Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is an applicant for a stage carriage permit on the route Kozhikode Chemancheri. The permit for the route has been granted to the first respondent by the Regional Transport Authority a second time after the case was remanded to the Regional Transport Authority. Before the remand, there has been a long drawn out fight between the writ applicant and the first respondent. In appeal this has been confirmed by the Order Ext. P-1 produced along with this writ application. It is this order that is challenged in this writ petition. 2. The point taken is a very short one. It is said that extraneous considerations have weighed with the appellate authority and this extraneous consideration has tilted the balance in favour of the first respondent. The extraneous consideration referred to is the sector qualification said to have been acquired by the first respondent by operating a vehicle on the route pursuant to the grant in this case itself which grant had been set aside later. It is pointed out that the Full Bench decision of this court in Themmalapuram Bus Transport v. The Regional Transport Authority, Palghat and others 1967 K.L.T. 122 has definitely ruled that any experience gained on the basis of a permit the grant of which is the matter in controversy cannot be a criterion for deciding who among the various applicants must be chosen. Reference was also made to a Division Bench ruling in Unniri v. Haji K. Mohammed 1963 K.L.T. 497 and it is urged that whenever extraneous considerations have weighed with a quasi-judicial authority, the order is vitiated and must necessarily be set aside. 3. It is clear from the. Full Bench decision in Themmalaouram Bus Transport v. The Regional Transport Authority, Palghat and others 1967 KLT.122 that experience gained under a permit pursuant to an application for the permit cannot be a criterion for deciding to whom the permit should be granted. If that factor had been taken into consideration, it will have to be said that the reliance on this factor is wrong. It does not however follow that the order must then be automatically vacated. No doubt in the decision in A. K... If that factor had been taken into consideration, it will have to be said that the reliance on this factor is wrong. It does not however follow that the order must then be automatically vacated. No doubt in the decision in A. K... Poulose v. Kerala State Transport Appellate Tribunal 1959 K.L.T. 91 Justice M. S. Menon, as he then was, said: "When more than one reason is given for the grant of a permit it is not possible to say which of the reasons given really turned the scale and induced the grant. To uphold the validity of such an order in spite of the invalidity of some of the reasons or ground would be to substitute the objective standards of the Court for the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority." Justice Raman Nayar on the other hand has taken a different view in the decision in Indian Motor Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1960) 11 K L.R. 136. The relevant passage is in these terms: "It might be that amongst the number of reasons given by the S. T. A. T. for coming to this conclusion there are some minor incidental reasons (not involving any question of law) as, for example, the reason that the workshop of the petitioner was not actually on the route in question although within the town which is one of the termini, and that in some respects the order of the R. T. A. was inconsistent with an order passed by it in some other case, which are not altogether sound. But I do not think that that would justify interference by way of certiorari, when the other reasons given by the tribunal are good reasons and are sufficient to sustain its order." The matter has been considered by the Supreme Court in more than one decision and it is therefore unnecessary to refer to any other cases decided by the High Courts. In the decision in State of Orissa and others v. Bdivabhushan Mohapatra 1963 S.C. 779. In the decision in State of Orissa and others v. Bdivabhushan Mohapatra 1963 S.C. 779. Their Lordships observed: "If the order of dismissal was based on the findings on charges 1 (a) and 1 (a) alone the court would have jurisdiction to declare the order of dismissal illegal but when the findings of the Tribunal relating to the two out of five heads of the first charge and the second charge was found not liable to be interfered with by the High Court and those findings established that the respondent was prima facie guilty of grave delinquency, in our view the High Court had no power to direct the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the order of dismissal." 4. This was of course a decision relating to the imposition of a punishment. There is a later decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Maharashtra Babulal Kriparam Thakkamore and others Civil Appeal 2340 of 1966 where the following passage occurs: "An administrative or quasi-judicial order based on several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained if it be found that some of the grounds are non-existent or irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds. On the other band, an order based on several grounds some of which are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, can be sustained if the court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds, and the exclusion of the irrelevant or non-existent grounds could not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision." 5. It is the contention of counsel for the first respondent that the order Ext. P-1 can be sustained on this principle. It is said that though elaborate arguments were advanced regarding the relevancy of experience gained on the basis of the permit issued in this same proceeding and that factor had been relied on by the appellate authority, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, it is urged, had come to the conclusion that the grant of the permit of the first respondent by the Regional Transport Authority, should be maintained, irrespective of these considerations. After elaborately dealing with the question as to whether the experience gained pursuant to the permit granted in these proceedings can be relied on or not, the authority summed up the case in Para.10 and 11 of its order in these terms: "10. The R.T.A has also taken into account the circumstance that applicant No. 2 is a small operator and can be trusted with this small route of 11 miles. The route is essentially a Mofussil route the town sector is also otherwise well served and there is no reason to think that the choice of any one bus operator with such experience as applicant No. 2 possesses, will be against public interests. Applicant No.1 is a big operator with 19 buses and applicant No. 3 holds five permits. In this situation it cannot be said that the R.T.A. erred in preferring or encouraging a small operator. 11. The position therefore is that of the three applicants No. 2 alone possesses experience of the route and consequently its special needs and requirements. That gives him a Superior claim. He has also adequate experience in the industry. He possesses a well-equipped workshop which is on the route. Nor has any charge of financial instability or any other disqualification been made against him. The route is small and the R.T.A. has taken the view that he could be selected for the route. Applicant No. 3 is not a big operator but bis claim is inferior. All aspects considered I am not satisfied that there is any ground to interfere with the decision of the R.T.A." It appears to me to be clear that even without relying on the experience gained pursuant to the permit issued in these proceedings the appellate authority was prepared to sustain the order of the Regional Transport Authority on the ground relied on by the Regional Transport Authority for preferring the first respondent. In fact the appellate authority has specifically said so. 6. In the light of the above, I have to hold that the order has relied on grounds unimpeachable which are sufficient to support it. I am not therefore satisfied that I should interfere in writ proceedings. I therefore dismiss this writ application. There will be no order as to costs.