ORDER : K. Sadasivan, J. 1. The plaintiff (respondent) is the proprietor of a pineapple estate in Nadathra Village. On 19th April 1963 he was taking manure to the estate in a lorry K. L.R. 2926. On the way the accused together with ten other persons obstructed the lorry and prevented the driver from proceeding forward. The obstruction continued unabated from 6.30 p. m. on 19th April 1963 till about 6.30 p. m. the next day. The obstruction was finally removed, by P.W. 3 the Sub-Inspector of Police to whom a complaint was made by the plaintiff. On account of the obstruction, the plaintiff was compelled to pay an additional lorry fare of Rs. 120 together with an additional waiting charge of Rs. 80. It is to recover this amount from the defendant that the suit was laid. 2. The defendant who is the postmaster of Nadathra branch post office, denying the obstruction attributed to him, contended that the case is the outcome of enmity resulting from a boundary dispute that was going on at the time between himself and the plaintiff. He also stated that lorries are not generally taken along that pathway which is not wide enough for lorry traffic. Learned Munsiff relying on the evidence of P.W. 1, the plaintiff, P.W. 2 the driver of the lorry, P.W. 3 the Sub-Inspector and P.W. 4 a neighbour has decreed the plaint claim. 3. It was argued before me on behalf of the revision petitioner that the learned Munsiff has indulged in such misappreciation of evidence as to result in injustice to the defendant and therefore this is a fit case where this court has to interfere in revision. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent argued with equal vehemence that there is no error of jurisdiction justifying interference by this court in revision and even if on a question of fact the court has gone wrong or that on the same facts a different view is possible, the revisional powers of this court are not attracted. This is a revision coming under section 22 of the Kerala Small Cause Courts Act (shortly stated the Act). It has to be remembered that the power conferred on this court under section 22 of the Act is wider than the revisional powers vested under section 115 C.P.C. In Turner v. Jugmohan Singh (1905) 27 All. This is a revision coming under section 22 of the Kerala Small Cause Courts Act (shortly stated the Act). It has to be remembered that the power conferred on this court under section 22 of the Act is wider than the revisional powers vested under section 115 C.P.C. In Turner v. Jugmohan Singh (1905) 27 All. 581 it was observed: "The power of interfering in revision conferred by the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wide-wider than the power conferred by section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, and if substantial grounds are shown for the interference of the court, the court is not merely justified in exercising, but acts reasonably in the exercise of, its revisional powers.” In Poona City Municipality v. Ramji (1895) 21 Bom 250 the Bombay High Court made the following observation: - "The provisions of section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882, (present section 115) do not afford a safe guide for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, IX of 1887 (present section 2). The wording of the two sections is wholly different, that of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act being of the widest description and conferring the most ample discretion on the High Court, while it has been held by the Privy Council that section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code ought to be construed in a very restricted and limited sense.” Section 22 of the Act reads: “The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a court of small causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit." Under section 115 C.P.C., on the other hand, the High Court is empowered to interfere if the subordinate court concerned, has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested, or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Interference under section 115 C.P.C. would thus depend solely on want of jurisdiction or failure to exercise jurisdiction in fact vested in the court or illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Interference under section 115 C.P.C. would thus depend solely on want of jurisdiction or failure to exercise jurisdiction in fact vested in the court or illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Under section 22 of the Act as is clear from the section itself, no want of jurisdiction or non-exercise of jurisdiction or irregular exercise of jurisdiction need be shown for this court to interfere. All that the section lays down is that the High Court can interfere and pass such order it thinks fit if it is satisfied that the decree or order made by the court of small causes is not according to law. In construing this provision, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shivnarayanon v. Hariram A.I.R. 1921 Bom. 407 has observed as follows: - "Although High Court would be averse to interfering under section 25 on pure questions of fact, it cannot be said that the High Court, has no power whatever of interfering with decisions on questions of fact. However, interference in regard to appreciation of evidence should in general only be exercised when there appears to the court to be a very clear case of misappreciation which has resulted in injustice to a party and makes the decree one that cannot be regarded by a revisional court as 'according to law'." In that case the High Court interfered on the ground that the lower court's appreciation of evidence was distorted by the view it took that the plaintiff ought to have got the defendant's signature when the entries were amended. The plaintiff had dealings with the defendant and one Dhularam. According to his story Dhularam paid in Rs. 100 which was credited in the rough and daily book of the plaintiff; but by mistake of his ledger clerk the amount was credited to the ledger account of the defendant, which ledger account was on the same page as the ledger account of Dhularam. Thereafter the defendant made payments which were in due course properly credited to his account in the ledger. It was only after sometime when the plaintiff was examining the accounts of Dhularam that he discovered that Rs. 100 paid by Dhularam had been wrongly credited to the defendant's ledger account. Naturally he made entries correcting the mistake. The defendant sent a notice claiming that he had paid Rs. 100 and when the plaintiff brought a suit for Rs. It was only after sometime when the plaintiff was examining the accounts of Dhularam that he discovered that Rs. 100 paid by Dhularam had been wrongly credited to the defendant's ledger account. Naturally he made entries correcting the mistake. The defendant sent a notice claiming that he had paid Rs. 100 and when the plaintiff brought a suit for Rs. 110-11-3, the defendant raised this defence with regard to Rs.100. The learned Judge dismissing the claim observed:- "The plaintiff ought to have taken defendant's signature for the correction made, if the defendant was then willing to admit plaintiff's mistake." Then he dealt with the evidence and stated that he disbelieved the plaintiff's story as his conduct was extremely suspicious and the account books could not be credited, and passed a decree for Rs. 10-11-3. The High Court finding for the plaintiff observed that: "the statement of the defendant that he had paid Rs. 100 was not supported by any outside evidence, and in my opinion it was clearly dictated by the defendant's desire to take advantage of the error in account keeping made by the plaintiff's ledger keeper." According to the High Court it was, "a very clear case of misappreciation which has resulted in injustice to a party and makes the decree one that cannot be regarded by a revisional court as 'according to law' ". In the same way in the present case also, I am afraid the conclusion reached by the learned Munsiff is the result of misappreciation of evidence resulting in injustice to the defendant and, therefore, it cannot be allowed to stand. The plaintiff's case from start to finish bristles with improbabilities of a grave nature. It is impossible to believe that from 6.30 p.m. on 19th April 1963 till 6.30 p.m. the next day the obstruction by the defendant who is a postmaster, and his men continued unabated. Unless it is proved that the obstruction continued day and night like that, his claim for damages to the tune of Rs. 200 could not be sustained. From the available materials it is difficult to enter a finding that the obstruction continued all the time. P.W. 1 who claims to have been present in the lorry all the time was himself not sure when the defendant and party left the place. 200 could not be sustained. From the available materials it is difficult to enter a finding that the obstruction continued all the time. P.W. 1 who claims to have been present in the lorry all the time was himself not sure when the defendant and party left the place. To quote his own words, "I do not know when the defendant and party left the place". He would further swear that, "when the Inspector came to the spot, the obstructors were gone." According to the Sub-Inspector when he visited the spot none of the obstructors was present there. The most interesting part of the Sub-Inspector's evidence is that the names of the obstructors were given by the driver, cleaner, owner of the manure and the first defendant. In other words, the first defendant also had mentioned to him the names of the obstructors. He would swear: "The 10 names given in the list as obstructors were given to me by the driver, cleaner, owner of the manure and the first defendant." This looks strange. How could the first defendant have supplied the names, and more so when on the Sub-Inspector's own admission the first defendant was not there when he visited the spot? To extract his own statement: "When I went there, these 10 persons were not in the act of obstruction; but some of them were on the 2 sides of the lorry. The first defendant was not there then." Now what exactly is the nature of the obstruction? We do not get any clue from the plaint as to the nature of the alleged obstruction; but in the course of the evidence the case was developed to the effect that the obstructors placed a cycle across the road at a distance of 20 feet and the persons also stood there across the road. This is the case of P.Ws. 1 and 2; but when we come to P.W. 4 the independent witness, the obstruction takes a further turn and according to him, "Obstruction was caused by making a chal of ½ foot depth and 2 feet in width. The lorry could not be taken ahead." The Sub-Inspector who visited the spot on 20th April 1963 did not notice any 'chal' there. No mention is made by him of such a 'chal' either in his report Ext. The lorry could not be taken ahead." The Sub-Inspector who visited the spot on 20th April 1963 did not notice any 'chal' there. No mention is made by him of such a 'chal' either in his report Ext. P-3 or in his deposition before court and there is nothing to connect the defendant with the alleged chal. Thus the incident is given colour and shape according to the imagination of the witnesses. The evidence of the so-called independent witness P.W. 4, is unacceptable for another reason also. According to him the owner of the lorry was also present there. This is nobody's case. It is patent that his purpose evidently was to over-reach the plaintiff himself. The ten other obstructors have been left out and the action has been laid against the defendant alone, and this has not been explained. The reason probably is that the plaintiff wanted to avenge the wrong done to him in the boundary dispute. The defendant could not have abandoned his job in the post office and squatted on the road in front of the lorry all the 24 hours. On the question whether any additional fare or waiting charge for the lorry, in fact, was paid by the plaintiff also, there is no credible evidence. The driver has produced a receipt Ext. P-1 showing that a sum of Rs. 470 was paid by him to the owner of the lorry of which Rs. 120 represents the hire for 20th April 1963 and Rs. 80 towards the waiting charge for the night. Why the payment was made by the driver is not clear from the evidence. Moreover, Devassy, the owner of the lorry has not come forward to endorse the statement of the driver that payment was actually received by him. Thus on the question whether any damage was suffered by the plaintiff, evidence is inconclusive. There is also the further difficulty that under item 36(b) of the Schedule to the Act, an action of this nature is not maintainable in a small cause court. The Schedule deals with suits excepted from the cognisance of a court of small causes and item 36 (b) is 'suit for compensation for wrongful arrest, restraint or confinement'. The spirit of the exception is that suits for compensation for certain offences punishable under the Penal Code should be exempted from the purview of the Act. The Schedule deals with suits excepted from the cognisance of a court of small causes and item 36 (b) is 'suit for compensation for wrongful arrest, restraint or confinement'. The spirit of the exception is that suits for compensation for certain offences punishable under the Penal Code should be exempted from the purview of the Act. Two decisions were cited before me by the learned counsel and they are Mt. Shahidam and another v. Jagan Nath and others A.I.R. 1922 Oudh 161 and Deoki Rai v. Harakh Narain Lal A.I.R. 1926 All. 760. Both these are cases falling under exception 35 (ii) of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act [present 36 (j)], i.e., satisfaction for compensation for acts which are offences punishable under Chapter 17 of the Indian Penal Code. But in the present case the acts alleged would come under Chapter 16 of the Penal Code. All the same the principle stated is applicable to item 36 (b) also. Jurisdiction to try the suit must prima facie be determined with reference to the allegations in the plaint; from the allegations in the plaint under consideration the acts would constitute wrongful restraint. In answer to this preliminary objection learned counsel for the respondent stated that 'wrongful restraint' and 'wrongful confinement' like 'wrongful arrest' stated under item 36 (b) can relate only to persons and not to goods or objects. In the present case, according to him the obstruction was caused to the lorry which is an inanimate object and therefore the exception cannot apply. I am afraid this is a faulty reasoning. "Wrongful restraint" according to the Penal Code is obstruction of any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed. The pathway in the present case is claimed to be a public pathway or road and as such obstruction offered to prevent a person from proceeding along the pathway will be wrongful restraint. The right of a person to take cattle along such a pathway if obstructed would be wrongful restraint even though cattle are also sought to be taken along with the person. In Lahanu Manaji v. Emperor 27 Crl. The right of a person to take cattle along such a pathway if obstructed would be wrongful restraint even though cattle are also sought to be taken along with the person. In Lahanu Manaji v. Emperor 27 Crl. L.J. 139 it was held that the accused were guilty of wrongful restraint inasmuch as they had obstructed the complainant from proceeding with his bullocks in a direction in which he had a right to proceed with his bullocks. In Peraiah v. Chendriah 1952 M.W.N. 163 where the complaint was that the accused obstructed the complainant from proceeding with his bulls along a pathway over which he had a right to proceed with his bulls by striking the bulls and making them run away, it was held that they were guilty of wrongful restraint. (Vide the Law of crimes by Ratanlal, 21st Edn. p. 901). So also in the present case, obstructing a person in taking his lorry along the pathway over which he has a right to take it, is a wrongful restraint. The lorry cannot move by itself. It is the human agency that causes the motion of the lorry and in essence it is the person in the lorry who is obstructed and not the lorry itself. I am, therefore, of the view that the suit is hit by the bar of exception 36 (b) of the Schedule to the Act. In any view, therefore the suit has only to be dismissed. The decree of the court below is hence set aside and this revision petition is allowed. In the nature of the question argued, I order no costs.