ORDER Satish Chandra, J. - The Petitioner applied for the grant of a licence for running a brick-kiln on plot No. 268, village Shakerpur on the Hapur Garh Road, under the provisions of the UP Roadside Land Control Act, 1945. By the impugned order the Roadside Land Control Officer, Meerut, has rejected the application. He held that mango orchards were situate within one mile on the east and west of the proposed brick-kiln. This contravened the instructions of the State Government as contained in G.O. No. 972/XXIX-R-2, dated 11-3-1964, a copy of which was filed by Naubat Singh (Respondent No. 3) along with his objections. Under that G.O., the State Government had instructed all the District Magistrates not to grant, in future, a new brick-kiln within one mile of an abadi or an orchard. The second ground accepted by the Roadside Land Control Officer was that Under Rule 5 of the Rules framed under that Act, the Applicant had to submit certain extracts from the village records showing the name of the owner tenant and other particulars of the land. That was not done. The third ground relied on was that the Applicant had been convicted previously u/s 13 of that Act and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200/- for running a brick-kiln without a licence. For these reasons, the Petitioner's application Under Sections 5 and 6 read with Section 12 of the Act and read with Rule 9 of the Rules was refused. 2. The Petitioner has alleged that he had made an application in the requisite form only u/s 12 of the Act. No application was made Under Sections 5 or 6. Section 5 provides for a licence for erecting or reelecting any building or making and extending any excavations etc. Section 6 gives the details of a licence for that purpose. u/s 12, a licence is necessary for using land within the controlled area for the purpose pf charcoal-kiln, brick-field or brick-kiln. In my opinion, when the land was sought to be used for the purpose of a brick-kiln, the application for a licence therefor would be u/s 12 simplicitor. Sections 5 or 6 would not be attracted to such an application. In my opinion, when the land was sought to be used for the purpose of a brick-kiln, the application for a licence therefor would be u/s 12 simplicitor. Sections 5 or 6 would not be attracted to such an application. Rule 5 of the Rules provides for the documents to be filed along with an application for a licence u/s 5, to make or extend an excavation or laying out means of access to a road. Rule 5 would not be applicable to an application for a licence for brick kiln, for which specific provision has been made by Rule 9. Rule 9 porvides the particulars which an Applicant must furnish to the Collector. The furnishing of an extract from the revenue records required by Rule 5 is not one of the requirements of Rule 9. The Roadside Land Control Officer was in error in holding that the Petitioner was liable to comply with Rule 5 and had failed to do so. His application could not be refused on that ground. 3. It was then urged for the Petitioner that the G.O. referred to by the Roadside Land Control Officer had been issued by the State. Government under the Coal Control Order, 1959. The instructions contained in that G.O. were not applicable to proceedings for the grant of a licence under the Roadside Land Control Act. The Roadside Land Control Officer was, in my opinion, in error in treating that G.O. as an instruction from the State Government in the matter of grant of a licence under the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act. The G.O. was not under this Act. It was issued under the Coal Control Order. Further, the G.O. dated 11-3-1964, relied on by the said officer was no longer in existence. It had been superseded by another G.O. dated 16-10-1965. The Officer was thus in error in relying upon it and disallowing the application for a licence on the ground that the G.O. dated 11-3-1964, had not been complied with because a mango orchard belonging to the third Respondent was in existence within a mile from the proposed site for the brick-kiln. 4. The amended G.O. was also issued under the Coal Control Order, 1959 and not under the Roadside Land Control Act. Its applicability would be on the same footing as that of the earlier order. 4. The amended G.O. was also issued under the Coal Control Order, 1959 and not under the Roadside Land Control Act. Its applicability would be on the same footing as that of the earlier order. The Roadside Land Control Officer was not entitled to look upon these G.O's. as instructions from the Govt, binding on him in proceedings under the Roadside Land Control Act. Of course, it would be, in my opinion, open to that officer to see whether the erection of a brick-kiln on the purposed site damaged any existing orchards etc. That would be, in my opinion, a relevant circumstance, but that is something entirely different from asking an Applicant for a licence to establish that he has complied with and not contravened the G.O's. issued under the Coal Control Order. 5. Thus, the Roadside Land Control Officer was in error in deciding two of the three points, upon which the application was dismissed. A perusal of the order does not indicate that the application for the licence would have been refused by that officer merely on the ground that the Applicant had previously been convicted for running a brick kiln without prior permission of the Collector. It may well be urged that the Petitioner having been sentenced and having undergone the sentence, the offence was mitigated. Further, in view of the proceedings in that case, the Petitioner applied for the requisite, permission. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Petitioner's application would have been refused merely on that ground. Under the circumstances, the case deserves to be decided afresh by the Roadside Land Control Officer. 6. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 14-3-1967, refusing the Petitioner's application for licence is quashed. The Roadside Land Control Officer, Meerut, would decide the application afresh and expeditiously in the light of the observations made above. The Petitioner would be entitled to his costs.