This is an appeal filed by the defendants 1 (Jagat Chandra Marak, son of late Jangdan Garo), 2 (Gunamani Garo, wife of Jagat Chandra Garo), 5 (As-wini Kumar Deb Nath, son of late Ram Charan Deb Nath), 7 (Ananga Chandra Deb Nath, son of late Adhar Chandra Deb Nath), 12 (Raimani Devi, widow of late Adhar Chandra Deb Nath), 14 (Kunja Lata Devi, widow of late Nadiar Chandra Bhowmick), 16 (Haridas Deb Nath. son of late Ishan Chandra Deb Nath) and 17 (Indramani Saha, widow of late Dwarka Nath Saha) in Title Suit No. 24 of 1953 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tripura at Agartala against the judgment and decree therein declaring the title of the respondents-plaintiffs to jote Nos. 59, 72, 96 and 105 in Champpamurah mouja, Ishanchandranagar Pargana comprised by the plaint 'Kha' schedule, for delivery of possession of the same to the respon­dents and for payment of Rs. 1,500 to­wards mesne profits. 2. Cross-objections were filed by the respondents against the decree for Rupees 1,500 for mesne profits. 3. The case of the respondents, plain­tiffs, briefly stated, is thus: (a) The plaint 'Ka' schedule ryoti jote land, situate in Champpamurah mouja, within Ishanchandranagar Pargana, about 1 drone and 11 kanis in extent, belonged to one Kadar Ali. After him. two brothers by name Minnat Ali and Saheb All came to own the said land. As Saheb Ali died issueless, Minnat Ali became the sole owner of the land. Minnat Ali sold it to Harinath Garo Sardar of Champpamurah. The latter mortgaged the land to one Saiy-ed Ali for Rs. 500 under registered mort­gage bond, dated 7-4-1336 T. E. Saiyed Ali transferred his mortgage interest under a registered deed of transfer dated 17-6-1341 T. E. in favour of Himmat Ali Bhuiya of Purba Gakulnagar village. The mortga­gor Harinath Garo Sardar sold the plaint 'Kha' schedule land about 1 drone in ex­tent, out of the hypotheca to the transferee, mortgagee Himmat Ali Bhuiya under a re­gistered sale deed dated 4-10-1341 T. E. in full discharge of the mortgage debt. (b) Himmat Ali thus became the owner of the plaint 'Kha' schedule land of about 1 drone. He was in possession and enjoy­ment of it until he died in 1343 T. E. After his death, his eldest son Ulfatali Bhuiya (first plaintiff-respondent) began to manage his entire estate. (b) Himmat Ali thus became the owner of the plaint 'Kha' schedule land of about 1 drone. He was in possession and enjoy­ment of it until he died in 1343 T. E. After his death, his eldest son Ulfatali Bhuiya (first plaintiff-respondent) began to manage his entire estate. In 1343 T. K. he learnt that, without the knowledge of his father Himmat Ali Bhuiya, Hari­nath Garo Sardar managed in 1341 T. K, about 2 months after he sold away the land to Himmat Ali Bhuiya, to have toujis posted in the names of his relations in the place of the original jotedars Minnat Ali and Saheb Ali. He got touji No. 59, for 1 Kani, 7 gandas and 3 karas posted in the name of his minor son Manik Garo, touji No. 105 for 4 kanis, 3 gandas and 1 kara in the name of his son-in-law Devendra and touji No. 96 for 3 kanis and 11 gan­das in the name of another son-in-law Jangdan Garo and touji No. 72 for 3 kanis, 18 gandas and 2 karas in the name of Himmat Ali. The first respondent raised disputes with Harinath Garo Sardar and the latter undertook not to make any claim through his son or sons-in-law to the toujis in question. The first respondent paid the land revenue in the names of Jangdan Garo, Devendra and Manik Garo. Him­mat Ali Bhuiya paid the rent for jote No. 72 in his own name. The first respon­dent got the entries relating to toujis Nos. 59, 96 and 105 corrected in his own name with the knowledge of Manik Garo, Jang­dan Garo and the heirs of Devendra. Later on, the first respondent paid the rents for toujis Nos. 59, 96 and 105 in his own name. (c) Jangdan Garo, Devendra and Hari­nath Garo Sardar died. Taking advantage of their death and of the toujis standing in their names, their heirs filed a peti­tion before the Collector, Sadar in 1359 T. E. for cancellation of the name of the first respondent against toujis Nos. 59, 96 and 105. They falsely represented that there was another person Harinath Garo. who was different from Harinath Garo Sardar, the vendor of Himmat Ali Bhuiya. The Collector passed an illegal order cancelling the name of the first respondent with reference to the said three toujis. 59, 96 and 105. They falsely represented that there was another person Harinath Garo. who was different from Harinath Garo Sardar, the vendor of Himmat Ali Bhuiya. The Collector passed an illegal order cancelling the name of the first respondent with reference to the said three toujis. (d) The appellants and others formed Into an unlawful assembly and forcibly dispossessed the respondents from the lands covered by toujis Nos. 59, 72, 96 and 105 on 9-3-1952 A. D. The first res­pondent filed a criminal case against them. (e) So, the respondents filed the suit on 17-11-1953 for declaration of their title to the plaint 'Kha' schedule land, for reco­very of possession of the same and for re­covery of Rs. 1,500 towards mesne profits. 4. The contesting defendants filed writ­ten statements denying the plaint allega­tions. Their case is as stated below: (a) Harinath Garo Sardar lived in Champpamurah. Jangdan Garo was the the said Harinath Garo Sardar's sister's husband. Harinath Garo, the father of Jangdan Garo, was not a Sardar, He re­sided in the Garo hills and died there. Jagat Chandra Garo was Harinath's dau­ghter's son. Neither Harinath Garo Sar­dar nor anybody else sold the suit land to Himmat Ail. (b) Jote No. 96 comprising an area of 3 kanis and 11 gandas stood in the name of Jangdan Garo, father of the first defen­dant-appellant. He enjoyed the land and, after his death, the first defendant-appel­lant and his deceased brother Jangma Garo enjoyed the land and the first defendant-appellant sold away the land subsequently to some of the supplementary defendants. The touji was posted in the name of the first defendant-appellant. Khatian was opened in 1340 T. E. (c) Jote No. 59 comprising 1 kani. 7 gandas and 3 karas of land was acquired by the third defendant Manik Chandra Garo from his grandfather late Harinath Garo Sardar and in the year 1340 T. E. the jote was created in his name. But, he sold away the land to some of the sup­plementary defendants. (d) In Jote No. 105, about 2 kanis of land belonged to the second defendant-appellant Gunamani Garo. But, he sold away the land to some of the sup­plementary defendants. (d) In Jote No. 105, about 2 kanis of land belonged to the second defendant-appellant Gunamani Garo. She sold it away to some of the supplementary defen­dants including the seventh defendant Ananga Chandra Deb Bath (fourth appel­lant) under a registered sale deed dated 10-12-1952 A. D. (e) The alienees from the above men­tioned defendants 1 to 3 are thus hi posses­sion and enjoyment of the suit land cover­ed by jote Nos. 59, 96 and 105. The res­pondents had neither title to nor posses­sion of the land of the said toujis within the statutory period and the suit is barred by limitation. 5. On the above contentions, the learn­ed Subordinate Judge framed the neces­sary issues and held that the respondents got title to jotes Nos. 59, 72, 96 and 105 that they were in possession and enjoy­ment of the same, but that were dis­possessed on 9-3-1952 A. D. Accordingly he declared their title to the land cover­ed by jotes nos. 59. 72, 96 and 105 and decreed that the respondents should get delivery of possession of the land cover­ed by the jotes and held that the suit is not barred by limitation. He also passed a decree for Rs. 1,500 towards mesne profits. He dismissed the suit against defendant No. 4 Joynath Garo, who died during the pendency of the suit, as his legal representatives were not brought on record. Hence the appeal by the defendants 1, 2, 5, 7, 12, 14, 16 and 17 against the judgment and decree against them and cross-objections by the respon­dents attacking the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge regarding mesne pro­fits. 6. The points which were argued and which arise for determination are: (i) Whether the respondents have title to and possession of the plaint 'Kha' schedule land, of about 1 drone in extent, within the statutory period? (ii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (iii) To what mesne profits, if any, are the respondents entitled? (iv) To what relief are the appellants entitled? 7 to 8. POINTS (i) AND (ii):- (After considering the evidence, judg­ment proceeded:) 9. Thus, that Himmat All Bhuiya, the predecessor-in-title of the respondents, acquired title to and possession of the plaint 'Kha' schedule land of about 1 drone in extent is proved by Ext. (iv) To what relief are the appellants entitled? 7 to 8. POINTS (i) AND (ii):- (After considering the evidence, judg­ment proceeded:) 9. Thus, that Himmat All Bhuiya, the predecessor-in-title of the respondents, acquired title to and possession of the plaint 'Kha' schedule land of about 1 drone in extent is proved by Ext. P-l registered sale deed dated 4-10-1341 T. E. The next question, that has to be con­sidered, is whether the plaint 'Kha' schedule land consists of the 4 toujis Nos. 59, 72, 96 and 105 in dispute and whether the respondents were in possession and enjoyment of the same until they were said to have been dispossessed on 9-3-1952. There are the following circumstances, which go to prove the respondents' case. (After narrating some of the circums­tances in the rest of this para (8), and para (9), the judgment proceeded:) 10. Secondly, the respondents produc­ed a number of tax receipts to show that Himmat Ali Bhuiya paid the land revenue for the 4 toujis in question and that, after his death, the respondents paid the same. Exts. P-4 (a) to P-4 (i) relate to jote No. 72 and they show that the land revenue for the said jote was paid by the respon­dents and their predecessor-in-title from 1343 T. E. Exts. P-4 (j) and P-4 (o) to P-4 (s) relate to jote No. 59 and they show that the respondents' predecessor-in-title and the respondents paid land revenue from 1344 T. E. Exts. P-4 (t) to P-4 (w) re­late to jote No. 96 and they show that the respondents' predecessor-in-title and the respondents paid land revenue of the said jote from 1344 T. E. Exts. P-4 (k) to P-4 (n) are tax receipts relating to jote 105 and they show that the respondents and their predecessor-in-title had been paying the land revenue for the said jote from 1344 T. E. The payment of land re­venue by Himmat Ali Bhuiya and by his successors-in-interest ever since Himmat Ali Bhuiya purchased the land under Ext. P-l dated 4-10-1341 T. E. is a very strong circumstance which goes to show that the 4 toujis in question are covered by Ext. P-l, that they were delivered to Him­mat Ali Bhuiya and that they had been in the possession and enjoyment of Himmat Ali Bhuiya and his successor-in-interest. The learned Counsel for the appellants raised four contentions on this aspect of the case. P-l, that they were delivered to Him­mat Ali Bhuiya and that they had been in the possession and enjoyment of Himmat Ali Bhuiya and his successor-in-interest. The learned Counsel for the appellants raised four contentions on this aspect of the case. His first contention is that the rent receipts were filed in the lower Court on 24-8-1960 long after the suit was filed on 17-11-1953 and that, therefore, they were got up. A perusal of the re­ceipts shows that they are all printed re­ceipts. If really the receipts were got up, the appellants would have summoned for the accounts from the revenue authori­ties to show that the respondents did not pay the land revenue and that the receipts were got up. So, I do not find any sub­stance in the contention that all the print­ed receipts Exts. P-4 (a) to P-4(w) were got up. His second contention is that the appellants are tribals and simple folk that to protect them and their interests in the lands the erstwhile Maharajah of Tripura issued notifications in the gazette dated 7th Aswin, 1343 T. E. and 15th Agrahayan, 1353 T. E. prohibiting aliena­tion of lands by the tribals in favour of non-tribals, that a similar provision was also made in S. 187 of the Tripura Land Revenue and the Land Reforms Act of 1960, that the appellants themselves paid the rents through Himmat Ali Bhuiya and the 1st respondent, Sardar of the vil­lage, and that, therefore, no importance should be attached to Exts. P-4 (a) to P-4(w) rent receipts. That the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants paid the land revenue through the respondents is an after-thought and un­tenable as is clear from the allegations made by D. W. 1, (the first defendant) in para 11 of his written statement and by the 7th defendant in para 12 of his written statement. Therein they stated that the respondents did not pay any rent for any year and that if they produced any rent receipts they would only be paper transac­tions designed to create evidence in the suit. The evidence of D. W. 1 is that he himself paid the rents. If really the ap­pellants paid the rents through the respon­dents, then they would have taken the re­ceipts and kept them with themselves. The evidence of D. W. 1 is that he himself paid the rents. If really the ap­pellants paid the rents through the respon­dents, then they would have taken the re­ceipts and kept them with themselves. So, the contention that the appellants them­selves paid the rents through the respon­dents under the rent receipts Exts. P-4 (a) to P-4(w) is wholly untenable. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the rent receipts show that rents were paid by the respondents in the names of Manik Garo for touji No. 59, Jangdan Garo for touji No. 96, Devendra Garo for touji No. 105 and that therefore the respondents cannot rely upon the payments. Touji No. 72 stands in the name of Himmat Ali Bhuiya and payments were made in his name. But. as the three toujis Nos. 59, 96 and 105 stand in the names of three different per­sons as evidenced by Ext. P.-6 series khatian, necessarily the payments of rents had to be made in their names until muta­tion was effected in the name of the first respondent in the accounts. How the names of Manik Garo, Jangdan Garo and Devendra were improperly entered in the the khatians will be adverted to presently. It is the question of actual payment of rent that is crucial and it is not materi­al through whom or in whose name the payment was made. The fourth contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the mere payment of rent, even if true, by the respondents for the 4 toujis in question does not show that the respondents had title to or possession of the same. He relied on Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh, AIR 1954 SC 758 where it was held that payment of rent does not neces­sarily establish the relationship of land­lord and tenant. But, a study of the judgment shows that the Supreme Court upheld the finding of the High Court that the fact of payment of rent by the defen­dants first party to the superior landlords as evidenced by the rent receipts produc­ed by the defendants first party from their own custody was quite consistent with their having permissive occupation of the lands under an amicable arrange­ment with the defendants second party, without there being any relationship of landlord and tenant between the two sets of defendants. In Nongamaithem Gourmani Singh v. Mayengbam Ibungohal Singh, AIR 1957 Manipur 15 the plaintiff deposited land revenue on behalf of the defendant's father whose name continued in the revenue papers. It was held that the plaintiff could not take advantage of his paying the revenue during a short period and that the defendant's continuous pay­ment of the same throughout was a material circumstance in his favour. It is very significant to note in this connec­tion that the appellants did not file even a single land revenue receipt to show that they ever paid land revenue for the jotes in question, until the suit was filed against them. If their case is true and they were really in possession of the suit toujis, they would have been able to pro­duce at least a single receipt to show that they paid the land revenue for the jotes in question after the suit was filed. The contention of the appellants that they paid the land revenue before the suit summonses were served upon them is not of any weight inasmuch as the land revenue was paid after the suit was filed. Exts. D-11 and D-11 (a) to D-11 (d) are of no evidentiary value and cannot show that the appellants were in possession of the suit jotes before the respondents were dispossessed from them. 11 to 13. [After discussing the evidence the judgment proceeded:] 14. Fifthly, there is the admission of the appellants themselves that the 4 jotes in question are the lands covered by Ext. P-l. The Order-sheet of the suit maintained by the Subordinate Judge shows that he framed three additional issues after hearing the lawyers for both the sides on 23-3-1961 and posted the suit to 27-3-1961 for arguments. Those issues are issues Nos. 10 to 12 mentioned by the Subordinate Judge in his judgment raising the question whether the suit land is identical with the land covered by jotes Nos. 59, 96 and 105 and whether the respondents have title to them and whe­ther the names of the defendants were fraudulently entered in the khatian re­garding the said jotes. Vide order No. 28 in the note sheet. 59, 96 and 105 and whether the respondents have title to them and whe­ther the names of the defendants were fraudulently entered in the khatian re­garding the said jotes. Vide order No. 28 in the note sheet. Then the respondents filed a petition on 27-3-1961 stating that the question whether the suit land is co­vered by the said jotes did not arise; in­asmuch as the defendants admitted that they sold away the lands in question, that there was no need for the lower Court to frame additional issues and that in case the additional issues were not deleted, then a Commissioner should be appointed to make local enquiry regarding the identity of the land and the jotes in question and to submit his report. Order No. 29 dated 27-3-1961 shows that the Subordinate Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed late after the evidence was recorded. As such, the contention of the appellants' counsel that the respon­dents themselves were in doubt regarding the identity of the land and that there­fore they filed the petition for appoint­ment of the Commissioner is not correct. The circumstances under which they filed the petition are quite different from those urged by the appellants' counsel. The appellants-defendants (who were impleaded before the supplementary de­fendants were added) filed a petition dated 4-1-1955 and another petition dated 14-1-1955 in the lower Court stating that the lands involved in the suit were sold away to the persons mentioned in the schedules and that the sale deeds executed by the defendants were in the possession of the alienees. These two petitions thus con­tain an admission that the plaint 'Ka' sche­dule land comprised the 4 jotes in ques­tion. But, the contention of the appel­lants' counsel is that the clerk who wrote the petitions was reckless in writing them, that he made irresponsible admissions,, which were gratuitous, and that no weight should be attached to them. He relied on Budhu Ram v. Uttam Chand, AIR 1928 Lah 726 and Ramchandra v. Keshav Khanderao, AIR 1953 Madh Bha 184 where it was held that a gratuitous ad­mission can be withdrawn at any time and that, therefore, it is of little value. Also, he further relied on Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 and K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India. Also, he further relied on Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 and K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India. AIR 1958 SC 419 in support of his contention that an admission is not conclusive as to the truth of matters stated therein, that it is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which must depend on the circumstances under which it was made and that it can be shown to be erroneous or untrue, so long as the person to whom it was made has not acted upon it to his detriment, when it has be­come conclusive by way of estoppel. In the lower Court and in the present appeal as well, it is the common case of all the appellants that the lands in ques­tion were sold away in favour of the supplementary defendants by the defen­dants who were impleaded at first and that the lands are now in the possession and enjoyment of the alienee defendants-appellants. So, there is no question of any carelessness or irresponsibility on the part of the pleader's clerk who wrote the petitions. The admission made by the appellants is not a casual or a gratui­tous one, inasmuch as it is the definite case of the appellants that the lands in dispute were sold away to the alienee defendants. So, the Court is entitled to rely on the petitions to show that the suit land namely, the plaint 'Kha' schedule land, comprises of the 4 Jotes in. question, which are claimed by the appel­lants. 15. Then there is the oral evidence of P. Ws 1 to 9 who deposed that the 4 Jotes in question were in the possession and enjoyment of Himmat Ali Bhuiya and P. W. 1 after the former's death through their lessees. (After considering their evidence the judgment proceeded:) But, as pointed out by the learned Sub­ordinate Judge, the witnesses could not be expected to speak to details of events which happened several years before they gave their evidence. The documentary evidence referred to above is more mate­rial in the present case than the oral testi­mony of P. Ws. 1 to 9, which suffers from vagueness to some extent. 16. Then, adverting to the case of the appellants their main plank is Ext. P-7 read with Exc. P-6 series. Ext. The documentary evidence referred to above is more mate­rial in the present case than the oral testi­mony of P. Ws. 1 to 9, which suffers from vagueness to some extent. 16. Then, adverting to the case of the appellants their main plank is Ext. P-7 read with Exc. P-6 series. Ext. P-7 is a copy of the "sheet of mistakes in Champamurah village prepared under Rule 166 of the rules regarding Survey and Settle­ment on 19-10-1341 T. E." Column 4 reads that on verification it was found that the land mentioned in the columns 1 and 2 formerly appertained to old touji No. 64 standing in the name of Minnat Ali and others, that the said land was 8 kanis, 15 gandas and 3 karas in extent and that the toujidars Minnat Ali and Saheb Ali died. Column 4 further reads that the persons mentioned in column 3 possessed the three items of land that out of them 1 kani, 7 sandas and 3 karas covered by khatian No. 66/59 was possessed by Manik Garo, son of Harinath Garo Sardar on the strength of an oral purchase, that Harinath Garo Sardar. son of Gena Garo entered in Khatian no. 80 was possessing 3 kanis, 18 gandas of the old touji on the strength of an oral purchase, that Jangadas Garo, son of Harinath Garo mentioned in khatian no. 105 was possessing 3 kanis and 10 gandas of land on the strength of an oral purchase and that it was necessary to assess "nazar" for purchases from the persons mention­ed in the Khatians Nos. 66, 80 and 105. In columns 7 to 10 it was written that there was a custom of oral purchase among the tenants of the hills and that, therefore, the transfers appeared to be true. The endorsement bears the signature of Sr J. Ganguly, S. O. dated 19-10-41 T. E. Ext. P-6 khatian shows that jote no. 96, 3 kanis, 11 gandas was entered in the name of Jangadas Garo. son of Harinath Garo and column 11 therein reads that it was a purchase made out of old touji no. 64. Ext. P-6 (a) shows that touii no. 72 for 3 kanis, 18 gandas and 1 kara stood in the name of Himmat Ali Bhuiya. This is not of much importance here, as admittedly Himmat Ali Bhuiya was the owner of jote 72. Ext. 64. Ext. P-6 (a) shows that touii no. 72 for 3 kanis, 18 gandas and 1 kara stood in the name of Himmat Ali Bhuiya. This is not of much importance here, as admittedly Himmat Ali Bhuiya was the owner of jote 72. Ext. P-6 (b) shows that touji No. 59, 1 kani, 7 gandas and 3 karas in extent stood in the name of Manik Chan­dra Baro. son of Harinath Sardar and that it was a portion purchased from out of old touji no. 64. Ext. P-6 (c) shows that jote no. 105 stood in the name of Debendra Garo, son of Manik Garo, that its extent was 4 kanis. 3 gandas and 1 kara and that it was purchased out of old touji no. 85. All the four toujis are prepared in 1340 T, E. 17. The contentions of the respon­dents' learned Counsel are two-fold. His first contention is that, according to the allegations made by the defendants 1 and 3 in paragraph 18 of their joint written statement, the market value of the suit lands was Rs. 20.000/- on the date of the plaint, that according to the said valua­tion each kani of land, which yields dou­ble crop, was at least more than 20/- at the time of the alleged oral sales men­tioned in Ext. P-7, that under section 12 of the old Tripura Registration Act cor­responding to section 17 of the Indian Registration Act the transactions of sales were compulsorily registrable and that in the absence of registered sale deeds the alleged oral sales were invalid. The respondents valued the suit land at Rs. 6.000/-. while the defendants 1 and 3 stated that the suit land would be worth Rs. 20.000/. in 1954. The oral sales were alleged to have taken place in or about 1340 T. E. corresponding to 1930 A. D. at a time when nobody was willing to live in wild animal infested & jungly Tripura and cultivate the lands therein. There is no evidence as to the value of the suit lands in 1340 T. E. or 1341 T. E. It must be remembered that Himmat Ali Bhuiya, the father of the first respondent pur­chased the plaint 'Kha' schedule land under Ext. P-l in full discharge of the mortgage debt, the principal of which was only Rs. 500/-. There is no evidence as to the value of the suit lands in 1340 T. E. or 1341 T. E. It must be remembered that Himmat Ali Bhuiya, the father of the first respondent pur­chased the plaint 'Kha' schedule land under Ext. P-l in full discharge of the mortgage debt, the principal of which was only Rs. 500/-. So, I find that if there was a custom of oral purchase the alleged oral purchases were. not hit by section 12 of old Tripura Registration Act. 18. But, the second contention of the respondents' Counsel has much force. The case of the appellants is that, as stated in Ext. P-7, 8 kanis, 15 gandas and 3 karas of land belonged to Minnat Ali and Saheb Ali but that they died and that their heirs were not trace­able. This is also the case of the respondents who plead that the lands originally belonged to Minnat Ali and Saheb Ali They further plead that Minnat Ali sold the suit lands under a registered sale deed dated 7-4-1336 T. E. to Harinath Garo Sardar. The respon­dents produced Ext. P-5 certified copy of the sale deed. But, the learned Subordi­nate Judge held that it was inadmissible in evidence. As already stated, Harinath Garo Sardar executed Ext. P-3 register­ed mortgage bond dated 7-4-1336 T. E. in favour of Saiyed Ali and Saiyed All transferred his mortgage interest in favour of Himmat Ali Bhuiya under Ext. P-2 dated 17-6-1341 T. E. and ultimately Harinath Garo Sardar sold the plaint 'kha' schedule land under Ext. P-l regis­tered sale deed dated 4-10-1341 T. E. to Himmat Ali Bhuiya in discharge of the mortgage debt. So, the land came to be possessed by Harinath Garo Sardar. But, Ext. P-6 reads that Jangdas Garo son of Harinath Garo purchased jote no. 96. Ext. P-6 (b) reads that Manik Garo, son of Harinath Garo Sardar purchased jote no. 59. Ext. P-6 (c) reads that Debendra Garo. son of Manik Garo purchased jote no. 105. Ext. P-7 shows that 3 persons namely, Manik Garo (son of Harinath Garo), Jangdas Garo (son of Harinath Garo) and Harinath Garo (son of Geza Garo) pur­chased orally the 3 notes 66/59, 105 and 80 mentioned in Ext. P-7. These allegations in Ext. P-7 are not correct. The sons of Harinath Garo namely, Manik Garo and Jangdas Garo did not orally purchase the lands. P-7. These allegations in Ext. P-7 are not correct. The sons of Harinath Garo namely, Manik Garo and Jangdas Garo did not orally purchase the lands. They were purchased by Hari­nath Garo Sardar. son of Geza Garo. So, the alleged oral purchases said to have been made by Jangdas Garo and Manik Garo in Exts. P-6 and P-6 (b) are false. The allegation in Ext. P-6 (c) that De­bendra Garo. son of Manik Garo orally purchased jote no. 105 is also incorrect. It was also purchased by Debendra Garo's paternal grandfather Harinath Garo Sar­dar. These entries are proved to be false by Ext. P-l. inasmuch as Ext. P-l shows that the lands were purchased by Hari­nath Garo Sardar and not either by Manik Garo or by Jangdas Garo or by Debendra Garo. As such, no reliance can be placed upon the order of Sri J. Ganguly, S. O. dated 19-10-41 T. E. in Ext P-7 that the oral transfers were true. The entries must have been got up by Hari­nath Garo Sardar. when he was alive, after he executed Ext. P-l registered sale deed in favour of Himmat Ali Bhuiya. The appellants' Counsel stated that the total extent of the suit 4 toujis exceeds 8 kanis 15 gandas and 3 karas mention­ed in Ext. P-7 and that therefore there is no identity between the suit 'Kha' schedule land and Ext. P-7 land. But it has already been shown that the suit toujis are comprised in the plaint 'Kha' schedule land. The variations in extents do not much matter, in view of the iden­tity of the specific toujis. 19. The case of the respondents is that P. W. 1 the first respondent learnt in 1343 T. E. about the toujis Nos. 59, 96 and 105 having been fraudulently made in the names of others that P. W. 1 rais­ed disputes before Harinath Garo Sar­dar, that the latter admitted that the persons, in whose names the toujis were entered, would not claim them and that subsequently to the knowledge of the heirs of Harinath Garo Sardar P. W. 1 got his name mutated (in mutation case no, 2C of 1357 T. E.) Ext. D-4 shows that D. W. 1 the first defendant-appellant filed case no. 164 of 1359 T. E. to cancel the mutation of the name of P.W.I with reference to the jote no. D-4 shows that D. W. 1 the first defendant-appellant filed case no. 164 of 1359 T. E. to cancel the mutation of the name of P.W.I with reference to the jote no. 96 and to mutate the same in his name. The then Assistant Collector Sri K. K. Dev Barma passed an order that, though P. W. 1 herein was in possession and enjoyment of the land he obtained mutation without notice to Jangdas Garo, son of Harinath Garo Sardar or Jagat Chandra Marak (D. W. 1 herein) and that, therefore, the mutation was liable to be cancelled. Ext. D-4 shows that P. W. 1 took out the mutation proceedings incase no. 2C of 1357 T. E. against Manik Garo and others. But, the Assistant Collector held that no notice was served on Jang­das Garo or D. W. 1. According to the plaint case Jangdas Garo was the son-in-law of Harinath Garo and was not his heir. So, the Assistant Collector went wrong in holding that no notice of the mutation proceedings was served on Jangdas Garo. Even if he was the son of Harinath Garo Sardar, notice had gone to Manik Garo, one of the sons of Hari­nath Garo Sardar. He was also wrong in holding that no notice was issued to D. W. 1 Jagat Chandra Marak, as no notice was necessary to him because notice was issued to his paternal uncle Manik Garo. the son of Harinath Garo Sardar. So, Ext. D-4 order was incorrect­ly passed by the Assistant Collector. The appellants' Counsel urged that there is no evidence that P. W. 1 raised disputes before Harinath Garo Sardar regarding the entries and that the latter promised that no claim would be made by the persons in whose name the entries were made. Lack of evidence regarding this dispute is not material, inasmuch as mutation was effected in the name of P. W. 1 in mutation case No. 2C of 1357 T. E. in the presence of Manik Garo (son of Harinath Garo Sardar) and others. 20. The appellants examined the first appellant as D. W. 1 and were satisfied with his evidence. They did not examine anybody else, because their main trump card is Ext. P-7 read with Ext. P-6 series. 20. The appellants examined the first appellant as D. W. 1 and were satisfied with his evidence. They did not examine anybody else, because their main trump card is Ext. P-7 read with Ext. P-6 series. The evidence of D. W. 1 is that jote No. 96 was his ancestral property and that the khatian was prepared in the name of his father late Jangdas Garo. It is his evidence that Devendra Garo was the father of the second defendant Gunamani Garo and that jote No. 105 belong­ed to him and, after his death, to her. Then, he stated that the third defendant Manik Garo was the owner of jote No. 59. It is his evidence that they were in pos­session and enjoyment of the said jotes, that they sold them away and that neither Himmat Ali Bhuiya nor the respondents had anything to do with them. In the cross-examination he stated that he did not know how his father Jangdas Garo acquired the land, but that he heard that Jangdas Garo purchased the land. But, he could not state from whom he pur­chased it. He further deposed that Manik Garo purchased the land, but that he could not state from whom he purchased it. He did not know in whose names the 3 jotes stood. Then, his evidence was one of lack of knowledge of the execu­tion of Exts. P-l to P-3. Thus, he could not prove the alleged oral purchases of the suit jotes 59, 96 and 105 referred to in Ext. P-6 series and Ext. P-7. Though he stated that he got rent receipts for payment of rent, he did not produce even a single rent receipt to show that the ap­pellants had ever paid any rent for any jote before the suit was filed. It is again significant to note that though he stated in para 14 of his writ­ten statement that there were two per­sons of the name of Harinath Garo, he deposed in the box that there was no other person of the name of Harinath Garo, except the father of Manik Garo. Thus, there is absolutely no evidence worth the name to show that the appel­lants were the legal owners of toujis 59, 96 and 105 and that they were in posses­sion and enjoyment of the same. But, their learned Counsel relied on Exts. Thus, there is absolutely no evidence worth the name to show that the appel­lants were the legal owners of toujis 59, 96 and 105 and that they were in posses­sion and enjoyment of the same. But, their learned Counsel relied on Exts. P-6 series and P-7 entries in the record of rights as presumptive evidence of their title to and possession of the said jotes. Also, he referred to Sheikh Barkat Ali v. Basant Nunia, 21 Cal WN 175 = (AIR 1921 Cal 79), Rani Harshamukhi Dasi v. Kshitindba Deb Roy, 47 Cal WN 662 => (AIR 1943 Cal 453) as authorities for the proposition that the entries in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct unless the contrary is proved and that it is not necessary for the person relying upon the presumption to adduce evidence to show that there was foundation for the entries. But, as can be seen from a number of decisions, the presumption raised by the entries in the record of rights is a rebuttable one. Vide Sm. Rakimjan v. Amar Krishna Choudhury, AIR 1925 Cal 404 (2), Rama Nath Sant v. Official Trustee of Bengal, AIR 1925 Cal 799, Kiran Chandra Roy v. Srinath Chakrabarti, AIR 1927 Cal 210 and Adu Mandal v. Hira Lai Mistry, AIR 1929 Cal 255. It is already shown that there is intrinsic evidence to show that the en­tries in Ext. P-6 series and Ext. P-7 were basically incorrect. Further, there is the documentary evidence adduced by the respondents, which sufficiently rebuts the presumption raised by the incorrect en­tries in Exts. P-6, P-6 (b) and P-6 (c) and P-7. The appellants evidently based their entire case on these wrong entries made in Exts. P-6, P-6 (b), P-6 (c) and P-7 and Ext. D-4 order passed on the basis of the incorrect entries. 21. Then, the last question that arises for determination is whether the suit is barred by limitation. It is common ground that Article 120 of the repealed Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) would apply to the facts of this case. Accord­ing to the said Article, the suit should be filed within 6 years from the date on which the right to sue accrued. The con­tention of the appellants' Counsel is that the final publication of the record of rights was made on 15-12-1341 T. E. as can be seen from Ext. Accord­ing to the said Article, the suit should be filed within 6 years from the date on which the right to sue accrued. The con­tention of the appellants' Counsel is that the final publication of the record of rights was made on 15-12-1341 T. E. as can be seen from Ext. P-6 series, that the suit should have been filed within 6 years there from, but that it was filed on 17-11-1963 and that it is barred by limita­tion. Reliance was placed by him on Midnapur Zemindary Co. Ltd. v. Secy, of State, AIR 1929 PC 286 and Gadadhar Patra v. Bholanath Choudhury, AIR 1939 Pat 548. But, these rulings have no direct application to the facts of this case. A mere adverse entry in a record of rights does not give rise to any cause of action. But, when the defendant causes an in­fringement of the right of the plaintiff by denying his title or dispossessing him from the property on the basis of such an entry, then the cause of action arises from the date of the infringement. The plain­tiff's knowledge of the adverse entry does not start the period of limitation. There is a long line of decisions in support of this proposition. Vide S. K. Acharil Chowdhury v. Umed Ali Howaladar, AIR 1922 Cal 251; Faujdar Singh v. Baldeo Singh, AIR 1927 All 597; Mt. Sukhdasi Kuar .v. Fateh Bahadur Singh, AIR 1933 Oudh 283 and Ghulam Mohammad Khan V. Samundar Khan, AIR 1936 Lah 37. The cause of action in the present case arose on 19-11-1951 the date on which the As­sistant Collector deleted the name of P. W. 1 and entered the names of some of the appellants, after which the appellants dispossessed the respondents from the suit jotes. The suit was filed within 2 years from 19-11-1951 the date of the order which infringed the respondents' rights and is not barred by time. 22. The appellants' learned counsel fur­ther argued that, according to the case of the respondents, they were in possession of the suit lands until they were dispos­sessed on 9-3-1952, that in such a case Article 142 of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) would apply, but that the respondents did not adduce any evi­dence to show that they were dispossessed on 9-3-1952, that the legal presumption raised by Exts. P-6 series and P-7 that the appellants were in possession of the suit lands from 1341 T. E. holds good and that, therefore, the suit which was filed on 17-11-1953 is barred by limitation. That In a case in which the plaintiff pleads possession and dispossession Article 142 of the repealed Limitation Act applies is be­yond doubt. Vide also Gathi Koch v. Meheruddin, AIR 1956 Assam 111 and Laxminarain Mulchand Kothari v. Vithaldas Kanhaiyalal, AIR 1962 Madh Pra 31. In the present case it is proved that the respondents were in possession of the suit lands until the Assistant Collector passed the order as per Ext. D-4 on 19-11-1951. The order itself mentions that the respon­dents were in possession of the suit lands upto 19-11-1951. The appellants took ad­vantage of the order and subsequently dispossessed the respondents from the suit jotes. So, even if the actual alleged date of dispossession namely, 9-3-1952 is not proved, still the suit is within time, as it was filed within less than 2 years from 19-11-1951. The suit is, in any event, not barred by limitation. 23. For the above reasons, I find point (i) in the affirmative and point (ii) in the negative. 24. Point (iii): The learned Subordinate Judge passed a decree for mesne profits on the basis of evidence adduced in the Court. But, the correct procedure is to ascertain mesne profits on a separate petition under Order 20 Rule 12 C. P. C. after the respondents obtain possession of the suit lands. So, the decree for mesne profits is liable to be set aside. The mesne profits have to be ascertained separately on a petition filed under Order 20 Rule 12 C. P. C. Finding accordingly. 25. Point (iv): In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. The decree for mesne profits is set aside and cross-objections are allowed. The Sub­ordinate Judge is directed to ascertain the mesne profits separately under Order 20 Rule 12 C. P. C. after the respondents ob­tain delivery of possession of the four toujis 59, 72, 96 and 105 decreed by the lower court. Appeal dismissed; Cross-objections allowed.