JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - The appellant, Surendra Nath Seth, is the husband of the respondent, Smt. Phulwati. They were married in the year 1933. They hail from the middle Class society and as the evidence on record shows have a good standard of living in the city of Kanpur. Three sons were born from the wedlock. The eldest son being Ravindra Nath, the second Navin Kumar and the third Ashwini Kumar. Unfortunately fortunately Ashwini Kumar, the third son, died in the year 1954 after long illness. Since then some feeling of estrangement' arose between the husband and the wife. The case of the husband is that the wife having been influenced by a cult known as 'Brahma Kumaris' which has some peculiar tenets, neglected her marital, duties and refused to cohabit with him. On the other hand according to the wife she was introduced to the cult of the Brahma Kumaris by the husband himself to assuage her sorrow on the death of the third son, and she never neglected her marital duties but due to excessive demands of her husband for carrel pleasures which she was not inclined to meet, she began to resent the advances of the husband and that caused certain amount of estrangement. However, the matters appear to have come to a head and in the year 1959 the husband filed a petition under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act for a decree for judicial separation against the wife. The main allegation on which the petition was based was that the wife had deserted the husband for the past two years prior to filing of the petition having left the residence of the husband and having refused to cohabit with him. This petition was opposed by the wife who brought counter charges against the husband. She pleaded that her husband had beaten her and had been guilty of cruelty and turned her out of the house. The parties led evidence in support of their respective case and the learned Civil Judge of Kanpur on a consideration of the entire material on record, recorded a finding that the wife had deserted the husband, she having refused to carry out her marital influence of 'Brahma Kumaris'. The evidence on behalf of the wife as to the alleged beating and cruelty on the part of the husband was disbelieved. The evidence on behalf of the wife as to the alleged beating and cruelty on the part of the husband was disbelieved. A decree dated 22-3-1960 for judicial separation was passed in favour of the husband against the wife. It may be mentioned that during the pendency of the petition under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, at one stage, the husband applied for withdrawing the petition but on the objection by the wife no action was taken upon that application of the husband. The objection of the wife was that the application was motivated at that stage having been brought to avoid the payment of interim alimony pending the proceedings which had been ordered by the court. In the proceedings for judicial separation no prayer was made on behalf of the wife for fixing of alimony by way of maintenance. Soon after passing of the decree for judicial separation an application under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act was presented on 841960 praying that the husband be ordered to pay to the wife for her maintenance and support the monthly sum of Rs. 1,000/- and the payment be secured by charge on immovable property of the husband. In the said application it was alleged that the monthly income of the husband was over Rs. 3,000/- from his Hosiery business and other properties. In a written statement the husband denied the -allegations made in the said application and pleaded that the wife being the guilty party having deserted the husband without reasonable cause, by her conduct' deprived herself of any claim for alimony and the prayer for any permanent maintenance was liable to be rejected. It was denied that the monthly income of the husband was over Rs. 3,000/- and it was pleaded that the; income was hardly about Rs. 1,000/-, The learned Civil Judge who tried this application examined a number of witnesses produced by the parties. On behalf of the husband witnesses were produced to prove the factum of the wife having become a devotee of Brahma Kumari cult and that her needs were few. The husband also produced oral evidence to show that his properties did not yield any income and he had a very small income from the-business. The wife examined herself as a witness. The husband also produced oral evidence to show that his properties did not yield any income and he had a very small income from the-business. The wife examined herself as a witness. She refuted the allegation of the husband that she had become a devotee of Brahma Kumari cult and testified to her' needs and the amount of money required by her to maintain herself with respect and. dignity. Some documents were also produced in evidence showing the income of the husband from business and other properties. It appears that in the court below at the trial of the said application copious reference was allowed to be made to the evidence already recorded in the proceedings for judicial separation under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the evidence examined therein was allowed to be taken into consideration for recording findings. I do not think it necessary to express any opinion as to the legality of this step. Since both the parties allowed that evidence' to be taken into consideration and no party seems to have been prejudiced thereby, I allow the matter to rest at that. As a result of the consideration of all the evidence on record the learned Civil Judge recorded: a finding that the income of the husband was Rs. 2,000/- or Rs. 3,000/- per month a. finding which has rightly been characterised by the learned counsel for the appellant before me as hardly a finding and considering. the need of the wife, a permanent alimony at the rate of Rs. 450/- per month was awarded. On the question whether the wife was a guilty party and thereby in law could be deprived of her right to maintenance by way of permanent alimony, the learned Civil Judge held that the decree for judicial separation having been granted on the ground of desertion by the wife she was no doubt a guilty party but that circumstance did not, in law, result in defeating her claim for permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. From the decree of the learned Civil Judge awarding to the wife permanent alimony at the rate of Rs. 450/- per month, the husband has come up in appeal to this Court. The wife has filed a cross-objection praying for an increased rate of maintenance. 2. From the decree of the learned Civil Judge awarding to the wife permanent alimony at the rate of Rs. 450/- per month, the husband has come up in appeal to this Court. The wife has filed a cross-objection praying for an increased rate of maintenance. 2. In the grounds of appeal, inter alia, it has been pleaded on behalf of the husband that he is ready and willing to take back the wife on her own terms and offers her residence in his own house without putting her under any fear of satisfying the creature comforts of the husband. In an affidavit filed in support of an application for certain interim directions an offer has been made to the same effect. Shri S. N. Kacker, learned counsel for the appellant in the forefront of his arguments made an offer at the bar on behalf of his client that his client was ready and willing to welcome the respondent to the house for residence and he will make no demands on her. I had, during the course of the hearing, offered an opportunity to the learned counsel for the parties to explore the possibility of any reasonable settlement between the parties by way of conciliation even partially, if not to the whole extent. It is unfortunate that nothing came out. It is all the more unfortunate that the parties who are well past middle age find themselves in such an unfortunate position. The only silver lining is that the two sons who are grown up and are well settled in life, may be, some day, instrumental in bringing about conciliation between their parents. 3. Shri S. N. Kacker in support of the appeal raised two contentions. His first contention was that wife being the guilty party having been found to have deserted the husband was not entitled to any alimony. The learned counsel conceded that under English practice even a guilty wife is entitled to a permanent alimony but he submitted that in view of Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 if the wife resides separately on her own Volition without any of the conditions of sub-sec. (2) of that section having been fulfilled, she, in law would not be entitled to any maintenance. (2) of that section having been fulfilled, she, in law would not be entitled to any maintenance. The argument of the learned counsel as I understood, was that since the law in respect of a Hindu wife to receive maintenance has been codified and by sub-sec. (2) of Section 18 confers a right on the wife to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance, if the husband was guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable course and without her consent or against her wish or wilfully neglects her or if he treats the wife with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it would be harmful or injurious to live with him or if the husband suffers from a virulent form of leprosy or the husband has any other wife living or keeps a concubine in the same house or has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion then it is implicit in law that she forfeits her claim to maintenance if she lives separately from her husband, when the husband is not guilty of any of the faults mentioned above. I am unable to agree with this submission of Shri Kacker. It would be seen that sub-sec. (1) of Section 18 imposes a duty on every Hindu to maintain his wife during her life time. That I understand was a well settled principle under the Hindu Law itself. Maintenance, I think, includes supporting the wife by giving her in cash some subsistence from time to time. What sub-sec. (2) of Section 18 lays down is that the wife as of right can live separately if the husband suffers from any of the faults enumerated in that subsection without losing her right to claim maintenance. In other words, what the Hindu Law provided as a rule for guidance has now been codified and a right of separate residence to a Hindu wife has been recognised by the statutes in certain circumstances. But that will not mean that under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act the court has no discretion left in the matter of awarding a permanent alimony where wife insists to live separately though the husband is not guilty of any of the faults mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. But that will not mean that under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act the court has no discretion left in the matter of awarding a permanent alimony where wife insists to live separately though the husband is not guilty of any of the faults mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. The provisions of Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, in my judgment, are not controlled or affected in any way by the provisions of Sec.. 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956. It has been so held in the case of Smt. Lila Devi Shrivastava v. Manohar Lal Shrivastava, A.I.R. 1959 MP 349. 4. It was then contended by Shri Kacker that the wife having deserted the husband and she having refused the offer of the husband to come back to reside in the husband's house, by her conduct in the circumstances of the instant case precludes herself from claiming any permanent alimony. Though the learned counsel, as pointed out earlier, conceded that a guilty wife does not forfeit her right to claim maintenance but he submitted that the court can yet examine her conduct in order to exercise its discretion under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act and judge whether the wife deserves any consideration so as to compel the husband to support her. The offending conduct attributed to the wife, as the learned counsel pointed out, was that she having become a devotee of the Brahma Kumari cult and having got so absorbed in it that she refused to perform her sacred s marital duty thereby causing immense pain and anguish to her husband and without any provocation on the part of the husband, whatsoever, under the influence of the Brahma Kumaris, voluntarily left the marital home. This is then at the worst the learned counsel has been able to paint the conduct of the wife. A suggestion was also made that she brought false charges against her husband in the suit for judicial separation of cruelty and beating and it was submitted-that that circumstance should also be taken into consideration. This is then at the worst the learned counsel has been able to paint the conduct of the wife. A suggestion was also made that she brought false charges against her husband in the suit for judicial separation of cruelty and beating and it was submitted-that that circumstance should also be taken into consideration. No doubt a finding has been recorded against the wife in the proceedings for judicial separation that she left the marital home of her own accord under the influence of Brahma Kumaris and refused to perform her duty and function as a wife to her husband and she cannot now go behind that finding, yet there is evidence on record that she left the home of her husband after a notice of the petition for judicial separation had been served upon her. It cannot be disputed that till the proceedings for judicial proceedings under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act were initiated, the wife was residing in the marital home. There is also evidence on record which has not been refuted that the efforts by the sons to bring about a reconciliation failed, though of course each party blames the other in this regard. The wife persists that the husband was not serious about it, while the husband persists that the wife had become indifferent to him under the influence of Brahma Kumari cult. 5. In regard to the fact as to how far the wife was influenced by the Brahma Kumari cult, with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties I went through the evidence on record. In my judgment there is hardly any sufficient evidence on record to show that the wife had become such a fanatic devotee of Brahma Kumari cult as to become indifferent to worldly affairs and loss all sense of filial ties. It may be the estimate of the learned Civil Judge in the proceedings for judicial separation that she refused to be a party to the satisfaction of the carnal desires of her husband because of the influence of the Brahma Kumaris but that finding does not amount to the wife having cut herself off from the worldly life as not to perform or carry out her other multifarious duties as house-wife. The own allegation of the husband in the petition for judicial separation showed that Aswani Kumar, the third son dies after a prolonged infliction of some mysterious kind of paralysis. One can very well imagine the torment and strain suffered by the mother in attending the invalid child for a number of years without any hope of recovery of the child and always fearing the inevitable tragic end. The utter hopelessness of the situation. naturally must have given rise to a sad and sombre feeling in her which may well have been the cause of her disinclination to be a party to the satisfaction of even normal physical desire of her husband. That kind of psychological state of mind is not uncommon: The finding that she deserted her husband is certainly binding on her but it is difficult to agree with her counsel that it were the excessive carnal demands of her husband which made her refuse him. There is no evidence on the record to show that the husband was sexually abnormal and made excessive demand on the wife for physical contacts. Whether the estrangement arose because of the wife being under influence of the Brahma Kumaris as alleged by the husband or because of some other psychological reasons which led to the desertion by the wife was hardly material so far as the grant of a decree for judicial separation was concerned but certainly such circumstances would be material for the purpose of judging her conduct in awarding alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 6. Under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act the conduct of the parties is also a relevant factor to be taken into consideration for awarding permanent alimony. From the circumstances discussed above it clearly appears that the wife left the house of the husband after a notice was served upon her by the husband for taking proceedings against her for judicial separation. Thus in so far as the legal battle is concerned the first arrow was shot by the husband. He may have adequate cause but at the same time it cannot be said hat on the receipt of the notice if the wife left the house of her husband, her conduct can be described as wanton of contumacious and devoid of all decency and propriety. He may have adequate cause but at the same time it cannot be said hat on the receipt of the notice if the wife left the house of her husband, her conduct can be described as wanton of contumacious and devoid of all decency and propriety. Indeed in support of her application for permanent alimony the wife had adduced evidence to show that she was asked by the husband to quit and if was the husband who compelled her to leave the marital home. I do not think it necessary for the purpose of this case to record any finding on this question of fact. I will assume that the finding recorded, in the proceeding for judicial separation that the wife left the husband's house of her own volition and was not turned out by the husband is a correct finding. It is difficult to imagine that a woman who was in a disturbed state of mind will not almost have a broken hearty on finding that her husband was prepared to go to the law courts and had given a legal notice to her. Under the stress of those miserable circumstance in which the wife found herself if she left her husband's house and tried to go to her mother's house or to he house of any of her sons who, as said above, were well settled, there would not appear any wantonness in her conduct. The evidence on record does not show that it was under some evil influence that she deliberately acted in departing from her husband's house. The case of the husband that the wife was under the evil influence of Brahma Kumaris cult and that led to the breaking up of the matrimonial home is at best his opinion as to the cause. It is what the husband thought. What stresses were working on the emotions of the wife and what led to her determination to leave the husband's house can best be judged from the circumstances. I have already endeavoured above to show that the circumstances that emerge our from the evidence om record cannot exclude the hypothesis that the husband's own conduct in threatening the wife to take recourse to legal proceedings may have added to the anguish and pain through which the wife was already passing in those fateful days. I have already endeavoured above to show that the circumstances that emerge our from the evidence om record cannot exclude the hypothesis that the husband's own conduct in threatening the wife to take recourse to legal proceedings may have added to the anguish and pain through which the wife was already passing in those fateful days. Her own evidence, which is on record, is indicative of her husband's extreme indifference and disrespect for her sentiments. Though on behalf of the husband some evidence has been led that he made an offer to bring her back to his house but there is equally good evidence controverting that claim of the husband. The two sons Revindra Nath and Navin Kumar who appeared as witnesses in support of their mother's case contradicted to some extent their father's claim that he made genuine effort to persuade their mother to return to the matrimonial home or that their father tried to crate a congenial climate as would have persuaded their mother to return home. Though in accordance with the judgment of the court given in the proceedings for judicial separation the wife has been guilty of desertion but the surrounding circumstances revealed by the evidence on record do not make that desertion gross or wilful so as to deprive her of any permanent alimony, see Shri Chander Ram v. Shrimati Sabiya Wati, AIR 37-II-XVII Pun. 732. 7. It was vainly tried to be made out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the wife was wilfully contumacious in her conduct when she adopted the ways of Brahma Kumaris and refused to perform her marital duties towards her husband. I do not find any sufficient evidence on record to justify. the conclusion that the wife had become an ordained Brahma Kumari in the sense that she had withdrawn herself from worldly life and completely devoted herself to the Guru of the cult and started living in the camp or the Ashram. The only evidence which has come on record is to the effect that she was seen attending some of the congregations of the Brahma Kumaris in Kanpur. There is no material on record that she was formally initiated as a disciple or that she took any oath or vows. Indeed there is complete absence of evidence on record about the principles and tenets of the so-called Brahma Kumari cult. There is no material on record that she was formally initiated as a disciple or that she took any oath or vows. Indeed there is complete absence of evidence on record about the principles and tenets of the so-called Brahma Kumari cult. I am unable to attach any importance to the allegation made by the husband that the wife become a Brahma Kumari wilfully and deliberately in utter disregard of her marital or filial ties and to avoid fulfilling her duties as a faithful wife. On a consideration of all the circumstances it appears to me that she was an unfortunate victim of circumstances. May be, had she been a woman of greater wisdom and had possessed the virtues of perseverance and tolerance of the highest order she might have staved off the crisis. But that required super human qualities. Likewise had the husband also shown some patience and tolerance the estrangement may not have developed to such an extent as has been found by the court. All said and done the relationship of husband and wife depends upon mutual love, regard, and esteem for the feelings and emotions of each other. It is tragic to find that after a happy married life for about more than two decades the parties somehow have bungled into a state of unhappiness and that at an age when one expects greater maturity, wisdom and tolerance. I am not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the conduct of the wife is such that in the exercise of its discretion the court should refuse her permanent alimony. 8. Shri S.N. Kacker, learned counsel for the appellant, then fell back on the alleged efforts repeatedly made by the husband to take back the wife on her own terms, that is, on a promise that he will not demand any more satisfaction of his carnal desire from her and would give her shelter in his house. Learned counsel was not able to point out any material on record to show that such efforts were made at any time prior to the filing of the application by the wife under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Learned counsel was not able to point out any material on record to show that such efforts were made at any time prior to the filing of the application by the wife under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned counsel tried to make much out of an application made during the pendency of the proceedings in the court below praying for adjournment of the hearing with a view to explore the possibilities of an amicable settlement. What transpired between the parties in the negotiations has not been brought on record, though the husband and wife both appeared as witnesses later on. I do not think I would be justified in taking notice of any circumstance or fact brought out in a statement made by the learned counsel who appeared in the court below and who appeared before me as well and narrated the terms which were offered buy the husband. 9. Lastly Shri Kacker submitted on this part of the case that in the grounds of appeal it has been mentioned that the husband offered to give shelter to the wife in the house and an affidavit has been filed to that effect alleging that the wife spurned that offer. The learned counsel argued that this conduct on her part ought to be taken into consideration by the court in not awarding alimony and in any view of the matter for fixing the rate of alimony. Shri V. K. S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out certain material on record which showed that the husband never readily carried out the orders of the court for paying interim maintenance and characterised the offer now made as not genuine. I do not think I should take such an uncharitable view in regard to the offer of the husband as Shri Chaudhary canvasses for. May, be, the passage of time might have brought about softening in the attitude of the husband and a change of heart, his wife having remained separated from him for the past six or seven years. I have no reasons to doubt the genuineness of the offer. But the question that arises is whether as a matter of law I can take the offer made now into consideration in awarding alimony or at any rate in determining the amount. I have no reasons to doubt the genuineness of the offer. But the question that arises is whether as a matter of law I can take the offer made now into consideration in awarding alimony or at any rate in determining the amount. It would be seen that it is the conduct of both the parties which has to be taken into consideration. Here is an offer by the husband but I have no means to know what is the reaction of the wife as the offer is being made during the pendency of the proceedings and no rule of law has been pointed out which would invest me with the power to ask the wife about it. It is only when her answer is revealed then her conduct would be judged. Merely because an offer has been made during the pendency of the proceedings and the other party is silent about it, when it is not under a duty to give any reply, I cannot draw any adverse inference against that party. This is the first difficulty in accepting Mr. Kacker's submission. Further I think the conduct of the parties which has to be taken into consideration under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is the antecedent conduct, that is to say, their acts of omissions and commissions which led to the proceedings under the Act and not to any thing done by them during the proceedings. This is the second difficulty in the way of Shri Kacker. I am thus unable to agree with Shri Kacker that there being an offer by the husband welcoming the wife back home on her own terms, this court ought to take it into consideration in deciding this appeal. For the reasons given above the first contention of Shri Kacker advanced on behalf of the appellant, fails. 10. The second contention raised on behalf of the appellant was as to the quantum of the alimony fixed. There is a cross objection on behalf of the respondent questioning the correctness of the amount of the alimony fixed. Thus both parties feel aggrieved as to the rate fixed by the court below. In the earlier part of my judgment I have pointed out that the court below did not record any definite finding as to the income and resources of the husband. Thus both parties feel aggrieved as to the rate fixed by the court below. In the earlier part of my judgment I have pointed out that the court below did not record any definite finding as to the income and resources of the husband. The learned Judge of the court below held that the income of the husband was between Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 3,000/, This is hardly a good finding. A gap of Rs. 1,000/- in the estimate is too much to be regarded as a satisfactory estimate. Learned counsel for both the parties have questioned the correctness of the finding. While Shri Kacker for the appellant contended that the monthly income of the husband on the evidence on record would not be more than Rs. 1,000/-, Shri Chaudhary for the respondent urged that on the evidence on record the monthly income would be much more than Rs. 3,000/-. It is the admitted case of the parties that the husband owns almost cent per cent shares of the Tarzan Hosiery (Private) Limited which is a company registered under the Companies Act and as found on the evidence on record almost exclusively owned by the husband, Only two shares, one belonging to each of the sons are not owned by the husband. I am satisfied by the evidence on record that shares about ten in number standing in the name of the wife are ostensibly in her name but actually are owned by the husband. Thus the husband has 98% holding in the hosiery business carried on by him. There is no doubt that the business is running successfully. It has been admitted by the husband that the company owns a car for use for business purposes. It is not an ordinary private limited concern which can afford the luxury of a car unless the business is running successfully. The balance sheet which has been filed also shows that the hosiery business is running successfully. The paid up capital shows in one of the balance sheet is Rs. 1,10,000/-. Since it is not the case that the sons invested any amount in the business or that the wife had her own money which was invested, all the amount which has been invested, therefore, is of the husband. This would at least show that the husband was possessed of large amount of cash. 1,10,000/-. Since it is not the case that the sons invested any amount in the business or that the wife had her own money which was invested, all the amount which has been invested, therefore, is of the husband. This would at least show that the husband was possessed of large amount of cash. Then there is evidence on record that the husband inherited two houses which are situate in Dalhousie, a hill station. He also owns a house in the city of Kanpur. It was tried to be shown from the evidence on record that the houses in Dalhousie are not yielding any income as after partition of the country in 1947 Dalhousie has lost its importance. There is contradictory evidence on record produced by the wife. It is admitted by the husband in his evidence that the ground floor of one of the big houses is always rented out, while the first floor he has reserved for himself. It has also been admitted that there is a small cottage also which is let out on rent. It is difficult to find out from the evidence on record what actual income the husband earns from the said houses, the evidence being vague about it. However, the fact remains that some income is derived by the husband from those houses. The averments in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the written statement of the husband to a great extent reveal the income earned from the business. On his own showing in three years 1957-58. 1958-59, 1959-60, the business yielded an income of Rs. 48,727/-. Shri Kacker pointed out that after deducting the losses and other necessary expenses, tax etc., the net income left in the hands of the husband would not be more than Rs. 36,000/- for those three years. Thus according to the appellant his average income will be Rs. 1,000/- a month. On behalf of the wife Revindra Kumar, her son, appeared as a witness and he in his examination-in-chief stated that the income of his father would be about Rs. 2,000/- a month. In view of what the witness of the respondent stated, I do not think the contention of Shri Chaudhary on behalf of the respondent has any legs to stand upon that the monthly income of the husband is more than Rs. 3,000/-. Thus according to the estimate of the appellant his income is Rs. 2,000/- a month. In view of what the witness of the respondent stated, I do not think the contention of Shri Chaudhary on behalf of the respondent has any legs to stand upon that the monthly income of the husband is more than Rs. 3,000/-. Thus according to the estimate of the appellant his income is Rs. 1,000/- and according to the estimate of the respondent the income is Rs. 2,000/- per month. 11. Having given my due consideration to the various balance sheets filed and the prosperous nature of the business which is manufacture of items of hosiery where-in very little fluctuations will arise and the profits depend upon the efficiency of running the business, it is not possible to hold that only a meagre amount of Rs. 1,000/-per month is the yield which comes into the hands of the appellant after deducting all expenses. It would be seen that in calculating the income, Shri Kacker, based on the averments in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the written statement of the husband, took into account of large amount of money which was deducted as losses. It appears that the said losses occurred in some previous years and which were deducted from the income in the ensuing years. It would be then an extraordinary deduction during these years. It cannot be predicated that always there would be losses to be deducted its future. Thus on the own showing of the appellant his income from the business alone is more than Rs. 1,000/- per month. There must be some earning from the houses in Dalhousie. Taking into consideration all the resources and the circumstances I consider that the monthly income coming into the hands of the husband after paying all taxes and necessary expenses would not be less than Rs. 1,500/- per month which would be available to him for domestic expenses. 12. The respondent in her statement be-fore the court claimed an allowance at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month detailing certain items of expenses. I have no doubt in my mind that her claim was highly exaggerated. In her claim she included an expense of Rs. 1,200/- to Rs. 1,500/- per year as expenses for going to hill station. I consider it as a thorough luxury and unnecessary expense. Of course her claim that Rs. 1,000/- per month detailing certain items of expenses. I have no doubt in my mind that her claim was highly exaggerated. In her claim she included an expense of Rs. 1,200/- to Rs. 1,500/- per year as expenses for going to hill station. I consider it as a thorough luxury and unnecessary expense. Of course her claim that Rs. 200/- per month would be spent on her food does not appear to be unreasonable considering the high prices of the commodities. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the figure of Rs. 200/- per month for food alone is very high and a sum of Rs. 100/- would be sufficient I do not think I should apply my mind to these details and actually record findings as to the correctness of the claim of the wife as per detail given by her in her statement before the court in determining the actual amount. A rough and ready estimate would be sufficient for the purpose. Much argument, however, was made on her right to receive some amount as rent for her residence and the offer made by the husband to give her shelter in his own house was again trotted out in this respect. I have already held above that the offer now made during the proceedings cannot be taken notice of by me. The circumstances of the case revealed that the attitude of the respondent to live separately is not unreasonable. It is no ground to deny any allowance for separate residence that she would be able to stay with her sons and would not need separate residence. I am, therefore, not inclined to agree with Shri Kacker that no amount for house rent be taken into consideration in finding the needs of the wife. The claim of the respondent to engage a servant is also justified. She must have some thing according to her status for wearing apparel, conveyance for her movement and medical expenses. Taking all that into consideration it cannot be said that a sum of Rs. 450/- per month fixed by the learned Judge of the court below errs on the side of excessiveness. 13. It was suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent having become Brahma Kumari hardly needed such a large amount of money for herself. My attention was drawn to some more than Rs. 45/- or Rs. 450/- per month fixed by the learned Judge of the court below errs on the side of excessiveness. 13. It was suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent having become Brahma Kumari hardly needed such a large amount of money for herself. My attention was drawn to some more than Rs. 45/- or Rs. 50/- per month for their needs. The learned counsel submitted that the respondent would not need more than Rs. 50/- per month and large balance of the big allowance that she will get, she would squander away for promoting the evil cult of Brahma Kumaris. There is hardly any substance in this line of argument. I have already observed above that there is no evidence on record that the wife has been ordained or initiated formally into the Brahma Kumari cult or that she had become a nun and given up wordily life. May be, she has some interest in the Brahma Kumari movement and attends the congregation, but that will not mean that she has taken any vows for which there is no evidence. I have already pointed out above that even there is no evidence what are the rules and tenets of the Brahma Kumaris cult. The evidence adduced by the appellant in respect of the needs of the Brahma Kumaris and the amount they spend on themselves, is of a big business man of Kanpur. He admitted to have got interest in the Brahma Kumaris cult and having joined their camp at Mt. Abu. It is manifest therefore that even a rich person can be a regular member of the cult and there is no evidence of the existence of my hard and fast rule that every' one who takes interest in Brahma Kumaris movement or attends their congregation avows not to spend more than Rs. 45/- or Rs. 50/- on himself or herself. There is no evidence on record that the wife ever gave donations to Brahma Kumaris in Kanpur or elsewhere or that she spent any money on them. The submission, therefore, that she will squander away the surplus money, which she does not need, on Brahma Kumaris is nothing but a hollow apprehension on the part of the appellant. There is ample provisions in law that the order for permanent alimony can always be modified when the circumstances change. The submission, therefore, that she will squander away the surplus money, which she does not need, on Brahma Kumaris is nothing but a hollow apprehension on the part of the appellant. There is ample provisions in law that the order for permanent alimony can always be modified when the circumstances change. If in future it is established before the Court that the wife does not need a large amount of money and she under the vows of Brahma Kumaris is ordained to spend only Rs. 45/- or Rs. 50/- on herself then suitable orders may be passed. But this is not a consideration which should prevail at present in fixing the rate of permanent alimony. 14. Now coming to the cross objection filed, I do not think there is any merit in it. I have already estimated the income of the husband at Rs. 1,500/- per month, in the light of the available surplus to him after all the business expenses have been deducted and taxes paid. It seems to be the settled practice that generally one-third of the income of the husband is to be paid as permanent alimony to the separated wife. The rate of Rs. 450/- fixed by the learned Judge of the court below is almost one-third of that income. It might be a little less but that difference is not very material. I think a sum of Rs. 450/- per month is sufficient for the needs of the wife for the present. It is equally open to her to come again before the court if there is any change in circumstances. I am, therefore of the view that no case has been made out for increase in the rate of the monthly maintenance fixed by the learned Judge of the court below. 15. The result is that the appeal and the cross objection both fail. The appeal and the cross objection are dismissed. The respondent would be entitled to her costs in appeal. There would be no order for costs in the cross objection.