JUDGMENT Tarkeshwar Nath, J. This appeal by the decree-holder has been preferred under Section 216(2) of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, directed against the order of the Sub-divisional Officer, Khunti, passed in Rent Execution case no. 21 of 1956-57 allowing the objection of the judgment debtor. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are shortly these. The appellant filed a Rent suit no. 202 of 1949-50 against-Tikait Pratap Chandra Nath Sah Deo, hereinafter referred to as Tikait Pratap for the sake of brevity, for arrears of rent for the period 1946-1949. Tikait Pratap was a tenure-holder under the appellant in respect of 311 villages. A decree in the rent suit was passed on 24.8.1953 for sum of Rs. 80,185/- and odd, including costs. Thereafter the appellant filed Execution case no. 21 of 1956-57 on 22.6.1956 in the court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Khunti, to realise the decretal dues by the attachment and sale of the movables out of the amount of compensation and by the sale of the house. The judgment debtor T1kait Pratap filed an objection on the ground that the compensation allotted to him by the State of Bihar in accordance with the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 was immune from attachment and his estate having vested in the State of Bihar he was no more liable for the payment of the decretal dues. Another objection was that the arrears of rent sought to be realised accrued during the lifetime of the previous Maharaja and hence all the sons of the late Maharaja were entitled to it, and as such the execution case filed by the present decree-holder alone was not maintainable. This objection of the judgment debtor to the execution was heard by the Sub-divisional Officer, Khunti, and he allowed it holding that the execution case was not maintainable. Being aggrieved by the order, the decree-holder has filed this Miscellaneous Appeal. 3. During the pendency of the appeal, Tikait Pratap (the sole respondent) died, and then his three heirs, including Thakur Gaurang Prasad Singh Deo, were substituted as respondents in his place. Subsequently Thakur Gaurang Prasad Singh Deo also died, and then his heirs were substituted in his place. 4. This appeal was at first placed before a Division Bench for hearing. During the pendency of the appeal, Tikait Pratap (the sole respondent) died, and then his three heirs, including Thakur Gaurang Prasad Singh Deo, were substituted as respondents in his place. Subsequently Thakur Gaurang Prasad Singh Deo also died, and then his heirs were substituted in his place. 4. This appeal was at first placed before a Division Bench for hearing. But at that time it was argued on behalf of the respondents that the two Division Bench decisions of this court in (1) Shri Lakshmi Narainji Birajman Mandir V. Umashanker Sinha (1962 B. L. J. R. 928) and Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh V. Govind Lal Nakphopha (1963 B. L. J. R. 779) should be reconsidered in the light of certain observations made in Rani Umeshwari Kuer V. Syed Nazmul Hassan and others (M. J. C. No. 289 of 1962 and its analogous cases disposed of on the 11th December, 1965). The Division Bench then formulated the following points for decision by a Full Bench to be constituted by the order of the Chief Justice: 1. Whether Section 14 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act applies to the case of rent or decree charged upon a tenure under the provisions of Section 60 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 2. Whether the applicability of Section 14 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act is excluded by reason of the fact that the charge on the tenure is destroyed on the vesting of the tenure in the state by virtue of the notification under Section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and 3. Whether the cases reported in 1962 B. L. J. R. 928 and 1963 B. L. J. R. 779, were correctly decided". 3. A Full Bench was constituted for deciding the points referred to above and on 14.10.1966, the Full Bench answered question no. 1 in the negative and question no. 3 in the affirmative. In view of the decisions on those two questions, question no. 2 did not arise for consideration, and this was not answered. Thereafter this appeal has been again placed before us for disposal. 6. 1 in the negative and question no. 3 in the affirmative. In view of the decisions on those two questions, question no. 2 did not arise for consideration, and this was not answered. Thereafter this appeal has been again placed before us for disposal. 6. The learned Sub-divisional Officer, no doubt, mentioned the various objections raised by the judgment debtor, but he did not choose to give his finding on all those objections what seems to have been accepted by him was that the present decree-holder had no authority to proceed with the execution case, inasmuch as the previous Maharaja had left several sons. He took the view that the present decree-holder had not produced any document to show that he alone had the authority to realise the decretal dues. In absence of such a proof, he came to the conclusion that the Execution case was not maintainable. The view which he has taken is entirely erroneous. The appellant had obtained a decree in the rent suit and it was he who had filed the present execution case. The Court executing the decree could not go behind the decree and it had to execute it according to the terms of the decree. This being the position, the decree holder appellant could not at all be required to produce any authority for proceeding with the execution case. 7. The learned Sub-divisional Officer further took the view that as the estate had vested after the death of the previous Maharaja, the question of execution did not arise. He has, no doubt, come to this conclusion, but he has not assigned any reason to support it. The provisions of Section 4 (d) and 14 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act were considered by the Full Bench in this very case and their Lordships held that the change created under Section 60 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act was not such charge within the purview of Section 4 (d) and 14 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Their Lordships further observed that the charge created either under Section 65 of the Bihar Tenancy Act or Section 60 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act was not such a charge which could be destroyed because of Section 4 (d) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Their Lordships further observed that the charge created either under Section 65 of the Bihar Tenancy Act or Section 60 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act was not such a charge which could be destroyed because of Section 4 (d) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. In (1) Shri Lakshmi Narainji Birajman Mandir V. Umashanker Sinha (1962 B. L. J. R. 928), it was held that a suit for Mokarari rent brought by the appellant was not a suit of the description contemplated by Section 4 (d) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and the view taken in that decision was held by the Full Bench to be correct. The position thus is that the decree obtained by the present appellant for rent is executable and the decree-holder could not be directed to ask his remedy in accordance with Section 14 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Even in spite of the vesting of the estate, the decree-holder is entitled to realise the decretal dues by attachment and sale of the various properties belonging to the judgment debtor or his heirs. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the original judgment-debtor was now represented, after his death, by his legal heirs, and those heirs were not personally liable for the payment of the decretal dues. This objection could not be raised in the executing court inasmuch as the decree was then being executed against the judgment debtor, but the judgment debtor having died during the pendency of this appeal his heirs have been impleaded as respondents in this appeal. At the present stage in the appeal by the decree-holder I refrain from expressing any opinion as to whether the decree holder can proceed against the heirs of the judgment debtor and to what extent. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent further referred to Section 210 (2) of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act and submitted that without the permission of the Deputy Commissioner, the decree-holder could not proceed against any other properties, movable or immovable, of the judgment-debtor. This objection was not raised before the learned Sub-divisional Officer and hence it cannot be successfully urged at the present stage in as much as it is not possible to determine it in absence of proper materials for its determination. This objection was not raised before the learned Sub-divisional Officer and hence it cannot be successfully urged at the present stage in as much as it is not possible to determine it in absence of proper materials for its determination. If the judgment debtor- had raised this objection in the court below, the decree-holder would have got a chance of meeting it and he could adduce some evidence for meeting this objection. The decree holder would now be taken by surprise and thus this objection cannot be entertained at such a belated stage. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs and the order in question of the learned Sub-divisional Officer is set aside. Appeal allowed B. N. JHA, J. I agree.