PATHAK, J. : This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 23-9-1963 passed by the learned Sub ordinate Judge II. Cachar at Silchar. in Title Suit No 35 of 1961. 2. The plaintiff's case in brief is as follows: Sachimani, the sister of the plaintiff, came to the plaintiff's house after becoming widow before she attained puberty and lived in the plaintiff's house. Thereafter, Sachimani purchased the land described in the second schedule of the plaint along with some other lands with the money from her own earnings as a teacher of L. P. Girls' School. After purchasing the said land, Sachimani settled the land described in items 1 and 2 of the second schedule with defendants 1 to 3 and got the land describ­ed in item 3 of the second schedule cultivat­ed by herself through plaintiff. Sachimani died on 27th Baisakh of 1364 B. S. (corresponding to 11th May 1947) leaving the plaintiff as her sole heir of her stridhan property of second schedule land. On the death of Sachimani, the plaintiff got his name mutated in respect of the second schedule land. 3. After the death of Sachimani defendants 1 to 3 did not pay rents and so the plaintiff filed rent suit No. 40/49 in the Munsiff's Court at Mailakandi and that the suit was decreed although defendants 1 to 3 in their written statement denied the title of the plaintiff and set up defendants 4 to 11 as being heirs of Sachimani. An appeal was preferred against the said judgment of the learned Munsiff and the learned appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree, with the direction to the plaintiff to file a suit for declaration of his title and also for mesne profits. Thereafter the defendants 1 to 3 in collusion with the remaining defendants dispossessed the plaintiff from the land described in item 3 of the second schedule in the latter part of Jaistha 1367 B. S.. corresponding to first part of June 1960. 4. The lands described in the 3rd Schedule to the plaint are the paternal lands of the plaintiff. The defendants have been trying to dispossess the plaintiff from 3rd schedule land also by denying his title. 5. corresponding to first part of June 1960. 4. The lands described in the 3rd Schedule to the plaint are the paternal lands of the plaintiff. The defendants have been trying to dispossess the plaintiff from 3rd schedule land also by denying his title. 5. The plaintiff has tiled the present suh for declaration of his title in respect of the entire 1st schedule land which comprises both 2nd and 3rd schedule land, for the khas possession in respect of the second schedule land and for confirmation of his possession in respect of the 3rd schedule land. 6. Defendants J and 3 filed a joint written statement The suit proceeded ex parte against the remaining defendants. The defendants' case is that Sachimani's husband Narayan Nath had three brothers, namely, Nityananda. Paramananda and Sarbananda. Nityananda died leaving behind his three brothers Paramananda. Sarbananda and Narayan as his legal heirs. Thereafter Narayan died leaving behind Sachimani as his sole heir. Paramananda and Sarliananda gifted away 4 bighas 17 kathas of land to Sachimani to be enjoyed by her during her lifetime. Some time after that, Sachimani sold away the gifted land at Rs. 500 and went away with considerable cash of her husband including the said sum of Rs. 500. Sachimani thereafter purchased the entire suit land excluding dag No. 323 with the said sum of Rs. 500 and also with the money that she got from her husband and she settled the above land with the defen­dants Nos. 1 to 3. On the death of Sachimani the title of the above land devolved on the sons of Parmananda and Sarbananda by right of inheritance and the defendants 1 to 3 have been possessing the above land of Sachimani on payment of rents to defendant No. 8. Defendants 4 to 7 are the sons of Sarbananda and defendants 8 to 11 are the sons of Parmananda. Defendants 1 to 3 are the tenants under Sachimani. 7. A number of issues were framed by the learned trial Court. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Sub­ordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit on contest against defendants 1 and 8 with costs and ex parte without costs against the remaining defendants. Defendants 1 to 3 are the tenants under Sachimani. 7. A number of issues were framed by the learned trial Court. On a consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Sub­ordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit on contest against defendants 1 and 8 with costs and ex parte without costs against the remaining defendants. By his judgment the learned Subordinate Judge declared (i) the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the 1st schedule land which includes both the second and third schedule land; (ii) con­firmed possession of the plaintiff in respect of the third schedule land and (iii) decreed khas possession of the second schedule land by evicting the defendants therefrom. Against the said judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, defen­dants 1 and 8 have preferred this appeal. 8. Mr. S. M. Lahiri, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted before us that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limita­tion and that the second schedule land was purchased with the money of the husband of Sachimani and as such it was not her stridhana property and after her death defendants 4 to 11 inherited the same as legal heirs of Sachimani's husband Narayan. 9. Regarding the question of limitation, Mr. Lahiri submitted that the defendants denied the title of the plaintiff in the suit property in Rent Suit No. 40/49 in their written statement filed on 27-5-1949 and therefore the defendants claimed adverse possession as against the plaintiff at least with effect from 27-5-1949. The present suit (Title Suit No. 35/61) was filed on 30-5-1961 beyond 12 years, and as such it was apparently barred by limitation. 10. The Court Witness No. 1, N. R. Deb, who was the Bench Assistant of Subordinate Judge I at Silchar, deposed that in May 1961 there was another Additional Subordi­nate Judge's Court at Silchar. All plaints and memoranda of appeals required to be filed before the Subordinate Judge used to be filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge I and that procedure was followed even at the time of his deposition. The Subordinate Judge I could not take his seat in Court due to picketing from 19th May 1961 to 29th May 1961, excluding holidays. Nobody could enter the Court premises during the above period of picketing. There was no other arrangement for receiving plaints and memoranda of appeals during the above period of picketing. The Subordinate Judge I could not take his seat in Court due to picketing from 19th May 1961 to 29th May 1961, excluding holidays. Nobody could enter the Court premises during the above period of picketing. There was no other arrangement for receiving plaints and memoranda of appeals during the above period of picketing. In his cross-examina­tion, the Court witness stated that except 21st May, 26th and 27th May 1961 there were no other declared Government holidays during the period from 19th May 1961 to 29th May 1961. The witness further stated that he came to attend Court on all the days excepting the above three holidays and the curfew days during the above period from 19th May 1961 to 29th May 1961, but he could not enter the Court premises due to picketing. The learned Subordinate Judge under the circumstances held that the Court of the Subordinate Judge I, remained closed within the meaning of Section 4 of the Limitation Act during the period from 19th May 1961 to 29th May 1961, both days inclusive, and the Court reopened oil the 30th May 1961 and the suit was filed on that very day and as such it was not barred by limitation. 11. Mr. Lahiri has submitted that under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, every suit instituted after the period of limitation pres­cribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Of coarse, this is sub­ject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 of the said Act. Section 4 of the Act lays down that where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day that the Court reopens. Under Section 15 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act (Act 12 of 1887), the High Court pre pares the list of days to be observed as closed holidays for the civil Court. 26th May 1961 and 27th May 1961 being declared Government holidays, the suit should have been filed on 28th May 1961. but it was filed on 30th May 1961 and as such the suit must be dismissed as barred by limita­tion under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, Mr. 26th May 1961 and 27th May 1961 being declared Government holidays, the suit should have been filed on 28th May 1961. but it was filed on 30th May 1961 and as such the suit must be dismissed as barred by limita­tion under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, Mr. Lahiri has referred to the case of Maqbul Ahmad y. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, reported in AIR 1935 PC 85. In that case it has been held that Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act is peremp­tory and the duty of the Court is to notice the Act and give effect to it even though it! is not referred to in the pleadings. The pro­position of law laid down in this case is not disputed, but it must be remembered that Section 3 of the Limitation Act is subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 of the Act. 12. Mr. Lahiri then referred to the case of Receiver of The Nidadavole and Medur Estates v. Suraparazu, reported in ILR 38 Mad 295 = (AIR 1916 Mad 3 FB). In that case it was held that a Court cannot be said to be closed within the meaning of Sec. 4 of the Limitation Act merely because the Presiding Officer is not in headquarters hut is in camp on tour. In the instant case the evidence is that the Subordinate Judge I could not take his seat in the Court due to picketing during 19th May 1961 to 29th May 1961 excluding the holidays and the Court Witness No. 1 also has stated that he also could not attend Court due to picket­ing. He received plaints and memoranda of appeals required to be filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge I during the period of his service as Bench Assistant. No officer, neither the presiding officer of the Court, nor the ministerial staff could enter the Court premises during the above period of pickeing. In fact the Court was closed for all practical purposes as nobody could enter the Court premises due to picketing. 13. Under Order 4, Rule 1, Civil P. C every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. "Presenting means bringing formally under notice and the Court means the presiding officer of the Court. 13. Under Order 4, Rule 1, Civil P. C every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. "Presenting means bringing formally under notice and the Court means the presiding officer of the Court. A suit therefore has to be instituted by bringing formally under notice of the presiding officer of the Court or such officer as it appoints in this behalf. In the instant case, it appears from the evidence on record that during the period from 19th May 1961 to 29th May 1961 nobody could enter the Court premises due to picketing. The Subordinate Judge I, also could not take his seat in Court due to picketing during that period. The Court Witness No. I was the officer appointed to receive the plaints and memoranda of appeals re­quired to be filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge I, during the relevant period. During this period of picketing there was no other arrangement for receiving plaints or memoranda of appeals. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case it is quite clear that it was practically impossible on the part of the plaintiff to present the plaint to the Presiding Officer of the Court or to any officer appointed in this behalf during that period 14. In this connection, we may take into consideration the legal maxim Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossiblia, which means the law does not compel the impossible. The follow­ing passage occurs at page 268 in Craies on Statute Law. Sixth Edition.- "Under certain circumstances compliance with the provisions of statutes which pres­cribe how something is to be done will be excused. Thus, in accordance with the maxim of law, Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibllia, if it appears that the performance of the forma­lities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God or the King's enemies, these circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse". 15. The other legal principle which may be relevant in this connection is Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit, which means 'an act of the Court shall prejudice no one'. This principle has been elucidated by the Bombay High Court in Dharamsi Chemical Co. v. Occhavlal, reported in AIR 1927 Born 480, as follows:- "... 15. The other legal principle which may be relevant in this connection is Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit, which means 'an act of the Court shall prejudice no one'. This principle has been elucidated by the Bombay High Court in Dharamsi Chemical Co. v. Occhavlal, reported in AIR 1927 Born 480, as follows:- "... when a party has to do something before a certain day and if upon that day or before that day he cannot do that thing by reason of the act of the Court, then he is entitled to an extension of time over that period during which he is delayed by the Court's action' The dictionary meaning of the word 'closed' is 'shut up, not open'. 'Open' means ready to receive or transact business with mem­bers of the public. On a consideration of the above, I hold that when neither the presid­ing officer of the Court nor any officer authorised to receive the plaint is present in the Court on any day due to circumstances over which the person concerned has no control, it must be held that the Court is closed out that day for the purpose of Section 4 of the Limitation Act. In the circumstances, I hold that when in the instant case neither the presiding officer of the Court nor any other person authorised to receive the plaint was present in the Court premises during the period from 19th May 1961 to 29th Ma> 1961 and the suit was filed on 30th May 1961, the suit must be held to have been filed within time. From the record it appears that the Vakalatnama that was filed on 7-6-1961 was executed by the plaintiff on 18-5-61 and it was received and accept ed by the lawyer also on the same date. The verification of the plaint was also signed by the plaintiff on 18-5-61. So all these go to show that the plaintiff made his plaint ready on 18-5-61 but he could not present the same in Court during the period from 19-5 61 to 29-5-61 as nobody was there in the Court premises even, due to picketing during that period. In the circumstances, 1 hold that the suit filed on 30th May 1961 was not barred by limitation. 16. In the circumstances, 1 hold that the suit filed on 30th May 1961 was not barred by limitation. 16. Another point urged by the learned counsel for the appellants is that on 30th May 1961 the Vakalatnama of the Advocate was not filed and therefore it is argued that the plaint was not filed on 30th May 1961. I have examined the plaint in original and it is found that the plaint was signed also by the plaintiff himself and the Court receiv­ed the plaint on 30-5-61 and on the same date it was registered. So the plaint must be held to be presented on 30-5-61. 17. Let me now discuss the merits of the case. The plaintiff stated that the land described in 3rd schedule was his ancestral land and it has always been in his khas possession. Defendants 1 and 8 in their written statement stated that they were not aware whether the land in Dag No. 323 was the ancestral land of the plaintiff. They however stated that the land of Dag No. 323 was not in their possession, that is, defen­dants 1 to 11. In his evidence D. W. 1 stated that he did not know who was the owner of dag No. 323. In other words, the defendants did not claim the laud covered by dag No. 323. From the pleadings as well as from the evidence of D. W. 1 it appears that defendants had not claimed the land of dag No. 323 and as such the plaintiff's title to the land of dag No. 323 is declared and his possession thereto is confirmed. 18. So far as the lands covered by item Nos. 2 and 3 of 3rd schedule are concerned, the plaintiff's case is that these lands are his paternal properties whereas the defendants' case is that the entire 1st schedule lands comprising those of 2nd schedule and 3rd schedule excluding the laud in dag No. 323 were purchased by Sachimani with the money given to her by her husband and also with the money that she got by selling the gifted land. 19. Defendants 1 to 3 as admitted by D. W. 1 possessed four dags out of five dags of the suit patta, that is, excepting dag No. 323, in exercise of their jote right. 19. Defendants 1 to 3 as admitted by D. W. 1 possessed four dags out of five dags of the suit patta, that is, excepting dag No. 323, in exercise of their jote right. Originally Sachimani was the owner of the said dags comprising 15 kedars of land and they used to pay rent to her during her life time After the death of Sachimani on 27th Baisak, 1354 B. S. the defendants 1 to 3 had been paying rent to defendant No 8, who is D. W. 2. So it is admitted that the suit land excepting dag No. 323 belonged to Sachimani and defendants 1 to 3 were tenants under Sachimani during her life time. 20. The question that falls tor detei inination is whether the suit land excluding land of dag No. 323 was acquired by Sachi­mani with the money that she got from her husband, or, in other words, whether the suit property excluding dag No. 323 was stridhan property of Sachimani or not. The plaintiff stated in his evidence that Sachimani purchased the second schedule land from Nayari Nath and others. Ext 3 and Ext 9 are the sale deed and a certified copy of the sale deed by which Sachimani purchased 3 kedars and 7 kedars of land respectively He further stated that the land of 3rd schedule was his paternal property. There is no satis factory evidence on record to show that Sachimaui purchased the items Nos. 2 and 3 of the 3rd schedule land. In the circum­stances I hold that the entire 3rd schedule land is the paternal property of the plaintiff and his possession thereof is confirmed. 21. We have now to consider about the 2nd schedule land. It is admitted by both sides that the 2nd schedule land was pur­chased by Sachimani. It is also admitted that if it was her stridhan property, the plaintiff would get it as her heir and if it was purchased with the money of her husband, the defendants Nos. 4 to 11 would get it as the heirs of her husband. The defendants alleged that the second schedule land along with other lands were purchased by Sachimani with Rs. 2000 which was left behind by Narayan. D. W. 2 (Defendant No. 8) stated hi his cross-examination that his cousin Kamesh (Defendant No. 5) told him that Sachimani had purchased the suit land with Rs. The defendants alleged that the second schedule land along with other lands were purchased by Sachimani with Rs. 2000 which was left behind by Narayan. D. W. 2 (Defendant No. 8) stated hi his cross-examination that his cousin Kamesh (Defendant No. 5) told him that Sachimani had purchased the suit land with Rs. 2000 left behind by Narayan and he stated that he had no personal know ledge about it. D. W. 2 further stated that he heard from Sachimani that Narayan had left behind Rs. 2000 but he had no docu­mentary evidence to prove that Narayan had saved the above amount of Rs. 2000. Sachi-mani died on 27th Baisakh of 1354 B. S. and defendant No. 5 also has not been examined. Under the circumstances, there is no evidence to prove the defendants' case that Sachimani purchased the suit land with Rs. 2000 which was left by Narayan. The defendants further case is that Sachimani acquired the suit property with the money of Narayan and also with the money she got by sale of Narayan's land. (His Lordship discussed the evidence and proceeded;. In the circumstances, it must be held that the defendants failed to prove that Sachimani paid the whole or any part of the considera­tion for the 2nd schedule land by selling her husband's land or with money brought from her husband 22. Another aspect of the matter to be considered is whether the sum of Rs. 500 which Sachrnoni got by selling the gifted property could remain with her till the date of purchase of the property by her. Defen­dant No. 1 did not help Sachimani with money after she left for her father's house. D. W. 2 also admitted in his cross-examina­tion that Sachimani was taught in her father's house for 2 or 3 years before she entered service and that Sachimani did the Gaya-Shradha of her husband herself at Gaya. The plaintiff stated that one Mahendra taught Sachimani privately for two years at monthly pay of Rs. 10 and that Sachimani paid for her maintenance from her funds while she lived in her parents' house. There is nothing to disbelieve the evidence of the plaintiff. After defraying the above expenses, out of the sum of Rs. 500 received by her by sale of the gifted property, nothing could have remained with Sachimani from out of the said sum. There is nothing to disbelieve the evidence of the plaintiff. After defraying the above expenses, out of the sum of Rs. 500 received by her by sale of the gifted property, nothing could have remained with Sachimani from out of the said sum. Defendant No. 8 also admit­ted in his cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge as to with which money Sachimani purchased the suit land. The plaintiff has claimed that the second sche­dule land belonged to Sachimani because she purchased it with her own money, though at one stage he stated that a part of the consideration was paid by him. On a consideration of the entire evidence on re­cord, I hold that the second schedule land was purchased with the self-earned money of Sachimani and it was her stridhan pro­perty. On the death of Sachimani, her pro­perty devolved on the plaintiff as her legal heir. In the circumstances, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to (he second schedule [property and as such his right, title and Interest therein are declared. 23. The plaintiff and P. W. 2 stated that defendants 1 to 3 were tenants of Sachimani in respect of the land covered by item Nos, 1 and 2 of the second schedule only. (After review of the evidence, his Lordship continued). On a consideration of the evi­dence of both sides, I hold that defen­dants 1 to 3 were tenants of land of Sachimani covered by items 1 and 2 of the second schedule and they dispossessed the plaintiff from the land of item 3 of the second schedule in Jaistha of 1367 B S. 24. The defendants denied title of the plaintiff in respect of the land covered by items 1 and 2 of the second schedule in the written statement filed in Rent Suit No. 40 of 1949. As such, defendants 1 to 3 must be treated us trespassers on the said land from that date, and as such the plaintiff is entitled to have a decree for khas possession in respect of the land covered by items 1, 2 and 3 of second schedule by evicting the defendants therefrom. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that without terminating the tenancy by notice in writing under Section 111 of the Transfer of Pro­perty Act, no decree for khas possession could be passed against defendants 1 to 3. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that without terminating the tenancy by notice in writing under Section 111 of the Transfer of Pro­perty Act, no decree for khas possession could be passed against defendants 1 to 3. Without entering into the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case there was substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is found that this section does not apply to leases for agricultural pur­poses under Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act unless the same is made appli­cable by notification by the State Govern­ment. Admittedly the lease in favour of the defendants 1 to 3 was for agricultural purposes and no such notification has been placed before us. In the circumstances I hold that there is no substance in the learn­ed counsel's submission on this point. The plaintiff is thus entitled to a decree for khas possession in respect of the entire second schedule land by evicting the defendants. 25. In the result, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. 26. S. K. DUTTA, J. i I agree. Appeal dismissed.