JUDGMENT : Chapman, J. 1. It was urged on me by counsel that the plaintiff was a gratuitous bailee of the machine, that it was not a thing dangerous in itself, and that, in relation to a chattel not dangerous in itself, the only duty of a person who has the ownership or de facto control of the' chattel is to give warning of the danger which factually known to the owner or controller. In support of these propositions, it was referred to MUNKMAN ON EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY (6th Edn., 1966), pp.147 to 149, and 2 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (3rd Edn.), p. 110 para 218. I venture to feel some doubt about these propositions, even assuming that I were capable of carrying my mind back to the legal atmosphere prevailing in 1931. The boundaries of the so-called category of things dangerous in themselves were always so vague as to be almost indeterminate once one passed beyond-the ambit of explosives, poisons and loaded guns, and no one would suggest that a grinding machine, if properly set up, came within the category. But this machine was not properly set up, and because it was improperly set up, it was in fact explosive. Why should it not be regarded as a thing dangerous in itself? Again would it be right to regard the plaintiff as a bailee of the machine? He was given permission for a short while to use it, but possession remained throughout with Arch Engineering and he never acquired any independent possession of his own. And even if he were a bailee, would it be right to regard him as a gratuitous bailee? The situation was that he, on behalf of the head contractors, and Arch Engineering as sub-contractors, was engaged on common work in effecting repairs to the pier, and it is the commonest thing in the world in such circumstances to have a good deal of interchanging of tools, machines and equipment. The user in such circumstances is not really gratuitous, because each has an interest in the mutual prosecution of the common work. In this day and age I think that many of the old cases which still find place in our text books are no longer of direct relevance. The user in such circumstances is not really gratuitous, because each has an interest in the mutual prosecution of the common work. In this day and age I think that many of the old cases which still find place in our text books are no longer of direct relevance. They are part of the history of the law of negligence and may serve as useful illustrations, but a lot of water has flowed under the bridge since 1931 and our modern law is founded on such cases as M'Alister (Or Donoghue) v. Stevenson (1932) All E.R. Rep. 1; (1932) AC. 562, Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd., v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd., (The Wagon Mound) (1932) All E.R. Rep. 1; (1932) AC. 562, and Hughes v. Lod Advocate (1932) All E.R. Rep. 1; (1932) AC. 562 Things dangerous in themselves have gone into limbo as a category since Read v. J. Lyons & Co., Ltd. (1932) All E.R. Rep. 1; (1932) AC. 562, see, in particular, Beckett v. Newalls Insulation Co., Ltd. (1932) All E.R. Rep. 1; (1932) AC. 562 per SINGLETON, L.J. Nor does it assist the law of negligence to attempt to pigeon-hole injured people according to precisely drawn categories such as purchasers, children, friends or neighbours of purchasers, tenants, hirers, invitees, licensees, voluntary bailees, bailees for reward, bare users etc. 2. The basic questions nowadays are always the same, namely, (1) was, there a reasonable foreseeable risk that the person in fact injured would sustain injury if no precautions were taken to guard against that risk? and (ii) was the defendant so situated that it was incumbent on him to take reasonable precautions to guard against that risk? On question (i), it seems to me clear that the answer must be yes. In the light of the knowledge which I have from a competent engineer, no other answer is possible. And I think that the viewpoint from which the question must be approached is the viewpoint of a reasonably competent engineer when one is dealing with a piece of mechanical engineering. If a person professing to handle or control such a machine does hot in fact have the engineering knowledge to enable him to appreciate whether the machine is correctly set up, so much the worse for him. If a person professing to handle or control such a machine does hot in fact have the engineering knowledge to enable him to appreciate whether the machine is correctly set up, so much the worse for him. He can hardly be heard to say, "Although I profess to be an engineer, in facts I am an ignoramus and simply did not know that it was dangerous.” If he does not know, then his duty must, in my view, extend to enquiring so as to find out. 3. On question (ii), again it seems to me that the answer must be yes. One may, of course, have a person who is so situated in relation to the person using a machine, that no duty is incumbent on him at all. For example, if in the present case a passer-by, perhaps an employee of the Dock Board, being a competent engineer, had seen the plaintiff about to start off to use the machine with a set-up which he recognised as being fraught with danger, it could, I imagine, be strongly argued that he owed no duty to stop him or warn him. But if a person is the owner of a machine, or for the time being in de facto control and possession of it, and he allows another person to use it, then it seems to me that he must be under a duty to warn him of dangers which are known to him or which ought to be known to him as an engineer, if that is what he professes to be. 4. I think that Arch Engineering are liable to the plaintiff. ……….. ……………. ………….. ……………. We then come to the second question, namely were G. Ltd. so situated, that it was incumbent on them to take reasonable precautions against the risk of injury to a person into whose hands the machine might forseeably come? This has involved embarking, once again, on an enquiry as to the scope of LORD ATKIN's famous speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) All E.R. Rep. This has involved embarking, once again, on an enquiry as to the scope of LORD ATKIN's famous speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) All E.R. Rep. 1; (1932) A.C. 562, particularly in relation to the stress that was laid on the absence of "a reasonable opportunity for intermediate examination." "It is now plain that the mere existence of such an opportunity will not exonerate a manufacturer or hirer-out of a chattel." see Haseldine v. Daw & Son., Ltd. (1941) 3 All E.R. 156; (1942) 2 K.B.343; Howard v. Walker & Lake (Trustees) & Crisp (1947) 2 All E.R. 197; (1947) K.B. 680; Shields v. Hobbs, etc., Co. (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 307; Cathcart v. Hull, (1963) N.Z.L.R. 333. "The proper question is whether .he should reasonably have expected that the person to whom he has passed the article would use the opportunity for inspection in such a way as to give him an indication of the risk and the means of warning any subsequent user of the article". 5. It will be seen that I have adapted and adopted the passage in SALMOND ON TORTS (14th Edn., 1965) pp. 435, 436. In other words, the importance laid on the possibility—that is, the probability —of intermediate examination is merely one fact of the wider principle as it has now been formulated, namely, was there a reasonably foreseeable risk that the plaintiff in fact injured would sustain injury if no precautions were taken to guard against the risk? That is, question (i) as formulated above, together with question (ii) in some ways are interlocking and overlapping questions. 6. In many circumstances a manufacturer or hirer-out of a tool would be fully entitled to assume that his customer would in fact make some examination of the tool before passing it on or allowing someone else to use it. Mr. Brueton The Expert engineer witness for the plaintiff in cross-examination by counsel for Gwent said in the present case that he would expect an engineer taking a tool like this into use to satisfy himself as to the safety factors. I am afraid Mr. Brueton in that regard is, perhaps, rather an idealist or a purist. Mr. Brueton The Expert engineer witness for the plaintiff in cross-examination by counsel for Gwent said in the present case that he would expect an engineer taking a tool like this into use to satisfy himself as to the safety factors. I am afraid Mr. Brueton in that regard is, perhaps, rather an idealist or a purist. Perhaps, the engineer should do that, but in practice there is a lot to be said for the view urged on me by counsel for Arch Engineering that the customer would rely on his supplier and assume that what his supplier handed out to him was sound and in proper order —particularly if he was paying for it. …………… …………. ……………. ……………….. 7. Furthermore, I think that it would really be invidious to distinguish between the extent of the liability to be attributed to each. The prosand and cons are pretty evenly balanced, and I think that liability as between them should be shared equally. 8. I do not think that I can acquit the plaintiff of all responsibility for the accident. He professed to know a great deal more about machines of this kind than he really did, but I think that it would be harsh to characterise his ignorance as failure to take proper care for his own safety. ………I think that the plaintiff's liability should be put at one-fifth leaving four-fifths to the defendants which should be shared equally, namely, two-fifths each.