JUDGMENT A. P. Sen, J. 1. This is an appeal by the defendants against a decree of the Additional District Judge, Umaria, dated 15th July 1964, affirming the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Class II, Umaria, dated 30th November, 1961. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that one Bharat was the Pattedar tenant of 33.35 acres of land situate in Mouza Kachhari in Tehsil Bandhogarh, and after his death the holding was mutated in the name of his son Ramadhin born to his mistress Mst. Tilokiya. When Ramadhin died in 1936, the lands came in the cultivating possession of the concubine Mst. Tilokiya, and she was recognized to be the Pattedar tenant thereof, having succeeded to the holding of her son Ramadhin in her status as the mother. After her death in 1953, an application for mutation of their names was filed by her daughters' sons. During the said proceedings, one Raghunandansingh claiming to be the son of Bharat by his married wife filed an objection setting up his own claim to the holding. While retaining seisin of the mutation case, the Revenue Court referred the following issue to the Civil Court under section 220 of the Vindhya Pradesh Land Revenue and Tenancy Act of 1953 (Act No.3 of 1955): ^^vk;k vkjkth eqruktk dk tk;t okfjl dkSu gSA^^ The Civil Court answered the reference holding that Raghunandansingh was entitled to succeed the lands in dispute. In accordance therewith, the name of Raghunandansingh was mutated in place of Mst. Tilokiya, but apparently, he was not placed in possession. The reference was numbered and tried as a civil suit. Thereafter, Raghunandansingh's heirs filed the present suit in 1958 claiming relief of possession on the allegation that he was wrongfully dispossessed from the lands by the heirs of Mst. Tilokiya, i. e. her daughter's sons and her husband. The defendants raised various pleas in defence. They asserted that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this nature. Further, that Mst. Tilokiya had acquired a title by prescription in as much as she, as a concubine, had no right to inherit the holdings of Bharat and her possession between years 1936 to 1953 was prima facie adverse; that the suit was barred by limitation. They further contended that Raghunandansingh was not entitled to succeed to the holdings and that in any event, Mst. They further contended that Raghunandansingh was not entitled to succeed to the holdings and that in any event, Mst. Chironji, one of the daughters of Mst. Tilokiya, who was a necessary party to this suit, not having been impleaded, the suit was not maintainable. 3. On these facts, both the Courts below have upheld the claim of the plaintiffs holding that the adjudication by the Civil Court on a reference under section 220 (2) of the Vindhya Pradesh Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1953, was res judicata. As regards jurisdiction, the Courts below hold that both Revenue and Civil Courts had jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred merely by the existence of an alternate summary jurisdiction. Having regard to the nature of the relief sought, the Courts below held that this was not a suit based on title, and therefore the non-joinder of Mst. Chironjia was not fatal. Lastly, it was held that the possession of Mst. Tilokiya till 1953, could not be adverse, and, therefore, the suit was within limitation. 4. The first point urged in support of this appeal is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit is barred under section 215, read with section 218 (2) (i) of the Vindhya Pradesh Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1953. This Court, interpreting sections 250 and 257 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, which are in pari materia, held that what is excluded from cognizance of a Civil Court is a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act for restoration of land to a dispossessed Bhumiswami. [See Nathu v. Dilbande Hussain and others 1964 RN 512=1964 JLJ 107=1964 MPLJ 822. 5. A suit for possession after possession is a suit based on title although the question of title may be res judicata. The relief of dispossession can not be had unless the plaintiffs established their title and also showed that the title was still subsisting on the date of suit. (See, Shanker v. Poonamchand ILR 1936 Nag 254). Such a suit is not ordinarily cognizable by the Revenue Courts. Upon my view that a declaration of title was implicit in the relief of possession asked for, the Civil Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction to try this suit, (see, Nathu v. Dilbande Hussain (supra)]. (See, Shanker v. Poonamchand ILR 1936 Nag 254). Such a suit is not ordinarily cognizable by the Revenue Courts. Upon my view that a declaration of title was implicit in the relief of possession asked for, the Civil Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction to try this suit, (see, Nathu v. Dilbande Hussain (supra)]. In Kalluram v. Ganesh Prasad S. A. No. 127 of 1961, it was held that section 215 provides merely an alternate summary remedy and does not take away the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. 6. This brings me to the question whether the previous adjudication by the Civil Court on a reference by the Revenue Court under section 220 of the Vindhya Pradesh Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1953, holding that Raghunandansingh was entitled to be recorded as a Pattedar tenant of the land, is res judicata between then parties. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that when a finding is given by a Civil Court in a revenue case, the ultimate decision would nevertheless be by the Revenue Court, and as such the decision by a Revenue Court cannot be res judicata. In support of this submission, strong reliance is placed on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhagwandayal v. Mst. Revati Devi AIR 1962 SC 287 . 7. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhagwandayal v. Reoti Devi (supra) refrained from expressing any view whether the decision on a question of title in the previous suit under section 271 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, was that of a revenue Court or of a civil Court. However, since the point has been urged before me, it is necessary for me to decide the question. It is contended that when a finding is given by civil Court in a revenue case, on an issue referred by the revenue Court under section 220 of the Vindhya Pradesh Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1953, the ultimate decision would nevertheless be by the Revenue Court inasmuch as it retains seisin over the case while making a reference. The contention must be accepted. 8. The application for mutation filed before the Revenue Court, which was a Court of exclusive jurisdiction in such matters. The contention must be accepted. 8. The application for mutation filed before the Revenue Court, which was a Court of exclusive jurisdiction in such matters. In accordance with section 220 of the Vindhya Pradesh Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1953, even though it was a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, the revenue Court was not entitled to give a finding of its own on a question of title. In accordance therewith, when the revenue Court was satisfied that a question of title had arisen in the mutation case before it, it had to frame an issue in this regard and submit the record to the civil Court of competent jurisdiction "for the decision of that issue only" The Civil Court, after reframing the issue, if necessary, was required to "decide such issue only" and to return the record with its finding thereon to the revenue Court which submitted it. The revenue Court was then required, in terms of sub-section (2); "shall then proceed to decide the suit, accepting the finding of the civil Court on the issue referred to it". That is the scheme underlying section 220 ibid. 9. A fortiori, it does not necessarily imply that the finding given by the civil Court on the issue referred to it, would be treated as if it were given by a civil Court in a suit respecting title. There is no manner of doubt that the revenue Court dealing with a mutation case, was still a Court of exclusive jurisdiction. While making a reference to the Civil Court on a question of title, the revenue Court, all the while, retained seisin of the case. In answering the issue of title referred, the civil Court was not acting as a Court of ordinary original jurisdiction but in a consultative or advisory capacity. It is noteworthy that the ultimate decision in the mutation case was by the Revenue Court. It must, accordingly, be held that the decision in the former proceedings was by a Revenue Court. 10. Even otherwise, the finding in the previous proceedings would not operate as res judicata inasmuch as the Revenue Court which ultimately tried the former mutation case was not competent to try the present suit. If the suit was for restoration of possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act simpliciter, i. e., involved no question of title, that would be a different matter. If the suit was for restoration of possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act simpliciter, i. e., involved no question of title, that would be a different matter. But, as I have already stated, a declaration of title was implicit in the relief of possession asked for. Apart from this, the relief cannot be had unless the plaintiff established that his title was still subsisting on the date of suit. Furthermore, the plaintiff had to meet the averment in the written statement that Mst. Tilokiya and after her, the defendants had perfected their title by adverse possession. 11. There is no denying the fact that a suit of this nature would not be cognizable by the revenue Courts. In Bhagwandayal v. Reoti Devi (supra), the Supreme Court rejected a plea of res judicata in like circumstances. It must, accordingly be held that the decision in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1959 would not operate as res judicata on the present suit. 12. The result is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, are hereby set aside and the suit is remanded to the Court of first instance for a trial according to law. The parties shall be afforded a fresh opportunity of leading such oral and documentary evidence as they may desire. The costs throughout shall abide the event.