JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J.- 1. This appeal, filed by the plaintiffs, is directed against a decree of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Bhopal, dated 10th July 1964, reversing the decree of the IIIrd Civil Judge, Class II, Bhopal, dated 31st March 1962. 2. The relevant facts are these. The plaintiffs in this case sued as de facto mutawallis to recover possession of a 3 chasma shop at Abidabad mandi, Bhopal, which is in occupation of the defendant. The property in question was originally held by one Kalekhan, but it appeared that on 6th January 1955, he executed an instrument purporting to be a Wakfnama under which he settled that property together with certain other properties not in dispute, as wakf in favour of "Masjid Ilahi Bux" at Bhopal, appointing himself as the mutawalli, and directing that on his demise, a congregation of worshippers would appoint 4 mutavallis to take charge of the wakf property. The Wakf due to infirmity of his age, was apparently unable to administer the wakf property and, accordingly, executed a mukhtiyarnama on 23rd October 1959 in favour of the plaintiffs, vesting in them the right of management. The plaintiffs sought eviction of the defendant on the ground that he was their tenant in respect of the aforesaid premises, that he had failed to pay arrears of rent within one month of the service upon him of a written notice of demand from them and that he had also renounced his character as a tenant. The defendant disputed the claim on various grounds, alleging that Kalekhan was not the owner of the property in question and could not make a valid wakf, nor had he made a wakf as alleged; neither had he appointed himself as a mutawalli nor had he any authority to execute the alleged power of attorney in favour of the plaintiffs; that he had never intended to execute the alleged mukhtiyarnama and as soon as it was brought to his knowledge that such a document had been obtained by the plaintiffs, by fraud, he immediately repudiated it by publication of a notice, that the plaintiffs had no locus standi to file this suit, that he was not a tenant of the premises but was in possession as a mortgagee under an unregistered deed dated 21st September, 1959, and that the alleged notice dated 11th February 1960 had not been served on him. 3. 3. The trial Court gave the plaintiffs a decree. The Court below has, however, held that inasmuch as the status of a de facto mutawalli is unknown in Mohammedan Law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to continue the suit as such unless their appointment, if any, was in terms of the wakf deed dated 6th January 1955. It further held that neither the alleged tenancy is established nor the service of notice dated 11th February 1960 proved and bas, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 4. The first point that arises for consideration in this appeal is, whether the plaintiffs can maintain or continue this action for ejectment. They had initially instituted the suit in their own name on the strength of the power of attorney executed by Kalekhan in their favour. Normally, it is the lessor alone who has the right to bring a suit for ejectment on determination of a contract of tenancy. That is because he is the person in whom the reversion of the lease is actually vested. An agent, holding a power of attorney from him, is only allowed to "appear" and "act" on his behalf and in his name, under Order III, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, but he cannot bring a suit for ejectment in his own name. There is no manner of doubt that if this was an usual type of suit, the plaintiffs would be non-suited on that account alone, viz., on account of the defective frame of the suit. 5. But, this is a suit with a difference, because the plaintiffs were under the terms of the power of attorney, constituted to be the de facto mutawallis of the waks, property. Al already stated, the Wakif had created a wakf and constituted himself to be the mutawalli of the waks property by the wakf deed dated 6th January 1955, and, thereafter, he appointed the plaintiffs to be his agents and entrusted to them with the power of management, including the right of bringing suits against tenants, etc. It would, therefore, be a misnomer to call them as agents simpliciter. They were, in reality, de factor mutawallis of the wakf property with certain powers. The alleged cancellation of their authority by the public notice Ex. It would, therefore, be a misnomer to call them as agents simpliciter. They were, in reality, de factor mutawallis of the wakf property with certain powers. The alleged cancellation of their authority by the public notice Ex. D. 3, dated 7th January 1961 is no legal consequence because it appears from the evidence of Mamdu alias Shaft (D.W. 1) himself that the alleged proclamation was at his instigation and not an act of the wakif as a free agent. The suit must, therefore, be regarded as having been validly instituted. 6. As already stated, the Court below has assumed that the status of a de facto mutawalli is unknown in Mohammedan Law, and upon that assumption held that the plaintiffs had no right to bring a suit in that capacity. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Siddique Ahemed Choudhury Vs. Sayed Ahamad Choudhury and others AIR 1945 Cal. 418, is cited before me, as supporting this view. That decision is, however not an authority for that proposition, and is distinguishable on facts. In Siddique Choudhury's case; the question was whether the founder or Wakif under the Mohammedan Law after he has dedicated his property to the Almighty and made provision for the appointment of a mutawalli, can subsequently alter the arrangement arrived at, or, remove the mutawalli appointed by him, if he had not reserved the power in himself when he created the wakf. After referring to the Fatawa Alamgiri, which is undoubtedly regarded as a work of high authority in this Country, their Lordships stated that reservation of such a power is necessary before the wakif can discharge a mutawalli appointed by him when he created the wakf. That principle, is not in question here because the wakif neither tried to remove a mutawalli once lawfully appointed nor sought to alter any of the provisions regarding management etc. of the wakf. It would appear that having appointed himself as the mutawalli, Kalekhan necessarily had the power to make such arrangements, as he felt necessary, for a proper management of the wakf property. The contention that the appointment of the plaintiffs as de facto mutawallis was void ab initio must, accordingly, be rejected. In my view, the defendant can not also now be permitted to challenge their appointment as such. The contention that the appointment of the plaintiffs as de facto mutawallis was void ab initio must, accordingly, be rejected. In my view, the defendant can not also now be permitted to challenge their appointment as such. After the death of Kalkhan during the pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs bad amended the plaint and inserted a new para 1-A, stating that they had been working as a sub or de facto mutawalli of the wakf property since 5-6th January 1955 and, therefore, were entitled to bring a suit in that capacity. The fact of their appointment as de facto mutawallis had not been controverted by the defendant by incorporating a denial of that fact in his written statement and the result now is that the fact stands admitted. Moreover, the wakf is now admittedly registered by the Madhya Pradesh wakf Board and the plaintiffs recognised as constituting the Committee of management of the wakf, under the provisions of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954. That gives to them an additional capacity to continue the suit. 7. Equally unsubstantial is the contention that the status or a de facto mutawalli is unknown in Mohammedan Law. The Madras High Court in Mst. Moideen Bihi Ammal Vs. Rathnavelu Mudali AIR 1927 Mad. 69, stated that the concept of a de facto trustee or trustee de son tort is not foreign to Mohammedan Law, nor is there any prohibition against a person becoming a de facto mutawalli by taking the charge of the wakf and purporting to manage the wakf property. It was held in that case that such person can collect the rents and profits and reimburse himself for the expenses incurred for such collection. That decision was followed in this Court in Chindhoo Vs. Haidarkhan 1955 NLJ 161, wherein it was further implicated that no difference lies whether a de facto mutawalli collects rent through Court by instituting a suit or otherwise than by legal process. The Allahabad High Court, which had frequently to deal with cases under the Mohammedan Law, also speak of a de facto mulawalli in Abdul Rahim Khan Vs. Ramzan AIR 1929 All. 508. nowhere indicating that such an office is legally inconceivable, and has thereby accepted that Mohammedan law recognises a de facto mutawalli who can sue without establishing his de jure character. Ramzan AIR 1929 All. 508. nowhere indicating that such an office is legally inconceivable, and has thereby accepted that Mohammedan law recognises a de facto mutawalli who can sue without establishing his de jure character. No authority is cited before me to the contrary and, as at present advised, I see no difficulty in accepting the legal concept of a de facto mutawalli of a mosque. Now, if a de facto mutawalli can institute a suit for recovery of rents, than a fortiori there is no reason why such person cannot file suits for recovery of the wakf property or such part of it as may have been let out to tenants. The suit, therefore, lies. 8. The next question is, whether the contract of tenancy is established. The finding arrived at by the Court below that the contract is not established, but it suffers from serious an infirmity, viz., the finding rests on the assumption that evidence led by the plaintiffs in proof of the contract is all hearsay. That is not so, Kamalkhan (P.W. 4), one of the witnesses examined to prove the alleged contract, has stated that the terms of the contract were settled by the parties in his presence. There is also other supporting evidence of disinterested persons showing that the defendant was a tenant. Mamdu alias Shafi (D.W. 1), while accepting that he is not a mortgagee wants us to believe that the property was given to him on account of his Khidmat. Apart from this the finding that has been arrived at by the Court below is by overlooking an important piece of evidence, namely, the recitals of mortgage deed, Ex. D. 2, dated 21st September 1959, on which the defendant himself relies for establishing his rights as the mortgagee, which describe him as a tenant of the premises. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have recently held in Smt. Sonavati Vs. Shri Ram Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1965, that where a finding is arrived at by the first appellate Court by ignoring very important evidence, that finding is not binding on the High Court. I have been taken through the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs. Apart from the oral evidence on record, there are overwhelming circumstances raising an irresistible inference that the possession of the defendant was nothing other than that of a tenant. I have been taken through the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs. Apart from the oral evidence on record, there are overwhelming circumstances raising an irresistible inference that the possession of the defendant was nothing other than that of a tenant. I would accordingly, reverse the finding reached by the Court below and restore that of the trial Court holding that the defendant was a tenant of the suit premises. 9. This brings me to the next and last question, namely, whether a service of the notice, Ex P. 9, dated 11th February 1960 upon the defendant, has been established. The law is clear on the subject. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji Vs. Ram Shashi Roy and others AIR 1918 PC 102 stated that: "If a letter properly directed containing a notice to quit is proved to have been put into the post office it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office, and was received by the persons to whom it was addressed and that presumption would apply with still greater force to letters which the sender has taken the precaution to register, and is not rebutted but strengthened by the fact that a receipt for the letter is produced signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself." The Court below has, however, refused to draw any presumption of due service in the absence of a proper postal acknowledgment even although the address of the defendant was correctly given in the notice. It now appears that the original postal receipts and the relative acknowledgments of the defendants were misplaced in the office of the plaintiff's counsel and were not raceivable. The postal receipts were, however, traced out and they had been produced; but the acknowledgments could not be filed as they were not traced out. The appellants have now filed an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, stating on affidavit of Abdul Rahim Khan, one of the de facto mutawallis that they made a search for the acknowledgments in the office of their counsel and after a through search, have now been able to trace the acknowledgments which bear the defendant's signature. These documents along with a letter of the Postmaster, Bhopal, dated 7th April 1960 is original, stating that the notices under reference had been delivered to the defendant, have been filed along with this application. The application is strenuously opposed on the ground that the documents should not be taken on record under Order XLI, Rule 27, to fill up a lacuna in the plaintiffs' case, But, after hearing the parties on this appeal, I am satisfied that the admission of those documents under Rule 27 is necessary and essential for an affectual adjudication of the question whether there was service of notice as alleged. These documents are matters of public record and their authenticity is beyond question. It is needless to add that the requirement for these documents is a requirement of the Court itself to enable it to pronounce judgment. In Venkataramaih vs. Seetharama Reddy AIR 1963 SC 1526 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have stated: "Under Rule 27 (1), the appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it required such evidence 'to enable it to pronounce judgment' but also for 'any other substantial cause'. There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of record as it is, and so it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause under Rule 27 (1) (b) of the Code". The application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code is for these reasons, allowed, and the documents filed along with the application are taken on record. The result is that the appeal has to be remanded, for a fresh decision on this issue. 10. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The application under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code is for these reasons, allowed, and the documents filed along with the application are taken on record. The result is that the appeal has to be remanded, for a fresh decision on this issue. 10. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below are set aside and the appeal is remanded to that Court with a direction to decide the question of service of notice dated 11th February 1960 afresh in the light of the additional documents placed on record by this Court under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, after allowing the parties afresh opportunity to leading such evidence as they desire on that aspect. The cost shall abide the event.