JUDGMENT Anwar Ahmad, J. This appeal by the State of Bihar is directed against the judgment and a ward made by the learned Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Chapra, specially empowered under Section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on a reference under Section 18 of the Act. 2. An area of 4. 795 acres (equivalent to 7 bighas 13 kathas 12 dhurs) situated in Mahalla Naibazar Dahiawan of Chapra town with trees, houses and wells was acquired by the State of Bihar for the improvement of the Sadar Hospital at Chapra. The notification under Section 4 (i) of the Act was published on the 11th January, 1958 in the Bihar Gazette. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on the 23rd December, 1959 in the Bihar Gazette. The land belonged to Bettiah Court of Wards. The Land Acquisition Officer valued the land at Rs. 78,685.95 at the rate of Rs. 16, 410 per acre. The trees, the houses and the wells were valued by him at Rs. 2,369.75, Rs. 34, 889 and Rs. 1,230 respectively. An additional compensation at fifteen per cent amounting to Rs. 17,577.10 was also granted. Thus, the total valuation of the property was fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer at Rs. 1,34,757.80 and an award was prepared accordingly on the 22nd April, 1960. On the 27th June, 1960, the Manager, Bettiah Raj Court of Wards, filed an objection on the ground that the valuation fixed under the award in respect of the properties acquired was too low and the reasonable price thereof should have been Rs. 4, 66, 739. This amount did not include the price of the trees. 3. It appears from the judgment under appeal that, although claims were made in respect of steel racks and electric fittings, the respondent did not press his claims for these items. The amount of compensation fixed for the well at Rs. 1,236 was also not challenged. The Collector awarded a sum of Rs. 2,369.75 for all the trees standing on the land under acquisition and the court below has upheld this award. In his application under Section 18 of the Act, the respondent valued the trees approximately at Rs. 2,000/- only. The State of Bihar did not object to the award, rather accepted it. The Collector awarded a sum of Rs. 2,369.75 for all the trees standing on the land under acquisition and the court below has upheld this award. In his application under Section 18 of the Act, the respondent valued the trees approximately at Rs. 2,000/- only. The State of Bihar did not object to the award, rather accepted it. Hence neither party can make a grievance to the award so far as compensation for the trees is concerned. 4. It has been contended by the learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State, that the valuation fixed by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge for the land and the buildings is excessive. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, in fixing the value of the land, has relied upon serial no. 3 of Exhibit E, which is a sale statement prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer. Exhibit E goes to show that fourteen sale-deeds Were produced before the Land Acquisition Officer. The sale-deeds under serials 1 to 8 of this exhibit were discarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has, however, relied on the sale-deed under serial no. 3 on good grounds. This sale-deed show that 0.09 acre of homestead land was sold for Rs. 4, 279 on the 27th September, 1957 at the rate of Rs.1,430 per katha. As the land covered by this sale-deed is nearer to the land under acquisition, the Additional Subordinate Judge has preferred it to the sale-deeds under serials 9 to 14[Ext. G to G (5)]. The court below has taken serial no. 3 of Exhibit E as the basis for assessing the valuation after giving some allowance for the element of competition as the land was sold by public auction. It has also reduced the sale price as given in the sale-deed under serial no. 3, as the area sold under it was very small and has fixed the valuation of the acquired land at Rs. 1,000/-per katha. To my mind, no possible exception can be taken to the method adopted by the court below and the price fixed at Rs. 1,000 per katha for the land under acquisition cannot be successfully challenged. 5. The contention of the learned Government Advocate, however, is that the court below was wrong in picking out only the sale-deed under serial no. To my mind, no possible exception can be taken to the method adopted by the court below and the price fixed at Rs. 1,000 per katha for the land under acquisition cannot be successfully challenged. 5. The contention of the learned Government Advocate, however, is that the court below was wrong in picking out only the sale-deed under serial no. 3 out of the fourteen sale-deeds which find mention in Exhibit E. In this connection, he has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1) A. I. R. 1959 Supreme Court 429 (Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore V. T. Adinarayan Setty). It was laid down by their Lordships in that case that one of the methods for fixing the valuation of lands under acquisition is to take the average price paid within reasonable time in bona fide transactions of purchase of land adjacent to the land acquired and possessing similar advantages. It was also pointed out therein that, if the Court adopted this method, it would be committing an error of principle if it took only four out of six transactions of sale during a particular period without giving sufficient reasons why the other two transactions were left out. In the instant case, however, the court below has chosen to rely on the sale-deed under serial no. 3 of Exhibit E after a due consideration of all the sale-deeds mentioned under the various serials of Exhibit E. The sale-deeds under serials 1 to 8 were discarded by the Land Acquisition Officer himself. Admittedly, the lands covered by the sale-deeds under serials 1, 2 and 4 to 8 are at a long distance from the land under acquisition. The court below did not agree with the Land Acquisition Officer so far as the sale-deed under serial no. 3 of Exhibit E is concerned and has given valid reasons for the same. The sale-deed under serials 9 to 14 were also taken into consideration; but preference was given to the sale-deed under serial no. 3 because, as already stated, the land covered by this sale-deed was nearer to the land' under acquisition than the lands covered by the sa1e-deeds under serials 9 to 14. The lands covered by serials 9 to 14 have road only on one side whereas the land under acquisition has roads on three sides. 3 because, as already stated, the land covered by this sale-deed was nearer to the land' under acquisition than the lands covered by the sa1e-deeds under serials 9 to 14. The lands covered by serials 9 to 14 have road only on one side whereas the land under acquisition has roads on three sides. The land under acquisition has also' some other advantage over the lands covered by serials 9 to 14 which has been pointed out by the court below in its judgment. The principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court has not been violated by the court below and, as such, the contention of the learned Government Advocate has no force. 6. So far as the compensation for the buildings is concerned, the court below has rejected the evidence of Sukhdeo Prasad Sinha (A. W. 1) and his valuation report [Ext. 1, 1 (a) and 1 (b)] on the ground that, although A. W. 1 himself admitted that the price of the buildings would vary according to their heights, Exhibits 1 to 1 (b) did not show their heights. As admitted by A. W. 1, he did not break the wan at any point to find out whether the wall was cutcha or pucka. A. W. 1 further admitted that the value of the buildings would differ according to the nature of materials used in roofing; but none of these reports gives any indication about the materials so used. The reports further do not show the space occupied by the windows and the doors. The court below was, therefore, right in not relying on the evidence of A. W. 1 or his reports [Ext. 1 to 1 (b)]. On behalf of the State, the Executive Engineer, World Bank Project of the Public Works Department, Begusarai, was examined as O. P. W. 2 and his original valuation statement was marked exhibit F and its copy Exhibit F (1). The court below has rightly held that the method adopted by O. P. W. 2 for fixing .the valuation was scientific but has reduced the percentage of depreciation charge. It cannot be disputed that O. P. W. 2 is an expert and, as such, was fully competent to assess the percentage of depreciation. The court below was, therefore, wrong in reducing the depreciation charge from 34% to 25% and 38% to 25% under items 1 and 3 respectively. It cannot be disputed that O. P. W. 2 is an expert and, as such, was fully competent to assess the percentage of depreciation. The court below was, therefore, wrong in reducing the depreciation charge from 34% to 25% and 38% to 25% under items 1 and 3 respectively. The court below was, however, right in striking out Rs. 31,000 towards future repairs on the ground that it was a mere guess-work and highly inflated and a very high percentage of depreciation had already been allowed. 7. It is next contended by the learned Government Advocate that the court below could not grant compensation more than what was awarded by the Collector, as no claim was made by the respondent under Section 9 of the Act within the time allowed by law. It appears that a petition was filed by the Agent of Bettiah Estate on behalf of the Manager, Bettiah Court of Wards, before the Land Acquisition Officer on the 10th February, 1960, which was the date fixed in the notice issued under Section 9 of the Act. It was stated therein that a notice under Section 9 of the Act had been received in the office of the Court of Wards at Chapra but it was not possible to submit any claim unless instructions Were received from the Manager, whose head office was at Bettiah. It was, therefore, prayed that a month's time be allowed to do the needful. The Land Acquisition Officer, by his order dated the 10th February, 1960, allowed time till the 18th February, 1960. Exhibit 2 is a letter elated the 14th February, 1960 from the Manager, Bettiah Estate, to the Agent, Bettiah Estate, Chapra, directing him to claim Rs. 2,000 per katha for the land and to get the buildings measured by an overseer and to ascertain the present price thereof with the help of any local overseer or executive engineer and to file claims accordingly. The claim under Section 18 was, however, filed on the 22nd February, 1960. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has rightly held that it was necessary to take instructions from the Manager and the delay of twelve days in filing the claim under Section 18 of the Act had been sufficiently explained and, as such, the claim is not barred by time. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has rightly held that it was necessary to take instructions from the Manager and the delay of twelve days in filing the claim under Section 18 of the Act had been sufficiently explained and, as such, the claim is not barred by time. It may be stated that the order-sheet of the Land Acquisition Officer does not bear the signature of the Agent of Bettiah Estate at Chapra, namely A.W.4. O.P.W.1 denies to have passed the order behind the back of the applicant. He says that the order was passed in his presence bat does not remember to have asked him to sign the order-sheet. The evidence of O.P.W.1. on this point is not free from doubt. It may be that the order was passed behind his back; otherwise, A. W. 4. must have himself signed the order-sheet or must have been asked to do so by O. P. W. 1. In any view of the matter, since the delay has been condoned by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge on sufficient grounds, there is no scope for interference. 8. The learned Government Advocate has, however, tried to bring the case under the mandatory provision of Section 25 of the Act and has contended that it should be held as if no claim was at all filed by the respondent. Reliance, in this connection, has been placed by the learned Government Advocate on (2) The State of Bihar V. Bhagwan Sah (A. I. R. 1964 Patna 484), (3) Punjab State V. M/S Lachhman Dass Mukand Lal (A. I. R. 1964 Punjab 68) and (4) Nalamvari Annasatram and another V. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Co-operative Housing Schemes, Madras (A. I. R. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 139): but, in none of these cases, a claim was filed at all; and they lay down that, in case no claim is filed at all in pursuance of the notice under Section 9 of the Act, the Court cannot award a higher sum than the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. Reliance has also been placed on (5) Land Acquisition Officer V. Fakir Mahomed and another (A. I. R. 1933 Sind 124). Reliance has also been placed on (5) Land Acquisition Officer V. Fakir Mahomed and another (A. I. R. 1933 Sind 124). wherein the Judicial Commissioner, Sind, sitting singly, laid down that if a claim was made later than the time fixed in the notice under Section 9 of the Act, the award of the Court would be governed by Section 25 (i) of the Act. I would, however, prefer to follow the Bench decision of the Punjab High Court reported in (6) 44 Indian Cases 883 (The Secretary of State for India in Council V. Sohan Lal), which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent, wherein a distinction was drawn by the Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court between cases in which the objector never appeared before the Collector at all and those in which he appeared after the date fixed in the notice. It was held therein that an applicant cannot be said to have omitted to make a claim in pursuance of the notice merely because he did not make it in conformity with the notice. This case was followed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in a case reported in (7) A. I. R. 1930 Madras 618 (Chigurupati Sub-banna V. District Labour Officer, East Godavari) and it was further held therein that the claimant is not required necessarily to make his claim in writing under Section 9 (2) of the Act and a claim for compensation can be made orally. In that case, however, it was found against the claimant that he did not make any oral claim. Reference may also be made to (8) G. N. Paul V. Secretary of State for India (41 Indian Cases 532). It cannot be disputed that, in the instant case, A. W. 4 did appear before the Land Acquisition Officer and intimated that he intended to file his claim but a month's time ought to be allowed for getting certified copies of the relevant sale-deeds and the instructions of the Manager, and the claim was actually filed within twelve days from the date fixed in the notice. The view which I have taken also find support from a decision of my learned Brother in (9) First Appeals No. 194 to 202 of 1962 (The State of Bihar V. Budhan Mahto and others) dated the 18th January, 1968. The view which I have taken also find support from a decision of my learned Brother in (9) First Appeals No. 194 to 202 of 1962 (The State of Bihar V. Budhan Mahto and others) dated the 18th January, 1968. In this view of the matter, there is no substance in the submission of the learned Government Advocate which is, accordingly, overruled. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed only so far as the depreciation charges on items 1 and 3 of schedule 'B' attached to the application under Section 18 of the Act are concerned. In other respects, the judgment and a ward of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge are affirmed. There will be no order for costs so far as this Court is concerned. Shambhu Prasad Sing, J. I agree and would like to make a few observations of my own on the question whether Section 25 of the Act, on the facts of this case, stood as an impediment in the way of the court below in allowing more compensation to the respondent than what was allowed by the Collector. I may add here that in Budhan Mahto's case, I merely held that the claim must not be in writing but may be even oral. It was not contended by the learned Government Advocate that the instant case was a case of refusal by the respondent to make a claim before the Collector pursuant to the notice under Section 9 of the Act. Either it was a case of making a claim or omitting to make a claim. If it was a case making claim, a view which is in consonance with the decision in (6) 44 Indian Cases 883, it would be covered by Sub-section (1) of Section 25. On the other hand, if it was a case of omitting to make a claim, then as held by the court below, from which I find no reasons to dissent, it was for sufficient reasons and would be covered by Sub-section (3) of Section 25. In either view of the matter, the court below could allow compensation exceeding that allowed by the Collector. Appeal dismissed.