RABEYA KHATUN v. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, PURI BANK LTD.
1968-04-22
G.K.MISRA, PATRA
body1968
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - Facts leading to this appeal may be noticed in brief. Plaintiff is the wife of Defendant-2 who sold the disputed property to the Plaintiff for Rs. 600/- by a registered sale deed dated 5-3-1945, the consideration being partial satisfaction of Plaintiff's dower debt. On 7.4.1947 Puri Bank Limited (Defendant.1) went into liquidation. Defendant.l obtained a decree against Defendant-2 for Rs. 7528/7/3 with future interest at six percent per annum in the Court of the Company Judge on 17-1-1952. In execution of the decree in Execution Case No. 3 of 156, Defendant-1 got the disputed property attached. Plaintiff filed an application under Order XXI, Rule 58 CPC in Misc. Case No. 2 of 1957 which was dismissed on 27-9-1957. On 28.10.1957 the disputed property was sold in auction for Rs. 3500/-. Plaintiff filed O.S. No. 280 of 1957 on 28-10-1957 in the Court of the Munsif, Balasore for a declaration that the disputed property belonged to her and was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree passed against Defendant-2. The Munsif held that be bad no jurisdiction to try such a suit and returned the plaint on 20-8-1959 to be filed before a Court of competent jurisdiction. The plaint was taken return of on 27.8-1959 and an application was filed before the Company Judge on 23.10.1959 for permission to sue. Permission was granted on 2-5-1960 and the suit was numbered as O.S No. 1 of 1960. The learned Company Judge accepted the Plaintiff's case that the disputed property belonged to her and not to Defendant-2 and was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree obtained by Defendant-1 against Defendant-2. The suit was, however, dismissed as being barred by limitation. Against the judgment dated 24-12-1963 this appeal has been filed. 2. The only question for consideration in this appeal is whether the suit was barred' by limitation. 3. The question of limitation arises thus: The application under Order XXI, Rule 58, CPC filed by the Plaintiff was dismissed on 27-9-1957. The suit out of which this appeal arises is one under Order XXI, Rule 63, Code of Civil Procedure. Under Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, (Act 9 of 1908), hereinafter referred to as the Act, the suit was to be filed within one year from 27-9-1957.
The suit out of which this appeal arises is one under Order XXI, Rule 63, Code of Civil Procedure. Under Article 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, (Act 9 of 1908), hereinafter referred to as the Act, the suit was to be filed within one year from 27-9-1957. The application for permission to sue was filed on 23-10-1959 which would be taken to be the date of institution of the suit after leave was granted and the suit was registered. The suit was thus filed a bout two years after. Plaintiff wants exclusion of the time during which the suit before the Munsif, Balasore was pending between 28-10-1957 and 20-8-1959. If this period of one year, nine months and twenty-two days is excluded u/s 4 of the Act, the suit would not he barred by limitation. 4. The short question, therefore, is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 and in respect of this period. Section 14(1) runs thus: In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the Defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. In this case, the proceeding before the Munsif, Balasore, is founded upon the same cause of action as in this suit. Under Sections 45-A and 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, as amended in 1950, the suit can be filed only in High Court. The Munsif, Balasore, had therefore no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The other element of the section, which the Plaintiff has to establish is that she was prosecuting the suit before the Munsif with due diligence and in good faith. u/s 2(7) of the Act, nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. 5. Mr. Roy contends that the Plaintiff entrusted the brief to one of the senior most members of Balasore Bar who filed the suit in the Court of the Munsif.
u/s 2(7) of the Act, nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. 5. Mr. Roy contends that the Plaintiff entrusted the brief to one of the senior most members of Balasore Bar who filed the suit in the Court of the Munsif. There was no want of care and attention on the part of the Plaintiff who has no knowledge of law and that she should not suffer for the fault of a senior lawyer in not examining the law carefully and in not giving her advice to file the suit in the High Court. This contention requires careful examination. 6. Position of law is now well settled that to give benefit to the Plaintiff u/s 14 of the Act, on account of mistakes committed by her legal advisor, the conduct of the lawyer must be examined and scrutinised carefully. If it is found that the conduct of the lawyer was palpably negligent and the view taken by him was unreasonable, the Plaintiff has to suffer for the conduct of her counsel. If on the other hand the view of the counsel, even though mistaken, was reasonable to be taken, Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 14. All the relevant authorities were reviewed in Triumala Bhaskara Rao Naidu Vs. Panasa Narayanamma and Another. The matter was further closely examined by one of us in Bhagirathi v. Achhuta 31 C.L.T. 105 and the aforesaid decision was followed. 7. It is now necessary to examine if the Plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act in light of the aforesaid tests. 8. It is important to note that the decree was passed by the learned Company Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction and not by the Munsif and that the execution case was levied in the High Court itself. These two features would put any advocate to caution that the suit under Order XXI, Rule 63 might not be filed in any other Court except in the High Court. That apart, Sections 45-A and 45-B conferring jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the High Court alone, are on the statute book ever since 1950. The matter was, clarified in H. Naik v. Jitendra Nath ILR 1954 Cutt. 65 : 20 C.L.T. 345.
That apart, Sections 45-A and 45-B conferring jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the High Court alone, are on the statute book ever since 1950. The matter was, clarified in H. Naik v. Jitendra Nath ILR 1954 Cutt. 65 : 20 C.L.T. 345. Even in the written statement filed by Defendant-1 on 25-2-1958, a plea was taken that the Munsif Court had no jurisdiction. Despite it, the suit before the Munsif was allowed to be continued from 25.2.1968 till 20.8.1959. In law, the conduct of the lawyer committing the mistake is to be scanned and scrutinised carefully. Plaintiff has not chosen to examine the lawyer who filed the suit at Balasore and the lawyer did not file an affidavit or appear before the High Court to offer his explanation. The aforesaid features lead to the irresistible conclusion that the lawyer of the Plaintiff in prosecuting the suit before the Munsif, Balasore, was palpably negligent and the view taken by him was wholly unreasonable. Plaintiff must have to suffer for the conduct of the lawyer who prosecuted the suit in the Court of the Munsif at Balasore. The learned Company Judge rightly held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the exclusion of time u/s 14 of the Act in the facts and circumstances of this care. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Patra, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed