ORDER V.G. Oak, C.J. - This criminal revision arises out of a case of alleged cheating. Rattu Ram filed a complaint against two accused, Rajendra Tewari and Sheo Kumar Pandey on these allegations. 2. The complainant is a member of a co operative society. Accused No. 1 was the sarpanch of the society; and accused No. 2 was the supervisor of the society. The two accused promised to secure for the complainant a loan from the co-operative society for a sum of Rs. 100/- . The complainant's signature was obtained suggesting that be had received the sum of Rs. 100/- . An appropriate entry was made in the complainant's passbook. The sum of Rs. 100/- was obtained by the two accused, but was never paid to the complainant. The complainant protested to the departmental authorities, but got no redress. Rattu Ram, therefore, filed al complaint in Court in September, 1961. That complaint was dismissed on 19-3-1962 on the ground that the complainant was absent. The same day (19-3-1962) Rattu Ram filed another complaint. The second complaint was dealt with by another Magistrate. He took the view that the second complaint was barred u/s 403, Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused were, therefore, discharged on 30-4-1963. Against that order, a revision was filed by Rattu Ram complainant. The revision was dismissed by the Civil and Sessions Judge, Mirzapur on 22-2-65. The present revision by Rattu Ram to this Court is directed against the order dated 22-2-1965 dismissing the complainant's revision. 3. It will be seen that the trial Court did not dispose of the complainant's case on merits. The trial Court held that the second complaint was barred u/s 403, Code of Criminal Procedure. This view has been challenged on behalf of the complainant. The trial Court took the view that the first complaint was dismissed u/s 247, Code of Criminal Procedure. That dismissal had the effect of acquittal. In view of the acquittal upon the first complaint, the second complaint is barred. In Chitto Adhikari Vs. Vidya Bhushan Sharma, AIR 1952 All 455 it was held that there is no legal bar to a Magistrate's taking cognizance of offence on a second or fresh complaint whether the previous complaint was dismissed on merits or otherwise. In that case the first complaint had been dismissed on the ground of vagueness. It was not dealt with u/s 247, Code of Criminal Procedure. In that case the first complaint had been dismissed on the ground of vagueness. It was not dealt with u/s 247, Code of Criminal Procedure. There was, therefore, no question of the dismissal operating as an acquittal. In Mafatlal Manilal Shah Vs. C.C. Shah, AIR 1965 Guj 180 it was held that the Court cannot add the words "on being called for hearing" in Section 247, Code of Criminal Procedure and cannot read those words in the section when those words are not there. Section 247 states: If the summons had been issued on complaint and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused...the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall...acquit the accused... The question has been raised whether an order as contemplated by Section 247, Code of Criminal Procedure can be passed in the early part of a day. In Ram Narain v. Mool Chand 1960 AWR 597 it was held by Mulla, J. that an order of acquittal for the default of appearance of the complainant should be passed at the end of the day. 4. I find some difficulty in following the reasoning in the judgment in Ram Narain's case. Had I been dealing directly with the validity of the order dated 19-3-1962, I might have considered the question of referring the matter to a larger Bench. But in the present case the criminal revision is directed against the orders, dated 30-4-1963 and 22-2-1965. We are not directly concerned with the propriety of the order dated 19-3-1962. The complainant appears to have, accepted that order dated 19-3-1962 as a valid order. He filed a fresh complaint on the same facts. Assuming that the order dated 19-3-1962 is a valid order, the learned Magistrate was right in holding that the principle of Section 403, Code of Criminal Procedure was attracted with reference to the second complaint. The result of the order dated 19-3-1962 was that the accused stood acquitted of the charge u/s 417, IPC. They could not be tried again on the same facts u/s 417, IPC. 5. It has further been contended for the complainant that apart from Section 417, IPC, the prosecution case makes out more serious charges against the accused. It has been suggested that the complaint makes out charges Under Sections 420, 406 and 466, IPC. They could not be tried again on the same facts u/s 417, IPC. 5. It has further been contended for the complainant that apart from Section 417, IPC, the prosecution case makes out more serious charges against the accused. It has been suggested that the complaint makes out charges Under Sections 420, 406 and 466, IPC. No such point has been expressly raised in the grounds of revision filed before this Court. Nonetheless I have heard the Learned Counsel on this point also. Section 420, IPC states: Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished.... An offence u/s 420, IPC may be made out in two ways. Either the accused may induce the complainant to deliver any property to any person. Or the accused may induce the complainant to make etc., a valuable security. In the present case the complainant's grievance is that the accused procured a sum of Rs. 100/- on behalf of the complainant, but did not pay the amount to him. This is not a case where the complainant was made to part with the sum of Rs. 100/- . The case does not, therefore, fall under the first part of Section 420, IPC. 6. The expression "valuable security" has been defined in Section 30, IPC. It is stated in the complaint that the accused induced the complainant to issue a fictitious receipt for Rs. 100/- . It is doubtful whether such a receipt constitutes valuable security as defined by Section 30, IPC. It seems that initially the figure "420" was typed at two places in the present complaint. Subsequently the figure "420" was changed to the figure "417". It seems that even the second complaint was filed u/s 417, IPC. Of course, it was open to the trial Court to deal with the matter u/s 420, IPC if the Court was satisfied that an offence u/s 420, IPC was made out against the accused. 7. It is the complainant's own case that he signed an application or a receipt. Since the document was signed by the complainant himself, there is hardly any question of forgery. 7. It is the complainant's own case that he signed an application or a receipt. Since the document was signed by the complainant himself, there is hardly any question of forgery. The complaint does not disclose that the accused acted as trustees for the complainant. I do not think that the complaint discloses offences Under Sections 406 and 466, IPC. 8. According to the complaint, the alleged offence was committed early in the year 1956. The first complaint was filed in September, 1961. The second complaint was filed in March, 1962. According to the complainant's own case, nearly 12 years have elapsed since the commission of the alleged offence or offences. It is not expedient to revive these criminal proceedings after all these years. 9. The revision is dismissed.