N. G. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) THE facts giving rise to this reference broadly stated are that one Patel Laljibhai Somabhai of village Juval Rupavati filed Civil Suit No. 11 of 1964 in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge (J. D.) at Dholka against Vora Safakathusein Yusufali the complainant in the present case and his brother Vora Ahmedhusain Yusufali for recovering a sum of Rs. 2000. 00 on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-63 drawn in the namo of self under the signature of the complainant Vora Safakathusein Yusufali Lakdawala on the Bombay Mercantile Co-operative Bank Ltd. Ahmedabad Branch. In that suit the defence of the complainant and his brother Vora Ahmedhusain Yusufali was that the cheque in question and certain coupons which were produced and relied upon in that suit were forged and a false suit in collusion with the accused In this case was filed. That suit came to be dismissed on 30-11-1965 by Shri R. M. Atodaria Joint Civil Judge (J. D.) Dholka. Thereafter on 16 the complainant Vora Safakathusein Yusufali Lakdawala filed a complaint in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class Dholka against the two accused for offences punishable under secs. 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. After making the necessary inquiry the learned Magistrate committed both the accused to the Court of Sessions Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol to stand their trial for offences under secs. 467 and 471 read with sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code That Sessions Case No. 45 of 1966 was transferred to the Court or the Assistant Sessions Judge Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol for disposal in accordance with law. ( 2 ) BEFORE the trial began the accused No. 2 presented an application inter alia contending that the provisions contained in secs. 195 (1) (c) 476 and 479a of the Criminal Procedure Code were not complied with and consequently the committal proceeding were bad in law. He therefore prayed that the order of commitment should be quashed. Since the learned Assistant Sessions Judge was not authorised under sec. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to report the case to the High Court he addressed a letter to the Court of Sessions in that regard and consequently that Sessions Case No. 45 of 1966 was withdrawn from his file and taken over on his file. Since the learned Assistant Sessions Judge was not authorised under sec. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to report the case to the High Court he addressed a letter to the Court of Sessions in that regard and consequently that Sessions Case No. 45 of 1966 was withdrawn from his file and taken over on his file. That application was then heard by the learned Sessions Judge Ahmedabad (Rural) at Narol. Before him the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor conceded that having regard to the fact that the provisions contained in secs. 195 (1) (c) 476 and 479a of the Criminal Procedure Code were not complied with the order of commitment was bad in law and that it required to be quashed. The learned Sessions Judge also found that the complaint filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class against the accused in the case was bad inasmuch as no sanction was obtained from the Court of the Civil Judge where the alleged forged cheque was produced. That being so the commitment order was also bad in law and he has consequently referred the matter to this Court for quashing the order of commitment made under sec. 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 3 ) MR. Nanavaty the learned Assistant Government Pleader opposes the acceptance of the reference whereas Mr. Shah the learned advocate for the accused supports the reference. Mr. Trivedi the learned advocate for the complainant joins hands with the arguments advanced by the learned Assistant Government Pleaded in this Court. ( 4 ) NOW the allegations made in the complaint are clearly to the effect that the cheque dated 22-11-62 for a sum of Rs. 2000. 00 on the Bombay Merchantile Co-operative Bank Ltd. Ahmedabad Branch was a forged one and that the accused had produced the same in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge (J. D.) Dholka in a suit filed against the present complainant for recovering a sum of Rs. 2000. 00 thereunder. That was the basis of a claim made by the plaintiff-accused in that suit and since they had collusively and In furtherance of their common intention to obtain a decree for the claim and for that purpose since they had produced and made use thereof knowing or having reason to believe the cheque to be a forged one they were liable for the offences under secs. 467-471 read with sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Now as the learned Civil Judge had not chosen to take any action while dismissing the suit for fabricating such evidence in the form a cheque produced by the party plaintiff under sec. 479a of the Criminal Procedure Code the learned Sessions Judge found that no proceedings can now be taken in respect thereof by the complainant. Apart from the applicability of sec. 479a of the Criminal Procedure Code having regard to the decision in Babu Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others A. I. R. 1964 Supreme Court 725 such an offence punishable under sec. 471 Indian Penal Code being one of fraudulently or dishonestly using as genuine any document which the accused knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document does not fall within the category of offences contemplated in sec. 479a (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot come in the way of any such complaint. It may be stated that there has been no application presented by the party for taking any action under sec. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code and therefore there would not arise any such consideration as thought by the learned Sessions Judge viz. that for want of taking any action under sec. 479a of the Criminal Procedure Code no such action can at all be taken against the accused in the case. So far there is no dispute. ( 5 ) THE material point however that requires to be considered is as to whether the Court was not entitled to take cognizance of any such offence said to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in Court in respect of a document such by a cheque dated 22-11-63 produced or given in evidence in such proceeding except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate as contemplated under sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sec. 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code entitles any Presidency Magistrate and any Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence except as hereinafter provided. In other words the cognizance of offences can be said to have been properly taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate unless it is shown that by any operation of section in the Criminal Procedure Code no such cognizance can be taken. In other words the cognizance of offences can be said to have been properly taken by the learned Judicial Magistrate unless it is shown that by any operation of section in the Criminal Procedure Code no such cognizance can be taken. Sec. 195 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code therefore serves as an exception to the general rule contemplated in sec. 190 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code for it lays down that:-195 (1) No Court shall take cognizance- (a) xx xx xx xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx xx xx xx (c) of any offence prescribed in sec. 463 or punishable under sec. 471 sec. 475 or sec. 476 of the same Code when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. The contention of Mr. Shah was that all the conditions contemplated in sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Code have been fulfilled so as to justify him to say that the cognizance of the complaint taken by the learned Magistrate was bad in law for that could only be taken provided a complaint in Writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate was filed. Now it is true as pointed out by him the cheque is said to have been forged and that had come to be produced in a civil proceeding in the Court of the Civil Judge (J. D.) at Dholka so that the offences in that regard fall under secs. 463 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. Then the person who produced the same or gave in evidence was a party- plaintiff to that suit before the Court. Consequently he urged that except on the basis of a complaint filed by that Civil Court it was not competent for the Judicial Magistrate to entertain any such complaint in respect of those offences under secs. 467 and 471 read with sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of that document which was produced In that civil suit between the parties. On a plain and simple reading of sec. 467 and 471 read with sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of that document which was produced In that civil suit between the parties. On a plain and simple reading of sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Code one feels inclined to 80 think but It was pointed out by Mr. Nanavaty the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the State by a reference to a decision in the case of The State of Gujarat v. Ali Bin Rajak IX G. L. R. p. 1 that this sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code has been Interpreted by the Division Bench of this High Court and as laid down therein no such complaint by the Court was essential to be filed and that therefore the complaint was competent under sec. 190 (1) of the Code and the committal proceedings made by the learned Magistrate were not vitiated by reason of non-compliance of sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Code. What ultimately appears to have been held In that case was that under sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code sanction for prosecuting a party to a proceeding for an offence under sec. 471 of the Indian Penal Code was not necessary in respect of a use made outside the Court to which the document was subsequently produced. That way the decision given in 4 Bom. L. R. 268 (Noor Mahomad Cassum v. Kaikhosru Meneckjee) was found to be correct as against the one in 38 Bom. L. R. 221 (Emperor v. Rachappa Yellappa ). But while analysing and interpreting that part of the section His Lordship Miabhoy C. J. speaking for himself and Mehta J. (majority) has held as urged by Mr. Nanavaty. that only the offences which came within the mischief are those which were committed by a party In regard to a document which is already produced or given In evidence in a proceeding in which the present accused is a party. Making that statement further clear it has been observed that clause (c) is confined only to those cases where the offences mentioned in the clause are committed in respect of document after they are so produced or given In evidence. In other words the offence in respect of that document already produced in the Court must have been committed while it remained in custody of the Court. In other words the offence in respect of that document already produced in the Court must have been committed while it remained in custody of the Court. It does not refer to any offence already committed in respect of that document outside and later on produced in Court In a proceeding between the same parties. While so holding His Lordship Miabhoy C. J. has towards the end observed as under:-UNDER the circumstances in our judgment though we are conscious of the fact that the authorities of the Bombay and several High Courts specially those dealing with offences connected with sec. 463 take the wider view on the whole we have come to the conclusion that the narrower view which was expressed but without any reason in Noor Mahomad Cassums case is the correct view and therefore we propose to answer the query put by the Division Bench by holding that that case was correctly decided. Desai J. however has given a dissenting judgment in that case and according to him. the correct interpretation of sec. 195 (1) (c) was that on the date on which the Criminal Court takes cognizance of the offence mentioned in the clause the Court has to satisfy itself whether the offence In respect of which it is called upon to take cognizance is alleged to have been committed by a party to a proceeding in any Court and whether the alleged offence is in respect of document produced or given in evidence in such proceedings. If these conditions are satisfied the Criminal Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint only if it is filed by the Court in which it is tendered in evidence by the party to the proceeding or by some other Court to which such Court is subordinate irrespective of the fact whether the alleged offence of forgery was committed before the proceedings were initiated or thereafter. Much though I feel inclined to be in agreement with the view expressed in the dissenting judgment since the decision of majority of the Pull Bench of this Court binds that must prevail as it governs the case. No offence of forgery was committed after the cheque was already produced in that civil suit and that since it must have been committed outside the Court before it was produced sec. 195 (1) (c) would not come in and bar the complaint in the case. No offence of forgery was committed after the cheque was already produced in that civil suit and that since it must have been committed outside the Court before it was produced sec. 195 (1) (c) would not come in and bar the complaint in the case. ( 6 ) IT was however pointed out by Mr. Shah that while interpreting this sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code in the Case referred to above the effect of the two important decisions is not considered The first is the decision of a Division Bench of this High Court in the case of The State through Dahyabhai Haribhai v. Bhikhubhai Ranchhodji Desai and others A. I. R. 1965 Gujarat 70 and the other is of the Supreme Court in the case of Budhu Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1963 (2) Cri. L. J. 698. in the first case of The State through Dahyabhai Haribhai v. Bhikhubhai Ranchhodji Desai the contention was that the learned Magistrate had committed an error of law in taking cognizance of the charge-sheet road with sec. 109 of the Indian Penal Code in view of the fact that the cognizance of the aforesaid offences was barred under sec. 195 sub-sec (1) clause (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The offence was in respect of a document Ex. 53 dated 15th January 1954 produced before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and it was found that the cognizance of any offence in relation to that particular document could only be taken on a complaint filed by the Tribunal and that a charge-sheet without the complaint of the Tribunal was barred. on a reference made to this Court for quashing the committal order after analysing sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Code it was observed that the cognizance of the criminal Court will be barred under sec. 195 (1) (c) if the following conditions are satisfied:- (1) The offence alleged to have been committed must be an offence described in sec. 463 or an offence punishable under sec. 471 sec 475 or sec. 476 of the Indian Penal Code. (2) Such offence must be alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court. (3) The offence so alleged to have been committed must be in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. 471 sec 475 or sec. 476 of the Indian Penal Code. (2) Such offence must be alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court. (3) The offence so alleged to have been committed must be in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding. If these conditions are satisfied a Criminal Court cannot take cognizance of any of the aforesaid offences except on a complaint in writing by such Court or by some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. Then after finding that the first two conditions were already satisfied in that case they referred to the third condition which was necessary to be satisfied as the offences must be alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in the proceeding before the Court. Then His Lordship Miabhoy J. speaking for the Division Bench observed as under:-FROM the facts already recited it is quite clear that the only document which was produced before the Tribunal vas the Contract Exhibit 83. Therefore it is quite clear that the charges of forgery in so far as they are based upon the document. Exhibit 83 would come within the purview of clause (1) (C) aforesaid it was then hold that it was hit by sec. 195 (1) (C) of the Code. But the other charge relating to a false entry in the stamp register was not so hit since that was not produced before the Tribunal. This case has laid down further that the offence must have been committed by a party to the proceeding and that it was not at all essential that the proceeding referred to in clause (1) (c) should be pending at the time when the cognizance of the crime was sought. Now the decision does appear to have proceeded on the basis that it did not matter whether the document In question was forged before the same was produced in a proceeding before the Court This decision it is also true does not appear to have been considered in the Full Bench case. But this decision cannot he said to have laid down any such direct proposition contrary to the Interpretation and decision given in respect of sec. 195 (1) (c) In the Pull Bench case. But this decision cannot he said to have laid down any such direct proposition contrary to the Interpretation and decision given in respect of sec. 195 (1) (c) In the Pull Bench case. In fact no such interpretation was at all required to be made in that case so as to say that It would have any effect in weighing or giving interpretation to the section as done in the Full Bench case. ( 7 ) THE other case of Budhu Ram v. Stage of Rajasthan (supra) referred to above does not also appear to have been placed before Their Lordships when the decision came to be given by the Pull Bench in the case reported In IX G. L. R p. 1. This decision also proceeds on the basis that any forged document when it Is sought to be produced or given in any evidence in any proceeding by any party to the same and any offences in relation thereto are said to have been committed by him a complaint would be essential as contemplated in sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Code. Considerable stress was laid by Mr. Shah on the observations made by the Supreme Court in this case for showing that sec. 195 (1) (c) would hit no sooner any such document alleged to have been forged is produced before a Court in any proceeding by a party thereto and that therefore it made no difference whether it was forged outside the Court or inside the Court at any time. After setting out sec. 195 (1) (c) of the (ode the pertinent observations made by the Supreme Court run thus :it will be seen on a plain grammatical construction of this provision that a complaint by the Court is required where the offence is of forging or of using as genuine any document which is known or believed to be a forged documemt when such document is produced or given in evidence in court. It is clear therefore that it is only when the forged document is produced in Court that a complaint by the Court is required. These observations are no doubt entitled to great weight and if they were brought to the notice of the Full Bench they would have been certainly considered. But even in this case the direct question nor decision was as to whether the offences referred to in sec. These observations are no doubt entitled to great weight and if they were brought to the notice of the Full Bench they would have been certainly considered. But even in this case the direct question nor decision was as to whether the offences referred to in sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Code related to the original document alleged to be a forged one or to a copy thereof as well and it was held test it did not apply to a copy of any document said to have been forged. At any rate the section does not appear to have been interpreted as we find it done in the Pull Bench case. ( 8 ) MR. Shah then invited a reference to the report of the Select Committee 1916 when amendments were made in this section by Act XVIII of 1923. The material part sought to be relied upon runs thus :the provisions of sec. 195 cause constant and great difficulty and various amendments have been suggested which we have considered at length. We have no doubt that it will not be possible to remedy the evils which are connected with this section so long as private individuals are allowed to prosecute for offences connected with the administration of Justice. In our opinion the only effective way of dealing with this section is to allow prosecutions to be launched only by the public servant or by the Court. Apart from these citations he also urged that sec. 471 of the Indian Penal Code has not been properly considered in the Full Bench Case for if one refers to that section the offence relates to in using as genuine a forged document. That section provides that whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document. The words uses as genuine say document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document presuppose the same having been already forged or at any rate known or having reason to believe the same to be a forged document by that party and having then made use thereof by producing the same or by giving in evidence In the proceeding before that Court. That in Itself rules out any such interpretation according to him given by the full Bench under sec. 195 (1) (c) of the Code for it relates to an offence which must have been committed In respect of that document before it is used in that proceeding and not necessarily and only in respect of a document already produced and then offence committed in that respect in the Court. With great respect it is difficult to agree with the majority view in the Full Bench Case referred to above for the reasons stated above and if I may say so I respectfully agree with the dissenting view expressed by Desai J. In that Full Bench Case. It finds considerable support from various authorities of different High Courts referred to therein. I need not repeat the same reasons given by him over again here. It is however enough to say that all that has no meaning as the decision of the Full Bench of this High Court binds this Court and I must abide by it as long as it stands. ( 9 ) IT was however urged by Mr. Shah that the Full Bench decision requires to be reconsidered as it would be far too difficult for anyone to go in appeal to the Supreme Court against any such decision in the case. That cannot be much helped. That is hardly a good ground for referring matter for reconsideration by a larger Bench. Ordinarily reconsideration of any Full Bench decision of ones own High Court cannot arise on a mere ground that one does not agree with that view. Such an approach would take away the finality of decisions in such matters. However it is not that it cannot be done at all. In my view that can only be done provided at any rate two conditions are satisfied. The first is that the decision is found to be manifestly wrong or that it has lost sight of important decisions of the same High Court or of the other High Courts on the same point. But more important is about the satisfaction of that Judge that the public interest of a very substantial character is seriously affected or jeopardised by allowing any such decision to stand. But more important is about the satisfaction of that Judge that the public interest of a very substantial character is seriously affected or jeopardised by allowing any such decision to stand. I do not think both these conditions are so fully satisfied in this case and therefore I do not consider this to be a fit case for any such request being granted. ( 10 ) IN the result therefore the reference is not accepted and the order passed by the learned Magistrate committing the accused to the Court of Sessions stands. Reference rejected .