I. D. Dua, J. ( 1 ) ONLY two points have been raised in this revision. According to the first one, no offence under section 307 I. P. C. has been made out on the present record and that at worst an offence under section 324, Indian Penal Code. alone cabe held to have been established. In the second place, the applicability of section 34, I. P. C. , has been questioned by Shri D. R. Kalia, the learned counsel for the accused petitioner. ( 2 ) NARRATING the facts relevent for the purpose of this revision, on the evening of 19-9-1966. Roop Narain, P. W. 5, and Kartar Singh accused played cards on a stake that half a kilo of barfi would be given by the loser. Roop Narain lost the bet and Kartar Singh insisted to have barfi from him. As Kartar Singh had no money, he requested Budh Ram, a shopkeeper, to lend it to him but on his refusal, Kartar Singh persisted in his demand on Roop Narain to give him barfi. This led to a quarrel and exchange of abuses between them which, on intervention of some people, came to an end and Roop Narain returned to his house. He narrated the incident to his mother, who advised him to honour his word and give the barfi to Kartar Singh the next day. Roop Narain took off his clothes for the purpose of taking rest, but on his mother s insistence, he went to his gher to feed the cattle. It was about 7 or 8 P. M. When he reached near the gher, Kartar Singh and Jage accused attacked him. Jage catching hold of Roop Narain and Kartar Singh inflicting injuries on him with a knife. Mam Kaur, sister of Roop Narain, saw the incident and ran towards her house to inform her mother. Sarti P. W. 1 the mother and Birmo, Roop Narain s wife, Public Witness. 3, rushed to the spot and also witnessed the occurrence. During the scuffle, Roop Narain also gave kicks to Kartar Singh and Jage, as a result of which Kartar Singh suffered an injury on his head. On an alarm being raised, several people came to the spot and saved Roop Narain from the clutches of the accused. This in brief is the prosecution story. During the scuffle, Roop Narain also gave kicks to Kartar Singh and Jage, as a result of which Kartar Singh suffered an injury on his head. On an alarm being raised, several people came to the spot and saved Roop Narain from the clutches of the accused. This in brief is the prosecution story. ( 3 ) THE accused, however, produced some defence witnesses in support of the counter-version, but the. defence version did not inspire the confidence in the mind of the trial Court and as the learned Assistant Sessions Judge put it, this version did not appeal to reason. Roop Narain had sustained seven injuries, all of which were clean-cut wounds and according to the medical evidence, six of these injuries were dangerous to life, some of them likely to cause death. After considering the entire evidence on the record in a very well-reasoned judgment, Shri M. R. Sikka, Assistant Sessions Judge, Delhi held the accused guilty of the offence under section 307/34,1. P. C. and sentenced each of them to under-go rigorous imprisonment for four years. ( 4 ) ON appeal, Shri G. R. Luthra, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, in an equally well-considered judgment, dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and the sentence, holding the sentence not to be excessive. ( 5 ) AS observed earlier on revision, the first contention raised by Shri D. R. Kalia, is that the offence does not fall under section 307, 1. P. C. According to him there is no evidence that the injuries caused were known to the accused to be likely to cause death. The submission seems to me to be misconceived. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has, in his judgment, observed thus- "kartar Singh was armed with knife. Jage caught hold of Roop Narain. Then Kartar Singh started giving knife blows on the chest and abdomen of Roop Narain. Roop Narain tried to run away. Even then the accused chased him and again previous performance was repeated. The result was that Roop Narain received as many as 7 injuries mentioned above as well as to superficial layer of liver. According to Dr. Dube, six injuries were dangerous to life. Further, all the aforesaid injuries were on vital parts. These circumstances lead to the irresistible conclusion that the accused wanted to put Roop Narain to death. The result was that Roop Narain received as many as 7 injuries mentioned above as well as to superficial layer of liver. According to Dr. Dube, six injuries were dangerous to life. Further, all the aforesaid injuries were on vital parts. These circumstances lead to the irresistible conclusion that the accused wanted to put Roop Narain to death. That being so had Roop Narain died the accused would have been guilty of murder as defined under Sec. 300 I. P. C. Hence the accused are guilty of offence under Sec. 307, Indian Penal Code. " ( 6 ) NO serious attempt has been made to refer to the evidence to show that this conclusion is wrong or is not supported by considerable evidence. Both the Courts below having held to the same effect in well-reasoned judgments, I unhesitatingly reject this submission and agree with the Courts below in their appreciation of the evidence and conclusions founded thereon. In view of the number and nature of the injuries on the vulnerable parts of the body in the circumstances established, it is futile to contend that the knife having not been produced, it cannot be said that it was long and sharp enough to cause sufficiently deep injury and, therefore, only an offence under section 324, Indian Penal Code. , should be held to have been made out. The destruction or disappearance of the weapon, at the instance of the accused in the peculiar circumstances of this case, is of little consequence and the intention of the accused is quite clearly reflected by the consequences of what they have done. The decision in Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar and Emperor v. Ball Jagoba. , are of no assistance to the accused. ( 7 ) THE next submission that there was no common intention and, therefore, section 34,1. P. C. , is inapplicable, is equally unacceptable and the decision in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor does not help the accused. Common intention does not necessarily require any definite passage of time between the meeting of the minds and the actual commission of the crime. The decision in Mahbub Shah s case does not lay down a rigid rule of law to the contrary. Common intention does not necessarily require any definite passage of time between the meeting of the minds and the actual commission of the crime. The decision in Mahbub Shah s case does not lay down a rigid rule of law to the contrary. The principle of joint liability contained in section 34 I. P. C. in essence postulates the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the criminal act in furtherance of such intention. The pre-arranged plan mentioned by the Privy Council need not be elaborate or concrete to be established by positive evidence, for the intention can only be inferred from the conduct and its consequence, nor must a given duration of time intervene between such a plan and the actual commission of the crime. Common intention as just stated can and often is a matter of inference from the act and the conduct of the accused and other relevant circumstances of the case. This aspect has been considered in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, one of the recent decisions being Anda v. The State of Rajasthan ( 8 ) THIS brings me to the last argument on the question of sentence. It has been argued that the parties are inter-related and now they have reconciled themselves. Had the offence been under section 324, Indian Penal Code. , it could have been compromised, says the counsel. The sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment in the circumstances is described to be too severe. ( 9 ) THE question of sentence is undoubtedly delicate and difficult in all cases and it is more so in the present case. As observed in 0m Parkash v. The State, Civil Revision No. 38 of 1968 decided on 22-4-1968, the central core of the problem isto impress on the accused and all other like-minded persons that life of crime in our society does not pay and I added that use of knives as a weapon of offence had become far too common in Delhi, posing thereby a serious threat to the orderly and peaceful life of the law-abiding citizens. That the injured and the accused are inter-related, cannot always be conclusive on the question of sentence, for if they all are habitually given to the use of knives in their normal activities for threatening others or getting their will to prevail, then this by itself would scarcely be a mitigating circumstance. They may have settled up their differences only either to keep the accused escape punishment or in the usual routine as a matter of habit. Normally speaking, if there is a sudden quarrel, the parties make peace, realising that use of violence is had for them and also for the average run of the people in the larger interests of civilised and law- abiding society. In such circumstances reconciliation may be a good guiding factor for the Courts to reduce the sentence, but such may not be the position when reconciliation is intended either as a matter of routine amongst parties, who are in the habit of using knives instead of arguments or when it is done in order to have the sentence reduced. In the latter circumstance, general public interests cannot be ruled out by the Courts in considering the question of reducing the sentence. Public policy has, I must emphasise, considerable relevance in the imposition of sentence for criminal offences and the Courts must always keep this consideration in the background. In the case in hand, the mutual reconciliation represented by the petitioners counsel has not impressed me as the outcome of a genuine realisation on the part of the accused that the life of voilence and crime is had either for them or for the like-minded persons. The accused, it may be pointed out, are not raw youths but are men of mature age and this circumstance has also some bearing. But in spite of what I have just stated, in the hope that reasonably long period of imprisonment may serve to reform the accused, I reduce the sentence from four years to three years rigorous imprisonment. This reduction of sentence is ordered on the special facts of this case and it is not intended to serve as a precedent to be cited in future in any comparable circumstances. ( 10 ) IN the final result, I uphold the conviction, but reduce the sentence of the accused to three years rigorous imprisonment.