JUDGMENT S.N. Katju, J. (April 14, 1967) -In the present case the learned Magistrate made a reference to the civil court with regard to a dispute relating to plot no. 26/d measuring 20 bighas and plot no. 26/9 measuring 10 bighas of land. I he grove and the trees in the aforesaid plots had not been described in the report of the Station Officer nor were they mentioned by the learned Magistrate in his preliminary order attaching the aforesaid plots. He was unable to decide the dispute himself and he drew up a statement of the facts of the case and forwarded the record of the proceedings to the civil court for the decision of the Munsif. In the statement drawn by the learned Munsif the land in dispute remained without any proper description. It was however mentioned in the order of reference that plots nos. 26/8 and 26/9 measuring 20 bighas and 10 bighas respectively were part and parcel of plot no. 26/6 which was formerly Banjar land belonging to the Gram Samaj. According to the Khasra of 1319 F the area of plot no. 26/6 was shown as 160 bighas while in the khewat of 1371 F its area was given as 84 bighas. Both the parties before the learned Munsif contended that they were in cultivation of portions of plot no. 26/6 along with certain other persons. It was not at all made clear by either party whether he was in actual cultivation of the entire plot no. 26/8 or 26/9. 2. The learned Munsif recorded a finding to the effect that the applicant Kalwa was in possession of the land in dispute on the date of the preliminary order. As mentioned above it was not at all clear as to what was the land in dispute as shown in the preliminary order. The learned Magistrate in conformity with the aforesaid, order of the learned Munsif released the aforesaid' land in favour of Kalwa. Jahana and others preferred a revision before the court below. It expressed the following view relying on a decision of the Patna High Court in Shreedhar Thakur v. Kesha Sao, A.I.R. 1962 Patna, 468 (1). "The only details given in the proceeding, which was drawn up, were the khata numbers, plot numbers and the area in dispute. Jahana and others preferred a revision before the court below. It expressed the following view relying on a decision of the Patna High Court in Shreedhar Thakur v. Kesha Sao, A.I.R. 1962 Patna, 468 (1). "The only details given in the proceeding, which was drawn up, were the khata numbers, plot numbers and the area in dispute. There was nothing to indicate the total area of any of the plots, nor was there anything to show that the whole or a portion of any of the plots numbers of which were given, was in dispute. Admittedly the parties were at issue as to the possession over only portions of some of the plots but there was nothing in the proceeding to indicate the direction in which the disputed portions in those plots lay. The boundary of none of the plots, or portions of the plots, was given." The court below held that in the reference made by the learned Magistrate the description of the land which was the subject of dispute was altogether vague. The reference to the Munsif should be held to be incompetent and illegal and the preliminary order of attachment, the order of reference and the entire proceedings after the reference should be struck off as being without jurisdiction. He has accordingly made a reference to this Court for setting aside the final order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Nakur and directing him to call for a fresh report from the police and hear the parties. If "he felt satisfied that the apprehension of breach of peace continued and that action under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is necessary he should ascertain the disputed land and thereafter draw up proceedings giving sufficient details and description of the land in suit so as to enable any one to identify easily and then dispose it of in accordance with law" 3. Learned counsel for Kalwa referred to a Single Judge decision of this Court in B. N. Pandey v. U. P. State, 1963 ALJ 1101. (2). The observations in the aforesaid case seem to suggest that once the Magistrate passes an order in conformity with the order passed by the civil court, the order cannot be challenged. Learned counsel for Kalwa referred to a Single Judge decision of this Court in B. N. Pandey v. U. P. State, 1963 ALJ 1101. (2). The observations in the aforesaid case seem to suggest that once the Magistrate passes an order in conformity with the order passed by the civil court, the order cannot be challenged. It was observed that "Any order passed by the civil court is final in the sense that no one can challenge that finding in appeal or revision, though he can challenge it in a regular suit to be instituted before a competent court." 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant in that case that it was open to the court to look into the propriety of the Magistrate making a reference to the civil court was repelled. It may appear from the aforesaid decision of this Court that even where the civil court had acted on an improper reference made by the Magistrate the finding of the Magistrate based on the order of the civil court cannot be challenged by way of revision. I am not prepared to subscribe to this view. If the initial reference to the civil court was bad it would follow that all the subsequent proceedings were vitiated and the order of the Magistrate based on the finding of the civil court could be challenged by way of revision and it will be open to this Court to direct that the proceedings following an improper reference should be quashed and the question should be reconsidered by the learned Magistrate. Since, however, the aforesaid observations of this Court in the case of B.N. Pandey (supra) could be read to mean that a finality is attached to the order of the civil court and the order passed by the Magistrate on its basis, it is desirable that the question should be considered by a larger Bench. 5. I, therefore, direct that the papers of this case be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for the decision of this reference. H.C.P. Tripathi, J. (August 10, 1967) Criminal Reference No. 406 of 1965 made by the learned Temporary Civil & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, came up for disposal before a learned single Judge of this Court. H.C.P. Tripathi, J. (August 10, 1967) Criminal Reference No. 406 of 1965 made by the learned Temporary Civil & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, came up for disposal before a learned single Judge of this Court. In his reference the Sessions Judge had recommended that the final order passed by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nakur, under section 146 (1-B) Cr. P. C. in conformity with the decesion of the civil court be quashed. Before the learned single Judge it was urged on behalf of the opposite party that such an order was not revisable and reliance was placed on a single Judge decision of this Court B. N. Pandey v. U. P. State, 1963 ALJ 1101. (1). 6. The learned single Judge was, however, of opinion that "if the initial reference to the civil court was bad it would follow that all the proceedings were vitiated and the order of the Magistrate based on the findings of the civil court could be challenged by way of revision." The learned Judge was, therefore, "not prepared to subscribe" to the view propounded in the single Judge decision referred to above and referred the case for decision to a larger Bench. I have heard the learned counsel for the applicant. In Criminal Revision No. 1270 of 1963 the following question was referred by me for decision by a division Bench. "whether an order passed by a Magistrate under sub-section (I-B) of Section 146 of the Code of Criminal procedure disposing of the proceeding under section 145 in conformity with the decision of the civil court is amenable to the revisional powers of the Sessions Judge and the High Court ?" The division Bench (Hon'ble M.C and C.P., JJ.) answered the question in the negative by its order dated November 30,1966. It appears that the decision of the division Bench was not brought to the notice of the learned single Judge when he referred the case to us. 7. I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken by the division Bench on this question. The division Bench has affirmed a series of single Judge decisions of this Court in which it had been held that such an order is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. In view of the division Bench decision this reference is incompetent and the revision is not entertain able. Accordingly I would reject the revision. The division Bench has affirmed a series of single Judge decisions of this Court in which it had been held that such an order is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. In view of the division Bench decision this reference is incompetent and the revision is not entertain able. Accordingly I would reject the revision. J.S. Trivedi, J. August 24, 1967) The facts of this Criminal Reference are that there was a dispute relating to plots nos. 26/8 and 26/9 situate in village Fatehpur, district Saharanpur, between Jahana and others an the one hand and Kalwa and others on the other. Proceedings under section 145 Cr. P. C. were initiated by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Nakur. Since the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was unable to decide as to which party was in possession of the subject matter in dispute on the date of the preliminary order or within two months next before it he drew up a statement of the facts and circumstances and forwarded the record of the proceedings to the Munsif Haveli Saharanpur, who after giving an opportunity to the parties to adduce their evidence recorded a finding to the effect that Kalwa was in possession of the land in dispute and the learned Magistrate in conformity with the aforesaid order released the land in favour of Kalwar jahana and others filed a revision and the learned Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur. by his order dated 6-3-65 allowed the revision and submitted the record to this Court. The case was heard by Hon'ble Katju, J. The main ground on which the revision was allowed was that the order of reference by the learned Magistrate to the Munsif was bad because the property was not identifiable on the spot and that the order of reference being bad the final order by the Magistrate on the basis of the finding given by the Munsif was without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for Kalwa and others referred to the case of "B.N. Pandey v. U. P. State" 1963 ALJ 1101. in support of his contention that any order passed by the civil court was final and could not be challenged in appeal or revision. Hon'ble Katju, J., however, was of opinion that the case required the consideration of a Bench and that is how this case has come to us. in support of his contention that any order passed by the civil court was final and could not be challenged in appeal or revision. Hon'ble Katju, J., however, was of opinion that the case required the consideration of a Bench and that is how this case has come to us. He was, however, of opinion that if the initial reference of the civil court was bad it would follow that all subsequent proceedings were vitiated and the order of the Magistrate could be challenged by way of revision. 8. It is not disputed that the plots nos. 26/8 and 26/9 were parts of plot no. 26/6. It was argued both before the learned Sessions Judge and before the learned Single Judge of this Court that the plots are not demarkable at the spot. The point, therefore, for determination in this case is whether the reference is bad for vagueness or other illegality. 9. I have gone through the order of my brother, Hon'ble Tripathi, J. According to him, the decision in Criminal Revision No. 1270 of 1963 by a Bench of this Court concludes the matter. With due respect I beg to differ from the view taken by him. In my opinion the decision of the Bench in that revision does not touch the proposition of law enunciated by the learned Sessions Judge and brother Katju J. The point before the Bench was whether a finding given by the civil court under section 146 C. P. C. could be interfered with in revision by the Sessions Judge or by the High Court. The Bench relied on section 146 (1-D) wherein it is provided that the findings of the civil court shall be final and no review or revision against any such finding shall lie. Relying on this proposition the Bench came to the conclusion that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly after the Magistrate had passed the order on the basis of civil court findings. The Bench examined a number of decisions of various High Courts on this point before coming to the conclusion mentioned above. The final conclusion of the Bench is given in these words : "For the reasons already mentioned our answer to the reference is that an order passed by a Magistrate under sub-section (1-B) of section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure disposing of the proceeding under section J45, Cr. The final conclusion of the Bench is given in these words : "For the reasons already mentioned our answer to the reference is that an order passed by a Magistrate under sub-section (1-B) of section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure disposing of the proceeding under section J45, Cr. P. C., if it is in conformity with the decision of the civil Court is not amenable to the revisional powers of the Sessions Judge and the High Court in so far as the decision of the civil court is concerned." I have underlined the words "in so far as the decision of the civil court is concerned''. A reading of the Bench decision would show that the Bench was concerned about the decision of the civil court and what it has decided is that the decision of the civil court cannot be interfered with in revision or appeal. Section 147 (1-D) is also to the effect that the findings of the civil court given in reference shall not be amenable to a review or revision. 10. That a revision was maintainable before reference if reference was bad cannot be questioned. Section 435 authorises the High Court to interfere in revision against the order of a Magistrate. What was argued in the Bench case was that after the findings of the civil court were incorporated by the Magistrate in his final order passed under section 146 (1-B), the order of the civil court merged in the order of the Magistrate and the order of the Magistrate was revisable under section 435 Cr. P. C. The Bench repelled that contention on the ground that the findings arrived at by the civil court would nonetheless remain the findings of the civil court and section 435 does not authorise the High Court to exercise revisional powers against the order of the civil court. The Bench did not, therefore, lay down that the order of the Magistrate cannot be interfered with in any respect. To my mind, if the illegality is in the order of the Magistrate a revision under section 435 Cr. P. C. would be maintainable. The Bench did not, therefore, lay down that the order of the Magistrate cannot be interfered with in any respect. To my mind, if the illegality is in the order of the Magistrate a revision under section 435 Cr. P. C. would be maintainable. If for instance the reference is wrongly made by a Sub-Divisional Officer of a joint land or if the reference is made by a Magistrate who had no territorial jurisdiction, or where the land itself is not determinable the High Court would be quite competent to interfere in a revision and give suitable directions. Whether a revision lies or does not lie will therefore depend on the fact whether the order sought to be challenged can be challenged without challenging the findings of the civil court. To my mind, what the Bench of this Court has stressed is that the order must in substance be the order of the Magistrate for exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 435 Cr. P. C. I am supported by the observations of the Bench while considering the scope of section 435 Cr.P.C. The Bench observed as under : "This section not only gives the power to call for the records but also to examine the record of a proceeding. The proceeding must be of an inferior criminal court and not of "any court". This is obvious because the purpose of examining the record of the proceeding is to "satisfy itself or himself" as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and also as to the regularity of the proceedings of that inferior court. Thus section 435 Cr. P. C specifically mentions the restriction that the proceedings of which the record is called for and examined is to be of an inferior criminal court." It may be that in some cases where inspite of bad reference after the civil court has determined the land itself and has given -a finding the High Court may refuse to interfere on technical grounds because substantial justice it done, but non-interference is distinct from the non-maintainability of the revision. 11. I, therefore, agree with my brother Katju, J. and hold that the revision to the High Court in the present case was maintainable. 11. I, therefore, agree with my brother Katju, J. and hold that the revision to the High Court in the present case was maintainable. I also hold that the property being un ascertainable the reference itself was without jurisdiction and all the proceedings including the reference is bad in law. The parties will be free to demarcate the land and re-agitate the matter if they so desire. H.C.P. Tripathi and J.S Trivedi JJ. Dated August 24, 1967, As we have differed in respect of the order to be passed in this Reference let the papers o' this case be placed before Hon. the Chief, Justice for passing whatever orders he deems fit and proper i.e. either to refer it to a third Judge or to a full Bench. K.B. Asthana J., (December 1, 1967). This criminal reference has come up before me on a difference of opinion between brothers Tripathi, J. and Trivedi, J. to whom the case was referred as the learned single Judge, who heard this reference first, was of the view that the question whether the finding of the learned Munsif as to possession given in a reference under section 146 Cr. P. Code can be set aside in revision required consideration by a larger bench. I have heard Sri D.P. Mittal, in support of the reference. What happened was that about certain agricultural plot, a dispute arose between Jahana Singh and others on one side and Kalwa and others on the other. It has come in evidence that there was a plot no. 26/6 of which a lease was executed by the Gaon Samaj in favour of Kalwa and others. In this connection there was some litigation between Jahana Singh and others who claimed to be the tenants, the Gaon Samaj and the lessees. I find from the record that the Gaon Samaj failed in its attempt to get a declaration from the court that the plot no. 26/6 vested in Gaon Samaj. There is yet another judgment on the record showing that Jahana Singh succeeded in getting a decree for cancellation of the lease executed by Gaon Samaj. Jahana Singh at first applied to the Magistrate that proceedings under section 107/117 Cr. P. Code be taken against Kalwa and other but later on the Magistrate ordered that the application of Jahana Singh be converted into one under section 115 Cr. P. Code. Jahana Singh at first applied to the Magistrate that proceedings under section 107/117 Cr. P. Code be taken against Kalwa and other but later on the Magistrate ordered that the application of Jahana Singh be converted into one under section 115 Cr. P. Code. On a report received from the Police and after ascertaining the Khasra numbers of the actual plot about which there was danger of the breach of peace, the Magistrate drew up a preliminary order. It related to plot no. 26/8, twenty bighas in area and plot No/9, ten bighas in area. On both these plots on the date of the preliminary order Chari crops were standing. An order was passed attaching the said plots along with Chari crops. The record shows that at the spot, when attachment was made all the parties were present and a supurdar took possession of the disputed Plots and the crop. Throughout the proceedings before the Magistrate no party ever raised any question regarding the identity of the plots in dispute. The Magistrate found it difficult to decide as to which of the parties was in possession on the date of the preliminary order and referred the matter to the court of the Munsif having jurisdiction. The learned Munsif after allowing an opportunity to the parties concerned to adduce evidence, came to the conclusion that it was Kalwa who was in possession of the disputed plots on the date of the preliminary order. When the record went back to the Magistrate, he passed a final order in favour of Kalwa based on the findings of the learned Munsif. Jahana Singh and others then went up in revision to the learned Sessions Judge. In the revision before the learned Sessions Judge it was urged on behalf of Jahana Singh thit the preliminary order was bad inasmuch as no specification of the plot in dispute was given and as they could not be identified at the spot, the preliminary order was void. Other points were also raised on merits which were decided against Jahana Singh by the learned Sessions Judge. On the technical point mentioned above the learned Sessions Judge thought that there being no proper specification the order would not be effective and recommended to this Court that the revision be accepted. Thus the reference has come before this Court. 12. Other points were also raised on merits which were decided against Jahana Singh by the learned Sessions Judge. On the technical point mentioned above the learned Sessions Judge thought that there being no proper specification the order would not be effective and recommended to this Court that the revision be accepted. Thus the reference has come before this Court. 12. In this Court, it appears that the learned counsel for Kalwa in the forefront raised the question that the findings of the learned Munsif under the law could not be impugned either by way of an appeal or revision and the final order passed by the Magistrate on their basis could not be set aside in revision. I do not think it necessary to go into this question of law, as I feel this reference can be rejected on merits. I do not at all a gree with the approach of the learned Sessions Judges that the plots in dispute were not specified and could not be identified at the spot. In fact no party to the proceedings at any stage ever raised any doubt about the same. It appears that all the parties concerned fully knew the extent in area of the plots nos. 26/8 and 26/9 which were the subject matter of dispute. It appears to me that in revision before the learned Sessions Judge some argument was made, which to my mind was not tenable, being based merely upon some lack of details in describing the immovable property involved in the dispute before the court. I have already observed that the record shows that when the said plots were attached, the parties concerned were present and they knew what was attached. The final order of the Magistrate related to the immovable property which had been attached and which was given in supurdagi. I do not see any difficulty in complying with the final order of the Magistrate. Jahana Singh will get the possession of the plots and the crops which were attached. I may observe that the criminal courts under section 145 Gr.P. Code are more concerned with prevention of breach of peace and not with the exact extent of the area of the immovable property which is the subject matter of dispute. Jahana Singh will get the possession of the plots and the crops which were attached. I may observe that the criminal courts under section 145 Gr.P. Code are more concerned with prevention of breach of peace and not with the exact extent of the area of the immovable property which is the subject matter of dispute. Want of precision in describing that property on paper in my judgment will not invalidate the proceedings under Sections 145 & 146 of the Cr.P.C. so long as those proceedings related to an immovable property which is sufficiently identifiable at the spot and the police or the parties concerned know where that property is situate. I do not, therefore, agree with the contention of Sri Mittal, that the final order passed by the Magistrate would not be an effective order in law for the supposed reason that the two plots concerned are not demandable or identifiable at the spot. 13. For the reasons given above I would recommend that the reference be rejected.