ORDER This revision under Section 115 C. P. C. read with Section 34 of the Manipur (Courts) Act of 1955 is directed against the order dated 11-4-1966 passed by the Additional Munsiff (II) in his Judicial Misc. Case No. 4 of 1966 in Title Suit No. 101 of 1964 on his file refusing to permit the petitioner (plaintiff in the suit) to amend the plaint. 2. The petitioner filed T. S. No. 101 of 1964 on the file of the lower Court for recovery of possession of the suit land covered by patta No. 88/709-I. E. T. mentioned in schedule "B" and in the alternative a decree for declaration that he is entitled to half of the paddy lands covered by pattas No. 86/21 and 86/942-I. E. T. mentioned in schedule "A" and for mesne profits etc. 3. The case of the petitioner in para 1 of the plaint is that late Laisangbam Angou Singh father of the petitioner, first respondent, pro forma second respondent and pro forma third respondents father acquired certain immovable properties during his lifetime as his absolute properties and that he died in 1958. In para 2 of the plaint he alleged that his father distributed his lands among his four sons, namely, the petitioner, the respondents 1 and 2 and Ahanba Singh, father of the third respondent. Late Angouba Singh gave the lands covered by old pattas No. 86/702, 86/748 and 86/22 to his first son Ahanba Singh. He gave the petitioner (who is his second son) half the paddy lands covered by old pattas No. 86/21 and 86/942 described in the plaint "A" schedule. He gave his third son viz.; the second respondent the paddy lands covered by old patta No. 86/688. He gave his fourth son (by his second wife) viz.; the first respondent the remaining half of each of the paddy lands under old pattas No. 86/21, 86/942, the entire ingkhol under patta No. 81/21 and the entire paddy field under old patta, No. 86/709. The last item of land covered by old patta No. 86/709 was described in the plaint "B" schedule, which is the suit land. 4. The last item of land covered by old patta No. 86/709 was described in the plaint "B" schedule, which is the suit land. 4. It is the further case of the petitioner, (as alleged in para 3 of the plaint) that the four sons or Angouba Singh enjoyed their respective shares, that in 1940-41 the first respondent at the instance of late Angouba Singh made a request to the petitioner to exchange the petitioners hall share of land covered by pattas No. 86/21, and 86/942 with the plaint "B" schedule land as the petitioners and the first respondents shares are in one bloc and as the plaint "B" schedule land and the petitioners paddy land under patta No. 86/696 are in another bloc. The petitioner agreed to the proposal. So, he took possession of the plaint "B" schedule land in 1940-41 and gave up possession of his half share of paddy lands in the plaint "A" schedule 86 to the first respondent. The petitioner was in possession and enjoyment of the suit land till 1962. 5. The petitioner alleges in para 4 of his plaint that the first respondent dispossessed him of the plaint "B" schedule land in 1963 taking advantage of the fact that his name was recorded in the record of rights with respect to the said land. Then, the petitioner demanded the first respondent to deliver back the possession of his half share in the land described in the plaint "A" schedule. But, the first respondent refused to do so. In para 5 of the plaint the petitioner alleged that his name was recorded as co-pattadar of the first respondent in respect of the plaint "A schedule land. 6. The petitioner prayed in para 8 of his plaint for a decree for recovery of possession of the plaint "B" schedule land by evicting the first respondent therefrom or, in the alternative, for declaration that he is entitled to half of the paddy lands mentioned in the plaint "A" schedule towards his share, for recovery of possession of the same and for mesne profits etc. 7. The contesting respondent denied the plaint allegations. 8. The petitioner filed Judicial Misc. Case No. 4 of 1966 under Order 6, Rule 17, read with Section 151, C. P. C. to permit him to amend his plaint. 7. The contesting respondent denied the plaint allegations. 8. The petitioner filed Judicial Misc. Case No. 4 of 1966 under Order 6, Rule 17, read with Section 151, C. P. C. to permit him to amend his plaint. The amendments sought for are as follows : (i) The petitioner wants to delete schedule "A" and make it as schedule "B" and to mention the various items of lands owned by late Angou Singh as items 1 to 8 in schedule "A and schedule "B" to be marked as schedule "C" and to delete the description of the respondents 2 and 3 as mere pro forma parties, (ii) The entire para 1 of the plaint has to be deleted and the petitioner wants to add fresh paras 1 and 1(A), wherein he wants to allege that he and the respondents 1 and 2 and the third respondent (son of Ahanba Singh) are each entitled to ¼4th share in the properties of late Angouba Singh and that the respondents 1 to 3 are only benamidars for the deceased Angouba Singh with respect to the lands standing in their names mentioned in the items 1 to 8 in schedule A. (iii) He wants to add in para 5 of the plaint that on the objection raised by the first respondent the name of the petitioner was deleted from the record of rights by an order dated 31-7-1964 by the A. S. and S. O. (C) in Objection Case No. 65 of 1964 and that the petitioners title to the suit land is shrouded by the hostile assertion of title by the first respondent. (iv) Then, he wants to amend para 8 of the plaint by praying for declaration that the petitioner is entitled to half of the paddy lands i. e. items 4 and 5 described in Schedule "A". (iv) Then, he wants to amend para 8 of the plaint by praying for declaration that the petitioner is entitled to half of the paddy lands i. e. items 4 and 5 described in Schedule "A". He wants a further amendment of para 8 regarding relief that, in the alternative, a decree should be passed for partition of all the properties described in Schedule "A" by metes and bounds according to the respective shares of the parties and for allotment of the same to them, in case the Court finds that there was no distribution of the properties left by late Angou Singh as alleged in para 2 of the plaint and that there was no exchange of lands between the petitioner and the first respondent as alleged in para 3 of the plaint. 9. The learned Munsiff rejected the petition on the ground that the amendment introduces a new case, which is inconsistent with the original pleadings of the petitioner. Hence, the present revision petition. 10. The original plaint filed by the petitioner contains a definite averment that late Angouba Singh distributed his properties among his four sons, namely, the petitioner, the respondents 1 and 2 and the 3rd respondents father late Ahanba Singh. Again, the petitioner definitely pleaded that he was given the plaint "A" schedule land, which is half of the paddy lands covered by old pattas Nos. 88/21 and 86/942. He further pleaded that the first respondent was given certain lands besides the plaint "B" schedule suit land covered by old patta No. 86/709. His original prayer was for a decree for recovery of possession of the plaint "B" schedule land to which he was entitled under an oral arrangement, said to have been entered into by him with the first respondent, under which the petitioner gave his half share of the paddy lands covered by the plaint "A" schedule to the first respondent in lieu of first respondents "B" schedule land by way of exchange. Alternatively, he prayed for a decree for declaration of his title to half of the plaint "A" schedule lands and for delivery of his half share to him. Alternatively, he prayed for a decree for declaration of his title to half of the plaint "A" schedule lands and for delivery of his half share to him. Now, he wants to amend his pleas by giving a go-by to his main plaint allegation mat late Angou himself distributed his properties among his four sons and he wants to introduce a prayer for partition of Angous lands into 4 equal shares and wants to allege that the respondents 1 to 8 were benamidars of Angou with respect to the lands which stand now in their names. According to Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law, which governs the parties herein, the father has absolute power to dispose of not only his own properties but also even his ancestral properties during his lifetime. Vide paragraph 274 of Mullas Hindu Law Vol. 1 13th edition, and also Kunja Behari v. Gourhari, AIR 1958 Cal 105 . The petitioner alleged in his plaint in unmistakable terms (hat his father Angou distributed the lands as mentioned in para 2 of his plaint among his four sons. His prayer for an amendment that Angous properties are now liable to be re-partitioned into 4 equal shares not only involves a lew case but is inconsistent with his definite pleading in para 2 of the plaint. Only 8 items of land are in dispute and are covered by schedules "A" and "B". The respondents 2 and 8 were described as pro forma parties and their lands were not the subject matter of suit. But, now, the petitioner seeks to bring them into the dispute. The character of the suit is sought to be changed and the cause of action also changes. The application is also belated. No doubt, Order 6, Rule 17, C. P. C. gives ample power to a Court to permit any party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. I had occasion to discuss the scope of Order 6, Rule 17, C. P. C. very recently in another case, State Bank of India v. Yumnam Gourmani Singh, Civil Revn. No. 9 of 1967 (Mani). I had occasion to discuss the scope of Order 6, Rule 17, C. P. C. very recently in another case, State Bank of India v. Yumnam Gourmani Singh, Civil Revn. No. 9 of 1967 (Mani). When leave to amend a pleading should be refused is clearly stated in Note 4 at page 728 of Mullas C. P. C. 13th edition, Vol 1. "4. Leave to amend should be refused: (1) Where the amendment is not necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties, as where it is- (i) merely technical, or (ii) useless and of no substance. (2) Where the plaintiffs suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment. (3) Where the effect of the amendment would be to take away from the defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time. (4) Where the amendment would introduce a totally different, new and inconsistent case, and the application is made at a late stage of the proceedings. (5) Where the application for amendment is not made in good faith". In Ma Shwe Mya v. Mating Mo Hnaung, AIR 1922 PC 249 the Privy Council held that all rules of Courts are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice and that it was therefore essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised, but none the less no power has been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by amendment, the subject-matter of the suit. Vide also Ramsaran Mandar v. Mahabir Sahu, AIR 1927 PC 18; Kanda v. Waghu, AIR 1950 PC 68, State of Madras v. Muniyappa Chetty, AIR 1956 Mad 679 and Shriram Sardarmal Didwani v. Gourishankar, AIR 1961 Bom 186 , which lay down that no amendment can be allowed if it introduces a new case altogether to the prejudice of the other side. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner however argued that the amendment sought for does not introduce any new cause of action, that it does not change the character of the suit; that a suit for possession can be converted into a suit for partition and that in the interests of justice the amendment should be allowed. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner however argued that the amendment sought for does not introduce any new cause of action, that it does not change the character of the suit; that a suit for possession can be converted into a suit for partition and that in the interests of justice the amendment should be allowed. He relied on the following 3 rulings. In Krishnaji Lakshman Rajvade v. Sitaram Murarrav Jakhi, (1880-81) ILR 5 Bom 496 the petitioner wrongly framed his plaint for possession, though there was no prior partition of the joint family property. It was held that his suit was not maintainable and that, however, permission could be given to him to amend his plaint. In L. J. Leach and Co., Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 357 it was held that it is no doubt true that the Court would, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application but that it is a factor to be taken into account in exercise of the discretion as to whether amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interests of justice. But when it causes prejudice to the other side and when a totally new case is set out, no amendment can be allowed. The petitioner strongly relied on P. Narasimham v. P. Venkata Narasimha Rao, AIR 1963 Andh Pra 78, in support of his contention that a suit for possession can be converted into a suit lor partition. In that case, the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of possession and certain properties by avoiding some alienations made by the first defendant and for an account of the first defendants management of the properties. The trial Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to half the properties and not all the properties as claimed by him and passed a decree for partition of the properties into two equal shares and for delivery of one share to the plaintiff. The trial Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to half the properties and not all the properties as claimed by him and passed a decree for partition of the properties into two equal shares and for delivery of one share to the plaintiff. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh discussed the various rulings on this subject and held that when a party claims certain property on the score of exclusive title thereto residing in him, there is no reason why he should not be permitted to ask for a portion thereof if it is based on the same title and if the ground on which he is entitled to a lesser relief is not inconsistent with the case set up by him in the original plaint or would lead to the determination of the issues which would embarrass him. In that case the basis of the plaintiffs claim, namely, his adoption remained the same. There was no change of cause of action or variation in the nature of the suit. All the necessary allegations for partition were contained in the original plaint and all the parties who were interested in the partition action were also before the Court. So, the Court held that a decree for partition could be passed by way of amendment of the plaint. The case before me stands on altogether a different footing. The petitioner wants to set at naught the admitted distribution of properties made by his father and wants a re-partition of all the lands including the lands of the pro forma respondents 2 and 3 also, which he is not entitled to. The petitioner wants to allege that the respondents are benamidars of his father. His allegations are totally inconsistent with the original case set up by him. The amendment, if allowed, introduces a new plaint altogether with a different cause of action. The Court cannot permit introduction of a fresh plaint in the place of the original one by way of an amendment. 12. Thus, the learned Munsiff is correct in disallowing the petition and the revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.