Judgment Misra and Kanhaiyaji, J. The question involved in this appeal is the amount of court fee payable in a suit for setting aside a certificate sale and for a declaration that the sale was vitiated by fraud, etc. The certificate sale was held for Rs.25,000/- which was the value of the suit, and for the prayer of injunction, the valuation put by the plaintiff was Rs.1000/- court fee was paid accordingly, it is stated that the valuation for the purpose of court fee was Rs.25,000/- plus Rs.1000/- on which court fee paid by it was accepted, but since the suit was for a declaration that the certificate sale was vitiated by fraud, etc., the court had to record a finding as to the actual value of the property. That was fixed at Rs.4,00,000/- which fact was taken into consideration by the court below in recording a finding on the plaintiff's case of fraud. The suit having been decreed, Sheonath Saraff, the auction purchaser in the certificate sale, has presented this first appeal to this Court. 2. According to the stamp report, the amount of court fee payable will be on the sum of Rs.4,01,000/- the actual market value of the property and the value of the relief for injunction, as found by the learned Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad. At this stage we are not concerned with the court fee payable on the memorandum of appeal, because the order passed by the Taxing Officer has been accepted by the appellant, and court fee has been paid on that amount. The Stamp Reporter has, however, called upon the respondent, Chunilal Ticamchand Coal Co. Private Limited, to pay additional court fee on the value of the property, being Rs.4,01,000/- in the court below also as the plaintiff brought the suit for setting aside the certificate sale of this property, together with the relief for injunction. The matter has been placed before us for a decision on the question. 3. The Stamp Reporter relies upon a decision of this Court in (1) Pandit Brij Krishna Das V. Chaudhury Murli Rai (4 Patna Law Journal 703) and in an unreported order of this Court in (2) Second Appeal no. 80 of 1961. In the former case the plaintiffs asked for a declaration that a decree obtained against them and others and a sale held thereunder were void on the ground of fraud. 80 of 1961. In the former case the plaintiffs asked for a declaration that a decree obtained against them and others and a sale held thereunder were void on the ground of fraud. It was held that the plaintiffs were bound to pay advalorem court fee on the value of their share in the property sold, and not merely advalorem fee on the amount of the decree. The plaintiffs valued the suit for purpose of court fee at Rs.3,976/- which was the value of their four annas share of Rs.15,904/- which was the amount deposited by the plaintiffs in court in payment of the decree-holder's decree and interest thereon. The plaintiffs did not claim any interest in the remaining twelve annas share, and hence for the purpose of jurisdiction the suit was valued at Rs.15,904/- A Division Bench of this Court held that if there had been no sale in execution of the money decree for Rs.15,904/- that decree being a. joint decree, the loss to the plaintiffs would have been Rs.15,904/- and they would have had to pay court fee on that sum, but the sale having taken place, the loss to the plaintiffs was the value of their interest in the property sold, that is, four annas share in the entire properties, the value of which, according to the plaint, was Rs.2,20,000/-. The plaintiffs were, accordingly, required to pay court fee on Rs.55,000/-. It is not necessary to refer to other questions which were raised in that case, the stamp report points out that in that case the view adopted by this Court was that since under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff is required to pay court fee ad valorem, that should mean actual market value of the property which the plaintiff seeks to recover after a declaration of the nature made in that suit, which was that the decree obtained did not bind the plaintiffs and that it was void because it was vitiated by fraud. This decision is frequently referred to in stamp report in suits of this character. It may be pointed out that it is incorrect for more than one reason. This decision is frequently referred to in stamp report in suits of this character. It may be pointed out that it is incorrect for more than one reason. This view of their Lordships in this case proceeds on the footing that ad valorem value as mentioned in Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act never means the actual market value, a proposition which has not been accepted in several decisions of this Court, and practically all the High Courts have a settled view that ad valorem value does not mean market value, but only a reasonable value to be put by the plaintiff for one thing. Therefore, to insist upon the market value of the property is misconceived and this practice should be given up. 4. In the second place, however, the more important question is where a properly has been sold in execution of a decree or by a certificate sale, as the case may be, and the plaintiff seeks a declaration that the decree and the certificate sale are void being as tainted with fraud etc., what is reasonable valuation to be put upon the plaint in such a case. One view may be that it should be approximate value of the property as it will fetch price in the market, although not the exact market value, and the other view is, applying the principle of reasonable valuation and following equally a settled view, that although the plaintiff has the option to put his own valuation in a suit under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, yet it must not be an arbitrary valuation. The via media, therefore, appears to be that where there is a reasonable criterion for the court to follow in understanding the valuation put by the plaintiff who is privileged to put his own valuation, that reasonable criterion should be adopted as the standard for determining whether the plaintiff's valuation should be accepted or it should not be accepted or modified. Mr. Rajgarhia has drawn my attention to the judgment of a learned Single Judge in (3) State of Bihar and another V. Tulshi Ram and others (A.I.R. 1958 Patna 201), which was a case of acquisition of land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, which acquisition was challenged by the plaintiff as null and void and not binding upon him. He valued the suit for the purpose of court fee on the amount of award given in his favour by the Collector. But the stamp report pointed out that that was not the correct valuation because the amount of loss suffered by the plaintiff alone would be taken to be ad valorem value in terms of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. I may point out that the fallacy in this view is to equate the expression "advalorem" with the market valuation which has been disapproved, as I have already stated, by all the High Courts in this country by this time [vide (4)Mt. Rupia V. Bhatu, A.I.R. 1944 Patna 17 (Full Bench)]. Accordingly the learned Single Judge who considered this matter, also accepted the valuation put by the plaintiff as a reasonable valuation, because the loss caused to the plaintiff in regard to his property was based on the amount of award which the Collector pronounced in the case as a reasonable value of compensation payable to the owner of the land acquired. In that case, therefore, there was reasonable basis on which the plaintiff could value the suit, and that was accepted as its correct value. 6. It is no doubt, true that if the matter were to be considered afresh with reference to the various decisions of the different High Courts, it might be relevant to refer to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in (5) Rajabala Dasi V. Radhika Charan Roy (A.I.R. 1924 Calcutta 969). In the matter of (6) Kalipada Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1930 Calcutta 686); and (7) Narayanganj Central Cooperative Sale & Supply Society Ltd. V. Mafizuddin Ahmad (A.I.R. 1934 Calcutta 448 Full Bench). But in view of the pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (8) S. Sam. A.S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar V. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chattiar (A.I.R. 1958 Supreme Court 245), it is superfluous to refer to the views expressed by the High Courts in several decisions. In the Supreme Court also, one of the points raised was whether the plaintiff's valuation of the suit at Rs.50,000/- would be taken to be reasonable valuation, if on a full consideration of the allegations made in the plaint it appeared to the Madras High Court that this case which arose on the original side of the Madras High Court, was governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. The High Court of Madras directed the plaintiff to pay court fee upon the valuation of the suit as it was made originally by the plaintiff, being Rs.15,00,000/-. It is not necessary to set out other facts, because the crucial question which came up for consideration was the matter of court fee in that case. The plaintiff went up in appeal to the Supreme Court, and their Lordships set aside the order of the Madras High Court, taking the view that in a suit under Section 7(iv)(b) or 7(iv)(c), it was the plaintiff's own valuation which really matters, and not the market valuation of the property. It may be stated that their Lordships approved in that case the decision of the Lahore High Court, which is a Full Bench decision of that court in (9) Karan Illahi V. Muhammad Bashir and others (A.I.R. 1949 Lahore 116). It was a case under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fee Act, and the plaintiff stated in the plaint a particular value for purposes of court fee and a different value for purposes of jurisdiction. One of the main questions which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was the same as it was before the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, that is, where the plaintiff puts one valuation for the purposes of court fee and another valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction, thinking that a fixed court fee would be payable, but subsequently the court holds that that suit will be governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act and court fee would be payable ad valorem, whether it would be open to the plaintiff to revalue his suit. Their Lordships held that it was perfectly open to the plaintiff to revalue his property subject, of course, I may add, to its being a reasonable value, although this point was not gone into in either of the aforesaid two decisions. But that the plaintiff has the privilege of revaluing his suit has been laid down in clear terms by their Lordships of the court, as it was done by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court. But that the plaintiff has the privilege of revaluing his suit has been laid down in clear terms by their Lordships of the court, as it was done by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court. It is no doubt, also laid down by their Lordships that in order to reconcile Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act with Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the value for the purpose of jurisdiction should be the value for the purpose of court fee, and it will be putting the cart before the horse to hold that the jurisdictional value will determine the value for the purpose of court fee. The plaintiff has first to value the suit for the purpose of court fee and then under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, this may be taken to be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction as well. Since their Lordships have gone so far as to say in general terms that the plaintiff is free to put a valuation upon the relief’s which he seeks, the question of applying the test of market value cannot arise. Accordingly, if in the present case the plaintiff valued his suit at Rs.25,000/- at which the property was auction sold at the certificate sale, it cannot be held that the valuation is arbitrary. It may be that in some cases where the loss of the property sought to be recovered by the plaintiff has been caused on account of fraudulent decree obtained by the decree-holder, the amount of the decree may be reasonable valuation. In yet another case, it may as well be that the valuation at which the property has been sold at auction may be reasonable valuation, but these are matters of detail to be applied with circumspection by the court on the facts of a particular case. Here, if the valuation has been put by the plaintiff according to the amount at which the property was auction sold, it cannot be characterised in any manner as arbitrary and unsustainable. 6. Mr. Rajgarhia has contended that apart from other materials, in this case the suit is for a mere declaration that the certificate on the footing of which the sale was held on 15.2.1955 was obtained by fraud and the sale has not been confirmed as yet. 6. Mr. Rajgarhia has contended that apart from other materials, in this case the suit is for a mere declaration that the certificate on the footing of which the sale was held on 15.2.1955 was obtained by fraud and the sale has not been confirmed as yet. This is purely a relief of a declaratory character, and in any case, the property has not so far been lost by the plaintiff, but it can be lost by him only if the sale is confirmed. He seeks to distinguish the facts of this case from the facts of the other cases. The argument is well founded and has to prevail. Since, however, we have considered this question a little more elaborately because of the frequency with which this question arises and causes confusion to the members of the Bar and the litigant public and even to the Stamp Reporter, this question must be settled once for all, and in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, any contrary proposition of law which may rest upon the decision of this Court in (1) Pandit Brij Krishna Das V. Chaudhury Murli Rai (4 Patna Law Journal 703) cannot be taken to be good law. 7. In the result, therefore the court fee paid by the plaintiff on the plaint in the court below must be taken to be sufficient and it cannot be made liable for any additional amount of court fee.