JUDGMENT PATEL J.-The Hindustan Electric Company had agreed to purchase from the State Government the land and building of the ex Military Vehicles Depot near Vithalwadi at Ulhasnagar and took possession of the same. In its turn, the Hindustan Electric Company agreed to sell a portion of the clams to the petitioner subject to the sanction of the Government. This permission the Government gave on July 19, 1958. The petitioner entered into possession the land. Eventually, sale deed was executed. 2. It seems that near this land is situated and which is a part of the pool of properties constituted under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was discovered that the petitioner had encroached upon a large area of that land. The Administrator of Ulha8nagar Township iS8ued to the petitioner notice dated March 31, 1966, to show cause why the encroachment should not be remond Sufficient time was given for the purpose and the inquiry was fixed on April US, 1965. The petitioner then asked for particulars of encroachment. The Manager of the Township then furnished a sketch to the petitioner; Later, the petitioner filed a written statement before the Manager on February 7, 1967. Thereafter, inquiry was held on April 23, 1967, and on May 26, 1967, the Manager passed an order for removal of encroachment in an area of 25,915 square yards under section 19 (3) of the Act. 3. The order (Exh. E) shows that detailed survey was carried out by the District Inspector of Land Records and he found that there was encroachment of an area of 25,\H5 square yards. It also shows that the petitioner had no defence. 4. The answer to the present petition is that there is inordinate delay. The order was made in May 1967 and the petition is filed in April 1968, practically a year after. Repre8entations having been made cannot furnish any answer. 5. Apart from this, the petitioner took its chance and contested the merits of the matter. It cannot be contended that it had no opportunity to prove its case, nor that it was inadequate. As the order shows, there was practically no answer. 6. The contention made before us is that section 19 of the hid Act is ultra mres Article 14 of the Constitution and the order is therefore, without jurisdiction. It cannot be contended that it had no opportunity to prove its case, nor that it was inadequate. As the order shows, there was practically no answer. 6. The contention made before us is that section 19 of the hid Act is ultra mres Article 14 of the Constitution and the order is therefore, without jurisdiction. For this purpose, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in N. I. Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab (1). The question before the . Court was whether section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act of 1959 was valid. By a majority of three to two, the Court held that section 5 was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The reasoning of the majority is this. The Act did not take away the ordinary remedy of suit available to the Government for recovery either of posseli8ion or rent of the property. The Act gave the Government an additional remedy of a summary nature for the purpose. The Court held that no principles were formulated for the guidance of the officer to enable him to choose one and not the other; that it could be arbitrarily used for evicting some occupants under that section and not others and that the said section was bad. The decision has no application to this case at all. 7. Under the Act of 1954 the scheme is entirely different. Section 19 (1) gives the Managing Officer wide powers of cancelling allotments, terminating and or amending the terms of leases and allotments. Sub-section (2) requires delivery of possession by any person in possession of the property which is part of the pool, if demanded by the Managing Officer or Managing Corporation and sub-section (3) enables the Managing Officer or the Managing Corporation to eject any such person on his failure to hand over possession. Evidently a trespasser could also be evicted. Section 22 provides for appeal against the order made by any officer under the Act. Section 24 gives powers of revision to various officers. Section 26 defines powers of officers making inquiries, and they are sufficiently wide to enable the officers to properly determine any question that may arise. Election 36exoludes the jurisdiction of regular Courts in respect of any matter that could be decided or determined by any of the authorities under the Act. Section 24 gives powers of revision to various officers. Section 26 defines powers of officers making inquiries, and they are sufficiently wide to enable the officers to properly determine any question that may arise. Election 36exoludes the jurisdiction of regular Courts in respect of any matter that could be decided or determined by any of the authorities under the Act. Thus the Act, in cases falling within it provides a summary remedy of eviction and bars any suit in respect of the same. It thus makes the occupants of properties falling within the Act, a separate class from the occupants of other properties and provides for a speedy and effective remedy of recovering possession absolutely essential for effectuating the purposes of the Act. This Act was passed for the rehabilitation of displaced persons who came to this country in the wake of partition of the country in 1947. Earlier, the properties of persons who left the country were taken over as evacuee properties. All these properties or their realizations and such other properties as were assigned by the Government for the purpose, became part of the compensation pool, for the management of which the Central Government was authorised to make arrangements such as appointing managing officers or corporations. In order that the purpose of the Act should be carried out, whenever necessary, possession should be readily available. Hence the special provision has been made by the Act. The classification as made, therefore, by the Act is fully justified and necessary, and, must be regarded as reasonable. In the above case, Shelat J., who delivered the majority judgment, says (p. 1586): “…. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that there is an intelligible different a between the two classes of occupiers (occupiers of public property and occupiers of private property) that they are not similarly situated in that in the case of public properties and premises the members of the public have a vital interest and are interested in seeing that such properties and premises are free from encroachment and unauthorized occupation a. speedily as possible " The subsequent reasoning clearly shown that the case was decided on the assumption that such classification was valid. The invalidity of section 5 resulted from the circumstance that section 5 left it to the discretion of the Government even as to the same class of occupants, the arbitrary power of filing a suit against some occupants and selecting some for summary eviction. This decision cannot support Mr. Bhatt in his present contention. No other ground of invalidity of section 19 of the Act is urged. We, therefore, hold that section 19 of the Act is valid. 8. Hence the order of rejection