JUDGMENT A.P. Sen, J. - 1. This appeal, filed by the defendant, is directed against a decree of the First Additional District Judge, Bhopal, dated 3rd March 1965, affirming the judgment and decree of the Second Civil Judge, Class II, Bhopal, dated 7th March 1964. 2. The relevant facts are these. The parties had dealings between them and the defendant used to borrow money from the plaintiff on Hundis. The plaintiff's case is that on 23rd January 1962, the defendant drew a Hundi upon himself payable after 180 days at sight a sum of Rs.2500/-, but that when it was presented for payment on 27th July 1962 the defendant dishonoured the Hundi. The defendant denied execution of the Hundi itself as also its consideration and further urged that the plaintiff was not entitled to any interest thereon. The Court of first instance held that the defendant had executed the Hundi and that it was for consideration, and, therefore, decreed the plaintiff's suit with interest at 6 percent per annum. The Court below has affirmed the decree in appeal rejecting all the contentions urged. 3. One of the objections raised by the learned counsel for the defendant is, that the trial Court in refusing to grant the adjournment prayed for by the defendant for the examination of the Handwriting expert, failed to exercise a sound and wise discretion, and thereby the defendant has been deprived of the right to lead evidence, and the suit, therefore, has to be remanded. The contention arises in this way. It appears that the disputed document, had been sent to Shri C. T. Sarwate, Handwriting expert and the case was fixed for 16th December 1963 for awaiting his report. On that day, the order-sheet starts by stating that the report had not been received, but later it mentions that the Handwriting expert's report had been received by post. The counsel, who was appearing for the defendant, asked for an opportunity to call the Handwriting expert and prove the report. The trial Court, therefore, directed the summoning of the Handwriting expert on payment within 3 days of process fee and necessary expenses, and the case stood adjourned to 25th February 1964. On 25th February 1964, it transpired that the defendant did not comply with the Court's order and had not paid process fee as required •and consequently, the Handwriting expert was not summoned. On 25th February 1964, it transpired that the defendant did not comply with the Court's order and had not paid process fee as required •and consequently, the Handwriting expert was not summoned. There was a request by the defendant for adjournment of the hearing on the ground that the default in payment was a bona fide mistake, but the adjournment was refused as the trial Court felt that this was not a ground for adjournment. It is urged before me that the 2nd part of the order-sheet dated 16th December 1963, had not been written by the trial Court in the presence of the defendant's council and, therefore, the defendant had no knowledge that the Handwriting expert's report had been received by post that day. The contention can not be accepted. A perusal of the order-sheet itself shows that the report reached the Court while the parties were present and the defendant's counsel, thereafter sought an opportunity to call the Handwriting expert and to prove that report. The order-sheet was signed by the Court after the 2nd part was written, and it cannot be accepted that 2nd part was subsequently inserted. Apart from this, this was not a ground taken in the application for adjournment filed by the defendant on 25th February 1964 nor was this fact mentioned in the affidavit filed along with this application. The assertion that the 2nd part of the order-sheet dated 16th December 1963 was written without the knowledge of the defendant's counsel, appears to be an afterthought. The only question then remains is, whether the hearing of the suit fixed on 25th February 1964 should have been adjourned. The trial Court held that the ground alleged did not constitute a ground sufficient for adjourning the hearing since this suit had been pending since long. The Court below has held that the discretion in refusing to grant an adjournment had been rightly exercised and not arbitrarily or in a capricious manner stating: "It cannot be said that the trial court gave no opportunity to the defendant to produce the evidence of handwriting expert. The defendant committed default by not depositing the necessary expenses and paying the process fees. The defendant committed default by not depositing the necessary expenses and paying the process fees. He gave no satisfactory explanation for not depositing the process fee in time and as such, the trial court was within its power to grant or refuse the adjournment and I, fully agree that the discretion exercised by the trial court cannot be termed as arbitrary or capricious." There is no reason for me to take a different view. It must, accordingly, be held that there was no denial of opportunity to the defendant to lead his evidence and the suit cannot, therefore, be remanded for the purpose of calling the Handwriting expert for proving the report. That opportunity the defendant had, but he had not availed of it due to his own laches. 4. Granting or refusal of adjournment on 25th February 1964 was a matter entirely in the discretion of the trial Court. It cannot be said in the circumstances of this case, that discretion had not been exercised by the trial Court in a judicial manner or in accordance with the legal principles. That being so, there was no error either of law or of procedure, and consequently, the exercise of its discretion cannot be interfered with in this second appeal, the first appellate Court having come to the same conclusion that adjournment had in the circumstances, been rightly refused. In Suriyamoni Dai v. Kalikanta Das ILR 28 Cal. 37, the circumstances under which adjournment was refused were entirely different. There, the Court departed from its usual practice of taking the evidence by driblets, of one or two witnesses at it time, and all of a sudden, insisted on taking the entire evidence of the defendant on one and the same day. That is not so here, because the defendant knew full well on that the Handwriting expert was to be examined on 25th February 1964 and he was required to pay the process-fee and other expenses within 3 days for issuing a summons to him for that purpose. The case of Madhodas v. Girdharilal 8 MPLC 82=16 NLR 1, was also distinguishable. There, the payment of process fee was a little delayed, but the witnesses were all duly served. When they did not appear on the date fixed for evidence, the Court arbitrarily refused to grant an adjournment. The case of Madhodas v. Girdharilal 8 MPLC 82=16 NLR 1, was also distinguishable. There, the payment of process fee was a little delayed, but the witnesses were all duly served. When they did not appear on the date fixed for evidence, the Court arbitrarily refused to grant an adjournment. In that context, Mittra, AJC, stated that the law does not contemplate the punishment of a party for delay in paying the process-fee, and: the Court's discretion will not be rightly exercised if in such a case the attendance of the witnesses is not enforced or an adjournment granted for the purpose. The learned Judge his, however, indicated as to what should be done when the witnesses are not served through the plaintiff's own negligence, following the dictum by West J., in Kaji Ahmad v. Kaji Mahamad ILR 9 Bom. 308, namely: "If there has been delay and want of diligence through which witnesses not having been served in good time are not present, the Court will properly refuse to adjourn the hearing for their attendance even though they have been summoned", Here, due to want of diligence, on the part of the defendant, the Handwriting expert was not summoned due to non-payment of process-fee, and the Court had, therefore, rightly refused to adjourn the hearing for his attendance. 5. The next objection is that the plaintiff having withheld his account-books to show that the consideration had been advanced, the Court should have drawn a presumption under section 114, Evidence Act, to the effect that if he had produced the said accounts, they would be unfavourable to the plaintiff. It is urged that this presumption can under certain circumstances, rebut the presumption arising under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the failure of the Court below to do so, vitiates its finding that the Hundi was for consideration. It is urged that this presumption can under certain circumstances, rebut the presumption arising under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the failure of the Court below to do so, vitiates its finding that the Hundi was for consideration. The circumstances, in Kundanlal Rallaram v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1316 , wherein their Lordships have stated: "The phrase "burden of proof" has two meanings : one, the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading and the other the burden of establishing a case; the former is fixed as a question of law on the basis of the pleadings and is unchanged during the entire trial, whereas the latter is not constant but shifts as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour. The evidence required to shift the burden need not necessarily be direct evidence, i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact." were entirely different. There, the plaintiff has asserted that he had sold certain goods to the defendant and that a promissory note was executed as consideration for the goods & that he was in possession of the relevant account-books to show that he was in possession of the goods sold and that the sale was effected for a particular consideration. Their Lordships stated that in that situation, the burden had shifted, and the plaintiff should have produced his account-books. 6. The Courts below have rightly presumed in this case that the Hundi in question was drawn for consideration under section 118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. When the defendant initially denied the making of the Hundi as well as its consideration, the initial burden of establishing both these facts, lay on the plaintiff. But, the moment the Hundi was proved to have been executed by the defendant, the burden of disproving its consideration shifted to the defendant who was the maker of the Hundi. The defendant could have discharged that burden by producing his own account-books for showing that the consideration had, in fact, not been advanced. According to their Lordships, this burden is constantly shifting as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour. The defendant could have discharged that burden by producing his own account-books for showing that the consideration had, in fact, not been advanced. According to their Lordships, this burden is constantly shifting as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour. The defendant, however, had not adduced any evidence to discharge the burden of proof of establishing want of consideration. Apart from this, the plea in denial of consideration appears to be an afterthought. In his reply-notice, Ex. P-3, dated 16th August 1962, the defendant had impliedly admitted execution of the Hundi and said that the Hundi has been discharged. That being so, the burden entirely lay on him to prove that the liability under the Hundi had been cleared off. 7. The learned counsel lastly challenges the award of interest. The plaintiff claimed interest at 6 per cent per annum, according to "market custom and usage", and this having been denied there was an issue framed regarding his right to receive interest on this basis, but the plaintiff led no evidence in proof of the alleged market usage and custom. The learned counsel, therefore, urges that the direction for payment of interest awarded in the decree should be struck out. I am not impressed with this submission. Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, provides that when no rate of interest is specified, the Court shall, notwithstanding any agreement relating to interest between the parties, award interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date on which the amount claimed became due and payable. Similarly, the Interest Act enacts that where there is no stipulation to pay interest, but the amount claimed is a sum certain (as distinguished from unascertained damages) and is payable at a certain time by virtue of some "written instrument", the Court may allow interest at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest from the day on which the amount became payable. The award of interest at 6% per annum is reasonable in the circumstance as that is the rate normally allowed. The point was also not urged in the Court below. 8. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 50/- if certified.