JDUGMENT - PALEKAR, J.:---This is a Civil Revision Application by original defendant No. 1 in Special Suit No. 11 of 1965 on the file of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nanded From an interim order passed by the learned Judge on 5-9-1967. The plaintiff in the suit was a minor represented by his guardian mother. The suit was filed by him against defendant No. 1 who claimed to be a tenant. The other two defendants were the plaintiffs father and the State of Maharashtra respectively. The suit was for a declaration that the plaintiff was the owner of Survey No. 242 in village Pethwadaj, Taluka Kandhar, District Nanded, and that the order passed by the Tahsildar on 3-2-59 declaring defendant No. 1 owner under section 37-A and section 38-E of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, was null and void and of no effect. He also asked for consequential relief by asking for possession of the same from defendant No. 1. 2. The plaintiff alleged in his plaint that Survey No. 242 referred to above was joint family property and that in a partition between him and his father, defendant No. 2 on 12-4-1954 that land was allotted to the share of the plaintiff. A suit was filed for partition and after the suit the plaintiffs name was entered in the revenue records in respect of the land as owner in possession of the property from 1954-55 onwards. He further alleged that he continued to be in possession of the land till June 1957 when he was forcibly dispossessed by defendant No. 1. 3. The further allegation was that defendant No. 1, having trespassed upon the land, sought to support his possession by fraudulent manipulations in the revenue records with the help of the Patwari. First he got it recorded that he was in possession of the land under an agreement to purchase the land. There after he got this entry scored out and got himself recorded as being in possession as a tenant for the year 1955-56 after scoring out the name of the plaintiff who was shown in possession. This was done by him in order to show for the purpose of section 37-A of the Act that he was in possession as a tenant on 12-3-1956 which, if upheld, would entitle him to get ownership rights under section 38-E of the Act. This was done by him in order to show for the purpose of section 37-A of the Act that he was in possession as a tenant on 12-3-1956 which, if upheld, would entitle him to get ownership rights under section 38-E of the Act. The plaintiff alleged that under the law then in force the defendant No. 1 could, under two circumstances, have been considered to be a tenant, and yet the Mamlatdar passed orders under sections 37-A and 38-A on 32-2-1959 holding that the defendant No. 2 was a protected tenant within the meaning of section 37-A and was, therefore, entitled to be declared owner under section 38-E. The plaintiff contended that these declarations had been made behind his back and without notice to him. He further alleged that no opportunity had been given to him to put his say in the matter or to lead evidence. As a matter of fact, the Tahsildar made the provisional and final declarations on the basis that the plaintiffs father was the owner of the property although the land itself was not the subject matter of any dispute before the Tahsildar. He, therefore, submitted that the declarations given by the Tahsildar under section 37-A or section 38-E were null and void and of no effect. He further alleged that Act No. 45 of 1961, viz., the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Re-enactment, Validation and Further Amendment) Act, 1916 in so far as it made provision for the re-enactment of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, was null and void and was ultra vires the State Legislature. He also put forward further constitutional objections to section 38-E with which we are not now concerned. 4. The Principal contest to the suit was by defendant No. 1. He denied the various allegations and maintained that he was a tenant having been let into possession by defendant No. 2 since Gudi Padva of 1955. He alleged that the plaintiff was not the owner or in possession of the land. He was a minor whose guardian was not the owner or in possession of the land. He was a minor whose guardian was defendant No. 2, and since defendant No. 2 was a party to the tenancy proceedings, the decision was binding on him. He denied that he had been responsible for any manipulations in the revenue records. He was a minor whose guardian was not the owner or in possession of the land. He was a minor whose guardian was defendant No. 2, and since defendant No. 2 was a party to the tenancy proceedings, the decision was binding on him. He denied that he had been responsible for any manipulations in the revenue records. He also denied that the orders passed by the Tahsildar declaring him to be the owner of the property were bad for want of proper notice or on account of any constitutional objection to the statute. 5. A number of issues were raised in the Court below, but the learned Judge decided to treat issues Nos. 3 to 5 as preliminary issues. Issues Nos. 3 to 5 are as under :--- (3) Whether the tenancy rights accrued to defendant No. 1 under the provisions of H.T.A.L. Act are ab initio void and the same can be challenged in this Court? (4) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try this suit? (5) Whether the declarations made by executive agency of defendant No. 3 in favour of defendant No. 1 under sections 37-A and 38-E of the H.T. and A.L. Acts on 3-2-1959 are without jurisdiction, null and void? 6. As would be seen from the order passed by the learned Judge, he considered only issue No. 4 viz. whether the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. He held that on the allegations made in the plain, the suit was maintainable, because, in his opinion, the plaintiff was not challenging the finding of the revenue authorities on the ground that they had no jurisdiction to determine the questions which they had actually done, but on the ground that those authorities had acted in excess and contravention of the powers conferred on them by the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. The plaintiff, according to the learned Judge, was not seeking a relief which the Tahsildar alone could have given him, but he was seeking relief against an order which the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to pass under the Act. On that ground, he held that the suit could be maintained. So far as the other two issues, viz. The plaintiff, according to the learned Judge, was not seeking a relief which the Tahsildar alone could have given him, but he was seeking relief against an order which the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to pass under the Act. On that ground, he held that the suit could be maintained. So far as the other two issues, viz. 3 and 5 are concerned, he seemed to be of the opinion that these issues involved mixed questions of fact and law and unless evidence was led before him, it was not possible to given any finding thereon and accordingly he directed that the suit be fixed for bearing of evidence. 7. Aggrieved by that order, defendant No. 1, has come to this Court in revision. The principal contention of Mr. Paranjpe on behalf of the applicant defendant No. 1, is that by the plaint the learned Judge was called upon to decide whether the applicant was a tenant or not. He referred to various allegations made in the plaint and submitted that what the plaintiff wanted was a determination as to whether defendant No. 1 was a tenant or not, a question which, under the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, was determinable by the Tahsildar. Section 8 of that Act provides that if any question arises where any person is a tenant, the Tahsildar shall, after holding an inquiry, decide such question. Then sections (1) and (2) are as follows :- "(1) Save as provided in these Act no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deals with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or by the Commissioner of Government. (2) No order of the Tahsildar Tribunal or Collector or of the Commissioner or Government made under the Act, shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court." Mr. Paranjpe contends that since the plaintiff has implicity asked in the plaint for the determination of the question whether defendant No. 1 was a tenant or not, the suit is not maintainable, because that was a question which by or under the Act was required to be settled by the Tahsildar. We have carefully gone thought the plaint and are satisfied that this is not the relief which the plaintiff asked for. We have carefully gone thought the plaint and are satisfied that this is not the relief which the plaintiff asked for. It was made clear before the learned Judge as noted by him in para 11 of his order that the plaintiff had not sought any relief to the effect that defendant No. 1 was a tenant of the suit land or for any declaration under section 38-E of the Tenancy Act. That was also the position taken by Mr. Parulekar on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1. The plaint also is not capable of the construction put on it by Mr. Paranjpe. We have only to refer to paras 1, 2 and 8 to 13 to see what exactly the case is. The plaintiff alleged that there was a partition between him and his father in 1954, and this partition was confirmed by decree of the Court. After the partition, the plaintiff was duly recorded in the revenue records as the owner of the property and the pahani patraks also showed that he was in possession personally of the property in suit, viz. Survey No. 242. He further alleged that he continued to be in possession till June 1957. It must be noticed here that section 37-A was inserted in the old Act by Act No. 3 of 1956 which came into force on 12-3-1956. By this new provision persons holding land as tenant at the commencement of this Act were deemed to be protected tenants in whose favour a declaration of ownership was liable to be made under section 38-E. It was, therefore, essential to get the benefit of section 37-A that a person seeking this declaration under section 38-E should have been a tenant in possession on 12-3-1956. So the plaintiff alleged that the defendant No. 1 having forcibly dispossessed him in June 1957 caused manipulations to be made in the revenue records with the help of the patwari just to show that he was in possession in 1955-1956. After first, he got an entry made that he was in possession under an agreement to purchase. Since that was considered insufficient, the entry was scored off and another entry was got made that he was the tenant in substitution of the name of the plaintiff who had been shown to be in personal possession in 1955-56. After first, he got an entry made that he was in possession under an agreement to purchase. Since that was considered insufficient, the entry was scored off and another entry was got made that he was the tenant in substitution of the name of the plaintiff who had been shown to be in personal possession in 1955-56. The plaintiff alleged that either under the law then in force, nor, in fact, defendant No. 1 could have possibly been in possession as a tenant, because no tenancy could have been created during the period to which this dispute relates. It is on these allegations in the plaint that Mr. Paranjpe chiefly relies for his submission. We do not think that these allegations have been made by the plaintiff with a view to have a decision as to whether defendant No. 1 was a tenant or not. It is only a historical narration of facts merely to show that the plaintiff could not possibly have been a tenant to merit a declaration in his favour under section 37-A or section 38-E. The real attack in the plaint comes at para 8. It is as follows :- "That treating the defendant No. 1 to be a tenant of the land in dispute and showing defendant No. 2 to be the owner of the suit land, the executive agency of the defendant No. 3 has made a provisional and final declaration both under sections 37-A and 38-E of the H.T.A.L. Act to the extent of 20 acres from suit land simultaneously behind the back of the plaintiff without giving any proclamation or notice in the came of the plaintiff, or without affording any opportunity to the plaintiff to put up his say in the matter or to adduce any evidence. Thus the whole of the declaration proceedings are vitiated ........" Then again in para 9, the plaintiffs alleges --- "That the order making the final declaration under sections 37-A, 38-E of the Tribunal in File No. 17/38-E/59 Pathwadaj is without jurisdiction, as in that case the suit land was not in issue and as the same order has been carried out on work sheets dated 3-2-59 the final declarations under sections 37-A and 38-E and all the proceedings connected there with the without jurisdiction, thus null and void". To understand these allegations reference may have to be made to some important dates. To understand these allegations reference may have to be made to some important dates. The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, came into force on 10th June, 1950. After that, it underwent a number of amendments with all of which we are not concerned. For the first time, by Act No. 3 of 1954, sections 38-E was inserted in the Act and came into force from 4th February, 1954. This section provided --- "(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter (Chapter IV) or any law for the time being in force or any custom, usage, decree, contract or grant to the contrary, the Government may, by notification in the Official Gazetted declare in respect of any area and from such date as may be specified therein that ownership of all lands held by protected tenants which they are entitled to purchase from their landholders in such area under any provision of this chapter shall stand transferred to and vest in the protected tenants holding them and from such date the protected tenants shall be deemed to be the full owners of such lands :........". In other words, on the notified date, a person in possession as protected tenant was entitled to own the property of which he was a protected tenant. In order to give effect to this provision, rules were made on 12-8-1955 known as the Hyderabad Transfer of Ownership Rules of 1955. The Tribunal appointed for the purpose was required by these rules to prepare what is known as the provisional list showing the names of the landlords and the protected tenants in respect of the lands and after due publicity was given to the same and disposing of objections that may be raised with regard to the list, pass orders confirming or varying the list finally declaring which of the protected tenants were entitled to purchase the lands. The area in which this property is situated was notified under section 38-E sometime in 1957, and, therefore, the proceedings started thereafter. In the meantime, as already pointed out, section 37-A was entered into the statute book on 12-3-1956, and accordingly a provisional list of ordinary tenants who became protected tenants under that section had also to be prepared. To facilitate this, another set of rules known as the Hyderabad Protected Tenants Rules, 1956 was promulgated on 14-7-1956 and these Rules also prescribed a similar procedure. To facilitate this, another set of rules known as the Hyderabad Protected Tenants Rules, 1956 was promulgated on 14-7-1956 and these Rules also prescribed a similar procedure. Accordingly, the Tribunal published the provisional list on 16-5-1958, and it is not disputed before us that in this list defendant No. 2 was shown as the owner of Survey No. 242 and defendant No. 1 was shown as the protected tenant thereof. It is clear from the Rules that it was not incumbent upon the Tribunal to give notices to the parties for determining the provisional list. The Tribunal could make necessary injuries which in most cases took the form of finding out the names of the owners and the protected tenants from the revenue records. The plaintiffs grievance is that although in the revenue records he was shown as the owner of the property, no notice was given to him either when the declaration was made of the provisional list or later on when that list was finalised. This Court has held in (Vithalrao v. Kondva)1, Special Civil Application No. 1720 of 1962, decided on 22nd August, 1963, that principles of natural justice require that the orders finally declaring that a party is a protected tenant should not be passed unless notice was given to the landlord affected by such declaration. The plaintiff has, therefore, complained that both the provisional list and the final list had been prepared without giving any proclamation or notice in the name of the plaintiff, and since the determination of the question was made without affording the plaintiff opportunity to put his say in the matter or adduce any evidence, the declaration was null and void and not binding on him. He alleged that the question was determined on the basis that defendant No. 2 was the owner and defendant No. 1 was the tenant, though, in fact, even according to the records on which the provisional list had been prepared, the name of defendant No. 2 could not have been justifiably entered in the list as owner of the land. In short, the complaint of the plaintiff in the suit is that he has been deprived of valuable rights to property without issuing any notice to him, and that is why he contended that the declaration was null and void. In short, the complaint of the plaintiff in the suit is that he has been deprived of valuable rights to property without issuing any notice to him, and that is why he contended that the declaration was null and void. Such a suit it is conceded, does not fall within the contemplation of section 99, because according to the plaintiff, he is not questioning the authority of the Tribunal to give the declaration under section 37-A or section 38-E, but what he questions is that this determination has been made without giving notice to him. In a sense, therefore, the plaintiff wants the declaration itself made by the Tribunal to be set aside on the ground that the Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental rules of judicial procedure. The various averments in the plaint with regard to the acts of defendant No. 1 like the manipulation of the record of rights and shown defendant No. 2 as the owner of the land in the provisional list are made not with a view to seek any relief on the merits as in the declaration that defendant No. 1 was a protected tenant but only with a view to show how the approach to the inquiry under section 37-A and section 38-E had been vitiated by reason of the erroneous entries in the revenue records and the provisional list. The plaintiff further alleged that even in the proceedings before the Tahsildar the dispute with regard to Survey No. 242 was not really in issue. The dispute was with regard to Survey No. 296, and yet in disposing of the dispute in regard to Survey No. 296, the Tribunal passed orders in respect of Survey No. 242. In other words, the inquiry itself made by the Tribunal is challenged in the suit and, therefore, the suit was clearly maintainable. 8. Mr. Paranjape in this connection referred to prayer Clause No. 2 wherein the plaintiff had asked that he be put in possession, and this, he argued, was only warranted on the basis that the plaintiff wanted a declaration from the Civil Court that defendant No. 1 was not a tenant. We do not think that this submission in correct. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the property and his allegation was that defendant No. 1 was a trespasser. We do not think that this submission in correct. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the property and his allegation was that defendant No. 1 was a trespasser. The impediment in his way was the order passed under sections 37-A and 38-E on 3-2-1958. Having claimed that order was null and void, he was entitled on the allegations made in the plaint to ask for the consequential relief of being put in possession of the property on the basis of his title and dispossession. It may be that it is open to defendant No. 1 to contend in his written-statement that as he was a tenant and in possession of the land thus particular relief should not be given to him. He may even ask for that particular issue being referred to the tenancy Court for determination, but the plaintiff could not have anticipated what places would be taken by defendant No. 1 in his written-statement, and therefore, the prayer made by him with regard to the possession of the property cannot be said not to emanate from the other reliefs claimed in the suit. 9. It was next contended by Mr. Paranjape that at the time of publishing the final list, the plaintiff through his guardian mother had raised objection to the declaration, and after the objection was decided against him, he had an opportunity to go in appeal and in revision. The plaintiff did avail of these opportunities and his objections to the declaration in respect of Survey No. 242 had been finally rejected. That rejection followed on a finding that there was no partition between the plaintiff and his father as alleged by the plaintiff, the consequence of which was that the father who was present represented the estate of the plaintiff; and the order having been made on the concession made by the father before the Tahsildar, it was no longer open to the present plaintiff to challenge the final order of declaration on the ground that he had notice. Mr. Parulekar on behalf of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 does not admit that the plaintiffs father had no authority to make any concession. He also submits that the plaintiff through his mother had filed objections to the declaration only in respect of Survey No. 296 and not in respect of Survey No. 242 at all. Mr. Parulekar on behalf of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 does not admit that the plaintiffs father had no authority to make any concession. He also submits that the plaintiff through his mother had filed objections to the declaration only in respect of Survey No. 296 and not in respect of Survey No. 242 at all. This he had not done, because he had no notice with regard to Survey No. 242. In dealing with Survey No. 296, the plaintiffs father, who appears to have been present at the time, made a concession with regard to Survey No. 242, although Survey No. 242 was not the subject matter of any dispute before the Tahsildar. It was the specific case of the plaintiff that there had been a partition between him and his father. His guardian was the mother and not the father, who has been described in the objection petition as a person who had wasted the ancestral property and incurred heavy debts a partition between the father and the son though the son was a minor. The learned Tahsildar accepts the position that there was genuine partition, and yet he proceeded on a concession made by the plaintiffs father though under the circumstances he could not have had any authority from the plaintiffs guardian mother at the time. Mr. Parulekar, therefore, contends that the concession being made by a wrong person against the interest of the minor, and the courts in appeal and revision having relied upon this concession only, there was in fact no judicial inquiry into the matter which would bind the plaintiff. 10. Now, the above contentions, both on behalf of the applicant-tenant and the plaintiff respondent No. 1 are based on facts which are not regularly proved in the Court below. We have merely referred to these facts on the basis of paper-books prepared in revision. The learned Judge had merely decided the question as to whether the suit was maintainable or not. He came to the conclusion that the suit was maintainable, but in his opinion, the other issues fixed for determination as preliminary issues was really mixed questions of fact and law and, therefore, he was not in a position to deal with them without any evidence being led before him. The facts that have been placed before us by both sides have not been duly proved before the learned Judge. The facts that have been placed before us by both sides have not been duly proved before the learned Judge. It is upto the learned Judge to make up his mind on the evidence which came before him as to whether the facts proved go to establish the plaintiffs principal case, viz. that the declaration made by the Tahsildar was null and void for the reasons already mentioned. Therefore, we do not think that we can enter into any inquiry about the determination as to how far the proceedings before the Tahsildar were binding on the plaintiff. All that would be a matter of evidence and in our opinion, the learned Judge was right in pointing out that necessary evidence will have to be led to help him in the determination as to whether the declaration made by the Tahsildar was null an void. 11. In our opinion, the learned Judge has correctly observed that in the absence of evidence he would not be in a position to weigh the grounds put forth by the plaintiff for impugning the declarations made by the Tribunal or to decide whether the said declarations or the other orders by the Tribunal referred to by the plaintiff were null and void or without jurisdiction. That was the principal point that he had to decide in that case, and we think that the learned Judge was right in requiring the parties to adduce their evidence. 12. In the result, the application fails. The rule is discharge with costs. -----