PATHAK, J.:- This is an application under Clause 6 of the Assam and Naga­land High Court (Jurisdiction over Dist­rict Council Courts) Order. 1954 against the judgment and order dated 29-4-1967 passed by Sri G. N. Bhattacharyya, Judi­cial Officer, District Court. Garo Hills District Council, Tura, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 6 pf 1966, by which the Learned Judicial Officer rejected the petitioner's appeal and affirmed the judg­ment and order dated 29-8-1966 passed by Sri S. Dam. Judicial Officer, Subordi­nate Court, Garo Hills District Council, Tura, in Miscellaneous Case No. 32 of 1963. 2. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The plaintiff-petitioner institut­ed Miscellaneous Case No. 32 of 1963 In the Subordinate Court of the Garo Hills District Council claiming the Akhing of Boldamgiri village as the Nokma of the clan. Her case was that her father late Tosu was the Nokma of Boldamgiri Ak­hing. Late Tosu incurred some debts, but could not repay. One Khewil Marak cleared the debts of Tosu and he got the Akhing land temporarily transferred in his favour from Tosu Nokma. Khe­wil had two wives, namely. Damje Sangma and Gonje Sangma. Khewil died in 1963. Gonje had one female issue, name­ly Jiji Mechik. Damje had none. Jiji was married to Singwan Marak, defen­dant No. 2. Both his wives having died. Khewil married Khilji Sangma, defen­dant No. 1. 3. Tosu had also two wives, namely Namje Sangma and Manje Sangma. The main wife Namje had two daughters, Singme Sangma Mechik, the plaintiff and Dongme. But Manje had no issue. 4. It was contended by the plaintiff that the transfer of the Akhing land by Tosu to Khewil was only conditional and not absolute and as such it did not con­fer any title on Khewil and through him on the defendants. The Akhing land or any part of it could not be sold out with­out the consent of the Maharis, and that at the time of transfer of the Akhing in question, a condition was laid down that on the plaintiff attaining majority, the Akhing would revert to the plaintiff and that the third wife of late Khewil. name­ly defendant No. 1. name­ly defendant No. 1. did not belong to 'Sko-Mechik clan and that she was not supplied as wife to late Khewil by her Maharis and as such she could not be Nokma of the Akhing and that the de­fendants secretly registered their names as Nokmas of the Akhing and therefore they could not legally claim the Nokma-ship under the customary law. 5. The case of the defendants-respon­dents was that the property was trans­ferred by Tosu Nokma to Khewil Marak as he had paid all the debts of Tosu and that Khewil Nokma had two wives, namely Damje Sangma and Ganje Sang­ma and that Damje Sangma had no issue while Ganje Sangma had one daughter, Jiji Sangma, wife of defendant No. 2 and that after the death of Damje. Khewil took defendant No. 1 as his third wife and thus the defendants claimed the pro­perty through Khewil Sangma. 6. The case was heard by the Learn­ed Judicial Officer, Subordinate Court, Garo Hills District Council, who dismissed the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff pre­ferred an appeal before the Garo Hills District Council Court, which dismissed the appeal. Thereafter the plaintiff moved the High Court under Cl. 6 of the Assam High Court (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order. 1954. in Civil Re­vision No. 2 (H) of 1964 and the High Court by its judgment and order dated 21-12-1964 set aside the judgments and orders of the Courts below and sent the case back to the Subordinate District Council Court for proper decision. 7. After remand, the Learned Judi­cial Officer. Subordinate Court, Garo Hills District Council, recorded evidence of the parties and by his judgment and order dated 29-8-1966 dismissed the plaintiff's case. Against the said judg­ment and order, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the District Court, Garo Hills District Council, which was regis­tered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 6 of 1966. The Learned Judicial Officer by his order dated 29-4-1967 dismissed the plaintiff-petitioner's appeal and against this order the present petition has been filed in this Court. 8. Mr. Lahiri, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted before us that the property in dispute is Akhing land and it belonged to the mother of the house and her Nokma and not to the father of the house nor to Nokrom. In other words, the suit property belonged to Namje Sangma. the mother of the plaintiff. 8. Mr. Lahiri, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted before us that the property in dispute is Akhing land and it belonged to the mother of the house and her Nokma and not to the father of the house nor to Nokrom. In other words, the suit property belonged to Namje Sangma. the mother of the plaintiff. From Section 29 of the Garo Law, by Jobang D. Marak, it is found that the Garo husband is only a guardian and manager of his wife's properties and as such he cannot dispose of them nor enter them into any liabilities without an explicit assent of the mother of the house and other female members of the family and some other important members of the family group. From Section 36 of the same book we find that no Akhing land can be disposed of in any way with­out the consent of the mother of the house, Charas and Chatchis and promi­nent female members of the mother's Ma* chong, or family group. In the instant case, the admitted position is that the suit land which is Akhing land was trans­ferred for the debts of Tosu Sangma in favour of Khewil. 9. The point that falls for determina­tion in this case is whether by the trans­fer of the Akhing land made by Tosu Sangma to repay his debts any title pass­ed to Khewil. depriving the plaintiff who was a minor at the time of the transfer. 10. The Learned Lower Appellate Court has relied on two orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Garo Hills on 26-9-1935 and 4-1-1936. From the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 26-9-1935 quoted in the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, it is found that Khewil paid Rs. 766-8-0 to clear the debts of Tosu Nokma, who borrowed the same from Thejing and Ginjing. Khewil want­ed the Akhing but Namje and the Maharis and Chatchis present objected to giv­ing the Akhing to Khewil unless Tosu's name was added there. The Deputy Commissioner decided that half of the amount, that is, Rs. 383-4-0 must be paid by Tosu to Khewil by 4-1-1936 and if he paid, then Khewil and Tosu would be joint Nokmas in respect of the Akhing land and on the failure of Tosu to pay the amount in question to Khewil, the Akhing of Boldamgiri would go to Khe­wil with his wife Gonje as Nokma. 383-4-0 must be paid by Tosu to Khewil by 4-1-1936 and if he paid, then Khewil and Tosu would be joint Nokmas in respect of the Akhing land and on the failure of Tosu to pay the amount in question to Khewil, the Akhing of Boldamgiri would go to Khe­wil with his wife Gonje as Nokma. From the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 4-1-36 as quoted in the Lower Ap­pellate Court's judgment it is found that Tosu failed to pay the amount as order­ed and therefore the Deputy Commis­sioner ordered that the Akhing went to Khewil. 11. Under the Garo Law, the Akhing land belongs to the mother of the house and her Nokma and not to the father of the house and the Garo-husband is only a guardian and manager of his wife's pro­perties and as such he cannot dispose of them, nor can he make the property lia­ble for any debt incurred by the father of the house without an explicit assent of the mother of the house and other fe­male members of the family and some other important members of the family group. No Akhing land can be disposed of in any way without the consent of the mother of the house, Charas and Chatchis and prominent female members of the mother's Machong, or family group. From Major A. Playfair's book called "The Garos', we find the following in the Inheritance Chapter: "The system which divides the Garo tribe into certain clans and "mother­hoods," the members of which trace back their descent to a common ancestress. and which has laid down that descent in the clan shall be through the mother and not through the father, also provides that inheritance shall follow the same course, and shall be restricted to the female line. No man may possess property, un­less he has acquired it by his own exer­tions. No man can inherit property under any circumstance whatever." 12. From the above mentioned two orders of the Learned Deputy Commis­sioner, it does not appear that the mother of the house, namely Namje, wife of Tosu, transferred the land or she ex­pressly allowed her husband to transfer the Akhing land. No man can inherit property under any circumstance whatever." 12. From the above mentioned two orders of the Learned Deputy Commis­sioner, it does not appear that the mother of the house, namely Namje, wife of Tosu, transferred the land or she ex­pressly allowed her husband to transfer the Akhing land. It also does not ap­pear from the said orders of the Deputy Commissioner that the liabilities incurred by Tosu in connection with the Akhing land was incurred with the explicit as­sent of the mother of the house and other female members of the family. At the relevant time, the daughter of Namje, namely the plaintiff was a minor. So the question of taking her consent did not arise at all. 13. On a consideration of the above facts and the incidents of Garo Law, I hold that Tosu had no legal right to encumber the Akhing land by taking loan from some other persons without the ex­press consent of Namje and other im­portant female members of the family and he also had no right to transfer the Akhing land for such debt without the express consent of the mother of the house and other female members. In the circumstances, by the Deputy Commis­sioner's orders referred to above, title in the Akhing land could not pass to Khe­wil. At the most, it can be said that the Nokmaship vested in Tosu was transfer­red to Khewil and when Khewil died the Akhing land would revert to the mother of the house and her daughter and since Namje is no more, the Akhing land must come to the plaintiff, the daughter of Namje. The title in the Akhing land cannot be said to have passed to Khewil by mutation in the revenue records. The finding of the Learned Lower Appellate Court that the transfer of the Akhing land by Tosu in favour of Khewil was unconditional and absolute is not correct inasmuch as Tosu had no authority to encumber the Akhing land and transfer the same in violation of the Garo Cus­tomary Law. By the transfer of the Akhing alleged to have been made by Tosu and enforced by the executive orders of the Deputy Commissioner the title to Akhing could not pass but only the Nokmaship or the managerial right of Tosu as husband of Namje might have passed. 14. By the transfer of the Akhing alleged to have been made by Tosu and enforced by the executive orders of the Deputy Commissioner the title to Akhing could not pass but only the Nokmaship or the managerial right of Tosu as husband of Namje might have passed. 14. Rule 39 of the Rules for the Ad­ministration of Justice and Police in the Garo Hills District, 1937, reads as fol­lows: "Although the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Act IX of 1908), has been barred by Notification No. 5868, A. P., dated the 8th September, 1934, the principles of the Act should be closely followed in disputes between persons not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe or Tribes specified in Items 1 and 2 of Part I - Assam, of the Schedule to the Constitution (Sche­duled Tribes Order, 1950)." The Limitation Act, therefore, is not ap­plicable to the instant case as both the parties belong to the Scheduled Tribe and as such the question of adverse pos­session does not arise here. The delay on the part of the plaintiff in coming to the Court cannot deprive her of the Ak­hing. It appears that Khewil died in early part of 1963 and the plaintiff put forth her claim in the same year for the Akhing and the Nokmaship. In the cir­cumstances, I hold that the Akhing of Boldamgiri has been inherited by the plaintiff as the legal representative of her mother Namje. I hold that the names of Khilji Sangma and her son-in-law Singwaii Marak, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as Nokmas of Boldamgiri Akhing land should be removed inasmuch as_ they were appointed Nokmas on the basis that the title in the Akhing land vested in Khewil. As it has been held that title in the Akhing land has vested in the pre­sent plaintiff, the names of the defen­dants cannot stand in the register of Nokmas in respect of the said Akhing. It is further directed that the members of the 'Sko Mechik' clan should now se­lect the Nokma of the Boldamgiri Akhing in accordance with the customary law of the Garos. 15. In the circumstances, the judgment and order of the Judicial Officer, District Court, Garo Hills District Council, Tura, passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 6 of 1966 are set aside. 16. The petition is allowed. But in the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we pass no order as to costs. 15. In the circumstances, the judgment and order of the Judicial Officer, District Court, Garo Hills District Council, Tura, passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 6 of 1966 are set aside. 16. The petition is allowed. But in the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we pass no order as to costs. 17. S. K. DUTTA, C. J.:- I agree. Petition allowed.