaration of title and delivery of possession, by initiating proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, would appear to run counter to the last portion of the dictum quoted from the decision of Manoharlal, J. aforesaid. In practical effect these two apparently conflicting views reach the same conclusion, viz., the order of the Magistrate which seems to fly in the face of the Civil Court decree and delivery of possession must be quashed as without jurisdiction according to one view and as grossly erroneous according to the other view. 12. In the present case, the plea of the successful second party in his written statement is that he continued in possession of the disputed property after delivery of possession through Civil Court and be has not alleged any events or state of facts which have occurred subsequent to the delivery of possession by the Civil Court on the basis of which he claims fresh acquisition of possession. The 145 proceeding in this case was initiated about one year and three months after the Civil Court delivered possession. In the case reported in Banamali Mohapatra Vs. The 145 proceeding in this case was initiated about one year and three months after the Civil Court delivered possession. In the case reported in Banamali Mohapatra Vs. Bajra Nahak and Others the 145 proceeding was initiated one and half years after the Civil Court decree, where the 145 order was quashed. 13. In my judgment, therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, in regard to lands claimed by the second party members must be set aside as highly improper and illegal. That portion of the order of the learned Magistrate which declares possession in favour of the third party must also equally be struck down not only as grossly erroneous but also as without jurisdiction. The third party members it is true, were not a party in the civil suit, but nevertheless so far as their, subsequent implication in this proceeding and intervening in its enquiry by setting up as independent claim on their behalf is concerned, it amounts to clubbing of two independent proceedings into one, for which there is no warranty in law. Further, mere existence of a dispute, assuming there is one, between the Petitioners and the third party member, concerning the land claimed by the latter, without the likely consequence of breach of peace flowing there from of which there is no allegation and regarding which the Magistrate has not recorded his satisfaction as to such dispute likely to cause breach of peace, would not empower the Magistrate to launch an enquiry into such disputed possession. It may, be still open for the Magistrate to start a fresh proceeding in regard to the land claimed by the third party members in pursuance of Section 145(1) Code of Criminal Procedure, if he still feels that apprehension of breach of peace exists concerning the same due to any dispute between the Petitioners and the third party members. 14. In the result, the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, is quashed and the rules is discharged. The criminal revision is allowed. Final Result : Allowed