ORDER This is a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against (1) The Chief Commissioner, Government of Manipur, (2) The Government of Manipur, (3) Smt. Waikhom Ongbi Kumari Devi, (4) Smt. Ayekpam Ongbi Rajani Devi, (5) Smt. Pebam Ongbi Chamu Devi, (6) Smt. Konjengbam Ongbi Shamu Devi and (7) Director of Settlement and Land Records, Manipur, for a writ of certiorari quashing the allotment of village grazing ground in Takyel Khongbal village No. 93, in favour of the respondents 3 to 5 and two others viz. the deceased Maipakpi Devi and Chaobiton Devi or in the alternative to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the first respondent to hear and decide the case of the petitioners on merits according to law. 2. The brief facts of the case, which have led to the institution of the present petition, are as follows : The petitioners allege that C. S. plots Nos. 83, 284, 523, 538 etc. in C. S. plot No. 284 in Takyel Khongbal village 93 is immemorial grazing ground for the cattle of the villagers of Bijoy Govinda Gram Panchayet, Takyel Gram Panchayet and Lamjaotongba Gram Panchayet. The Government of Manipur took up the matter of allotment of a portion of the land on 6-5-1965 in favour of 5 political sufferers. The Director of Settlement and Land Records, Manipur granted certain lands on 7-10-1966 to the respondents 3 to 5 and two others namely, Smt. Waikhom ongbi Kumari Devi, Smt. Ayekpam ongbi RajaniDevi, Smt. Pebam ongbi Chamu Devi and late Laimayum ongbi Maipakpi Devi and late Aribam ongbi Chaobiton Devi, (vide Exts. B/1 and A/5). The petitioners allege that in the first week of May 1967 they came to know of the allotment, that they held a public meeting on 28-5-1957 objecting to the allotment and that they made a representation on 17-6-1967 to the Secretary R. and M., Government of Manipur, requesting him to cancel the allotment but that no action was taken by the second respondent. (Vide Exts. A/6 and A/7). The petitioners filed a revision petition (C. C. Rev. Revision Petition No. 178/1967) on 26-7-1967 in the Court of the first respondent (Chief Commissioner, Manipur) under section 95 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act of 1960 (hereinafter called as the Act of 1960) to set aside the allotment. (Vide Exts. A/6 and A/7). The petitioners filed a revision petition (C. C. Rev. Revision Petition No. 178/1967) on 26-7-1967 in the Court of the first respondent (Chief Commissioner, Manipur) under section 95 of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act of 1960 (hereinafter called as the Act of 1960) to set aside the allotment. Also, they filed a petition under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act read with para 62 of schedule III of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Rules of 1961 framed under the Act of 1960 (hereinafter called as the Rules of 1961). But, the learned Chief Commissioner, Manipur summarily dismissed the case without hearing the petitioners on the ground that the petition was barred by limitation, though no period of limitation is prescribed by section 95 of the Act (Vide Exts. A/9 and A/10). Hence, the present writ petition. 3. The writ petition was opposed by the respondents 1, 2 and 7 who filed a joint counter. The other respondents also filed a joint counter. Their allegations are the same. 4. The points which were argued and which arise for determination are : (i) Whether the order of the first respondent is correct? (ii) Whether the writ petition is not maintainable? 5. Points i and ii :- Ext. A/10 shows that the learned Chief Commissioner dismissed C. C. (Revenue) Revision Petition No. 178 of 1967 summarily on the ground that the petition was filed on 26-7-1967 questioning the order of the Director of Settlement and Land Records dated 7-10-1966 after lapse of nearly eight months and that there was no reason why such delay had occurred and why the revision petition was not filed "in time". 6. 6. But, Section 95 of the Act runs thus : "The Administrator or the Deputy Commissioner may, at any time, either on his own motion or on the application of any party, call for the records of any proceedings before any revenue officer subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or the propriety of any order passed by such revenue officer, and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit : Provided that he shall not vary or reverse any order affecting any right between private persons without having given to the parties interested notice to appear and be heard." Section 95 does not lay down any period of limitation. On the other hand, it gives wide powers of interference to the Administrator and the Deputy Commissioner, who may at any time, call for the records of any proceedings before any revenue officer subordinate to him and may pass such orders as they think fit. But, the order in question shows that the learned Chief Commissioner was under the impression that Section 95 of the Act prescribes some period of limitation, though it does not. As such, his order is liable to be set aside. 7. Further, Ext. A/9 shows that the petitioners filed a petition under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act to condone the delay, if any, in filing the revision petition. Under Section 81 of the Act of 1960, a revenue officer sits as a Revenue Court when he exercises the powers under the Act of 1960. Paragraph 62 of Schedule III of the Rules of 1961 directs that a Revenue Court should hold an enquiry in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. So, the learned Chief Commissioner should have exercised his jurisdiction and considered the merits of the petition filed by the petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay, if any. But, he failed to do so. For this reason also the order of the first respondent is liable to be set aside. 8. The contention of the learned Government Advocate is three-fold. But, he failed to do so. For this reason also the order of the first respondent is liable to be set aside. 8. The contention of the learned Government Advocate is three-fold. His first contention is that the land in question is not a grazing ground, that the respondents deny the nature of the land and that the writ petition is not maintainable, as there is a disputed question of fact He relied on Union of India v. T. R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 and Ganesh Chandra Khan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1958 Cal 114 in support of his contention. Though the respondents dispute the nature of the land, the very counter filed by the respondents 1, 2 and 7 shows that in the recent cadstral survey, the land in question was entered as grazing ground in the Dag Chitha. Vide paras 2 and 4 of their counter. The petitioners produced Exts. A/1 to A/4 certified copies of Dag Chithas in the land records (record of rights) wherein C. S. Plots Nos. 83, 284, 523 and 538 in village No. 93, were recorded as "village grazing ground". The entries were made according to the sub-rule (ii) of Rule 55 and sub-rule (1) of Rule 66 of the Rules of 1961. The entries in the Dag Chitha were made by the Revenue Officers concerned in Form VII prescribed by the Rules of 1961 after consulting the previous records and after making local investigation. Under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, a Dag Chitha is a "Public document" forming the act or the record of the act of a public officer. Section 2 (17), Civil P. C. defines a "public officer" as a person falling in any one of the categories mentioned therein including an officer, whose duty is to make any survey of Government property etc. Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act makes an entry in any public or official record made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties as a relevant fact. So, the entries in Exts. A/1 to A/4 are relevant to show prima facie that the land in question is a "village grazing ground". But, the survey is said to be still going on and the record of rights has not been finally published under Section 43 of the Act of 1960. So, the entries in Exts. A/1 to A/4 are relevant to show prima facie that the land in question is a "village grazing ground". But, the survey is said to be still going on and the record of rights has not been finally published under Section 43 of the Act of 1960. A presumption that the record of rights is correct arises only after it is finally published. So, the weight to be attached to the entries in Exts. A/1 to A/4 has to be decided by the learned Chief Commissioner. But, their admissibility in evidence is quite a different matter and they are admissible in evidence to prove that the lands were tentatively recorded in the Dag Chithas as "village grazing ground". Also, the petitioners filed Ext. A/12 to show that the then Chief Commissioner cancelled the allotment of neighbouring land in C. C. (Revenue) Revision Case No. 6 of 1961 on the ground firstly that no consideration was given by the S. O. to the question whether there was enough grazing ground left for the village after the settlement of the land in dispute was made, secondly that notices calling for objections to settlement were not effectively served and, thirdly, that a number of persons to whom settlement was made appeared to be fictitious. The petitioners also filed Exts. A/15 and A/16 to show that notices were issued by the S. D. C., I. W. in the Eviction Cases Nos. 33 and 36/A. S. and 80 of 1960 and that eviction cases were started against them. The petitioners also rely on Ext. A/17 proceedings in the Manipur Assembly to show that the Government admitted that the land in question is village grazing ground. Thus Ext. A/12 and A/15 to A/17 further probabilise the petitioners contention that the land in question was set apart as common village grazing ground and that there is justification for the petitioners complaint that a portion of the village grazing ground was granted away to some political sufferers. As the matter is being remanded, I do not wish to enter deeper into this aspect of the case. 9. As the matter is being remanded, I do not wish to enter deeper into this aspect of the case. 9. The second contention of the learned Government Advocate is that the petitioners have an alterantive remedy under S. 11 of the Act of 1960 and that Section 159 of the Act of 1960, bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court with respect to any matter arising under the Act. He argued that the land in dispute is vested in the Government under Section 11 (1) of the Act of 1960, that the petitioners should have filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner claiming the land under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the said Act and that, if the petitioners felt aggrieved with his order or any order passed in appeal or revision, then they should institute a civil suit within a period of six months from the date of the order under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act. He relied on the passages at pages 34, 35 and 37 of the Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Remedies by V. G. Ramachandran - Vol. III -1963 edition, where the learned author states that in the matter of domestic tribunals there is a certain amount of finality in the exercise of their powers on account of their being vested with autonomy within their sphere in the interest of public good and that the Court can intervene in a limited way, either when such domestic authorities have acted under bias or in bad faith and mala fide or when they have violated the principles of natural justice or when such authorities have exceeded their jurisdiction under the statute; Vide also Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 . Though the learned counsel for the petitioners Contended that Section 11 of the Act does not apply to the land in question, his contention is not correct. Section 11 of the Act of 1960 is very general in scope, which vests the property in all the lands etc., which are not the property of any person, in the Government. The petitioners have got only an easementary right of pasturage over the lands. They are not the owners of the same. Section 11 of the Act of 1960 is very general in scope, which vests the property in all the lands etc., which are not the property of any person, in the Government. The petitioners have got only an easementary right of pasturage over the lands. They are not the owners of the same. But, it has to be seen that under Section 13 of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner has to set apart land belonging to the Government for pasturage for the village cattle etc. Rules 9 to 13 of the Rules of 1961 lay down the procedure to be adopted by him when he sets apart land for pasturage for the village cattle. But, it appears that, so far, he did not allot any land under Section 13 of the Act for pasturage for the village cattle. In Manipur the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (Assam Act 1 of 1886) was in force before the Act of 1960 repealed it. The petitioners claim that their right of pasturage under the Regulation is saved by section 170 of the Act 1960. Thus, the petitioners have got 2 remedies under the Act of 1960. Either they could file an application under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act of 1960 before the Deputy Commissioner questioning the grant. Alternatively, they could also file revision petition under Section 95 of the Act questioning the order of the Settlement Officer which affected the petitioners right, which are preserved and saved by Section 170 of the Act of 1960. They pursued the latter remedy. But, the first respondent failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by disposing of the revision petition and the petition filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act on merits. The existence of an alternative remedy is not always a bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court. Vide Ravi Pratab Narain Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1952 All 99 , State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , M. Velayudhan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1960 Kerala 220 and Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka, AIR 1962 SC 1694 . As the order of the first respondent is manifestly incorrect and against natural justice, a writ of Mandamus has to issue to set right the illegality and the writ petition is maintainable. As the order of the first respondent is manifestly incorrect and against natural justice, a writ of Mandamus has to issue to set right the illegality and the writ petition is maintainable. It is desirable that the first respondent should direct the Deputy Commissioner to set apart land under Section 13 of the Act of 1960 for the purpose of pasturage for the village cattle, after due enquiry according to the Rules of 1961 to avoid further litigation. 10. The third contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioners did not file any petition under O. 1, R. 8, Civil P. C. so that they may represent the body of villagers and that the writ petition is not maintainable. He referred to the American Law on the subject and relied on sub-articles (a) and (b) of Article 47 at pages 77 to 81 of Vol. 55 of Corpus Juris Secundum. But, the Indian Law is different. Even a right to graze, which is an easementary right to land, is "property" within the meaning of Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India, and is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Vide Brij Bhukan Kalwar v. D. O. Siwan, AIR 1955 Pat 1 (SB) and State of Manipur v. Nongthombam Amubi Singh, AIR 1957 Manipur 1 . The petitioners and every other villager of the 3 villages in question have a right to graze his cattle on the village grazing ground and if the land is allotted to others, the petitioners right is affected and it is not necessary for the petitioners to represent other villagers also. The issuing of writs or directions by the High Court is founded only on its decision that a right of the aggrieved party under Part III of the Constitution, of India had been infringed. The existence of the right is the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners have to make out some personal interest, which the law recognises, to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Vide State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 , Bhanwarlal v. Rajasthan State, AIR 1953 Raj 180 , Damodar Goswami v. Narnaravan Goswami, AIR 1955 Assam 163 and Dr. P. S. Venkataswamy Setty v. University of Mysore, AIR 1964 Mys 159. Vide State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 , Bhanwarlal v. Rajasthan State, AIR 1953 Raj 180 , Damodar Goswami v. Narnaravan Goswami, AIR 1955 Assam 163 and Dr. P. S. Venkataswamy Setty v. University of Mysore, AIR 1964 Mys 159. So, the writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on this ground. 11. The petitioners counsel also referred to certain merits of the case. Firstly, he stated that there are executive instructions by the Central Government and the Government of Manipur that, before any village land is allotted to others, notice should be issued to the village Panchayet concerned and that no allotment should be made before such notice is issued. He produced Exts. A/13 and A/14 which are copies of the instructions of the Government of India and the Government of Manipur respectively, which support his contention. But, no writ lies for violation of and disobedience to the executive instructions. Vide G. J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1753 . It is for the first respondent to consider the executive instructions. Secondly, the petitioners counsel stated that the allotment was made to two dead persons, namely, Laimayum Ongbi Maipakpi Devi and Aribam Ongbi Chaobiton Devi. The learned counsel for the respondents 1, 2 and 7 stated that the proposal for the allotment to political sufferers was taken up on 6-5-1965, that as one of the ladies was found dead long ago, her name was excluded from the list of recommended persons, but that her name was entered in the list and that the order of the allotment in her name was cancelled on 3-11-1966 when the mistake was detected. But, still there was another person Maipakpi Devi, who too died. The respondents counsel stated that the proposal for settlement was made in her favour when she was alive and that therefore the allotment order was not cancelled. This has to be considered by the first respondent. Thirdly, the petitioners counsel stated that all the ladies are widows and "disqualified persons" within the meaning of Sec. 2 (q) of the Act, that under Section 46 (2) of the Act, a minors contract is void as a minor is a disqualified person and that similarly a widow is equally disqualified and is not entitled to a grant. Thirdly, the petitioners counsel stated that all the ladies are widows and "disqualified persons" within the meaning of Sec. 2 (q) of the Act, that under Section 46 (2) of the Act, a minors contract is void as a minor is a disqualified person and that similarly a widow is equally disqualified and is not entitled to a grant. But, there is no force in this contention, inasmuch as, even a widow can be a landless poor person and a cultivator within the meaning of Rule 6 of the Allotment of Land Rules, 1962. But, under Rule 6 (1) of the said Rules, a person who is evicted is entitled to preference. The bearing of the Allotment of Land Rules is also to be considered by the learned Chief Commissioner. 12. For the above reasons I find point (i) in the negative. I find on Point (ii) that the writ petition is maintainable. 13. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the first respondent dated 27-7-1967 in C. C. (Revenue) Revision Petition Case No. 178 of 1967 is set aside. He should dispose of the case in the light of observations made in this order. There shall be no order for costs in this petition. Petition allowed.