JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - This special appeal is directed against an order passed by Satish Chandra, J. on 15-7-1967, allowing Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 3028 of 1966 and quashing an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Allahabad, dated 23-5-1966, together with the order of the Additional Commissioner, by which the case had been remanded to the Rent Control Officer for fresh decision, and the order of the State Government, refusing to interfere with the remand. 2. The dispute relates to a house in Lukerganj Mohalla owned by the Appellant Mrs. Ira Mitra. At the beginning of December 1964 this house was in the occupation of a tenant S.M. Dutta, while the landlady was living along with her father in a portion of her uncle's house in Mutthiganj. On 11-12-1964 S.M. Dutta vacated the house and in armed the Rent Control and Eviction Officer about the vacancy thereby created. The Petitioner-Respondent A.K. Mandhyan applied on 19-12-1964 for this house to be allotted to him; and on 6-1-1965 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order of allotment u/s 7(2) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act in his favour. The landlady had meanwhile taken possession of the house and informed the Rent Control Officer accordingly on 8-1-1965 and again on 15-1-1965 (when she took the plea that S.M. Dutta had been a mere licensee and that there was no question of the house being let out on rent). A.K. Mandhyan, finding that he could not obtain possession of the premises, applied to the Rent Control Officer for action to be taken u/s 7-A of the Act; and notice was issued to the landlady on 5-2-1965. She failed to file any reply within the time allowed and consequently an eviction order was passed against her on 18-2-1965. Thereupon she filed a revision before the Commissioner, which was allowed on the ground that notice had not been properly served on her, and the case was remanded for fresh orders. It was at this stage of the proceedings, on 20-5-1965, that the landlady formally applied for release of the house in her favour Under Rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. On 19-6-1965 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed in order (Annexure C) rejecting Mrs. It was at this stage of the proceedings, on 20-5-1965, that the landlady formally applied for release of the house in her favour Under Rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules. On 19-6-1965 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed in order (Annexure C) rejecting Mrs. Ira Mittra's objections against the notice issued u/s 7-A of the Act, along with her prayer for release of the disputed accommodation in her favour; and a fresh eviction notice was issued. Again a revision was filed before the Commissioner; and on 5-1-1966 this was allowed (by means of the order Annexure H), on the ground that the Rent Control Officer had rejected the landlady's application for release of the premises without considering one of the major pleas advanced by her (viz. that she needed the house to live in, in order to pursue her studies in a certain college in Allahabad), and the case was remanded to the Rent Control Officer for predetermining the landlady's need. A.K. Mandhyan filed a revision u/s 7-F of the Act to the State Government against the order of the Additional Commissioner, but it was rejected on 14-2-1966 (Annexure I). The Rent Control Officer then proceeded to hear the case afresh and on 23-5-1966 passed the main impugned order (Annexure K), holding that the landlady's need was genuine and bonafide and releasing the disputed house in her favour. 3. The learned Single Judge has taken the view that in proceedings u/s 7-A of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act the Rent Control Officer had only to inquire whether the allotment order u/s 7(2) had been "duly passed", i.e. whether that order had been made after complying with the requirements of law, and that it was not open to the Rent Control Officer to interfere with the allotment on the ground that it was not just or proper. He has pointed out that there was no fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts that might vitiate the allotment order; and he has held that the mere fact that the landlady subsequently applied for release and succeeded in establishing that she had a genuine need for the premises would not be sufficient to render the allotment order invalid. He has pointed out that there was no fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of facts that might vitiate the allotment order; and he has held that the mere fact that the landlady subsequently applied for release and succeeded in establishing that she had a genuine need for the premises would not be sufficient to render the allotment order invalid. He has found, therefore, that the Rent Control Officer had no power to cancel the allotment order of 6-1-1965 in favour of A.K. Mandhyan or to release the accommodation to the landlady in proceedings u/s 7-A of the Act. He has accordingly quashed the Rent Control Officer's order of release passed on 23-5-1966, together with the Additional Commissioner's remand order dated 5-1-1966 and the State Government's order dated 14-2-1966, refusing to interfere u/s 7-F. 4. Mr. Gopi Nath, who appears for the landlady Appellant, strenuously contends that the learned Single Judge was fundamentally wrong in treating the 'allotment order' issued in favour of the Respondent on 6-1-1965 as though it gave the 'allottee' an indefeasible right. He points out that an order of this kind, passed u/s 7(2) of the Act, does not actually allot the accommodation to the prospective tenant, but merely directs the landlord to let it to him; and until there is actual letting or acceptance of rent by the landlord, the would be tenant acquires no existing right. In support of this proposition he has relied upon certain earlier decisions of this Court. For example, in Lachmi Narain v. R.C. and E.O. Lucknow 1962 AWR 161 it was observed: Shanker Datt had never approached the Appellant (the landlord) and the Appellant had never let out the shop to him. Shanker Dutt could not, therefore, claim any right of occupancy on the basis of the allotment order. The allotment order was simply an order calling upon the Appellant to let out the accommodation to him and so long as it was not let out to him he acquired no rights whatsoever. Shanker Dutt could not, therefore, claim any right of occupancy on the basis of the allotment order. The allotment order was simply an order calling upon the Appellant to let out the accommodation to him and so long as it was not let out to him he acquired no rights whatsoever. And in Bal Krishna Dass Gupta v. State of UP 1967 AWR 1 , one of us, sitting alone, has pointed out that even if the 'allottee' takes possession of the accommodation, he cannot acquire rights therein on the basis of the 'allotment order' unless the landlord accepts him as a tenant either by a specific contract or by acquiescence revealed by conduct (e.g. by the acceptance of rent). These decisions go to show that the mere passing of an order u/s 7(2) of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act creates no right in the so called 'allottee', unless and until the landlord has complied with the direction given to him to let the premises to that person and a tenancy has come into existence. Mr. Gopi Nath therefore argues that even after proceedings u/s 7-A of the Act have been initiated, it is still open to the Rent Control Officer to reconsider an 'allotment order' previously passed by him and to supersede it with a fresh order u/s 7(2), if facts are brought to his notice justifying such action; and that fresh order may either be a direction to the landlord to let the premises to some other would-be tenant or a direction to the landlord not to let the accommodation (meaning thereby that he may occupy it himself, having satisfied the Rent Control Officer that he genuinely needs it for his personal occupation). 5. We see considerable force in this contention. Rule 6, which allows the Rent Control Officer to permit the landlord to occupy the vacant accommodation himself, if he is satisfied that the landlord bonafide needs it for his own personal occupation, is an overriding provision that can be enforced at any stage of the 'allotment' proceedings, whether u/s 7 or u/s 7-A; and we are satisfied that in the circumstances of the present case, the Rent Control Officer was fully competent to entertain Mrs. Ira Mittra's application for release on 20-5-1965, even though proceedings u/s 7-A had already been started against her for her eviction from the premises. Ira Mittra's application for release on 20-5-1965, even though proceedings u/s 7-A had already been started against her for her eviction from the premises. As laid down in the Full Bench decision given in Ram Surat Singh v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer 1964 AWR 177 the provisions of Rule 6 are mandatory and must be given effect to in every case in which the Rent Control Officer is satisfied that the landlord requires the accommodation for his own personal occupation. And in the present case the 'allotment order' passed on 6-1-1965 in favour of the Respondent was ex parte and could constitute no bar to the entertainment and consideration of a subsequent application by the landlady Appellant for the release of the accommodation in her favour in accordance with Rule 6. 6. Mr. Kacker, who appears for the Respondent, has laid stress on the fact that a 'release order' Under Rule 6 is in effect an order u/s 7(2) of the Act, requiring the landlord not to let certain accommodation to any person. With this proposition we can have no quarrel: it is supported by the observations made by this Court in a number of rulings, from Ram Saran Das v. State of UP 1952 ALJ 208 down to Onkar Nath v. Chhaju Ram 1963 AWR 141. But 1 his does not mean that an order under Rule 6 cannot be passed in the course of proceedings u/s 7-A. In fact, if the landlord is the person against whom action u/s 7-A is taken, it will obviously be open to him to invoke Rule 6 at that stage in order to satisfy the Kent Control Officer "that he is entitled to remain in occupation of the accommodation", as required by Clause (2) of the section. 7. An attempt has been made to argue that Mrs. Ira Mittra's application for release should not have been entertained, because it was belated, the suggestion being that she was bound to apply for an order Under Rule 6 at the very first opportunity, as soon as she came to learn of the allotment order passed in favour of the Respondent. But we can see no provision in the Act that imposes a time limit for such applications. But we can see no provision in the Act that imposes a time limit for such applications. Our attention has also been drawn to the case of State of UP v. Smt. Shiama Devi 1957 AWR 657 in which it was held that a landlady could not claim release of the disputed accommodation in her favour when there was no application for release in existence and pending on the date when the allotment order was made in favour of the tenant. But that was a case of an entirely different complexion and affords no guidance whatsoever for the decision of the present case. There the landlady had applied for release on the occasion of an earlier vacancy and that application had been rejected; and all that the learned Judges held was that such an application could not be treated as still pending when the subsequent vacancy occurred. But in the present case the facts are totally different: here no question arises of any earlier application for release and instead we are concerned with an application presented by the landlady after the allotment which she challenges had been made. No ruling has been cited before us that would show that an application of this nature is barred. 8. We are satisfied therefore that in the circumstances of this case the Rent Control Officer had full jurisdiction to entertain and consider the landlady's application for release Under Rule 6, even though that application was presented after proceedings had been started against her u/s 7-A of the Act; and the mere fact that he had earlier passed an ex parte order of 'allotment' in favour of the Respondent would not debar him from disposing of that application on the merits and passing an order of release, if he found the landlady's need for personal occupation of the premises to be genuine and bonafide. 9. Mr. Kacker, however, contends that it is the earlier order (Annexure C), passed by the Rent Control Officer on 19-6-1965, that must stand and not the latter order (Annexure K), passed on 23-5-1966. 9. Mr. Kacker, however, contends that it is the earlier order (Annexure C), passed by the Rent Control Officer on 19-6-1965, that must stand and not the latter order (Annexure K), passed on 23-5-1966. His argument is that in so far as the earlier order (Annexure C) decided the question of the genuineness of the landlady's need in accordance with Rule 6, it must be treated as an order u/s 7(2), which was revisable only by the State Government u/s 7-F, and not as an order u/s 7-A(2), which would be revisable by the Commissioner Under Clause (4) of Section 7-A. Thus the revision filed by the landlady before the Commissioner was incompetent, so far as her claim for release was concerned, and the Commissioner's order of 5-1-1966 (Annexure H), remanding the case to the Rent Control Officer for further inquiry into the question of the landlady's needs, was without jurisdiction. On this view of the matter, Mr. Kacker argues, not only the Commissioner's remand order itself (Annexure H) must fail, but also the subsequent orders of the State Government (Annexure I) and of the Rent Control Officer (Annexure K), since they have been passed on the basis of that remand. 10. As already observed by us above, however, an order Under Rule 6 can legitimately be passed in proceedings u/s 7-A, for if the person who is alleged to be in unlawful occupation of the accommodation happens to be the landlord, it is open to him to satisfy the Rent Control Officer that he is "entitled to remain in occupation", as required by Clause (2) of that section, by showing that he bonafide needs the premises for his own personal occupation. In such a case, the decision given with reference to Rule 6 would be an order u/s 7-A, either taking action or refusing to take action under that section for the eviction of the person in occupation (the landlord). It seems to us therefore that in the circumstances of the present case the order passed by the Rent Control Officer on 19-6-1965 (Annexure C) falls squarely within the ambit of Section 7-A, notwithstanding the fact that it deals among other things with an application for release in favour of the landlady in accordance with Rule 6. It seems to us therefore that in the circumstances of the present case the order passed by the Rent Control Officer on 19-6-1965 (Annexure C) falls squarely within the ambit of Section 7-A, notwithstanding the fact that it deals among other things with an application for release in favour of the landlady in accordance with Rule 6. And if this is so, a revision obviously lay to the Commissioner Under Clause (4) of Section 7-A and the Commissioner was fully competent to pass the remand order of 5-1-1966. 11. Mr. Gopi Nath has further argued in this connexion that even if we treat the Rent Control Officer's order of 19-6-1965 as a composite order, partly u/s 7(2) of the Act, and partly u/s 7-A, a revision would still lie to the Commissioner against the whole order; and in support of this contention he has cited Virendra Kishore Shrivastava Vs. Kesharinandan Prasad, AIR 1962 Patna 410 , Maramreddi Ramireddi v. Vallapareddi Ramkishan Reddy AIR 1949 Mad 404 and Gopal Laskar Vs. Harihar Mukherjee and Others, AIR 1948 Cal 37 . In addition Mr. Gopi Nath has contended that even if the revisional power lay with the State Government and not with the Commissioner, the State Government in effect exercised that power when it dismissed the revision filed by the Respondent against the Commissioner's remand order and must be deemed to have confirmed the remand. Thirdly it has been argued that the Respondent is not entitled to ask for the issue of a writ quashing the remand order, because he acquiesced in the remand and participated in the ensuing proceedings before the Rent Control Officer, which culminated in the decision of 23-5-1966. We do not however consider it necessary to investigate these alternative pleas, in view of the basic conclusion arrived at by us that the whole of the order of 19-6-1965 (Annexure C) was covered by Section 7-A and that the whole order was thus revisable by the Commissioner u/s 7A(4). 12. We do not however consider it necessary to investigate these alternative pleas, in view of the basic conclusion arrived at by us that the whole of the order of 19-6-1965 (Annexure C) was covered by Section 7-A and that the whole order was thus revisable by the Commissioner u/s 7A(4). 12. An attempt has been made to argue on behalf of the Respondent that the landlady Appellant actually has no genuine bonafide need of the premises for her own personal occupation, firstly because there is no necessity for her to stay in Allahabad at all, since she can live with her husband who is at present employed in Lucknow, and secondly because even if she has to stay in Allahabad, she can live with her uncle as she used to before the disputed house fell vacant. But she produced adequate proof before the Rent Control Officer to show that she was enrolled in an Allahabad College and had to stay in Allahabad for the purpose of pursuing her studies there. And it is obvious that she can have no legal right to force herself on her uncle as a guest in his house. In the circumstances we can see nothing perverse in the finding that has been arrived at by the Rent Control Officer regarding the genuineness of her need for the disputed accommodation; and we accept that finding as conclusive and binding for the purposes of this writ petition and special appeal. 13. Our conclusion is that the learned Single Judge was not justified in issuing a writ to quash the impugned orders passed by the Rent Control authorities. The Rent Control Officer had full jurisdiction to entertain the application from the landlady for the release of the accommodation in her favour Under Rule 6 in the course of the proceedings taken against her u/s 7-A of the Act; and he could validly pass on order of release in her favour in those proceedings, inspite of the earlier order of 'allotment' that had been passed by him in favour of the would-be tenant. Further, an order refusing release of the accommodation in such circumstances would constitute an order u/s 7-A, revisable Under Clause (4) of the section; hence the remand order passed in revision by the Additional Commissioner or 5-1-1966 cannot be said to be invalid for want of jurisdiction. Further, an order refusing release of the accommodation in such circumstances would constitute an order u/s 7-A, revisable Under Clause (4) of the section; hence the remand order passed in revision by the Additional Commissioner or 5-1-1966 cannot be said to be invalid for want of jurisdiction. And in the final order passed by the Rent Control Officer on 23-5-1966 in pursuance of the remand he has given a finding of fact regarding the genuineness of the landlady's need for the accommodation that cannot be questioned in these proceedings. The order for the release of the property in favour of the landlady thus appears to be legal in every respect and fully justified. 14. This appeal is accordingly allowed with costs, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petition of the Respondent A.K. Mandhyan stands dismissed.