ORDER This is a petition filed by Shrimati Konthoujam Nongol Yumshang Devi and Shri Rajkumar Achoubi Sana Singh against (1) Bharat Sevak Samaj, (2) Chief Commissioner, Manipur, (3) The State Transport Authority, Government of Manipur, (4) The Government of Manipur and (5) Pechimayum Ibotombi Singh under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing the order of the second respondent (Chief Commissioner, Manipur) in C. C. Motor Vehicle Appeal Case No. 5 of 1967 (who cancelled the permit granted to the second petitioner for running the petitioners vehicle No. MNS 2064 from Imphal to Sugnu) and notification of the respondent No. 3 dated 21-5-1968 inviting applications for permit to run a vehicle from Imphal to Sugnu. 2. The brief facts of the case, which led to the institution of the present writ petition, are as follows: Applications were invited by the third respondent (State Transport Authority, Manipur) by issuing a notification Ext. B/1 in the Manipur Gazette dated 16-5-1967 for grant of one stage carriage permit each for Imphal to N. C. C. route, Imphal to Sugnu route. N. C. C. to Lamjang route and some other routes. The first respondent filed 3 separate applications for 3 routes including Imphal to Sugnu. But, he did not file any application for granting permit for N. C. C. to Lamjang route. The second petitioner was one of the applicants for Imphal to Sugnu route. The 5th respondent was one of the applicants for Imphal to N. C. C. route. The third respondent considered the applications on 16-9-1967, as can be seen from Ext. B/2, and passed a resolution granting permit to the 5th respondent for Imphal to N. C. C. route. Though the first respondent did not apply for a permit for N. C. C. to Lamjang route, the State Transport Authority granted to him a permit for that route. The State Transport Authority considered the 4 applications of the second petitioner, the first respondent and two others for Imphal to Sugnu route and by another resolution granted a stage carriage permit in favour of the 2nd petitioner on the ground that he was an old operator on the route and that no complaint was received against him. So, it permitted him to run a 3 tonner vehicle of 1950-61 model, even though the other applicants possessed 1964 and 1965 models. So, it permitted him to run a 3 tonner vehicle of 1950-61 model, even though the other applicants possessed 1964 and 1965 models. Accordingly, the permit in favour of the second petitioner was renewed on 27-11-1967 upto 30-9-1968 and the date of the expiry was fixed as 30-9-1970. Vide Exts. A/1 and A/2. 3. The first respondent filed an appeal C. C. Motor Vehicle Appeal Case No. 5 of 1967 before the second respondent (Chief Commissioner) against the grant of permit in his favour for the N. C. C. to Lamjang route for which he did not apply and against the grant of permits for other routes to others, for which he applied. The second petitioner and the 6th respondent herein were made parties to that appeal (vide Ext. A/3) as respondents 1 and 2 respectively. The Chief Commissioner upheld the grant of permit in favour of the 5th respondent for the Imphal to N. C. C. route. But, so far as the Imphal to Sugnu route is concerned, he held that the first respondent was unauthorisedly given permit for N. C. C. to Lamjang though he did not apply for it, that, as there were better vehicles, the third respondent (State Transport Authority) was unjustified in granting permit to the second petitioner to run an old model vehicle of 1950-51 that the third respondent ignored the claims of deserving candidates and that the grant of permit in favour of the second petitioner herein was not in the interest of the public. So, he cancelled the grant of permit in favour of the petitioners and directed the State Transport Authority to call for fresh applications for Imphal to Sugnu route and finalise the proper selection according to the law by 30-6-1968. The second petitioner was allowed to continue to operate his bus service on the said route till 30-6-1968. Vide Ext. A/4 certified copy of his order. 4. In pursuance of the order of the second respondent, the third respondent notified again on 21-5-1968 inviting applications for permits to run vehicles on the various routes including Imphal to Sugnu (Vide Ext. A/5). 5. Hence, the present writ petition. 6. The contentions of the petitioners counsel relate to the contents of Ext. A/4 certified copy of his order. 4. In pursuance of the order of the second respondent, the third respondent notified again on 21-5-1968 inviting applications for permits to run vehicles on the various routes including Imphal to Sugnu (Vide Ext. A/5). 5. Hence, the present writ petition. 6. The contentions of the petitioners counsel relate to the contents of Ext. A/3 certified copy of the memorandum of appeal in C. C. Motor Vehicle Case No. 5 of 1967 filed by the first respondent and the order of the 2nd respondent. His first contention is that the first respondent did not file any written representation before the 3rd respondent opposing the grant of permit to the second petitioner for Imphal to Sugnu route under Section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act 4 of 1939) (hereinafter called as the Act), that the first respondent did not ask in his memorandum of appeal for cancellation of the permit issued to the second petitioner for Imphal to Sugnu, that the provisions of sub-s. (f) of S. 64 of the Act were not attracted but that the appeal was filed under sub-sections (a) and (i) of Section 64 of the Act and that, therefore, the second respondent was not competent to cancel the permit issued to the second petitioner for the route in question. The substance of his contention is that the first respondents case must fall within the purview of both the sub-sections (a) and (f) of Section 64 of the Act, to enable the second respondent to cancel the permit. Sub-sections (a), (f) and (i) of S. 64 run thus: "64. The substance of his contention is that the first respondents case must fall within the purview of both the sub-sections (a) and (f) of Section 64 of the Act, to enable the second respondent to cancel the permit. Sub-sections (a), (f) and (i) of S. 64 run thus: "64. Appeals - Any person - (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or X X X X X X (f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, or X X X X X X (i) aggrieved by any other order which may be prescribed may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard." The petitioners counsel relied on Natesa Pillai v. Central Road Traffic Board, Egmore, Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 39 , V. Krishnamurthy v. Ceded District Auto Transport Co., Ltd., Kuraool, AIR 1953 Mad 321 and Sainiks Motors v. State Transport Authority, AIR 1956 Raj 65 in support of his contention that a right of appeal must be expressly conferred by the statute and that it cannot be inferred by implication. There cannot be any difference of opinion on this point. He further contended that the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to cancel the permit because the appeal was under sub-sections (a) and (i) of section 64 of the Act and not under sub-section (f) of Section 64. It has to be noticed that the third respondent was not competent to issue a permit to the first respondent to run a vehicle on N. C. C. to Lamjang route as he did not apply for it and his order is illegal under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act. As the first respondent also applied for Imphal to Sugnu route and as his application was rejected, he is a person aggrieved by the refusal of the third respondent to grant a permit and clearly falls under sub-sec. (a) of Section 64 of the Act. As the first respondent also applied for Imphal to Sugnu route and as his application was rejected, he is a person aggrieved by the refusal of the third respondent to grant a permit and clearly falls under sub-sec. (a) of Section 64 of the Act. Sub-section (i) of Section 64 is a general one and the 1st respondents case does not fall under it, because the respondents could not point out any order, which was "prescribed" by the Motor Vehicles Rules of Manipur, 1951, (hereinafter called as the Rules of 1951) within the meaning of sub-section (21) of Section 2 of the Act, which is applicable to him. Besides, the first respondent must be deemed to have opposed the grant of permit to the second petitioner within the meaning of sub-section (f) of Section 64 of the Act, as he too applied for permit for the same route, for which the second petitioner also applied. As the matter was before the second respondent in appeal, all the points, which were to be considered by the third respondent, were at large for consideration by the second respondent and he was entitled to consider the merits and de-merits of the cases of the second petitioner and the first respondent and was competent to pass the order in question. 7. My attention was drawn by the petitioners counsel to two rulings in Dholpur Co-operative Transport and Multipurpose Union Ltd. v. Appellate Authority Rajasthan, AIR 1955 Raj 19 and Ramnibora Thakur v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 293 wherein it was held that, unless the provisions of not only sub-s. (a) of Section 64 but those of sub-section (f) of Section 64, are satisfied and that unless foundation was laid before the Transport Authority by filing an objection under Section 57 (3) of the Act, to attract the provisions of sub-section (f) of Section 64 of the Act before the appellate authority, the latter has no jurisdiction to cancel the permit issued by the Transport Authority in favour of the other party. In AIR 1955 Raj 19 , it was held that where an appeal had been filed under sub-section (a) against the refusal of a permit, the appellate authority would generally have the right to give relief to the appellant by grant of a permit, but that it would not have any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another person, unless a foundation had been laid before the Regional Transport Authority for an appeal provided by sub-section (f) by an objection by somebody entitled to appeal under that sub-section. It was also held that if such objection had been filed, then it would not matter whether that particular person appealed or not, that in such a case, on an appeal under Sec. 64 (a) the appellate authority might consider the objection of the nature specified in Clause (f) before the Regional Transport Authority and give its own decision in the matter. Reliance was placed on Nadar Transports Tiruchirapalli v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 1 . The above case is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Firstly, in the present case the first respondent also filed an application for a permit for the same route and his application must be treated as an objection within the meaning of Section 57 of the Act. Secondly, in the above case, the appellate authority not only cancelled the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority but also issued a permit in favour of the appellant. In the present case, the second respondent simply cancelled the permit issued to the second petitioner and directed the third respondent to call for fresh applications and to dispose of the matter according to law. So this decision cannot apply to the facts of this case. In AIR 1958 Pat 293 , the Regional Transport Authority advertised for applications for grant of a permit for four months subject to automatic renewal in every 4 months. On 12-1-1955 or 13-1-1955, the Regional Transport Authority considered all the applications and granted a permit to the petitioner. The opposite party No. 4 filed an appeal to the appellate Board. On 13-12-1955, the appellate Board allowed the appeal and cancelled the permit granted to the petitioner and ordered that a permit should be granted to the opposite party No. 4. The opposite party No. 4 filed an appeal to the appellate Board. On 13-12-1955, the appellate Board allowed the appeal and cancelled the permit granted to the petitioner and ordered that a permit should be granted to the opposite party No. 4. The High Court held that opposite party No. 4 did not prefer any application in the proceeding for grant of the permit for 4 months (renewable in every 4 months) but that he filed an application in the proceedings for the extension of the temporary permit on 12-6-1954 and that on the same date the Regional Transport Authority rejected his application and granted an extension of one month of the temporary permit. So, the opposite party No. 4 could not be considered to have opposed the grant of the permit for 4 months in favour of the petitioner. The Court, therefore, held that the appeal did not fall within the purview of Section 64 (f) of the Act. But, the facts of the present case are otherwise. The first respondent filed his application before the third respondent for the same route for which the second petitioner also applied. As such, his application must be held to be a representation against the grant of permit in favour of the second petitioner. Therefore, he is a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 64 (f) of the Act. Also, it has to be noted in the above case that the appellate authority ordered issue of a permit to the appellant unlike in the present case. As such, this ruling also has no bearing on the facts of the present case. 8. When the provisions of Clauses (a) and (f) of Section 64 of the Act would apply was laid down in AIR 1953 Mad 1 . Sub-sections (a) and (f) are intended to apply to different situations. Sub-section (a) applies to cases where a person is aggrieved by the refusal of the Road Transport Authority to grant a permit to him or is aggrieved by any condition attached to a permit granted to him. But, if he further objects to the grant of a permit to another, then, he would fulfil the conditions of both sub-sections (a) and (f). But, if he further objects to the grant of a permit to another, then, he would fulfil the conditions of both sub-sections (a) and (f). But, if he does not apply for a permit for himself, but opposes formally or by a written representation under Section 57 (3) of the Act, the issue of permit to another, sub-section (f) would apply, if the objector provided transport facilities. The various rulings on the subject were discussed by the Judicial Commissioner in Yagsen Ram Prashad v. Chief Commissioner, Ajmer, AIR 1956 Ajmer 41. The facts of that case are similar to the facts of the present case. As rightly pointed out by him, in the appeal the whole matter is at large before the appellate authority. There is nothing in Section 64 of the Act, which lays down that an aggrieved person, to whom a permit has been refused and who cannot in view of the limitation of the number of the permits for any particular route, be granted a permit unless some other permit already issued is cancelled, will have no right of appeal, unless he is also qualified under Clause (f) of Section 64 of the Act to file the appeal. The scope of the appeal and the scope of the powers of the appellate authority are nowhere restricted by the Act itself. So, the appellate authority has jurisdiction to consider the whole matter involved and to give its decision thereon provided, of course, he gives an opportunity to the other side of being heard. So, I hold that the case of the first respondent falls both under Clauses (a) and (f) of Section 64 and that, in any event, even if his case falls under Clause (a) of Section 64 of the Act. the second respondent was entitled to re-open the entire matter and to cancel the permit granted by the third respondent in favour of the second petitioner and to direct third respondent to call for applications afresh and to consider them. 9. The second contention of the petitioners counsel is that the first respondent did not pray for cancellation of the permit issued by the third respondent in favour of the second petitioner and that in the absence of such prayer, the second respondent is not entitled to cancel the permit. He relied on AIR 1952 Mad 39 . 9. The second contention of the petitioners counsel is that the first respondent did not pray for cancellation of the permit issued by the third respondent in favour of the second petitioner and that in the absence of such prayer, the second respondent is not entitled to cancel the permit. He relied on AIR 1952 Mad 39 . This point is covered by the first contention of the petitioners counsel referred to above. As the matter was at large before the second respondent in the appeal, he was entitled to cancel the permit granted by the third respondent in favour of the second petitioner. The first respondent made a prayer in his memorandum of appeal for a direction to the third respondent to issue a permit for one of the routes mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. It includes the route from Imphal to Sugnu and the second respondent was, therefore, competent to set aside the permit issued to the second petitioner by the third respondent 10. The third contention of the petitioners counsel is that under the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 58 of the Act, the second petitioner was entitled to preference over the new applicants. But, this proviso applies only when other conditions are equal. The petitioners vehicle was considered to be unsafe for the public, as it is a very old one. So, this contention also fails. 11. The third contention of the petitioners counsel is that the petitioners were not given opportunity by the second respondent to contest the appeal before him, that under Rule 65 of the Rules they were not given any opportunity to produce the vehicle, that their vehicle is in a good condition, as can be seen from Ext. A/6 (fitness certificate) and that the order of the second respondent is, therefore, liable to be set aside. He relied on AIR 1966 Raj 19 and Taini Mal v. State Transport Authority, Lucknow, AIR 1959 All 495 . Ext A/3 shows that the first respondent made the second petitioner as respondent No. 1 in C. C. Motor Vehicle Appeal Case No. 5 of 1967. Notices were sent to him. Yet, he did not contest the matter before the second respondent, though it was brought to his notice as per Ext. A/3 that the first respondent claimed permit for any one of the three routes including Imphal to Sugnu. Notices were sent to him. Yet, he did not contest the matter before the second respondent, though it was brought to his notice as per Ext. A/3 that the first respondent claimed permit for any one of the three routes including Imphal to Sugnu. So, he cannot now be heard to state that he was not given any opportunity to contest the appeal. 12. The fifth contention of the petitioners counsel is that under Rule 83 of the Rules of 1951, the memorandum of appeal should have been addressed to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner that the Rules of 1951 were wrongly quoted as those of 1961, that the memorandum of appeal should have been accompanied by a certified copy of the order of the third respondent, that the second respondent should have called upon the first respondent to deposit such fee not exceeding Rs. 25-00nP, as he might specify, that these formalities were not complied with and that, therefore, the second respondent was not entitled to allow the appeal. The Rules were framed under the Act and as can be seen from Manindra Chandra v. Jogesh Chandra Dey, AIR 1959 Tri 35, Rule 83 is as mandatory as Section 64 of the Act. But, these objections were not taken by the second petitioner before the second respondent. It is no doubt true that Ext. A/3 shows that the memorandum of appeal was addressedto the "Court" of the Chief Commissioner and not to the Secretary, that the appeal was not accompanied by a certified copy of the order of the third respondent and that he did not appear to have deposited any fee at all. These matters relate to the procedure and do not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the second respondent to pass the order in question. The High Court will not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of issuing a writ for non-compliance with such trivial technical errors in the procedure. So long as the facts, which enabled the second respondent to exercise his jurisdiction existed, the High Court would not interfere with his order. The second respondent was mainly guided by public interest generally as laid down by Section 47 of the Act as the second petitioners vehicle was a very old one of 1950-1951. So long as the facts, which enabled the second respondent to exercise his jurisdiction existed, the High Court would not interfere with his order. The second respondent was mainly guided by public interest generally as laid down by Section 47 of the Act as the second petitioners vehicle was a very old one of 1950-1951. He also acted correctly by cancelling the permit given to the first respondent for a routefor which he did not apply. There is no error in the order of the second respondent and the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India under the circumstances of the case. Vide G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, AIR 1952 SC 192 and Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1956 SC 463 . 13. In the result, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Pleaders fee Rs. 100-00nP. Petition dismissed.