ORDER R.J. Bhave, J. The applicant, who is a licensed milk dealer, has been found guilty u/s 16(1)(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. He has preferred this revision challenging his conviction. On the date of the incident, the Food Inspector Puntambekar was standing near the gate of the Secretariat at Bhopal at about 11 A. M. The applicant, who supplies milk to the Canteen at the Secretariat, came there with a can of milk. The Food Inspector asked him to give a sample of the milk, but the applicant, without paying any heed to the request, went to the Canteen. The Food Inspector, along with witnesses, followed him and reached the Canteen which was situated at the fourth storey. At this stage, the applicant left the can of milk in the Canteen and bolted away. The Food Inspector attached the can in the presence of the witnesses and prepared a Panchnama, On these facts, the applicant was prosecuted. The trial Court held that the evidence tendered by the prosecution was not sufficiently convincing to hold that the applicant refused to give a sample of milk when asked for. The trial Court, however, held that the applicant in leaving the can of milk at the Canteen and in bolting away prevented the Food Inspector from taking the sample and thus committed an offence punishable u/s 16(1)(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The appeal preferred by the applicant was dismissed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal. The Courts below mainly relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Municipal Board, Sambhal Vs. Jhamman Lal and Another, . In the Allahabad case, the Food Inspector reached the shop of vendor Jhamman Lal and asked him to give a sample of mustard oil which was stored there for the purposes of sale. Jhamman Lal, instead of complying with the request of the Food Inspector, left the shop and promised to come back shortly; but he did not return. When Jhamman Lal did not return for a long time, the Food Inspector left the shop and thereafter made a report against Jhamman Lal that he prevented him from obtaining the sample. Jhamman Lal, instead of complying with the request of the Food Inspector, left the shop and promised to come back shortly; but he did not return. When Jhamman Lal did not return for a long time, the Food Inspector left the shop and thereafter made a report against Jhamman Lal that he prevented him from obtaining the sample. On these fact;, the trial Court found Jhamman Lal guilty; but, in appeal, it was urged before the Sessions Judge that in order to prevent a sample being taken there should have been some overt act; that it was open to the Food Inspector, in the absence of Jhamman Lal, to take a sample from the tin and, therefore, it could not be said that the Food Inspector had been prevented from taking the sample. This argument prevailed before the Sessions Judge who allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction of Jhamman Lal. The High Court of Allahabad, however, set aside the acquittal. It was urged before the High Court that when a person leaves the shop, he "prevents the Food Inspector from taking a sample as authorised by this Act", because one of the methods authorised by the Act by which he can take sample under the Act is from any person selling such article; and that if the person, who was selling the article, disappears, then, in that event, the Food Inspector is prevented from taking sample in the manner authorised by the Act. On behalf of the accused the contentions raised before the Sessions Judge were reiterated. On these arguments, the High Court, however, held: It was contended by learned Counsel for the Respondent that before there could be prevention there should be some kind of overt act. If a person disappears from the shop, in our opinion, he has done overt act by means of which he has made it impossible for the Food Inspector to obtain a sample from him. Apart from this fact, we do not think that in eases of prevention an overt act is necessary. In Public Prosecutor Vs. Murugesan, , 'where a person by his action effectively prevented the officer from taking the sample' it was held: No overt act was necessary to make out preventing' u/s 14(3) of the Act.' Reliance was placed by learned Counsel on a decision in Bishan Dass Telu Ram Vs. In Public Prosecutor Vs. Murugesan, , 'where a person by his action effectively prevented the officer from taking the sample' it was held: No overt act was necessary to make out preventing' u/s 14(3) of the Act.' Reliance was placed by learned Counsel on a decision in Bishan Dass Telu Ram Vs. State, , where it was held by a learned single Judge that. Refusal to give the sample even on payment is not the same thing as prevention which need not have an element of obstruction but inevidence(sic) some act which hinders an Inspector from taking a sample. The learned single Judge distinguished the case reported in Cort v. Ambergats Etc. Ry. Co. 20 L J Q B 460, where it was held: To prevent' does not mean only an obstruction by physical force but it may involve threat. With respect we might say that the learned single Judge did not consider the point that by disappearance the accused had made it impossible for the Food Inspector to obtain sample 'from the person selling such article,' which he was entitled to obtain u/s 10(1) and thereby he had prevented the Food Inspector in taking the sample as authorised by the Act. We think that the opinion of the appellate Court was not correct. If a person either by an overt act or by his omission prevents the Food Inspector from obtaining sample from him he would be guilty u/s 16(b). So far as Jhamman Lal is concerned, there cannot be any doubt that he prevented the Food Inspector from taking the sample from him. This decision was followed by Tare J. in Ramdayal v. State of M. P Cri. Rev. No. 387 of 1967, decided on the 17th October 1967. In that case also the accused had left the milk can at the place where the Food Inspector was taking a sample and disappeared, and his Lordship held that the offence u/s 16(1)(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was made out against him. His Lordship, while following the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Municipal Board, Sambhal v. Jhamman Lal (supra), expressed his dissent from the view expressed by the Punjab High Court in Bishan Dass Telu Ram v. State and that of the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat Vs. Laljibhai Chaturbhai, . His Lordship, while following the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Municipal Board, Sambhal v. Jhamman Lal (supra), expressed his dissent from the view expressed by the Punjab High Court in Bishan Dass Telu Ram v. State and that of the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat Vs. Laljibhai Chaturbhai, . Shri Rajendra Singh, learned Counsel for the applicant, however, urged that a clear distinction has been made under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act between the powers of the Food Inspector and the procedure prescribed for the exercise thereof. He urged that the applicant in leaving the milk can at the Canteen and bolting away, at best, made it impossible for the Food Inspector to follow the procedure prescribed u/s 11, but it could not be said that the applicant prevented the Food Inspector from taking the sample of the milk. The milk was available to the Food Inspector which was actually seized by him and nothing prevented him from taking the sample in the presence of the witnesses. He urged that the expression "prevents" envisages an overt act on the part of a person so as to make it impossible for the Food Inspector to take the sample, or the taking of the sample should be made difficult by the person by putting some obstacles in the way of the Food Inspector. By way of illustrations, he urged that if the article of food is destroyed by the person or that it is mixed with another article so as to prevent the taking of the sample, or if some force is used or threat is administered, in those cases it could be said that the person prevented the Food Inspector from taking the sample. He further urged that the procedure prescribed u/s 11 was for the protection and safety of the holder of the goods and, as such, if the person makes it impossible for the Food Inspector to follow the procedure, the only effect of it is to prevent the person from raising any ground of non-observance, of the procedure in case he is tried. He urged that in following the procedure prescribed u/s 11, the Food Inspector performs a duty-cast on him under the statute and does not exercise the power of taking the sample conferred on him. He urged that in following the procedure prescribed u/s 11, the Food Inspector performs a duty-cast on him under the statute and does not exercise the power of taking the sample conferred on him. In support, he relied on the decision of M. C. Desai, J. (as he then was) of the Allahabad High Court in Mussaddi Lal and Another Vs. The State, . He urged that if this case had been noted in the latter Allahabad decision, the decision might have been otherwise. He, therefore, urged that the decision of Tare J. which was based on the latter Allahabad decision, requires reconsideration. In the case of Mussaddi Lal v. State (supra), relied on by Shri Rajen-dra Singh, a vendor of food articles refused to sign on the labels put on the bottles of sample taken by the Food Inspector and to sign the receipt for the price received by the vendor. It was held in that case that there was nothing in the Act making it obligatory on the dealer to put the signatures on the said documents and hence his failure to do so could not be said to result in his preventing the Food Inspector from taking the samples. His Lordship (M.C. Desai, J.), however, proceeded to observe further as under: Section 11 (of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act) does not deal with a Food Inspector's powers at all; it prescribes the procedure to be followed by him when he takes the sample; in other words it lays down his duties. * * * * * The distinction between 'power' and 'duty' has this importance that the legislature may punish a vendor for preventing an Inspector from exercising his powers under the Act but has no necessity to punish him for preventing him from performing his duties towards him. If the exercise of the powers is prevented, the public would suffer because the enforcement of the provisions of the Act would be prevented, but if the performance of the duties is prevented, only the vendor will suffer and he need not be punished further. A vendor must have notice of an intention that he may retain a part of the sample given to him for use, as mentioned in Section 13, in case of necessity. Field J. stated in Parsons v. Birmingham Dairy Co. A vendor must have notice of an intention that he may retain a part of the sample given to him for use, as mentioned in Section 13, in case of necessity. Field J. stated in Parsons v. Birmingham Dairy Co. (1882) 9 Q B D 172, that the provision is one of the precautions taken by the legislature to protect against the contingency of the sample said to be adulterated being tampered with after it has left the vendor's possession. Similarly a part of the sample is to be given to him so that if he disputes the correctness of the analysis of the part sent by the Inspector for chemical analysis or fears that the part might have been tampered with before the analysis, he may send his own part for another chemical analysis. Therefore, if a vendor refuses to accept the notice and a part of the sample offered to him, only he would suffer, his refusal would not at all stand in the way of his prosecution and conviction. That is why u/s 16(1)(c) only preventing a Food Inspector from exercising any power is made punishable and not preventing a Food Inspector from performing his duty. A Food Inspector is bound to tender a notice and a part of the sample to the vendor, but no obligation is cast upon the vendor to accept the notice and the part of the sample. The legislature contemplated refusal on the part of a vendor to receive a portion of the sample and, therefore, enacted Sub-section (2) of Section 11; if a vendor refuses to accept a portion of the sample tendered to him, the Inspector is required to inform the Public Analyst of the fact. Thus giving information to the Public Analyst of the fact that the vendor has refused to accept a portion of the sample is an alternative to the vendor's accepting the portion, and so long as an Inspector is not prevented from giving information to the Public Analyst of the fact, it cannot be said that he has been prevented from exercising any power. Shri Rajendra Singh urged that there is no difference in principle in the case of a vendor not co-operating with the Food Inspector in the performance of his duties towards him and in the case of a vendor making himself scarce but leaving the food stuff available to the Inspector. Shri Rajendra Singh urged that there is no difference in principle in the case of a vendor not co-operating with the Food Inspector in the performance of his duties towards him and in the case of a vendor making himself scarce but leaving the food stuff available to the Inspector. When an enactment confers a power on a certain officer and prescribes the manner in which the power is to be exercised, it is common sense that the power should be exercised in the manner prescribed. There is no doubt that a distinction exists between the exercise of a power and the performance of a duty. But when a manner of exercise of power is prescribed, it cannot be held that the exercise of the power in that manner becomes a performance of the duty only because the particular manner is prescribed with a view to protect the interests of the person to be affected thereby. In certain cases, in the context of a particular statute the manner prescribed may be either mandatory or directory depending on the context of the statute. Inasmuch as the manner prescribed u/s 11 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is designed to protect the interests of the holder of the food stuffs, it must be held that the manner prescribed is mandatory, and hence the Food Inspector can exercise the power prescribed u/s 10 only in the manner prescribed thereunder or not at all. tor this reason, I find it difficult to agree with M.C. Desai J., with due respect, in holding that any duties are cast upon the Food Inspector u/s 11 of the Act. The performance of a duty by one person envisages an existence of a right in the Other. Section 11 does not create any right in favour of the holder of fdod stuffs. If the manner prescribed u/s 11 is not followed by the Food Inspector, its only effect Will be that his exercise of the power u/s 10 would be rendered null and void. It is no doubt true that the decision of M. \C. Desai J. was not noted in the latter Allahabad Case. But, in my view, that would not have made any difference. It is no doubt true that the decision of M. \C. Desai J. was not noted in the latter Allahabad Case. But, in my view, that would not have made any difference. I may also add that for the decision of the case before M.C. Desai J., it was enough to hold that no obligation was cast on the holder of the goods to sign the labels on the Samples or to sign the money receipts and hence it could not be said that he prevented the Food Inspector in the exercise of his power. In my view, the rest of the observations in the case are in the nature of obiter. Now I shall consider the argument of Shri Rajendra Singh from another aspect. The power of taking the sample has been conferred on the Food Inspector so that he may prosecute the person found selling adulterated food stuff or found in possession thereof for the purposes of sale. Now, if a person bolts away and thus his identity remains undisclosed, the whole purpose of the exercise of the power conferred u/s 10 on the Food Inspector is defeated. In such a case, it will have to be held that in bolting away the person prevented the effective exercise of the power by the Food Inspector. If this is so, it is difficult to see how the same action on the part of a known person would make any difference. If he bolts away, an additional burden will be cast on the Inspector, if he decides to prosecute him for selling or keeping for sale adulterated food articles, to prove that the person who bolted, away. was the accused and that the article left by him was in his possession. Witnesses may not be available at the nick of the time and here, again, the result would be the same. This is why it is necessary to interpret the two expressions "prevents" and "in exercise of the powers under the Act" in the manner interpreted by the Allahabad High Court in Municipal Board, Sambhal v. Jhamman Lal (supra). In Bishan Dass Telu Ram v. State (supra), the accused had refused to give a sample even when the price for the same was offered. It was held in that case that mere refusal to give a sample did not amount to preventing the Food Inspector from exercising his powers. In Bishan Dass Telu Ram v. State (supra), the accused had refused to give a sample even when the price for the same was offered. It was held in that case that mere refusal to give a sample did not amount to preventing the Food Inspector from exercising his powers. It was held that refusal is not the same thing as prevention, as prevention involves some overt act which hinders an Inspector from taking a sample. There is. no discussion in the said case. Similar is the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. Laljibhai Chaturbhuj (supra). In that case also, without any discussion, it was held that mere refusal could not amount to preventing the Food Inspector from taking a sample, as there must be a physical obstruction or a threat or an assault. With due respect, I must observe that it is not always necessary to use either threat or physical force to prevent the exercise of any power. It can be done in many other ways. I, therefore, respectfully differ from the above said two decisions. In any case, I am bound by the decision of Tare J., and nothing has been brought to my notice to persuade me to refer the matter to a larger Bench. I, therefore, hold that the applicant has rightly been convicted u/s 16(1)(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the same is hereby confirmed. As to the punishment, the applicant has been awarded the minimum punishment prescribed under the Act. No interference is, therefore, possible in that matter also. For the aforesaid reasons, the revision petition fails and is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed