DUTTA, C. J.: This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner's case is as follows. The petitioner is a firm registered under the Indian Partner­ship Act and this firm owns and possesses a tea estate known as Bagrodia Tea Estate in the district of Lakhimpur, Assam. During the second World War the Government or India acquired in 1940 for defence purposes a part of the Sookeriting Tea Estate with its adjoining lands measuring 769.20 acres for the construction of an air-field. The air-field was constructed on a portion of the said land; but an area of 300.20 acres over which there were tea bushes, was left out. The tea bushes were unattended and grow­ing wild. This area became overgrown with thick jungles. After the war, the area utilised for the air-strip measuring 469 acres was transferred to the State Government for its use and this area is still lying unutilised. The Government of India with a view to earn foreign exchange, decided to settle the aforesaid area of 300.20 acres with tea bushes thereon with some established tea planter. The petitioner corning to know about this entered into negotiation with the Special Military Estates Officer. Assam Circle, with headquarters at Shillong and also with the Ministry of Defence, Govern­ment of India. Ultimately an agreement for lease was made by and between the Union of India through Sri S. N. Mathur, the then Special Military Estates Officer, Assam, Shillong and the petitioner through its partner Sri Jayantilal Agarwalla. On 2-3-62 the said deed of agreement was signed by Sri Mathur for and on behalf of the President of India and by the said Sri Jayantilal Agarwalla for the petitioner. By this deed of agreement the Union of India agreed to lease out the said 300.20 acres of land at Sookeriting at an annual rent of Rs. 6304.20 P. to the petitioner. It was stipulated that the lease would run for one year from the date of handing over of pos­session of the land and that it would be renewable for a period of one year at a time subject to the condition that the land was not required by the lessor. Pursuant to this agreement, the petitioner paid on 2-3-62 the first installment of annual rent amounting to Rs. 6304.20 P. and on the 10th March, 1962 took possession of the land. Pursuant to this agreement, the petitioner paid on 2-3-62 the first installment of annual rent amounting to Rs. 6304.20 P. and on the 10th March, 1962 took possession of the land. After thus taking possession, the petitioner invested a sum of about Rs. 175000 and renovated the tea estate and succeeded in converting it to a well managed tea garden which now gives an average annual yield of 324317 kilograms of green leaves producing 73,149 kilograms of made tea worth Rs. 2,78,649. The peti­tioner thereafter deposited as directed, the requisite stamps for execution of the lease. But Sri Mathur put off the execution of the same from time to time on one pretext or another. In the meantime the petitioner approach­ed the Government of India through Sri J. N. Hazarika, Member of Parliament, who took up the matter with the Ministry of Defence at New Delhi. Then the Deputy Minister for Defence by a letter dated 20-12-62 informed Shri Hazarika that it would not be possible to extend the current lease as the land was required for Defence purposes. Thereafter, as the matter was pursued further by Sri Hazarika, the Minister of Defence informed him by a letter dated 1-4-63 that since several tea planters had showed interest in the said tea estate, it was decided to auction the lease-hold right of that tea estate on an annual basis subject to the condition that the land might be re­sumed on short notice for defence purposes. The petitioner demanded the renewal of the lease on 25-1-63 but in spite of such demand, no action was taken whatsoever by the Government of India. On the other hand, the Military Estates Officer, Jorhat Circle (opposite party No. 4) issued a public notice on 20-3-63 for disposal of the said tea garden in public auction temporarily for one year. Being aggrieved by this notice, the petitioner moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution when a rule was issued and an interim order was passed restraining the opposite parties from giving effect to the said notice for public auction. On 28-5-63 the opposite parties moved an application before this Court for restraining the petitioner from plucking tea leaves, but this application was rejected. On 28-5-63 the opposite parties moved an application before this Court for restraining the petitioner from plucking tea leaves, but this application was rejected. On 18-7-63, the petitioner filed a suit being Title Suit No. 30 of 1963 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Upper Assam Districts, Dibrugarh against the Union of India and others for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and for specific performance of the agreement for lease and an interim injunction was granted by the Court restrain­ing the defendants from interfering in any manner with the plaintiff's possession of the tea garden in suit. The writ application filed before this Court came up for hearing on 23-7-63, but it was not pressed as identical reliefs were claimed by the petitioner in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Upper Assam Districts at Dibrugarh in the afore­said title suit. The petition was therefore dismissed by this Court by its order dated 23-Z-63. Subsequently two more suits being Title Suit No. 6 of 1964 and Title Suit No. 13 of 1965 were filed by the petitioner in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Upper Assam Districts, Dibrugarh claiming identi­cal reliefs in respect of different years. In these two suits also a temporary injunction was granted. Thereafter another suit being Titile Suit No. 4 of 1966 was filed by the petitioner claiming identical reliefs for another year. All these four suits are now pending. On 4-9-65 the temporary injunc­tions granted by the Subordinate Judge were confirmed. On 26-10-66 the petitioner received an order of requisition of the said lands passed by opposite party No, 1, the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, Dibru­garh. The petitioner, therefore, moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and a rule was issued and the operation of the requisition order was stay- 2. The arguments advanced by Mr. A. K. Sen, appearing on behalf oi the peti­tioner, are as follows :- (1) The order of requisition was made by the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, Dibrugarh in which it was said that in his opinion it was necessary to requisition the property. The Deputy Commissioner was not the competent authority to form the opinion. (2) The requisition of the land of the tea garden was malafide. 3. In order to appreciate the first point it is necessary to refer to certain provisions in the Defence of India Act 1962 (herein­after called the Act). The Deputy Commissioner was not the competent authority to form the opinion. (2) The requisition of the land of the tea garden was malafide. 3. In order to appreciate the first point it is necessary to refer to certain provisions in the Defence of India Act 1962 (herein­after called the Act). Section 29 (1) of the Act is as follows. "29. Requisitioning of immovable pro­perty:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, if in the opinion of the Central Government or the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the defence of India, civil defence, public safety, main­tenance of public order or efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, that Government may by order in writing requisition any immovable property and may make such further orders as appear to that Government to be neces­sary or expedient in connection with the requisitioning: Provided that no property or part thereof which is exclusively used by the public forreligious worship shall be requisitioned". Section 40 of the Act is as follows : "40. Power to delegate: (1) The Central Government may, by order, direct that any power or duty which by this Act or by any rule made under this Act is conferred or im­posed upon the Central Government shall, in such circumstances and under such condi­tions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercised or discharged also- (a) by any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or (b) whether or not the power or duty relates to a matter with respect to which a State Legislature has power to make laws, by any State Government or any officer or authority subordinate to such Government, or (c) by any other authority. (2) The State Government may, by order, direct that any power or duty which by this Act or by any rule made under this Act is conferred or imposed on the State Govern­ment or which, being by this Act or any such rule conferred or imposed on the Central Government, has been directed under sub-section (1) to be exercised or dis­charged by the State Government, shall, in such circumstances and under such condi­tions, if any, as may be specified in the authority not being (except in the case of a Union territory) an officer or authority sub­ordinate to the Central Government". 4. It will appear from the above sections that the opinion has to be formed either by the State Government or the Central Gov­ernment. The Ministry of Home Affairs, by, notification No. S. O. 1888, dated the 10th June, 1965, published in the Gazette of India, Ext. dated June 11, 1965, delegated the powers under Section 29 to all Collec­tors, District Magistrates, Additional District Magistrates and Deputy Commissioners in the States and all Political Officers in N. E. F.A. 5. It is contended by Mr. Sen, the learn­ed Counsel for the petitioner, that under Section 40 of the Act the delegation of the powers and duties of the Central Govern­ment can be made by the said Government only to officers subordinate to it. Hence delegation made by the above notification to Deputy Commissioners who are not sub­ordinate to the Central Government, is bad. But it will appear from Clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Section 40 that the Central Government may delegate its powers and duties under the Act to an officer, subordi­nate to the State Government. Reading the aforesaid section as a whole, I find the following result viz., the Central Govern­ment may delegate its powers (1) to officers subordinate to it, (2) to officers subordinate to any State Government, (3) to any auth­ority, (4) to a State Government. If powers and duties are delegated to the State Gov­ernment, the said Government in its turn may delegate the same to any officer or authority not being an officer or an auth­ority subordinate to the Central Govern­ment. In this view of the matter, the above notification must be held to be valid. 6. Mr. Sen further argues that delega­tion cannot be made without specifying conditions. There is no force in this argu­ment. In this view of the matter, the above notification must be held to be valid. 6. Mr. Sen further argues that delega­tion cannot be made without specifying conditions. There is no force in this argu­ment. As stated above Section 40 (I) reads as follows:- "40. Power to delegate.- (1) The Central Government may, by order, direct that any power or duty which by this Act or by any rule made under this Act is conferred or imposed upon the Central Government shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercised or discharged also * * * * * * * * * * * * 7. From the above provision it is quite clear that when delegation is made, the delegate has all the powers of the Central Government unless the order of delegation imposes some conditions. Imposition of conditions is not obligatory and delegation may be unrestricted. 8. As regards the question of malafides, the law is well settled that a writ of manda­mus will be issued to strike down any malafide action of the executive authorities. In this connection Mr. Sen cites the case of in re Banwarilal Roy, (1944) 48 Cal WN 766. In this case after discussing various English and Indian cases the Calcutta High Court held that if a person exercised a power conferred on him by a statute in bad faith or for collateral purpose, it is an abuse of the power and fraud upon the statute and is not real exercise of the power at all. This rule of law is so well settled that it appears to me that reference to judi­cial decisions on it is not necessary. 9. I have already stated the circum­stances that led to the requisition of the pro­perty by the Deputy Commissioner. The real purpose of the Government in requisi­tioning the land in question can be seen from certain correspondence that passed be­tween the Ministry of Home Affairs and Sri Jogendra Nath Hazarika, M. P. In a letter dated the 20th December, 1962 Sri D. R. Chavan, Deputy Minister for Defence wrote to Sri Hazarika, M. P. saying that the lease of the land could not be extended as it was required for defence purpose vide Annexure E to the petition. Then in a letter dated the 1st April, 1963 from Sri Y. B. Chavan, Minister of Defence to Sri Hazarika, it was said as follows : "Since several tea planters have evinced interest in the Tea Estate, it will be in the public interest to auction the lease-hold rights on a yearly basis only, subject to the provisions that the land can be resumed at a short notice for Defence purposes". 10. In the affidavit filed by the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, Dibrugarh, it is said that till 1964 the land in question was not needed for Defence purposes, but the need of the land for such a purpose arose thereafter and hence the requisition notice dated 25-10-66 was issued. The petitioner has stated in his affidavit that although the Union of India as a defendant, is contesting the suits filed by the petitioner in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Dibrugarh yet the said defendant did not take the plea in its written statements that the land was re­quired for Defence purposes although the written statements were filed in 1966. When the Court granted the temporary injunctions restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the land by the petitioner, the plea that the land was required for Defence purposes was not taken. All these go to show that the intention of that Government is to lease out the land to the highest bidder in the hope of getting a good value as the land has now been developed into a working tea garden. Such a purpose cannot be said to be bona fide and it must| be held that the land is being requisitioned only for a collateral purpose. 11. The learned Government Advocate submits that M/s. Bangshidhar Shewbhag-wan and Company who is the petitioner in this case has no locus standi to file the peti­tion. The order of requisition is against M/s. Bagrodia Tea Estate with whom there was the agreement entered into by the Military Estates Officer. It may however, be noted that the petitioner in his petition says that M/s. Bangshidhar Shewbhagwan and Com­pany owns and possesses the Bagrodia tea estate. This has not been controverted in any of the affidavits filed by the opposite parties. This firm has filed the writ petition through one of its partners Sri Jayantilal Agarwalla. The agreement of lease was also through the said Sri Jayantilal Agarwalla. This has not been controverted in any of the affidavits filed by the opposite parties. This firm has filed the writ petition through one of its partners Sri Jayantilal Agarwalla. The agreement of lease was also through the said Sri Jayantilal Agarwalla. In such circumstances, I do not see any reason why M/s. Bangshidhar Shewbhagwan and Company should have no locus standi to file the petition. 12. In the result, the petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued directing the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, Dibru­garh not to give effect to his order dated 25-10-66 i.e., order No. LA 100/27511-15/ R for requisition of lands including tea bushes and trees standing thereon. There will be no order as to costs of this petition. 13. K. C. SEN, J.: I agree. Rule made absolute.