ORDER R.L. Gulati, J. - This is a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution and is directed against an order of suspension passed against the Petitioner, who is the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha of village Loni. 2. The Petitioner was elected as the Pradhan of the Goan Sabha, Loni, in the year 1961. It appears that subsequently in September, 1962, a report was made against him by opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 to the effect that he had encroached upon the land of the Gaon Sabha and had also permitted others to make similar encroachments. On the receipt of the complaint, the Tehsildar got an enquiry made through the Naib Tehsildar, who found that the Petitioner had in fact encroached upon the land of the Gaon Sabha. In fact the Naib Tehsildar found that not only the Pradhan himself had encroached upon the land of the Gaon Sabha, but had allowed other persons also to encroach upon the land of the Gaon Sabha and to construct shops thereon. The Naib Tehsildar accordingly sent a report to the Tehsildar which is dated 26-10-1962. The Tehsildar sent the said report to the Sub-Divisional Officer with the following endorsement: S.D.O. If approved Pradhan may be placed uftder suspension for these misdeeds and S. Kgo. may be asked to report all cases of encroachments within 15 day's and to obtain explanation of the Pradhan for these misdeeds. Sd/- -H.L. Gupta. 31.10.1962 Tehsildar. The Sub-Divisional Officer thereupon passed the following order: Approved, as proposed at "A". The Pradhan is placed under suspension with immediate effect and he shall submit his explanation within two weeks. S.K. Loni to inquire and report cases of encroachment. Sd/- -R. Vasudevan, SDO, 8-11-1962. It is against this order of suspension passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer that this writ petition is directed. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has challenged the order of suspension on two grounds: (a) that no order of suspension could be passed against the Petitioner as he was not an employee of the State Government, and (b) that the Petitioner had not been accused of any offence involving moral turpitude and as such he could not be suspended. 4. Section 95 of the Panchayat Raj Act contains a provision for suspension of an office bearer of a Gaon Panchayat. Section 95 is in Ch. 4. Section 95 of the Panchayat Raj Act contains a provision for suspension of an office bearer of a Gaon Panchayat. Section 95 is in Ch. VII of the Panchayat Raj Act dealing with external control by the State Government over the village institutions like Gaon Sabha, Gaon Panchayat, Nyaya Panchayat and its office bearers and members. Sub-clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 deals with the powers of the State Government to carry out inspection of these institutions and to issue directions for the removal of defects and irregularities in the working of the institutions and also to suspend, supersede or dissolve an institution in certain cases. Clause (g) of Section 95(1) provides for the suspension or removal of a member of a Gaon Panchayat or Joint Committee or an office bearer of a Gaon Sabha or Nyaya Panchayat for various defaults of the office bearers. Section 95(1)(g) runs as follows: 95 (1) The State Government may-- (g) suspend or remove a member of a Gaon Panchayat or joint committee or Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti, an office bearer of a Gaon Sabha or a panch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat, if he-- (i) absents himself without sufficient cause from more than three consecutive meetings or sittings, (ii) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever, or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude, (iii) has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by this Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest, or (iv) being a Sahayak Sarpanch or a Sarpanch of the Nyaya Panchayat takes active part in politics, or (v) suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (m) of Section 5A. In view of the above quoted clear provision in Clause (g) it is difficult to understand how can an office bearer of a Gaon Sabha deny his liability to be suspended. It may be noticed that a Gaon Sabha is the creation of the Panchayat Raj Act itself. The rights and duties of the Gaon Sabha, its members and office bearers are regulated by the statutory provisions contained in the Panchayat Raj Act. An office bearer of a Gaon Sabha enjoys certain rights and performs certain duties in accordance with these provisions. The rights and duties of the Gaon Sabha, its members and office bearers are regulated by the statutory provisions contained in the Panchayat Raj Act. An office bearer of a Gaon Sabha enjoys certain rights and performs certain duties in accordance with these provisions. He is similarly liable for certain penalties for any default or omission on his part. He cannot, therefore, claim any right outside the frame work of the Act and when the Panchayat Raj Act itself of which a Pradhan is a creature provides for his suspension in certain circumstances, he cannot deny his liability to be suspended on the ground that he is not an employee of the Government. In the case of any employee, his liability to be suspended would depend upon the terms of the contract of employment and in certain cases the right of an employer to suspend an employee may be implicit, even if there is no express term in the agreement of employment subject to the condition that the employer would be bound to pay to the employee his wages or salary for the period of suspension incase after the enquiry the employee concerned is absolved from the default attributed to him. But that is entirely a different matter. In the case of an office bearer of a Gaon Samaj, his liability to be suspended is a statutory liability and the anology of an employee being suspended by an employer in the absence of an express provision to that effect in the agreement of employment is wholly out of the place. It is not the case of the Petitioner that Section 95(1)(g) is ultra vires of the State Legislature and therefore the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Pradhan was not liable to suspension is not understandable. 5. The other contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is clearly misconceived. It is true that Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (g) of Section 95(1) requires that the member or office bearer of a Gaon Sabha should be accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude before he is suspended, but this is not the only ground for suspension. There are four other grounds contained in Sub-clauses (i), (iii), (iv) and (v). The order of suspension does not say as to under which of the sub-clauses the Pradhan was suspended. There are four other grounds contained in Sub-clauses (i), (iii), (iv) and (v). The order of suspension does not say as to under which of the sub-clauses the Pradhan was suspended. Later on, however, on an enquiry from the A.D.M. (J), the Sub-Divisional Officer wrote to him that the Pradhan was suspended u/s 95(1)(g)(iii) of the Panchayat Raj Act. The Pradhan in the instant case had been suspended because he was found to have encroached upon the land of the Gaon Sabha and had permitted other people also to make similar encroachments upon the land of the Gaon Sabha. In a way the Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha is the custodian of its properties and if he encroaches upon the properties of the Gaon Sabha and also allows others to make such encroachments, he renders himsdf liable to an action u/s 95(1)(g)(iii). His action would be a clear abuse of his position and in any case such a Pradhan could not be considered to be desirable in public interest. 6. It was then contended by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that Pradhan could not be suspended pending an enquiry. I do not find any such ground in the writ petition. Whether the Pradhan in the instant case was suspended pending enquiry or by way of punishment would require an investigation into facts. The order of suspension does not on the face of it say that the suspension of the Pradhan was pending an enquiry against him. In fact an enquiry had already been conducted by the Sub-Divisional Officer through the Naib Tehsildar and the Tehsildar. It is true that by the order of suspension dated 8-11-1962, the Sub-Divisional Officer called upon the Petitioner to submit his explanation within two weeks, but this explanation might have been asked for with a view to taking action against him for the recovery of the land encroached upon by the Pradhan and other persons as by the same order Sadar Kanungo, Loni, was directed to enquire and report the cases of other encroachments also. This being the situation, I cannot permit the Learned Counsel to raise this ground at this stage. 7. Apart from this, I do not see how it is possible to say that a Pradhan cannot be suspended pending an enquiry. This being the situation, I cannot permit the Learned Counsel to raise this ground at this stage. 7. Apart from this, I do not see how it is possible to say that a Pradhan cannot be suspended pending an enquiry. A perusal of Sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Section 95(1)(g) makes it clear that an office bearer may be suspended for an indefinite period. A larger power to suspend for an indefinite period certainly contains the lesser power to suspend for a definite period and the period may be a specified period of certain days or months or may be for the duration of the enquiry. 8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on the case of Babu Nandan Gir v. Sub Divisional Officer, Salempur, District Deoria 1965 AWR 603 . In this case a learned Single Judge of this Court held that a Pradhan of a Gaon Samaj could be suspended pending enquiry if he was accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude and in no other case. According to this decision, a Pradhan could be suspended pending enquiry only if his case fell under Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (g) of Section 95(1) for the reason that in a case falling under Sub-clause (ii) an enquiry into the charges or accusation of an offence would be invitable. That may be so, but it would also follow from that reasoning that no enquiry was contemplated in cases falling under other sub-clauses and suspension could be ordered on the subjective satisfaction of the State Government alone. In the instant case the Sub Divisional Officer on the material placed before him was fully satisfied that the Petitioner had abused his position or that his continuance as a Pradhan was not desirable in public interest. In these circumstances it was perfectly open to the Sub-Divisional Officer to have suspended the Pradhan as he did without instituting any formal enquiry against the Pradhan. Moreover, I am of opinion that a charge of encroachment on the land of which the Pradhan was a trustee did amount to an offence involving moral turpitude falling u/s 405 IPC. In these circumstances it was perfectly open to the Sub-Divisional Officer to have suspended the Pradhan as he did without instituting any formal enquiry against the Pradhan. Moreover, I am of opinion that a charge of encroachment on the land of which the Pradhan was a trustee did amount to an offence involving moral turpitude falling u/s 405 IPC. However, it is not necessary to pursue this matter any further as I have already held that the Petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the question at this stage as to whether the order of suspension passed against him was an outright order of punishment or was merely pending enquiry. 9. The result is that this writ petition must fail and the same is dismissed with costs.