ORDER D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Deo Dutt and four others to challenge the orders of the Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Dy. Director of Consolidation and Jt. Director of Consolidation, whereby their claim based on sale-deeds executed by Kateshwar, Respondent No. 5, were rejected. 2. On the learned Advocate for Parmatma, Respondent No. 4, making an objection, the learned Advocate for the Petitioners made a statement that In this proceeding only the judgments and orders of the Consolidation authorities, in so far as the sale-deed on 23-12-1953 was considered, be looked into. What is desired is that the finding recorded with regard to this sale deed be quashed and the rights of the Petitioners upheld with regard to the plots transferred under this document. 3. The material facts of the case are that the disputed plots were the Bhumidhari of Kateshwar, Respondent No. 5. He executed a sale-deed in favour of Deo Dutt on 23-12-1953, in respect of plots Nos. 204, 205, 239/3, and 245/1. The sale-deed was registered on 11-3-1954. Meanwhile Kateshwar executed a gift deed in favour of Parmatma reserving the right of possession during his life time with an additional stipulation that after his death his wife, Smt. Dhanraji, can also remain in possession. It was after the death of Kateshwar and Smt. Dhanraji that Parmatma could enter into possession. Thereafter Kateshwar instituted a declaratory suit for cancellation of the gift deed. This suit was compromised and under the compromise Parmatma could have his name recorded along with Kateshwar and Kateshwar had the right to remain in possession of the gifted properties. 4. Plot No. 245/1 was originally recorded in the names of Ram Dularey and Sita Ram. The Petitioners filed an objection u/s 9 claiming to be the Bhumidhars of this plot also. Parmatma, however, claimed to be the Bhumidhar on the basis of the giftdeed. With regard to plots Nos. 204, 205 and 239/3, Parmatma alone filed an objection based on the gift-deed executed in his favour. Second Appeal No. 867 pertains to the three plots, while Second Appeal No. 869 to the fourth plot No. 245/1. Both the Second Appeals were dismissed and the Dy. With regard to plots Nos. 204, 205 and 239/3, Parmatma alone filed an objection based on the gift-deed executed in his favour. Second Appeal No. 867 pertains to the three plots, while Second Appeal No. 869 to the fourth plot No. 245/1. Both the Second Appeals were dismissed and the Dy. Director of Consolidation also held that the sale-deed said to have been executed on 23-12-1953 was executed after the gift-deed and hence did not confer any title in the transferee. It was for this reason that the names of the Petitioners were either expunged or were not entered against the four plots. 5. The revisions filed by the Petitioners were also dismissed. 6. It is true that the Consolidation authorities have recorded the finding that the sale-deed dated 23-12-1953 was of ft doubtful character, but none made comments on the oral evidence or the factor of purchase of the stamp paper on 23-12-1953. Stress was laid upon two factors, namely, that there was inordinate delay in the registration of the sale-deed, and secondly, that the Petitioners were helping Kateshwar in the subsequent litigation. Where the transferor tries to resile from the contract and, in fact, executes a gift deed, there shall be delay in the registration of the document. The delay in the registration of the sale-deed of 23-12-1953 was thus not so strong or conclusive, as to make the courts of law hold that a document registered late is necessarily forged or ineffective. Similarly, the conduct of the Petitioners in financing the subsequent litigation of Kateshwar is not of a conclusive nature. The Petitioners could, in order to safeguard their rights, finance the litigation so that their claims may be established and may be beyond controversy. Of course, these two factors could be used to record a finding against the Petitioners if the other evidence or circumstances were against them. 7. The Consolidation authorities did not at all consider why the stamp paper for the execution of the sale-deed was purchased on 23-12-1953. Stamp papers, except stamps needed for moving applications or affidavits, are invariably purchased when the party wishes to execute the document. Stamp paper is never purchased merely to keep it unused. Oral evidence had to be looked into as to the purpose for which the stamp paper was purchased. Stamp papers, except stamps needed for moving applications or affidavits, are invariably purchased when the party wishes to execute the document. Stamp paper is never purchased merely to keep it unused. Oral evidence had to be looked into as to the purpose for which the stamp paper was purchased. If the stamp paper was purchased for the execution of a sale-deed, the next point to be seen would have been in whose favour the sale deed was to be executed. If the finding on these points was favourable to the Petitioners, it would have been necessary to consider why the sale deed was not registered soon after the purchase of the stamp paper. 8. Even though important questions of title with regard to agricultural land are now determined by the Consolidation authorities, it is necessary for them to proceed in accordance with law. They cannot act arbitrarily. They must follow the well established principles, i.e., to duly consider the evidence, both oral and documentary, and the circumstances of the case. 9. When the consolidation authorities did not consider the oral evidence and also the material circumstances of the case, the omission amounts to a question of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. The purpose shall be served if the order of the revisional court and also the order of the Deputy Director o Consolidation in Second Appeal are quashed. The Deputy Director of Consolidation hearing the Second Appeal is entitled to go into facts and can admit additional evidence. Consequently, any omission on the part of the subordinate authorities can be made good by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 10. As already indicated above, the two Second Appeals pertain to the sale-deed of 23-12-1953. Second Appeal No. 869 is one in which Ram Dularey and Sita Ram can be regarded to be necessary parties. It is true that they submitted to the order of the Consolidation Officer, but before the Petitioners can succeed in this Second Appeal, they shall have to establish their rights and to demolish the case of all other persons including Ram Dularey and Sita Ram who were not impleaded parties in the present proceeding. It will, therefore, be in the fitness of things to remand Second Appeal No. 867 only. 11. The writ petition is partly allowed and partly dismissed. It will, therefore, be in the fitness of things to remand Second Appeal No. 867 only. 11. The writ petition is partly allowed and partly dismissed. The order dated 23-1-1963 of the Joint Director of Consolidation and the order dated 18-6-1962 of the Deputy Director of Consolidation are, in so far as the Second Appeal No. 867 is concerned, hereby quashed. Second Appeal No. 867 shall now be registered afresh and disposed of in accordance with the law. It is made clear that none of the observations made above shall be treated as a finding of this Court. All the material questions of law and fact shall have to be decided afresh by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Observations have been made simply to indicate which points had not been considered by the Consolidation authorities and also to indicate why it was necessary for this Court to exercise the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. Further, the Second Appeal should be heard by a competent officer, i.e., one who has been duly authorised to hear Second Appeal. Costs on parties. Stay order is vacated.