This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge No. 2, Silchar, affirming the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif of Silchar. 2. The plaintiffs' case is that the de­fendant is a tenant under them in res­pect of the suit holding, which is a room in a two-storeyed building. The rent was payable at the rate of Rupees 12/- per month according to the Bengali calendar month. They, therefore, gave a notice to the defendant on 7th Bhadra 1336 B. S., corresponding to 24th August 1959, by registered post asking the defen­dant to vacate at the end of the month of Bhadra. They also demanded payment of all arrears of rent within seven days of the receipt of that notice. The de­fendant did not reply to the notice nor complied with the demand and hence the plaintiffs filed the present suit. 3. The defendant pleaded that he took the settlement for starting his trunk factory and gold-smith work-shop. Hence the notice is invalid and insufficient under the law. He also denied that the plaintiffs have any bona fide requirement of their own for the premises. 4. The learned Munsiff held that the lease was for manufacturing purpose and hence the notice given in this case was invalid and insufficient. The learned Munsiff, however, held that since the defendant has admitted that he has acqu­ired a residence at Silchar Bilpar, he is liable to be evicted under section 6 (1) (f) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Con­trol Act. He also held against the plain­tiffs regarding their bona fide require­ment. Since, however, the notice was held to be invalid, the learned Munsiff dismissed the suit. The learned Subor­dinate Judge dealt only with the point of notice and agreed with the finding of the learned Munsiff that the lease was for manufacturing purpose, and, as such, the notice giving the defendant only fifteen days' time expiring with the month of the tenancy is insufficient in law. 5. Mr. Lahiri, the learned Counsel for the appellants, submits that both the courts below erred in law in deciding against the plaintiffs regarding the vali­dity of the notice of eviction served in this suit. He contends that there is no averment in the written statement that the notice is invalid on the ground taken, namely that the lease was for manufacturing purpose. He contends that there is no averment in the written statement that the notice is invalid on the ground taken, namely that the lease was for manufacturing purpose. On the other hand, it is submitted that the admitted position being that rent was payable monthly according to Bengali calendar, the lease must be held to be from month to month. He further submits that even on the facts found by the court below, the case does not come within the ambit of the expression "manufacturing pur­pose" within the meaning of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. He submits that the popular rather than the etymological meaning should be given to the expression "manufacturing purpose". 6. I have gone through the findings of the courts below on this point. Both the courts below found after appreciation of the evidence that the lease was for manufacturing purpose. The defendant in paragraph 7 of his written statement describing the real facts averred that he has been running the business of manu­facturing and selling trunks and of gold and silver there in the suit premises. In paragraph 4 of the written state­ment, the defendant avers that the notice described in the plaint is illegal, invalid and insufficient. Paragraphs 4 and 7 read together do not support the conten­tion of Mr. Lahiri that the ground of invalidity of the notice, which was pleaded in the courts below and accept­ed by the courts, was absent in the writ­ten statement. The question of validity of the notice was definitely pleaded by the defendant in his written statement and the courts below rightly went into it Although no specific issue was fram­ed in the suit. The courts below dis­cussed this issue while discussing issue no. 2 regarding the maintainability of the suit. No objection, therefore, can be taken by the plaintiffs on this techni­cal ground in a second appeal. 7. The next important point Is whe­ther on the facts found by the courts below, the lease could be held to be taken for manufacturing purpose. Mr. Lahiri submits that the facts disclosed in the evidence do not warrant the con­clusion that any manufacture takes place in the premises in suit. The word 'manufacture' in the Chambers' Diction­ary is stated to mean "to make, originally by hand, now usually by machinery and on a large scale". Mr. Lahiri submits that the facts disclosed in the evidence do not warrant the con­clusion that any manufacture takes place in the premises in suit. The word 'manufacture' in the Chambers' Diction­ary is stated to mean "to make, originally by hand, now usually by machinery and on a large scale". The Webster Diction­ary also gives the same meaning "a mak­ing of goods and articles by hand or specially by machinery often on a large scale with a division of labour". The root of the word 'manufacture' in Latin is 'Manu' (hand) and Factura (making) from Latin 'Factus'. Mr. Lahiri relies on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sati Prasanna Mukherjee v. Md. Fazel, AIR 1952 Cal 320 of p. 321, to support his contention that the present case is not one of manufacturing purpose and reads the following passage: "The word 'manufacture' must In this context in my opinion be construed in a popular sense. The popular concept is that there must be production of a new or a different article or the process must be such as converts one kind of article into another kind. The observations of Lord Westbury, Lord Chancellor in 'Ralston v. Smith' (1866) H. L. C. 223 at p. 246 are material on the point. They are: "Your Lordships are well aware that by the large interpretation given to the word 'manufacture' it not only compre­hends productions, but it also compre­hends the means of producing them. Therefore in addition to the thing pro­duced it will comprehend a new machine or a new process or an improvement of an old process." The learned Judge in the Calcutta case was dealing with a lease, the material portion of which ran as follows, "I shall pay the rent Rs. 175/- per month according to the English calender month and I shall occupy the same for dwell­ing purpose, for setting up a press and for ordinary business purposes." The learned Judge, on construction of these words, held the lease to be for multiple purposes, and, as such, not a lease for manufacturing purpose within the meaning of Section 106 of the Trans­fer of Property Act. Regarding 'manu­facture' also, the learned Judge held that printing simpliciter is not always 'manu­facture'. On the other hand, Mr. Regarding 'manu­facture' also, the learned Judge held that printing simpliciter is not always 'manu­facture'. On the other hand, Mr. Ghose, the learned Counsel for the respondents, relied on a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jayanti Hosiery Mills v. Upendra Chan­dra Das, 50 Cal WN 441 :(AIR 1946 Cal 317) and read the following passage therefrom: "A lease of a premises where cotton sheets were worked into articles of hosi­ery and made ready for the market by cutting and knitting machines is a lease for manufacturing purposes within sec­tion 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1884, although the yarn and the sheet from the raw material were not prepared there." Mr. Lahiri also drew my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Krishna Das Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy, AIR 1959 Cal 181 , and reli­ed on the following passage at Para 33: "The overall position thus seems to be that the tenancy was taken for start­ing a motor repair 'works' or a motor repairing workshop which would not, even ordinarily or prima facie and, cer­tainly not, necessarily, be a manufactur­ing purpose." The test laid down in the Calcutta deci­sion 50 Cal W. N. 441 :(AIR 1946 Cal 317) which has been also noticed in the Calcutta decision AIR 1952 Cal 320 at p. 321, is that there must be production of a new and different article or the pro­cess must be such as to convert one kind into another. This feature was absent in the case AIR 1952 Cal 320 (at p. 321), but was present in the Jayanti Hosiery Mills' case 50 Cal W. N. 441 :(AIR 1946 Cal 317). In view of the dictionary meaning as also ;the popular meaning noticed in these Calcutta decisions, I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed therein and applying the same test, I am of the opinion on the facts found in this case that in the present case the main purpose was to prepare in large scale trunks from iron sheets and the secondary purpose was for sale. Obviously, new articles, namely trunks were produced out of the iron sheets and the tests laid down in the Calcutta decisions as also by Lord Westbury, Lord Chancellor in" 1866 HLC 223, clearly apply to the instant case. Obviously, new articles, namely trunks were produced out of the iron sheets and the tests laid down in the Calcutta decisions as also by Lord Westbury, Lord Chancellor in" 1866 HLC 223, clearly apply to the instant case. There is, therefore, no error of law committed by the courts below in holding that the lease was for manufac­turing purpose. Obviously, therefore, section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was attracted and the notice giving only fifteen days' time is invalid in law and the plaintiffs' suit has rightly been dismissed on this ground alone. i 8. Mr. Lahiri also strongly relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Second Appeal No. 156 of 1962 D/- 11-2-1965 (Assam) for the purpose of his sub­mission that mere conducting of manufac­ture in the house will not convert this to be a lease for manufacturing purpose. But the following passage in that very judg­ment would clearly show that Mr. Lahiri does not get aid from this decision at all: "To attract the operation of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is not enough if a premises is taken on lease, and subsequently a factory is esta­blished at the convenience and wish of the tenant. As the clear language of the section indicates, the lease itself must have been given for manufacturing pur­poses, that is for the purpose of using the premises for manufacturing pur­poses." I have already noticed that there Is a definite finding in favour of the defen­dant by both the courts below that he took the premises for manufacturing purpose. There is, therefore, no ques­tion of the purpose being introduced at a subsequent stage after taking of the lease. 9. Mr. Lahiri also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bam Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, AIR 1952 SC 23 , for his proposition that in this case admittedly the mode of pay­ment of rent being a monthly payment, the lease should be presumed from month to month and hence the notice given in this case is a valid notice. He relied on the following passage: "It has no doubt been recognised in several cases that the mode in which a rent is expressed to be payable affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. He relied on the following passage: "It has no doubt been recognised in several cases that the mode in which a rent is expressed to be payable affords a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. Conse­quently, when the rent reserved is an annual rent, the presumption would arise that the tenancy was an annual tenancy unless there is something to rebut the presumption." If we carefully read this decision, we find that the mode of payment is taken in­to account amongst other things for ascer­taining whether there is a contract to the contrary. This will appear from the argument advanced by Mr. Setalvad who relied very strongly upon the fact that the rent paid in that case was an annual rent and he argued that from this fact it can fairly be inferred that the agree­ment between the parties was certainly not to create a monthly tenancy. Mr. Setalvad's difficulty in this case was that the contract which he was trying to establish on the facts of this case was palpably contradicted by the admitted facts of the case. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court disposing of this contention held as fol­lows: "It is one thing to say that in the ab­sence of a valid agreement, the rights of the parties would be regulated by law in the same manner as if no agreement existed at all; it is quite another thing to substitute a new agreement for the parties which is palpably contradicted by the admitted facts of the case." It must also be observed that in this case before the Supreme Court, it was conceded that the tenancy was not for manufacturing nor for agricultural pur­pose, which is not the case in this second appeal before me. Here the defendant is asserting that the lease was for manu­facturing purpose and there is a con­current finding of fact in his favour in that respect". Their Lordships particularly observed: "The section lays down a rule of con­struction which is to be applied when there is no period agreed upon between the parties. In such cases the duration has to be determined by reference to the object or purpose for which the tenancy is created. Their Lordships particularly observed: "The section lays down a rule of con­struction which is to be applied when there is no period agreed upon between the parties. In such cases the duration has to be determined by reference to the object or purpose for which the tenancy is created. The rule of construction em­bodied in this section applies not only to express leases of uncertain duration but also to leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and acceptance of rent and other circumst­ances." This decision of the Supreme Court is, therefore, of no assistance to Mr. Lahiri in this case where section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is to be appli­ed and no contract to the contrary has been established in the case. 10. Mr. Lahiri next contended that even 5f it is conceded that the" lease is for manu­facturing purpose, such a lease in ab­sence of a registered instrument will be void under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. To appreciate this sub­mission we may read the material por­tion of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act: "106. In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immoveable property for agricul­tural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy", .and a lease of immoveable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, termina­ble, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the ten­ancy," Section 106 lays down a rule of const­ruction. Even if an oral lease of im­moveable properly for manufacturing purpose is established and nothing to the contrary is proved, the rule of construc­tion provided for in section 106 will be applicable. Such a lease by its deeming provision shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable by six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy. Such a lease by its deeming provision shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable by six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy. For the purpose of section 106 of the Transfer of [Property Act, in the absence of a con­tract etc., there will be a presumption under the law, in view of the purpose of the lease, in favour of a lease from year to year, even though a written lease for manufacturing purpose from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, must be by a registered instru­ment. For the purpose of section 106 in respect of the duration of the lease and ,for the purpose of the period of the notice for terminating such lease, the lease will be deemed to be a lease from year to year or from month to month according to the purpose for which it has been made. In my judg­ment, there is no conflict between sec­tion 106 and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The rubric of S. 106 clearly indicates that it refers to only duration of certain lease in absence of a written contract or local usage. If no con­tract is established in a particular case, the provision of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will operate and section 107 will not stand as a bar to giving effect to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. Mr. Lahiri relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court AIR 1952 Cal 320 and read the following passage: "A lease which under the law (e.g. under section 106) is 'deemed' to be a lease from year to year is nonetheless 'a lease from year to year' under sec­tion 107 of the Act and must therefore satisfy the statutory requirement of registration subject of course to the pro­vision of section 53A. of the Transfer of Property Act." The learned Judge was unable to hold In that case that there was a lease for manufacturing purpose in absence of a registered lease. Mr. Ghose, on the other hand, placed strong reliance in the deci­sion reported in AIR 1959 Cal 181 . which took a contrary view of the decision on which Mr. of the Transfer of Property Act." The learned Judge was unable to hold In that case that there was a lease for manufacturing purpose in absence of a registered lease. Mr. Ghose, on the other hand, placed strong reliance in the deci­sion reported in AIR 1959 Cal 181 . which took a contrary view of the decision on which Mr. Lahiri relied, wherefrom the following passage may be quoted: "Section 107 does not control section 106 and notwithstanding the former sec­tion, the latter will apply to a manu­facturing lease, whether registered or un­registered so as to make it a lease from year to year for purposes of that sec­tion (section 106), terminable with a six months' notice to quit, or in other words, to control its duration and period of notice, in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary. The lease will be a lease from year to year for the limited purpose of section 106, that is, for the limited purpose of its duration and period of notice, the dura­tion being until the notice expires. This will not raise any conflict with S. 107." The same view was adopted also by another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case AIR 1963 Cal 198 , and the contention of Mr. Lahiri is, therefore, devoid of any substance. 12. Since the plaintiffs' suit stands dismissed on the ground of invalidity of the notice, it is not necessary to deal with the other points raised by Mr. Lahiri regarding some of the issues decid­ed against the plaintiffs by the learned Munsiff. These issues are, therefore, left open for adjudication in any future pro­ceeding between the parties. 13. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed but in the entire circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in any of the courts. 14. Prayer for leave to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is allowed. Appeal dismissed.