JUDGMENT Ramaswami, J. - 1. This appeal is brought by special leave from the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, dated August 3, 1961 in Second Appeal No. 390 of 1959. 2. Prior to the abolition of the proprietary rights one Fanindraraj Singh the elder brother of the appellant was the Zamindar of Tarapur Zamindari within the State of Raigarh in Madhya Pradesh. The respondent was the gaonthia of village Regda within that Zamindari. He owed large sums to the Zamindar which he was unable to pay. He therefore surrendered his rights as a Gaonthia by a duly registered deed dated March 24, 1933. As a result of this surrender the Bhogra and raiyati lands became vested in the Zamindari of Fanindraraj Singh. After the surrender of his rights as a Gaonthia by the respondent no other Ganothia was appointed by the Zamindar. Consequently the rights of the Gaonthia vested in the Zamindar himself. Mst. Kesharkumari the mother of the appellant acting as a guardian of the minor Zamindar Fanindraraj Singh leased out 20.82 acres of land to the respondent. The document Ex. D-4 dated January 19, 1936 recites that the land leased to the respondent will be got recorded as raiyati lands at the time of the next settlement. 3. In the State of Raigarh the rights and liabilities of holders of agricultural lands, agricultural tenures and all other matters relating to devolution of the agricultural lands were governed by the State Wazib-ul-arz, upto the 16th March 1949 when the Central Provinces State Land Tenure Order came into force. By the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (Madhya Pradesh Act I of 1951) the Zamindari rights in the former States were acquired. The Bhogra lands and other raiyali lands not included in the home farm of the proprietor were settled with them under section 54 (1) of the Act (Act I of 1959). Accordingly the revenue Authorities settled with the appellant all the Bhogra lands including the land presently in dispute by an order dated September 27, 1952. After the lands were settled with the appellant by the Revenue Authorities the respondent filed a suit in the Civil Court under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act for possession of plot No. 232 area O. 10 on the ground that he was in possession thereof and had been wrongly dispossessed. After the lands were settled with the appellant by the Revenue Authorities the respondent filed a suit in the Civil Court under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act for possession of plot No. 232 area O. 10 on the ground that he was in possession thereof and had been wrongly dispossessed. The respondent was granted a decree on December 18, 1954 in Civil Suit No. 153-A of 1951. The appellant thereafter filed the present suit on March 3, 1955 with regard to plots 303 area 1.49, 228 area 1.35. 2.31 area O. 58 and 232 area O. 10 total area 3.52 acres. The defence of the respondent was that Mst. Kesharkumari had granted an oral lease of 20.82 acres of land which belonged to the ex-gaonthia and, the Zamindar acknowledged this fact of the agreement under receipt Ex. D-4. In pursuance 'of the oral lease the respondent had been in possession of the entire land of 20.82 acres. The Civil Judge of Raigarh dismissed the suit of the appellant by his judgment dated April 24, 1958 on the ground that the respondent was raiyat within the meaning of cl. 2 (g) of the Central Provinces State Laud Tenure Order, 1949 and since the respondent was in possession before the date of vesting, the provisions of section 54 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act would not apply. On appeal the decree was affirmed by the Additional District Judge of Raigarh in Civil Appeal No. 25-A of 1958. In Second Appeal Noticed on page 91 of Dvivedi’s Twelve Years’ Digest. the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that the appellant became raiyat of the land under section 54 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950 and the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated September 27, 1952 that the lands were the raiyati lands of the appellant was correct. The High Court was also of the view that the respondent was a lessee of the Bhorga lands belonging to the Ex-Zamindar and he continued as -sub tenant in actual possession of the land. The effect of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, was that the respondent became an ordinary tenant of the tenure holder. The High Court was also of the view that the respondent was a lessee of the Bhorga lands belonging to the Ex-Zamindar and he continued as -sub tenant in actual possession of the land. The effect of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, was that the respondent became an ordinary tenant of the tenure holder. With effect from October 2, 1959 the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 came into force and under section 185 of this Code the respondent became an occupancy tenant of the appellant and the tenancy of the respondent could therefore be terminated only on the conditions mentioned in section 193 of the Code and not otherwise. The High Court accordingly dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had no right to evict the respondent from the disputed land. 4. In support of this appeal Mr. Barlingay submitted in the first place that the High Court was in error in relying upon Ex. D.4 receipt granted by Mst. Kesharkumari. It was argued that the document required registration and not being registered was inadmissible in evidence. It was contended that the respondent could not use the document to prove that he was either a lessee or sub-lessee of the lands mentioned therein. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. The language of the document taken as a whole shows that Ex D. 4 is rather a memorandum of concluded transaction than a document creating raiyati rights in favour of the respondent. It is necessary in this connection to distinguish a document which itself creates or declares a title or an interest in immovable property from a document which is a mere narration of a transaction which took place in time past. As observed by the Judicial Committee in Bageshwari Charan Singh V. Jagannath Kuar 59 IA 130, "the distinction is between a mere recital of a fact and something which in itself creates a tine." In the present case therefore the High Court was right in holding that the document Ex-D. 4 could be used not as evidence of the lease but as explaining the nature arid character of the possession of the respondent. Apart from Ex. Apart from Ex. D. 4 there was oral evidence given before the trial Court with regard to the lease and upon consideration of that evidence the trial Court held that there was a grant of lease of the suit land from January 19, 1936 in favour of the respondent. In support of this finding the trial Court referred to the Khasra entries for 1945-46 to 1949-50 (Exs. D.1 and D.2) and also to the oral evidence given of behalf of the respondent. The finding of the trial Court on this point has been affirmed both by the Additional District Judge and also by the High Court. We are therefore unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant that the transaction referred to in the receipt Ex. D-4 dated January 19, 1936 was not a transaction of lease but was a mere licence granted to the respondent to occupy the lands. 5. It was next submitted on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was bound to take the Wazib-ul-arz in evidence because the terms of the Wazib-ul-arz governed the legal relationship between the parties prior to the enactment of the C.P. State Lands Tenure Order 1949. It was pointed out that the lands were Bhogra lands and in the State of Raigarh the rights and liabilities of the holders of such lands were governed by the State Wazib-ul-arz. In our opinion there is no substance in the argument of the appellant. The reason is that the High Court has remarked that the Wazib-ul-arz was not brought on the record of the case and the appellant had at no stage made out a case for taking the Wazib ul-arz as additional evidence. The appellant does not appear to have applied to the High Court for taking the Wazib-ul-arz as additional evidence in the case, nor did he adduce sufficient grounds for taking it as additional evidence. 6. For the reasons expressed we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs as the respondent has not appeared.