ORDER Shri Khumukcham Chitrasen Singh, Extension Officer, Industries, Manipur, obtained rule nisi from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the respondents (1) the Director of Industries, Manipur, (2) the Chief Commissioner of Manipur and (3) the Union Territory of Manipur to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not be issued quashing the order of the first respondent dated 9-1-1964 removing the petitioner from service. 2. The respondents showed cause. 3. The petitioner was first appointed temporarily as Lower Division Clerk in the Office of the Manipur State Transport in Imphal by the Officer on Special Duty, Manipur State Transport on 31-8-1955 with effect from 1-9-1955. Vide Ext. A/1. He was confirmed as Lower Division Assistant with effect from 20-11-1958. Vide Ext. A/2. 4. Subsequently, he was appointed temporarily as Upper Division Assistant in the Industries Department, by an order of the first respondent - Director of Industries, Manipur on 24-8-1959. Vide Ext. A/3. Again, the first respondent appointed the petitioner as Extension Officer temporarily in the Industries Department on 7-10-1961. He was directed to undergo training of Block Level Extension Officer for one year in the Small Industries Service Institute in Calcutta, as can be seen from Ext. A/4. After he returned from training, he was temporarily attached to the Small Scale Industries Section to study block programmes. Vide Ext. A/5 dated 6-11-1962 issued by the first respondent. 5. On his return from training, the petitioner applied for leave on 19-11-1962 for 1½ months with effect from 1-12-1962 on the ground that his house required repairs, vide Ext. A/6. But, a discussion was held by the first respondent Director of Industries with the Additional Development Commissioner on 23-11-1962 regarding the petitioners posting to a development block. In view of the exigency of the Government work and the fact that the petitioner underwent special training, the first respondent posted him to Thanlon Development Block on 24-11-1962. Vide Ext. A/7. The petitioner sent a reminder Ext. A/8 dated 26-11-1962 to the first respondent requesting him to grant him earned leave for 1½ months according to Ext. A/6 his previous application. But, the first respondent sent a reply Ext. A/9 dated 28-11-1962 that his application for leave could not be considered at that stage. The first respondent also directed the petitioner to report himself for duty in Thanlon Block on or before 7-12-1962. A/6 his previous application. But, the first respondent sent a reply Ext. A/9 dated 28-11-1962 that his application for leave could not be considered at that stage. The first respondent also directed the petitioner to report himself for duty in Thanlon Block on or before 7-12-1962. But, the petitioner did not report himself for duty in Thanlon Block. He sent another application Ext. A/10 dated 6-12-1962 to the first respondent to defer the order of his transfer until 15-1 1963 to enable him to repair the house. The first respondent again issued a further memorandum Ext. A/11 dated 7-12-1962 to the petitioner informing him that he had discussion with the Additional Development Commissioner on 23-11-1962, that according to the then existing immediate need of E. O. (I) Block, an order transferring the petitioner to Thanlon Development Block was issued on 24-11-1962 and communicated to him on the same day, that his application for leave was not considered and that he was asked to report for duty at Thanlon Development Block on or before 7-12-1962 but that the petitioner was indulging in delaying tactics. The petitioner was given an ultimatum for the second time to report for duty in Thanlon Development Block on or before 13-12-1962 at the latest and that, if he failed to do so, he would be charge-sheeted for insubordination and for playing delaying tactics in carrying out the orders of Head of the Department. Therefore, the petitioner sent a representation Ext. A/12 dated 10-12-1962 to stay the operation of the order of his transfer pending disposal of his petition for leave. The petitioner stated in Ext. A/12 that, unless his application for leave was disposed of, the order of the first respondent transferring him to Thanlon Development Block was quite "meaningless", that it would be to the "credit of the office of the first respondent" if Departmental E. Os. belonging to Thanlon locality were posted to Thanlon Development Block as they would be acquainted with the local conditions, that sending a person like the petitioner who was not acquainted with the facts and conditions of the locality amounted to "waste of administrative machinery", that the first respondent was not free to exercise his power according to his sweet will and arbitrarily and to the prejudice of the petitioners interest", that, the petitioner should be given leave and that bis transfer should be kept in abeyance. 6. 6. The first respondent thereupon issued Ext. A/13 memorandum to the petitioner accompanied by Ext. A/14 charges. The first respondent charged him, firstly, that the petitioner was disobedient and insubordinate during the period from 9-10-1961 to 10-12-1962, secondly, that he was playing delaying tactics in carrying out the order of the first respondent and, thirdly, that file petitioner violated Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. The petitioner was asked to file his written statement within 21 days. He was also directed to inspect the documents, if necessary, within 7 days from the date of the receipt of the memorandum. The petitioner applied under Exts. A/15 and A/16 dated 24-12-1962 and 26-12-1962 respectively for certain copies of documents mentioned therein. But as he did not get the copies, the petitioner prepared written statement and filed it on 31-12-1962. The first respondent placed the petitioner under suspension as seen from Ext. A/17 dated 18-1-1963 with effect from that date. 7. The first respondent framed further charges, as can be seen from Ext. A/19, firstly that the petitioner was found to have wilfully absented himself from duty without any permission from 26-11-1962 and secondly that the petitioner violated Rule 8 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. The first respondent issued a memorandum Ext. A/18 along with Ext. A/19 charges, to the petitioner on 19-1-1963. The petitioner filed his written statement Ext. A/20 on 5-2-1963. 8. The first respondent appointed Shri Iboyaima Singh, Development Officer, Khadi and Village Industries, as Inquiring Officer to enquire into the charges framed against the petitioner under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter called as the Rules of 1957). Vide Ext. A/21 dated 2-3-1963. The Inquiring Officer made some enquiry and submitted his report to the first respondent. The first respondent set aside his report and appointed Shri S. Singson, E. A. C. Departmental Enquiries, as Inquiring Officer under Ext. A/22 dated 18-7-1963. 9. The first respondent permitted the petitioner to inspect the documents mentioned in his applications Exts. A/15 and A/16. Vide Ext. A/23 dated 30-8-1963. The petitioner inspected the documents and filed supplementary written statement 10. After enquiry, the Inquiring Officer sent up Ext. A/25 report to the first respondent on 21-9-1963 stating that the charges were proved. The first respondent considered the report and issued Ext. A/15 and A/16. Vide Ext. A/23 dated 30-8-1963. The petitioner inspected the documents and filed supplementary written statement 10. After enquiry, the Inquiring Officer sent up Ext. A/25 report to the first respondent on 21-9-1963 stating that the charges were proved. The first respondent considered the report and issued Ext. A/24 order dated 1-10-1963 stating that he agreed with the report and provisionally came to the conclusion that the petitioner should be removed from service and directed him to show cause why he should not be removed from service. After considering the representation made by the petitioner, the first respondent removed the petitioner from service with effect from 19-11-1963. Vide Ext. A/26. 11. As there were mistakes regarding the dates of "26-11-1962" and "27-11-1962" which were wrongly typed as "26-12-1962" and "27-12-1962" in the report of the Inquiring. Officer and which were adopted by the first respondent, the latter issued a memorandum Ext. A/27 dated 28-11-1963 that the said dates "26-12-1962" and "27-12-1962" should be read as "26-11-1962" and "27-11-1962" respectively and directed the petitioner to submit his representation, if any, showing cause against the correction. After the petitioner submitted his representation, the first respondent passed the impugned order Ext. A/29 dated 9-1-1964 that the order of removal of the petitioner from service should take effect from 9-1 1964 and made some modifications with regard to the period for pay and allowances to be paid to the petitioner. 12. The petitioner filed an appeal before the second respondent against Ext. A/29 (order of dismissal). The second respondent dismissed the appeal on 3-8-1964, vide Ext. A/30. Hence the present writ petition. 13. The petitioners counsel formulated his contentions on 3 grounds. His first contention is that a departmental enquiry is a solemn one, that the charges must be definite, but that they were very vague in this case and that the petitioner was not given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. He relied on Tribhuwannath Pandey v. Government of the Union of India, AIR 1953 Nag 138, Raghu Bans Ahir v. State of Bihar. AIR 1957 Pat 100 ; Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 ; Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh), AIR 1961 SC 1070 and Union of India v. H. C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 . No doubt, even a departmental enquiry is a solemn one. AIR 1957 Pat 100 ; Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 ; Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh), AIR 1961 SC 1070 and Union of India v. H. C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 . No doubt, even a departmental enquiry is a solemn one. But, the law only requires that tribunals should observe rules of natural justice such as that Appellant party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses and that no materials should be relied on against him without being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, then the enquiry is not open to attack. Vide also Union of India v. T. R. Varma, 1958 SCR 499 : ( AIR 1957 SC 882 ). 14. The charges framed against the petitioner on 14-12-1962 are as follows : Charge I. "That the said Sri Kh. Chitrasen Singh, while functioning as E. O. (Industries) of Industries Department, Manipur during the period from 9-10-61 to 10-12-62 is found guilty of disobedience and insubordination. Charge II. "That during the aforesaid period while functioning in the aforesaid office Sri Kh. Chitrasen Singh is found guilty of playing delaying tactics in carrying out the orders of the Head of Department and also for use of arrogant ana offending language to his superior authority". Charge III. That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office the said Shri Kh. Chitrasen Singh is found guilty of violation of Rule 3 of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955." 15. The charges framed subsequently on 19-1-1963 as seen from Ext. A/19 are as follows : Charge I. That the said Shri Kh. Chitrasen Singh while functioning as Extension Officer (Industries) of Industries Department, Manipur during the period from 26-11-62 is found guilty of wilful absence from duly without authority". Charge II. That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid Department the said Shri Kh. Chitrasen Singh is found guilty of violation of Rule 3 of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955." 16. Charge II. That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid Department the said Shri Kh. Chitrasen Singh is found guilty of violation of Rule 3 of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955." 16. Regarding the earlier charge I, the contention of the petitioners counsel is that, as the petitioner was given time to join in Thanlon Block Development Office till 7-12-1962, as can be seen from Exts. A/9 and A/11, he could not be said to be guilty of disobedience or insubordination upto 10-12-1962. The petitioner never joined in Thanlon Block Development Office even before 13-12-1962, the date fixed in Ext. A/11 by the first respondent for his joining. So, charge 1, under which the petitioner was charged that he was guilty of disobedience and insubordination upto 10-12-962, is not incorrect. Again, it was pointed out that charge 2 is vague because the alleged arrogant and offending language was not mentioned in it. The alleged arrogant and offending language used by the petitioner is found in Ext. A/12, representation made by him on 10-12-1962. The statement of allegations attached to the charges in Ext. A/14 contained the allegations against the petitioner and gave him sufficient notice of the same and also of the objectionable remarks made by the petitioner in his representation dated 10-12-1962. So, it cannot be said that the second charge as per Ext. A/14 is vague. In Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, 1951 SCR 451 : ( AIR 1951 SC 270 ), the time and place at which the speeches were alleged to have been made and their general nature and effect, namely, that they were such as to excite disaffection between Hindus and Muslims were also stated in the grounds communicated to the petitioners, who were detained under the Preventive Detention Act of 1950. It was held that the allegations were not too vague or indefinite to enable the petitioners to make an effective representation and that the detention was not illegal. In view of the statement of allegations mentioned in Ext. A/14, I do not consider that the charges are vague. 17. But, the petitioners counsel contended that in Ext. A/13 it was stated that the petitioner should file his written statement within 21 days but that it was not mentioned from what date the period of 21 days was to be counted. A/14, I do not consider that the charges are vague. 17. But, the petitioners counsel contended that in Ext. A/13 it was stated that the petitioner should file his written statement within 21 days but that it was not mentioned from what date the period of 21 days was to be counted. Evidently, it meant that he was asked to file his written statement within 21 days from the date of the receipt of Ext. A/13 (memorandum) and he filed the same accordingly. By Ext. A/13 he was informed that he could take copies of documents within 7 days from the date of receipt of Ext. A/13. He did so accordingly. He was also permitted to inspect the other documents mentioned in Exts. A/15 and A/16 (vide Ext. A/23) and after inspection he filed additional written statement. Thus, the petitioner was not at all prejudiced by any alleged vagueness in the charges. He was also given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. 18. The second contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that the first respondent was actuated by malice and mala fides and that though the petitioner applied for leave on 19-11-1962, the first respondent did not grant it but that, on the other hand, he transferred him to Thanlon Block Development Office on 24-11-1962. The contention of the petitioners counsel that the first respondent did not pass any order on Ext. A/6 (application for leave) is not correct. The first respondent informed the petitioner under Ext. A/9 dated 28-11-1962 that his application for leave could not be considered at that stage. This meant that his leave was refused. Under F. R. 57 no Government servant is entitled to claim leave as a matter of right. It is purely in the discretion of the granting authority. The petitioners counsel brought to my notice a recommendation of the Pay Committee that generally leave must be granted to enable Government servants to work more efficiently after their return from leave and that there must be a phased programme for granting leave to them. But, this depends upon the exigencies of the service. Exhibit A/11 shows that the first respondent had a discussion with the Additional Development Commissioner, Manipur, that according to the then pressing need an Extension Officer had to be posted to the Thanlon Block Development Office and that, therefore, the petitioner was posted to work at Thanlon. But, this depends upon the exigencies of the service. Exhibit A/11 shows that the first respondent had a discussion with the Additional Development Commissioner, Manipur, that according to the then pressing need an Extension Officer had to be posted to the Thanlon Block Development Office and that, therefore, the petitioner was posted to work at Thanlon. But the petitioner was more worried about the alleged repairs of his house than his official duties; that was only a pretext on the part of the petitioner to evade the transfer. There was sufficient evidence on record before the Inquiring Officer to prove the charges. The High Court has no jurisdiction to sift the evidence and to find out whether the first respondent had sufficient evidence before him to pass the impugned order. It is not the function of the High Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding. If proper enquiry had been held, the question of adequacy and reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. Vide also State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1964-3 SCR 25 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ). 19. It was next stated by the petitioners counsel that the first respondent had at first appointed Shri Iboyaima Singh as the Inquiring Officer, that after he submitted his report, the first respondent did not accept it as it went against him, that thereafter he appointed Shri S. Singson, E. A. C. Departmental Enquiries, as Inquiring Officer and that therefore, the first respondent acted mala fide. I perused the report of Shri Th. Iboyaima Singh. It shows that he did not record any evidence but that he orally heard the first respondent and the petitioner and gave his findings against the petitioner. So, the first respondent was justified in setting aside his report, which was illegal, and appointing Shri S. Singson as Inquiring Officer. 20. The subsequent enquiry was held by an independent Officer, namely, Shri S. Singson, E. A. C. Departmental Enquiries, who had nothing to do with the Industries Department and the first respondent accepted his findings and the report. The impugned order is well within the power of the first respondent and no mala fides can be attributed to him as the enquiry was conducted according to the provisions of law. The impugned order is well within the power of the first respondent and no mala fides can be attributed to him as the enquiry was conducted according to the provisions of law. Vide also S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 . 21. The third contention of the petitioners counsel is that the petitioner was a permanent employee of the State Transport at Imphal, that his services were lent to the Industries Department, that he has a lien to the former Department, that his dismissal by the first respondent Director of Industries without reference to the Manipur State Transport is contrary to Rule 20 of the Rules of 1957 and that, therefore, it is illegal and liable to be set aside. Rule 20 runs as follows : "20 (1) Where an order of suspension is made or a disciplinary proceeding is taken against a Government servant whose services have been borrowed from a State Government or an authority subordinate thereto or a local or other authority, the authority lending his services (hereinafter in this rule referred to as "the lending authority") shall forthwith be informed of the circumstances leading to the order of his suspension or the commencement of the disciplinary proceeding, as the case may be. (2) In the light of the findings in the disciplinary proceeding taken against the Government servant (i) if the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (iii) of Rule 13 should be imposed on him, it may subject to the provisions of sub-rule (11) of Rule 15 and except in regard to Appellant Government servant serving in the Intelligence Bureau or on the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of or below the rank of Assistant Central Intelligence Officer or Inspector of Police, after consultation with the lending authority, pass such orders on the case as it deems necessary : Provided that in the event of a difference of opinion between the borrowing authority and the lending authority the services of the Government servant shall be replaced at the disposal of the lending authority; (ii) if the Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 13 should be imposed on him, it shall replace his services at the disposal of the lending authority and transmit to it the proceedings of the inquiry for such action as it deems necessary". In the present case, the services of the petitioner were borrowed by the Industries Department from the Manipur State Transport. For, the first respondent advertised on 23-7-1959 calling for applications from suitable candidates, including those already in service in other Departments, to fill up the vacancy of two temporary posts of U. D. Cs. Evidently, on the application of the petitioner, the first respondent temporarily appointed him on 24-8-1959 as seen from Ext. A/3 as U. D. C. Though R. 20 uses the expression "whose services have been borrowed" the appointment of the petitioner, who was then working in the Manipur State Transport, amounts to "borrowing his services" from the Manipur State Transport by the Industries Department and is covered by Rule 20 of toe Rules of 1957. But, that Rule 20 of toe Rules of 1957 applied to toe case of a Government servant whose services had been borrowed from another Department under toe same Government is made clear by toe corresponding Rule 20 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, which is more clear on this point. But, that Rule 20 of toe Rules of 1957 applied to toe case of a Government servant whose services had been borrowed from another Department under toe same Government is made clear by toe corresponding Rule 20 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, which is more clear on this point. Therefore, toe first respondent should have replaced his services at toe disposal of the Manipur State Transport as soon as he came to toe conclusion provisionally as per Ext. A/26 that the petitioner must be discharged from service and should have transmitted the proceedings of the inquiry to it for such action as it would deem necessary under Clause (ii) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 20. Evidently, the first respondent lost sight of this provision, which applies to toe case of the petitioner who was only temporarily working in the Industries Department having his permanent lien in the Manipur State Transport as a permanent L. D. C. The contention of the learned Government Advocate that Rule 20 of toe Rules of 1957 applied to toe Government servant whose services had been "borrowed" from a State Government or an authority subordinate thereto is not correct. It not only applied to a Government servant whose services had been borrowed from a State Government or an authority subordinate thereto, but also to a local or other authority, in which he had lien. There is also a direct ruling of this Court reported in Konsam Joykumar Singh v. Union Territory of Manipur, AIR 1963 Mani 25. In that case the services of toe petitioner, who was holding toe permanent post of L. D. C. of the Judicial Department, were lent to the Police Department. The I. G. of Police after enquiry removed him from toe services of toe Police Department. It was held that toe petitioner should be deemed to have been reverted to his parent Department from the date of his removal from service. The I. G. of Police after enquiry removed him from toe services of toe Police Department. It was held that toe petitioner should be deemed to have been reverted to his parent Department from the date of his removal from service. But, Rule 20 (2) (ii) of the Rules of 1957 would show that the services of the petitioner should be replaced at the disposal of the lending authority and that all the proceedings should be transmitted to it for such action as deemed necessary, because the first respondent was of the opinion that the penalty of removal from service under Clause (vi) of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1957 should be imposed upon the petitioner. So, the impugned order of the first respondent is liable to be modified to this extent. 22. In the result, the findings and the order of the first respondent dated 19-11-1963 as per Ext. A/26 are confirmed and toe writ petition is dismissed to that extent. The order of removal of the petitioner from service is however set aside. The first respondent is directed to replace toe services of the petitioner at toe disposal of the Manipur State Transport, the lending authority and to transmit toe proceedings of enquiry to it for such action as the Manipur State Transport may deem necessary under R. 20 (2) (ii) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. I direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this petition. Order accordingly.