NAYUDU, C. J. : These appeals arise out )f Money Suits Nos. 2, 10 and 17 of 1960 and 6 and 8 of 1961. These suits were disposed of by a common judgment by the Subordinate fudge, Cachar at Silchar. The suits were brought by the consignees of goods consigned together from Nimtellaghat for carriage to Silchar-the destination. These were booked on the 19th August, 1959. Different sets of issues were framed in each suit, except in Money Suit No. 8 of 1961. But the main point for consideration common to all of them was whether the two defendants, namely, (1) R.S.N. Co. Ltd. and (2) I.G.N. and Railway Co., Ltd., the ap­pellants before us, were liable to make good the damage caused to the consignment in ques­tion during the period the defendants were carrying them from the starting point to the destination. (2) The respective plaintiffs (respondents herein) in the above-mentioned suits, had con­signed certain goods, to wit, bales of cloth to the defendants for conveyance as aforesaid. It is claimed by the defendants that the goods were being carried in one of their steamers, when there was a tidal bore, which resulted in the oil tins placed on the deck bursting and as a result of their falling on the deck, the mus­tard oil contents thereof trickled into the hold, where the bales of cloth were stored and damaged the cloths. The defendants contend­ed that as this tidal bore amounted to an act of God, any consequential damage should be attributed to an act of God and, therefore, they claimed exemption or mitigation in respect of the liability to pay damages. (3) The learned Subordinate Judge, who tried the suits, held that there was negligence on the part of the defendants in taking care of the oil tins and the bales of cloth, that although the tidal bore could be regarded as an act of God, there was absence of care by the defen­dants and that they had sufficient warning of the onset of the tidal bore and thus they can­not take the benefit of this defence. The learn­ed Subordinate Judge himself was not very certain that the goods were loaded in the manner stated by the defendants and held that as the delivery of the consignments was made as 'assessment delivery', although without pre­judice, the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to claim at least the amount determined by the defendants as representing the damage caused to the goods. (4) We have no doubt whatsoever that the tidal bore, which sweeps a ship in mid-water, is an act of God, and such being the case, any damage which is the direct result of the tidal bore, might assist the defendants in claiming exemption or mitigation in respect of the lia­bility. But it is not the case of the defendants that the water raised by the tidal bore swept into the ship, entered the hold and damaged the goods stocked therein. The damage admit­tedly resulted by reason of the fact that a num­ber of oil tins placed on the deck had been thrown down and all the oil entered the hold and damaged the goods. It is thus clear that the damage would not have resulted had not the oil tins been stacked and had they not been allowed to fall down and empty their contents into the hold. These are not all acts of God, and the law is clear that even where the defence of act of God is available to a carrier, the car­rier must show by clear evidence that the car­rier had taken all reasonable steps and precau­tions to prevent the damage resulting from the act of God. In the instant case, apart from the circumstances that the defendants had advance notice of the onset of the tidal bore, they do not appear to have taken any steps to prevent any remote or consequential damage to the goods stored in the hold. If the tins were not placed on the deck and if they had not leaked, 'the damage would not have occurred. This certainly could have been prevented by the defendants and the act of God did not prevent them from taking these precautions. Hence, we are clearly of the opinion that in the instant case the defence of an act of God is not avail­able to the defendants to avoid the liability in respect of the damage sustained by the plain­tiffs-respondents in these cases. Hence, we are clearly of the opinion that in the instant case the defence of an act of God is not avail­able to the defendants to avoid the liability in respect of the damage sustained by the plain­tiffs-respondents in these cases. We are fully in agreement with the learned Subordinate Judge when he held that there was clear negli­gence on the part of the defendants' employees, who were manning the ship, in which goods were stored and, but for this negligence, the damage might not have resulted. (5) It is contended by Mr. Banerjee, the learned counsel for the appellants that there is nothing to show that the tins were leaking. But it has been established beyond doubt in the in­stant case that the damage is the result of the leaking of oil, and if the tins were not properly soldered or kept, they would let out their contents when they fall down and this again would amount to negligence on the part of the defen­dants. (6) Mr. Banerjee further contended that, assuming that the liability of the defendants/ is there in law, they are not liable to make good the damage indicated by the assessment deli­very. He relied on the circumstance that every plaintiff must prove his case and must prove, his entitlement to the damages claimed. 'Al­though as a general principle this is correct, the instant case stands on a different footing.- _The Defendants themselves made a rough estimate of the damage caused to the goods, and gave delivery of the goods as an assessment delivery assessing the damage,! according to their esti­mation, which w6uja vary in reference to the actual loss sustained by the plaintiffs. As the plaintiffs have not claimed anything more than hat was estimated in the matter by the defendants themselves in their assessment of the damage, the defendants cannot complain that there has been want of proof in this case and that they are not liable to pay the entire sum and that the plaintiffs should further bring in proof of the actual damage sustained by them. The argument of Mr. Banerjee is centred in the circumstances that when the delivery was given, it was made 'without prejudice'. The argument of Mr. Banerjee is centred in the circumstances that when the delivery was given, it was made 'without prejudice'. The expression 'without prejudice' does not mean anything more than this that it would be open to the defendants in law to prove that the assessment made by them regarding the damage was higher than what actually it is. But that right apparently has not been availed of by the defendants and they brought in no proof that the damage suffered by the plaintiffs in these cases was less than the assessment of the damage made by the defendants. Similarly, it would have been open to the plaintiffs to have brought in evidence to show that the damage sustained by them was more than what was as­sessed by the defendants. The expression 'without prejudice' gives liberty to both the sides to bring in evidence to enable the Court to arrive at the correct amount of the damage caused. In these suits as the plaintiffs had limited their claim to the assessment of the damage made by the defendants and as the de­fendants failed to show that their assessment was wrong or higher than what it should have been, the Court below was fully justified in giving effect to the claim of the plaintiffs on the basis of the assessment delivery made by the defendants. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned Sub­ordinate Judge in these appeals. (7) The other point raised by Mr. Banerjee is that there is no proof that the plaintiffs' firms were registered under the Partnership Act, and, therefore, they would not be entitled to any relief. But our attention has been drawn to p. 51 of the paper-book, where the learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment clearly re­corded that ultimately the defendants had abandoned the defence based on the non-regis­tration of the firm. (8) In the result, we see no reason to in­terfere with the judgment and decree of the Court below, which we affirm. The appeals are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.