JUDGMENT : A. Misra, J. - Plaintiffs have filed this appeal against a reversing judgment. According to them their common ancestor Bali Panigrahi and one Udayanath Panigrahi were co-archakas of two deities Radhakrishna Mahaprabhu and Jagannath Mahaprabhu each having eight annas interest. Each remained in possession of half share of the lands attached to the office as rayat. Out of the three sons of Bali, Madan died issueless, while the family was joint and Sahadeb (Defendant No. 1) was given in adoption to Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai. Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are sons of Defendant No. 1. After the death of Madan, Bishnu possessed the half share of the properties which froms the subject matter of the suit and the other half was possessed by Udayanath, who later on alienated all his rights in favour of Defendant No. 5. At the instigation of Defendant No. 5, Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 interfered with the possession of Plaintiffs, sons of Bishnu. Hence Plaintiffs filed the present suit fora permanent injunction restraining Defendants from interfering with their possession or in the alternative for recovery of possession. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 resisted the Plaintiffs' claim alleging that Bali had four sons, Bishnu, Harihar, Madan and Sahadeb, out of whom, Harihar and Madan are said to have died issuless. They deny the adoption of Defendant DO. 1 to Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai and allege that after the death of Harihar and Madan, Bishnu, father of Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 1 succeeded to the suit properties and were jointly performing the archakar service. Bishnu being the eldest brother the properties were recorded in his name, though both the brothers were in joint possession. On these allegations, their contention is that Plaintiffs have only four annas share, while Defendant No. 1's branch has the remaining four annas share in the suit properties. 2. The trial Court rejected the Defendants case that Bali left four sons including one Harihar and found that he left only three sons, Bishnu, Madan and Sahadeb. It., however, found that Sahadeb (Defendant No. 1) had been adopted away out of the family to Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai since his childhood and that Plaintiffs were in enjoyment of the archaka right and possessed of the suit properties to the exclusion of Defendant No. 1. On these findings, it decreed the suit. On appeal by Defendants Nos. It., however, found that Sahadeb (Defendant No. 1) had been adopted away out of the family to Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai since his childhood and that Plaintiffs were in enjoyment of the archaka right and possessed of the suit properties to the exclusion of Defendant No. 1. On these findings, it decreed the suit. On appeal by Defendants Nos. 1 to 4, the lower appellate Court, while agreeing with the finding of the trial Court that Bali left only three sons, reversed the other two findings and held that Defendant No. 1 was not adopted away from the family at any time and that he was in joint possession of the archakaship as well as the properties with the Plaintiffs. On these findings it allowed the appeal. 3. It is not disputed that Bali was owner of eight annas interest in the archaka rights of the two deities and was in possession of eight annas share of the properties attached to that office which constitute the subject matter of the suit. The finding of the Courts below that Bali had only three sons, Bishnu, Madan and Sahadeb and that Madan died issueless is not challenged. The entire question in this appeal depends on a decision regarding the alleged adoption of Defendant No. 1 to one Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai. If it is found that Defendant No. 1 was given in adoption away from the family, he must deemed to have lost all his rights in the natural family and Plaintiffs will be entitled to the reliefs claimed. On the other band, if the alleged adoption of Defendant No. 1 is not established, Plaintiffs will not be entitled to succeed. Though the question of possession of the properties or the archakaship is a relevant factor in considering the truth or otherwise of the adoption, in case the plea of adoption fails, Plaintiffs will not be entitled to any relief on the ground that by their long and exclusive possession the right of Defendant No. 1 was extinguished, because a case of ouster and acquisition of right by prescription has not been pleaded. Therefore, as stated above, the only point for determination is whether Defendant No. 1 was given away in adoption from the family or not. 4. Therefore, as stated above, the only point for determination is whether Defendant No. 1 was given away in adoption from the family or not. 4. The lower appellate Court on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, and in the light of circumstances and probabilities, has come to a categorical finding that Plaintiff have failed to establish that Defendant No. 1 was adopted away from the family to Shri Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai. This is a finding of fact and ordinarily such a finding is not open to be assailed in second appeal. Learned Counsel for Appellants, however, urges that the finding cannot be treated as conclusive and binding on the following two grounds: Firstly, it is contended that on the facts of the case the lower appellate Court has erred in placing the onus on the Plaintiffs to prove the alleged adoption. Secondly, it is urged that the finding is vitiated on account of failure to consider certain material pieces of evidence which had been considered and given due weight by the trial Court. 5. The first contention is that when in Ext. 4 dated 5.6.1923 Sahadeb (Defendant No. 1) made an admission describing himself as the adopted Bon of Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai, the Court below should have placed the burden of proof on the Defendants to disprove the adoption. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the following observation of the. Supreme Court in the decision reported in Kishori Lal Vs. Mst. Chaltibai, : An admission shifts the onus on the person admitting the fact on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption is rebutted, the fact admitted must be taken to be established. The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court do not apply to cases where the initial onus rests. On the other hand, it is we] settled that a person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him of proving the factum of adoption as well as its validity vide Kishori Lal Vs. Mst. Chaltibai. While enunciating the aforesaid principle, the Supreme Court have also laid down the essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof. Mst. Chaltibai. While enunciating the aforesaid principle, the Supreme Court have also laid down the essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof. It has been held that the burden of proof lies upon the, person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in evaluation of evidence. The position, therefore, is that where natural succession is sought to be displaced by alleging an adoption, the burden of proof lies on the party who alleges it, though on proof of certain admissions, in the process of evaluation of the evidence, the onus of proof may shift. On this principle, when an admission is proved, it may reasonably be presumed to be true until the presumption is rebutted. The lower appellate Court, while dealing with the evidence adduced by respective parties relating to the alleged adoption, has clearly kept these principles in view, and considering certain circumstances and other factors, accepted the explanation offered by Defendant No. 1 as to the circumstances in which such a description of Sahadeb was found in Ext. 4. Therefore, the contention of Appellants that the lower appellate Court erred in placing the onus on Plaintiffs is not correct. Apart from it, as has been observed in the decision reported in Kishori Lal Vs. Mst. Chaltibai the question of onus loses its efficacy when it is never objected to in t he lower Courts and evidence having been led by the parties, at the appellate stage the Court has to adjudicate on the material before it. In the present case, Plaintiffs who allege the adoption of Defendant No. 1 do not appear to have raised any objection regarding onus in the trial Court and adduced evidence in proof of the alleged adoption. The first appellate Court had to adjudicate on the material before it. When evidence on both sides had been recorded without any objection having been taken on the ground of onus, the finding of the lower appellate Court cannot be assailed on the ground that the onus had been wrongly placed on Plaintiffs. 6. It is next urged that the lower appellate Court in arriving at its finding on the question of adoption has not taken into consideration certain material pieces of evidence which had been considered by the trial Court. 6. It is next urged that the lower appellate Court in arriving at its finding on the question of adoption has not taken into consideration certain material pieces of evidence which had been considered by the trial Court. Reference is made to paragraph 518 of Mulla's Hindu Law and it is urged that when the adoption in questing is an ancient one, direct evidence of the factum of adoption cannot be expected to be available and the lower appellate Court has failed to take this aspect into consideration. Apart, from it, is pointed out that the lower appellate Court has failed to give due weight to the admission of Defendant No. 1 in Ext. 4 wherein he described himself as the adopted son of Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai as well as his admission that he sold some property as son of Harihar Panigrahi in 1946. It is further pointed out that d.w. 1 in his evidence admits that he had taken a mortgage from Bishnu and Plaintiffs which would indicate that Defendant No. 1 was no longer a member of the family as otherwise d.w. 1 would have insisted on his joining the mortgage. Similarly, reference is made to the statement of Defendant No. 1 that he lived in Balichai for twenty years till two or three years prior to 1945 and it is contended that such residence is only consistent with his having been adopted at Balichai. Though it is conceded that in second appeal it is not open for fresh assessment of the evidence, it is contended that where the first appellate Court fails to notice some important piece of evidence, its finding cannot be regarded as binding on the High Court. In this connection, reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sonawati and Others Vs. Sri Ram and Another. In that decision it was observed that where the first appellate Court ignored or failed to refer to important piece of evidence, its conclusions cannot be regarded as binding on the High Court in second appeal. There is, however, a distinction between cases where material or important pieces of evidence are ignored and cases where the challenge is on the ground that the finding of fact is erroneous. There is, however, a distinction between cases where material or important pieces of evidence are ignored and cases where the challenge is on the ground that the finding of fact is erroneous. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Sinha Ramanuja v. Ranga Ramanuja 1962 S.C.D. 6 : AIR 1961 S.C. 720 have observed: It has now been well settled that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on ground of erroneous finding of fact however gross the error may seem to be. The first appellate Court has taken into consideration the admission in Ext. 4 as well as the admission of Defendant No. 1 in 1946 where be bad purported to effect a sale describing himself as the son of Harihar Panigrahi. It has accepted the explanation of Defendant No. I regarding these documents. Therefore, it is not correct to say that it has ignored to take note of these documents or the admissions contained therein. The other circumstances referred to relate to conduct of the parties subsequent to the alleged adoption. Both the Courts have come to concurrent finding that the oral evidence adduced by the parties in support of and against the adoption is not worth much. Reliance has been placed by both sides on certain documents evidencing the conduct of the parties and the manner of treatment such sequent to the alleged adoption. On the Plaintiffs' side, apart from the description given in Ext. 4 and the admission of Defendant No. 1 having effected some sale as son of Hari Panigrahi in 1946, reliance has been placed on the statement of d.w. 1 that he had taken a mortgage from Bishnu and Plaintiff without Defendant No. 1 joining as an executant and continuous stay of Sahadeb at Balichai for about twenty years tome years prior to 1945. On the other hand, for Defendants reliance has been placed on two sale deeds (Exts. A/1 and A/2) executed in favour of Defendant No. 1 in 1946 as wen as two memos (Exts. B and B/l) issued by the office of the Hindu Religious Endowments Orissa to Sahadeb in the year I )48. In Ext. A/1 and A/2 Sahadeb has been described as son of Bali Panigrahi and in Ext.B and B/1, Sahadeb has been given notice as archaka of the two deities whose lands form the subject matter of dispute. B and B/l) issued by the office of the Hindu Religious Endowments Orissa to Sahadeb in the year I )48. In Ext. A/1 and A/2 Sahadeb has been described as son of Bali Panigrahi and in Ext.B and B/1, Sahadeb has been given notice as archaka of the two deities whose lands form the subject matter of dispute. So far as t he description in Ext. 4 is concerned, as already stated, the lower appellate Court has accepted the explanation offered by Defendant no Exts. A/1 and A/2 show that as early as 1946 Sahadeb was treated as son of Bali Panigrahi which militates against the alleged adoption to Hari Panigrahi of Balichai. It is not suggested that any dispute had arisen between the parties by 1946 for Sahadeb to obtain documents for the purpose of creating evidence against the alleged adoption. Exts. Band B/1 were the two notices issued by the Endowment Commissioner wherein Sahadeb has been described as one of the archakas. There is clear finding on the evidence that Sahadeb was in possession of a portion of the properties attached to the office of archaka. The explanation offered by Plaintiffs that Sahadeb was mentioned in Exts. B and B/1 because he was acting on behalf of Udayanath Panigrahi who was a minor has not been accepted by the Court below and rightly so, because Udayanath himself has been described as one of the archakas. Thus, in this case, it is not possible to say on the basis of documents available subsequent to the date of alleged adoption that there has been a consistent pattern of conduct or treatment of Sahadeb as the adopted son of Harihar Panigrahi of Balichai. When in some documents whose genuineness has not been challenged, be has been described as son of Bali Panigrahi and his explanation has been accepted in respect of his description in Ext. 4, the Court below has observed that it is not possible to draw an inference that adoption must have taken place. In arriving at its conclusion, it has referred to all the material pieces of evidence. 4, the Court below has observed that it is not possible to draw an inference that adoption must have taken place. In arriving at its conclusion, it has referred to all the material pieces of evidence. The mere fact that it has not referred to Rome non-essential facts like residence of Sahadeb at Balichai for a period or his non-joining a particular mortgage bond executed by Bishnu and his sons will not be sufficient to bold that the finding has been arrived at by ignoring important piece of evidence which would justify interference in second appeal. Thus I find no reason to interfere with the finding of fact in second appeal on either of the grounds urged by learned Counsel for Appellants. 7. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed