ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - This petition arises out of consolidation proceedings. 2. The holding now in dispute was the sir or khudkasht of one Hari Nandan. It devolved on his two sons, Mahanand and Ramanand, Ramanand died in 1942. Mahanand, the other brother, died in 1956. Before his death, Mahanand executed a will in 1955 bequeathing his property to two of his grandsons, Jata Shankar (Petitioner) and Adya Shankar (Respondent No. 3). During consolidation operations, Prem Shanker another grandson of Aahanand through Pudh Nath raised an objection and challenged the validity, of the will. The Deputy Director has upheld the claim of Prem Shanker and rejected the will on the ground that Mahanand, being a member of the Joint Hindu family, became a joint bhumidhar and as such he could not bequeath any part of the joint family property. For this view, he placed reliance, upon a decision of this Court in Mahabir v. Suba Lal 1965 AWR 419 : 1965 UPRC 189. 3. Another point of contest between the parties related to the share of Ramanand. The Dy. Director has found that Ramanand had separated from his brother Mahanand, though the will alleged to have been executed him in favour of the two of the grandsons of Mahanand was invalid because it was not proved to be genuine. He, therefore, upheld the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) that the parties would have a share in all the family properties-according to the family pedigree. 4. In the present petition, the view of the Deputy, Director that a bhumidhar cannot will his property has been challenged. The point is supported by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mahendra Singh v. Attar Singh 1967 AWR 73 : 1967 UPRC 26 (2), where it was held that the principles of Hindu law relating to coparcenary property were not applicable to humidhaifi rights which were fresh rights and were to be governed, by the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act. For this proposition, the Division Bench relied upon a Full Bench decision, of this Court in Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath 1964 AWR 75 : 1964 UPRC 44. The Bench also observed that a bhumidhar can make a will of his holding or any hart thereof, as provided by Section 169 of fire Zamindari Abolition Act. For this proposition, the Division Bench relied upon a Full Bench decision, of this Court in Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigunath 1964 AWR 75 : 1964 UPRC 44. The Bench also observed that a bhumidhar can make a will of his holding or any hart thereof, as provided by Section 169 of fire Zamindari Abolition Act. In view of this decision, the earlier decision relied upon by the Deputy Director cannot hold the field. It will, therefore, have to be held that Mahanand as a bhumidhar was competent to execute a will of his interest in the bhumidhari holding. 5. But the will related to the entire holding. The holding belonged to Mahanand and Ramanand jointly. Ramanand had separated and on the findings he died intestate. His share consequently devolved on Mahanand, his own brother. According to Mulla's Hindu Law 13th (1966) Edition page 249, Article 223(3), the share inherited by Mahanand from Ramanand would be his self-acquired property qua his own sons and lineal descendants. They would not acquire any title or interest in it by birth. Mahanand was exclusive owner of that share and he became the sole bhumidhar in respect of that share. He could validly dispose of that share by transfer or by will according to the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act. 6. So far as his own original half share is concerned, it is clear that prior to the date of vesting, it was governed by the provisions of Hindu Law. The family had a, proprietary interest, the property being sir or khudkasht. Mahanand got the half share from, his father. It was ancestral property in his hand qua his son and lineal descendants. His sons and grandsons had an interest in it by birth. On 30th June, 1952, i.e., the date immediately preceding the date of vesting under the Zamindari Abolition Act, Mahanand his son and grand sons all had a share in that half share. They would all become bhumidhars of their respective shares. Mahanand alone would not be deemed to be the bhumidhar of that share. Thus, Mahanand would not be competent; to bequeath by a will a share not belonging to him. The will, therefore, could not validly operate in respect of the shares belonging to his sons and grandsons Mahanand could, however, validly execute will in respect of his own share of this half of the family property. Thus, Mahanand would not be competent; to bequeath by a will a share not belonging to him. The will, therefore, could not validly operate in respect of the shares belonging to his sons and grandsons Mahanand could, however, validly execute will in respect of his own share of this half of the family property. Thus, the-will-could validly operate in-respect of the half share originally belonging to Ramanand as well as the personal share of Mahanand in the family properties. 7. It was urged for the Respondents that the joint family as such would be deemed to be the owner of the entire-holding and on the date of vesting the joint family itself became, a bhumidhar. Though reference was made to some unreported decision of this; Court, where' it was alleged to have been held that a joint family itself becomes a bhumidhar, no copy of that judgment was furnished or cited. I am unable to hold that a joint Hindu family is a juristic personality. Reliance in this connection was placed upon a decision of this Court in Mahabir Ram v. Ram Kishen Ram and Ors. 1936 AWR 1005. There, it was held that the members of a joint Hindu family were body of individuals who came under the definition of 'persons'. This does not mean that the joint Hindu family itself is a person, much less a juristically recognised personality. The various individuals who constitute a joint Hindu family taken together may be designated as a person for certain purposes. For instance, in that case, the question was whether a joint Hindu family could constitute a partnership by itself. The answer was given in the negative. It is apparent form that decision that a joint Hindu family was not recognised as a person by itself. The principle decided was that since the various individuals constituted a single person in the eye of law for certain purposes, they could not constitute a partnership as members of the joint Hindu family. The answer was given in the negative. It is apparent form that decision that a joint Hindu family was not recognised as a person by itself. The principle decided was that since the various individuals constituted a single person in the eye of law for certain purposes, they could not constitute a partnership as members of the joint Hindu family. Certain other old decisions were relied upon, where it was held that a joint Hindu family could hold a tenancy None of these decisions held that a joint Hindu family is a legally recognised juristic person, that is to say, it can hold property of its own as apart from the members constituting it in those cases, it was held that when a member of the joint Hindu family died the holding did not go by the rule of succession laid down by the Tenancy Act, but by the provisions of the Hindu Law. It is unnecessary to deal with those cases because they were, firstly, on different statutory enactments and secondly, they cannot override the express decision of a Division Bench of this Court dealing with the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act. I am therefore, not prepared to accede to the submission that a joint Hindu family by itself would be deemed to be the bhumidhar as distinct from the members of that family. In my opinion, the various members of a joint Hindu family would be co-bhumidhars of the holding on the date of vesting, each having a hare in it. If it were to be held that a joint Hindu family by itself could hold property, it would, like a registered corporation, be the owner of the property apart from the members of that family. The members of the family would have no interest in the property. The position, therefore, would be that none of the members of the family would have any title or interest in the holding. 8. The Respondents had challenged the validity and genuineness of the will executed by Mahanand. The Consolidation Officer held that the will was not genuine. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal did not decide that question. He disregarded the will on the ground that a member of the joint Hindu family could not execute a will. In revision, the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not advert to this question of fact at all. The Consolidation Officer held that the will was not genuine. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal did not decide that question. He disregarded the will on the ground that a member of the joint Hindu family could not execute a will. In revision, the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not advert to this question of fact at all. The position is that the finding of the Consolidation Officer that the will was not genuine, still remains, because it has not been set aside by any of the higher authorities. On that finding, the Petitioner could not get any share in the property on the basis of the will. The Deputy Director, in my opinion, committed an error in proceeding on the assumption that the will was genuine without touching upon and setting aside the finding of the Consolidation Officer that the will was not genuine. 9. The petition, therefore, succeeds in part. The impugned order of the Deputy Director is set aside and the matter is sent back to him for deciding the question relating to genuineness of the will and then to dispose of the revision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. The Petitioner will be entitled to his costs.