ORDER This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by Shri M. Radhamohan Singh, First Subordinate Judge, Manipur, who had been compulsorily retired, for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of compulsory retirement dated 30-6-1966 passed by the first respondent, the Chief Commissioner, Manipur and for a writ of mandamus to reinstate him. 2. The brief facts of the case giving rise to the institution of the present writ petition are as follows : The petitioner, who is not a Law Graduate, started his career as a junior clerk in 1935 in the Office of his Highness late Sir Churachand Singh, K. C. S. I., C. B. E., the then Maharajah of Manipur. He was promoted as Head clerk in 1941. He was the Aid-de-camp and the Private Secretary to the Maharajah in 1943 and 1944 respectively. He became a member of the Manipur State Darbar in 1945. He was appointed as the 4th Judge in the Chief Court and took up office on 5-8-1946. He was made a permanent Puisne Judge in Manipur State Chief Court with effect from 5-10-1949. After the Government of India took over the administration of Manipur with effect from 15-10-1949 under the Manipur Merger Agreement dated 21-9-1949, the petitioner was appointed by the first respondent (Chief Commissioner, Manipur) as a Subordinate Judge with effect from 25-1-1950 on a temporary measure. On the enactment of the Manipur Courts Act of 1955, the Court of Subordinate Judge was established in Manipur on 1-3-1956. The petitioner was appointed as Subordinate Judge with effect from 1-3-1956. He was also invested with the powers of an Assistant Sessions Judge at first and then of Additional Sessions Judge to exercise jurisdiction in the Sessions Court of Manipur. 3. The date of birth of the petitioner is 1-1-1911. While the petitioner was in the service of the Government, the first respondent served him with a notice dated 30-6-1966 that he was required to retire from Government service with effect from 1-10-1966 in pursuance of the Presidents direction in paragraph 6 of the Government of Indias decision No. 23 in G. I. M. Affairs Memo No. 33/18/62-Ests(A) dated 30-11-1962. (Vide Ext. A/1). (Vide Ext. A/1). But, by the date of the notice F. R. 56 was amended under Fundamental (6th Amendment) Rules of 1965 published in the Gazette of India No. 2350 dated 21-7-1965 (Vide Ext. A/12). A notice under the amended F. R. 56 (j) should have been issued that in the opinion of the first respondent, the petitioner should retire in the public interest. On the other hand, the notice (vide Ext. A/1) purported to have been issued under paragraph 6 of the Government of India decision No. 23, which was no longer in force. The petitioner made a representation on 7-7-1966 to the Chief Commissioner to withdraw the notice. But, his representation was rejected (vide Ext. A/2). The petitioner then preferred an appeal to the President of India. The Chief Secretary, Manipur Government, informed the petitioner that the President of India rejected his appeal (vide Ext. A/3). The petitioner requested the Chief Secretary to give him a certified copy of the order of the President of India to enable him to question the order in a Court of law. But, the Chief Secretary informed the petitioner that the original order of the Government of India was not available with the Government of Manipur (vide Ext. A/4). Then, the petitioner sent an application to the Secretary to the President of India to furnish him with a copy of its order. The Secretary informed the petitioner that the matter was referred to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi (vide Ext. A/5). The petitioner then addressed the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, to give him a certified copy of the order of the President. In the meanwhile, the second respondent (District and Sessions Judge, Manipur) issued an order under Section 38 of the Manipur (Courts) Act of 1955 that the petitioner should hand over charge, (vide Ext. A/6). The petitioner made an enquiry with Shri S. Lakhi Singh Chaudri, editor of Chaudris Compilation of the Fundamental Rules and the Supplementary Rules, to let him know why he did not publish the Government of Indias decision No. 23 below F. R. 56 in his 3rd edition (vide Ext. A/7). Shri Choudri replied that the said decision No. 23 became obsolete, since the age was raised to 58 and that, therefore, he did not publish it (vide Ext. A/8). A/7). Shri Choudri replied that the said decision No. 23 became obsolete, since the age was raised to 58 and that, therefore, he did not publish it (vide Ext. A/8). Thereupon, the petitioner again made representation to the first respondent stating that his notice as per Ext. A/1 requiring him to retire under para 6 of the Government of Indias decision No. 23 was illegal as it was obsolete and repealed by the date of the notice and that the petitioner should be retained in service till the age of his superannuation, namely, 58 years. But, the first respondent did not send any reply. The petitioner thereupon served the respondents with a notice of demand for doing justice (vide Ext. A/9). As the order in question was not vacated, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. 4. In brief, the case of the respondents is that the notice dated 30-6-1966 issued to the petitioner calling upon him to retire with effect from 1-10-1966 was issued by mistake under para 6 of the decision No. 23 of the Government of India, under F. R. 56, that the first respondent had the power to retire him under F. R. 56 (j) of the Fundamental (Sixth Amendment) Rules of 1965, that both provisions are similar and that, therefore, the notice in question is not illegal. Alternatively, they contend that the decision of the Government of India in para 6 under decision No. 23 is also in force, even after sub-rule (j) was added by the Fundamental (Sixth Amendment) Rules of 1965 to F. R. 56. 5. The main question for determination is, therefore, whether the order of the first respondent dated 30-6-1966 issued under para 6 of decision No. 23 below F. R. 56 covered by G. I. M. affairs Memo No. 33/18/62-Ests (A) dated 30-11-1962 is illegal and inoperative and whether the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated. 6. To follow the intention of para 6 of decision No. 23 under G. I. M. S. Affairs Memo No. 33/18/62-Ests (A) dated the 30th November, 1962 and the amended F. R. 56 (j) and to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for both the parties, they can be extracted in juxtaposition to each other as hereunder : Decision No. 23 in G. I. M. Affairs Memo No. 33/18/62-Ests (A) dated 30-11-1962. F. R. 56 as amended by Fundamental (Sixth Amendment) Rules of 1965, published in the Gazette of India No. 2350 dated 21-7-1965 : "The Government have had under consideration for some past the question whether the age of compulsory retirement of Government servants should be raised above 55 years. F. R. 56 (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Rule, every Government servant shall retire on the day he attains the age of 58 years. (2) It has now been decided and the President is pleased to direct that the age of compulsory retirement of Central Government servants should be 58 years subject to the following exceptions : * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * (j) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Rule, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. have the absolute right to retire any Government servant after he has attained the age of fifty-five years by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing : (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing paragraphs, the appointing authority may require a Government servant to retire after he attains the age of 55 years on three months notice without assigning any reason. This will be in addition to the provisions already contained in Rule 2 (2) of the Liberalised Pension Rules 1950 to retire an officer who has completed 30 years qualifying service and will normally be exercised to weed out unsuitable employees after they have attained the age of 55 years. The Government servant also may, after attaining the age of 55 years, voluntarily retire after giving three months notice to the appointing authority. (7) These provisions will have effect from 1st December, 1962". Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to a Government servant referred to in clause (c), who entered Government service on or before 23-7-1966 and to a Government servant referred to in clause (f). 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought to raise a contention that the first respondent retired the petitioner on the basis of adverse reports against the petitioner made by the previous Chief Commissioners and the Judicial Commissioner, specially, Honble Shri T. N. R. Tirumalpad, as can be seen from Ext. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought to raise a contention that the first respondent retired the petitioner on the basis of adverse reports against the petitioner made by the previous Chief Commissioners and the Judicial Commissioner, specially, Honble Shri T. N. R. Tirumalpad, as can be seen from Ext. B/1, that the petitioner, was not given any opportunity under the "Instructions for preparation and maintenance of Annual Confidential Reports" or the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules to refute them, that he was condemned without being heard, that my learned predecessor Honble Shri Rajvi Roop Singh, passed an order (of which Ext. A/10 is a copy dated 26-11-64), that the adverse remarks were not communicated to the petitioner and that it was not proper to condemn him on the basis of such remarks but that the remarks could not be expunged, that the petitioners retirement virtually amounted to a stigma that the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India were attracted and that the order of compulsory retirement is illegal. But, in the course of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not press this point in view of the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in I. N. Saksena v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1264 . In Ext A/1 the first respondent simply mentioned that notice was given to the petitioner requiring him to retire from Government service with effect from 1-10-1966 in pursuance of the Presidents direction in paragraph 6 of the Government of Indias decision No. 23 below F.R. 56. He did not mention the grounds why the petitioner was asked to retire from service. In AIR 1967 SC 1264 , it was held that an order, requiring a Government servant to retire compulsorily, could not he considered to be one of removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India when it does not throw any stigma on him and that the Court cannot look into the background resulting in the order to discover whether some kind of stigma could be inferred. The petitioners counsel did not press this aspect of the case. 8. The main contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that on 30-6-1966 the date of the notice (vide Ext. The petitioners counsel did not press this aspect of the case. 8. The main contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that on 30-6-1966 the date of the notice (vide Ext. A/1) issued to the petitioner, F.R. 56(j) was in force, but that the notice was not issued thereunder and that, therefore, the non-compliance with the said amended F.R. 56(j) is justiciable and that the order of compulsory retirement is liable to be set aside. He relied on a number of rulings relating to the statutory service rules in other States. Vide State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 , Moti Ram v. N. E. Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 600 , Gurdev Singh Sidhu v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 1585 , B. Basavannappa v. State of Mysore, A.I.R 1967 Mys 194, H. B. Huilgol, Gadag v. Divisional Superintendent (Personnel) Southern Railways, Hubli, AIR 1967 Mys 116, AIR 1967 SC 1264 , Union of India v. Santi Kumar Banerjee, A.I.R. 1967 Cal 129 and Sham Lal v. Director, Military Farms, AIR 1968 Punj 312 (F.B.). He laid much reliance upon the latest ruling of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1967 SC 1264 out of the above rulings. This decision has got some bearing on the facts of this case. The appellant in that case was in the service of the State of Madhya Pradesh as a District and Sessions Judge. In the normal course he had to retire on completing the age of 55 in August, 1963. But on 28-2-1963, the Madhya Pradesh Government issued a memorandum in the form of letters to all the Collectors in the State (a copy of which was also sent to the other Department) stating that the State Government decided that the age of compulsory retirement of State Government servants should be raised to 58 years subject to some exceptions. Exception No. 5 provided that the appointing authority might require a government servant to retire after he attained the age of 55 on three months notice without assigning any reason and that the power should be normally exercised to weed out unsuitable employees after they attained the age of 55 years, and that a government servant also might, after attaining the age of 55 years, voluntarily retire after giving three months notice to the appointing authority. Para 6 provided that the orders would take effect from 1-3-1963. Para 6 provided that the orders would take effect from 1-3-1963. Para 7 provided that necessary amendments to the State Government Civil Service Regulation would be issued in due course. As a result of the memorandum, the appellant, who would have otherwise retired in August, 1963, continued in service. But, on 11-9-1963 the Government sent an order to the appellant informing him that the Government decided to retire him with effect from the afternoon of 31-12-1963. This notice was issued in pursuance of para 5 of the memorandum. But, on 29-11-1963 a notification was issued by the Finance Department, which was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 6-12-1963 making an amendment to F.R. 56 of the Rules applicable to the State of Madhya Pradesh. In the amended Rule (F.R. 56) the date of compulsory retirement was raised to the age of 58 years. The Rule came into effect from 1-3-1963. But, the amended F. R. 56 did not contain that part of the 5th paragraph, which gave power to the appointing authority to require a government servant to retire after he attained the age of 55 years on 3 months notice without assigning any reason. Thereafter, the appellant was retired. It was held that the memorandum dated 28-2-1963 was only an executive decision of the Government of Madhya Pradesh and not a rule within the meaning of Article 309 of the Constitution of India and that the appellant could not be retired after the amendment of F.R. 56 on the basis of the memorandum. The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant. This case is distinguishable from the facts of the present case for the following reasons : Firstly - The memorandum of the Government of Madhya Pradesh dated 28-2-1963 was in the form of a letter communicated by the Madhya Pradesh Government to all the Collectors in the State, copies of which were sent to the other departments. But, the decision No. 23 of the Government of India under the unamended F.R. 56 is not in the form of a letter. It is in the form of a decision taken by the President which was printed below F.R. 56. Secondly - The memorandum issued by the Madhya Pradesh Government contained a note in paragraph 7 that necessary amendments to the State Civil Service Regulations would be issued in due course. It is in the form of a decision taken by the President which was printed below F.R. 56. Secondly - The memorandum issued by the Madhya Pradesh Government contained a note in paragraph 7 that necessary amendments to the State Civil Service Regulations would be issued in due course. Thereby, it clearly indicated that it was only in the nature of an executive instruction. But, the Government of Indias decision No. 23 did not contain any such paragraph to indicate that the Government would be subsequently amending F.R. 56 and that its decision was only an executive order. Thirdly, the distinction, which is of the utmost importance, is that, while the memorandum of the Government of Madhya Pradesh contained para No. 5 that a Government servant could be retired compulsorily after he attained the age of 55 years on 3 months notice without assigning any reason, no such power was reserved in the Government in the amended F.R. 56 which came into effect from 1-6-1933. The appellants case in the above ruling was covered by the amended F.R. 56, which did not provide for any such provision which enabled the Government to retire him compulsorily on giving him a notice for 3 months. So, it was held that the Government of Madhya Pradesh had no power to retire the appellant under the repealed memorandum, which was not in force. He could only be retired under the amended rule - F.R. 56. But, it is significant to note that in the present case the power of requiring a Government servant to retire compulsorily after he attains the age of 55 years on three months notice was incorporated in F.R. 56(j) by the Central Government. The same power which the appointing authority had under para 6 of decision No. 23 was reserved in the amended F.R. 56 (j) which would apply to the present case. 9. Thus, on a comparison of the provisions of paragraph 6 of para 23 under the unamended F.R. 56 with those in sub-rule (j) of the amended F.R. 56, it is seen that under para 6 the appointing authority could require a Government servant to retire after he attained the age of 55 years subject to four conditions. 9. Thus, on a comparison of the provisions of paragraph 6 of para 23 under the unamended F.R. 56 with those in sub-rule (j) of the amended F.R. 56, it is seen that under para 6 the appointing authority could require a Government servant to retire after he attained the age of 55 years subject to four conditions. Firstly, the authority which gave the notice must be appointing authority, secondly, the notice must be for 3 months; thirdly the Government Servant must have attained the age of 55 years and fourthly no reasons need be assigned in such a notice. Similarly, in the amended F.R. 56 (j), firstly, the authority competent to give notice is the appointing authority, secondly, the notice must be for three months; thirdly the Government Servant should have attained the age of 55 and fourthly the notice must have been issued on the opinion of the appointing authority that it was in the public interest to retire the Government servant. So, the only difference is in the language regarding the grounds. While in the former case no reasons were required to be mentioned, in the latter case the appointing authority must be of the opinion that it was in the public interest to make the Government servant retire. Paragraph 6 mentioned that no reasons were necessary to be mentioned, if the appointing authority was of the opinion that he should exercise his authority "to weed out unsuitable Government servants". This is the same thing as making them retire "in public interest". There is a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court, relied on by the respondents Counsel, which laid down that Appellant mere mistake in quoting the provision of law under which the Government took action is not a ground for setting aside the order, provided the Government could exercise the power under another valid enactment. In P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232 , the appellants services were terminated by the orders of the Railway authorities under rule 3 of the Security Rules. The High Court held that the orders could be sustained under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code. In P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232 , the appellants services were terminated by the orders of the Railway authorities under rule 3 of the Security Rules. The High Court held that the orders could be sustained under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code. The Supreme Court held that, though no exception could be taken to the proposition that when an authority passes an order which is within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision, if it could be shown to be within its powers under any other rule, and that the validity of an order should be judged on a consideration of the substance and not its form, but that the said proposition did not apply to that case because it had not been the contention of the authorities at any stage that the orders in question were really made under Rule 148 of the Railway Establishment Code. In L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle Ambala Cantt. AIR 1961 SC 200 , the Commissioner of Income-tax transferred a case from Patiala to Ambala purporting to act under sections 5(5) and (7A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, while he should have acted under S. 5(5) of the Patiala Act. It was held that the fact that he referred to the Indian Act did not make the action of the Commissioner as one without jurisdiction, because the exercise of a power would be referable to a jurisdiction which confers validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under which it would be nugatory. In Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1329 amendments were made to the Indore Industrial Tax Rules of 1927 by a notification issued by the Madhya Bharat Government under Rule 18 purporting to make rules under Rule 17. It was held that the mistake in reciting the wrong source of power did not affect the validity of the amendments made. In Roshan Lal Gautham v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 991 , the State Government of U.P. reconsidered and notified under section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act a scheme which was originally framed under section 3 of the U.P. Act. Section 68-C made mention of an "efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service" in the "public interest". Section 68-C made mention of an "efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service" in the "public interest". But, the U. P. Act merely mentioned the "interest of the general public" subserving common good or for maintaining and developing efficient road transport system. It was held that there was only a change in the language between section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act and section 3 of the U. P. Act, but that the intention underlying the words was the same and that even if the exact words of section 68-C might not have been present before the framers of the scheme, it was obvious that they took into account those very factors and that the exercise of the powers by the Government must be referred to section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, under which it had validity and not to Section 3 of the U. P. Act. 10. Thus, the order of the first respondent can be sustained under sub-rule (j) of the amended F. R. 56. But, then the question, which incidentally arises is whether the decision No. 23 of the Government of India under the repealed F. R. 56 was in the nature of a mere executive instruction or had the force of a rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Though, my attention was not drawn to any gazette in which the decision No. 23 was published, it had the force of statutory rule, because it was a self-contained one under which a Government servants age of superannuation was raised to 58 subject to certain conditions. There was no need to rely on any general or specific order regarding any individual. Nor was there any need to draw any inference from his continuation in service under the unamended F. R. 56 after his attainment of 55th year. Decision No. 23 was full and comprehensive and had the force of rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. As in the case of memorandum issued by the Madhya Pradesh Government referred to in AIR 1967 SC 1264 , there was nothing in the decision No. 23 to show that the Central Government wanted to incorporate decision No. 23 by amending F. R. 56. As in the case of memorandum issued by the Madhya Pradesh Government referred to in AIR 1967 SC 1264 , there was nothing in the decision No. 23 to show that the Central Government wanted to incorporate decision No. 23 by amending F. R. 56. The decision taken by the President might be in the nature of an executive instruction or in the nature of a Rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. This matter came up for decision before the Orissa High Court in the latest case in Batahari Jena v. State of Orissa AIR 1968 Orissa 44, which is on all fours with the facts of the present case. The Orissa High Court held that para 6 of decision 23 had the force of a Rule and not of a mere executive instruction. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Orissa High Court did not refer to AIR 1967 SC 1264 . The reasons why the Supreme Court held the memorandum issued by the Madhya Pradesh Government in that case to be only an executive instruction had already been noticed. But the same grounds do not exist here. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on K. P. Krishnankutty Menon v. State of Kerala, AIR 1968 Ker 198 which held with reference to Keralas Service Rules that there is a distinction between a Rule framed by the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 and an executive order passed by the Government and that they are not the same. It was held that an executive order could not alter or modify an already existing rule under Article 309. But, in the present case the reverse is the case. Decision No. 23 which had the force of a rule under the unamended F. R. 56 must be deemed to have been repealed by the amended F. R. 56. I hold that the decision No. 23 of the Government of India under the unamended F. R. 56 had the force of a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel conceded that in such a case, the petitioner cannot succeed. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on passages at pages 276 and 277 of Basus Commentary on the Constitution of India Vol. The learned counsel conceded that in such a case, the petitioner cannot succeed. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on passages at pages 276 and 277 of Basus Commentary on the Constitution of India Vol. III-1967 edition wherein the learned author states that Article 166(2) of the Constitution of India does not bar the Court from enquiring whether an order is passed upon the satisfaction of a particular authority, when the satisfaction of a particular authority is necessary under the law to make the order and that the Court can examine the same. He also relied on the following decisions to show when the Court can examine the opinion of the administrative authority in such cases. Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji, AIR 1945 PC 156, Shyamaghana Ray v. State, AIR 1952 Orissa 200, Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation AIR 1959 SC 308 . Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal U. P. AIR 1961 SC 1381 and Nani Gopal Paul v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1966 Cal 167 . He relied on the following decisions to show that the appointing authority cannot retire a Government servant before the normal age of retirement without assigning any reason. Vide Pt. Sunder Lal Vasudeva v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 Puni 140, State of Mysore v. Padmanabhacharya, AIR 1966 SC 602 , B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore AIR 1966 SC 1942 ; AIR 1967 Mys 116; AIR 1967 Mys 194; AIR 1967 SC 1264 and AIR 1968 Ker 198 . He relied on Workmen of M/s. B. R. Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, Hubli by L. G. Patil v. Management of M/s. B. R. Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, Hubli, by its Manager, AIR 1966 Mys 225, N. Narayana Kamath v. Director of Food Supplies in Mysore, Bangalore AIR 1967 Mys 1 and M/s. Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. v. L. K. Bose AIR 1967 SC 361 to show what is an error apparent on the face of the record, which can be rectified by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He relied on Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes AIR 1967 SC 1401 which held that the High Court will exercise its jurisdiction in an action against a party under an invalid law. In State of Orissa v. Dr. He relied on Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes AIR 1967 SC 1401 which held that the High Court will exercise its jurisdiction in an action against a party under an invalid law. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei AIR 1967 SC 1269 it was held that the violation of natural justice in the passing of an administrative order is liable to be set aside. In State of West Bengal v. P. N. Talukdar, AIR 1965 SC 646 and Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1967 SC 1081 it was held that the Court is not precluded from making an enquiry to see whether the notification under the Land Acquisition Act alleged to have been made for a public purpose was in fact made in fraud of the Act. In Sushil Kumar Choudhary v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 Pat 227 it was held that colourable exercise of power under Bihar Service Rules was liable to be quashed. But, these decisions do not have much bearing on this case. For, the purpose of sub-rule (j) of the amended F. R. 56 and that of para 6 of decision No. 23 in making the Government servant retire compulsorily are one and the same. The common purpose is to weed put an unsuitable Government servant in the public interest. This relates to only the background of the work of the officer and is not a condition precedent. So long as the satisfaction of the appointing authority on this point is present, the Court cannot examine the reasons. Nor do they need be mentioned in the notice. Vide State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi AIR 1957 SC 892 , P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 243 , State of Uttar Pradesh v. Madan Mohan Nagar, AIR 1967 SC 1260 and AIR 1968 Orissa 44. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents alternatively contended that para 6 of decision No. 23 of the Government of India is still in force and was not expressly repealed by the amended F. R. 56. I do not agree with this contention, because, the substance of para 6 was incorporated in sub-rule (j) of the amended F. R. 56. So, it must be deemed to have been repealed. 13. I do not agree with this contention, because, the substance of para 6 was incorporated in sub-rule (j) of the amended F. R. 56. So, it must be deemed to have been repealed. 13. The respondents counsel contended that the petitioner filed the petition late and that the petition is liable to be dismissed on account of delay. As stated in paragraph 3 supra, the petitioner was not furnished with a copy of the order of the President. He was only informed that the President rejected his appeal. Exts. A/4 and A/5 bear out this fact. As the petitioner waited for the order of the President, he cannot be said to be guilty of any laches. In these circumstances delay is not a bar. Vide also Ahmed Hasan v. Chief Commissioner of Manipur, AIR 1966 Manipur 18 , Rajinder Parshad v. Punjab State AIR 1966 Punj 185, Dev-Raj v. Union of India AIR 1966 Him Pra 13, Chennai Sri Ekambareswarar Devastanam v. Collector and Land Acquisition Officer Madras AIR 1966 Mad 385 , G. N. Nanjundiah v. Inspector General of Police in Mysore, Bangalore, AIR 1967 Mys 179, Damomal Kausonal Raisinghani v. Union of India AIR 1967 Bom 355 , K. V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore AIR 1967 SC 993 , Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1074 , Dalpathbhai Hemchand v. Municipality of Chansma AIR 1968 Guj 38 , and Vaishanava Dass v. Faqir Chand, AIR 1968 Delhi 6. 14. Another contention of the respondents counsel is that the petitioner had an alternative remedy, that he should have filed a suit and that the writ petition is not maintainable. But, the alternative remedy is not always a bar and the matter is pre-eminently one of discretion. Vide Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163 , K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission AIR 1954 SC 207 . Collector of Customs Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1506 , Customs Collector Bombay v. Shantilal and Co., AIR 1966 SC 197 , AIR 1967 SC 1401 and Surgical Dressing Manufacturing Co., Private Ltd., Amritsar v. Punjab State 1968 Lab IC 722 (Punj). Vide also my own decision reported in Iuwangjao Kabui v. Union of India 1968 Lab IC 1145 (Mani). 15. Vide also my own decision reported in Iuwangjao Kabui v. Union of India 1968 Lab IC 1145 (Mani). 15. Thus, though 3 months notice for compulsory retirement was wrongly issued by the first respondent under para 6 of decision No. 23, it is still a valid one under the corresponding sub-rule (j) of F. R. 56, under which he could validly issue the said notice. 16. In the result, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed, but under the circumstances without costs. Petition dismissed.