ORDER Naik, J.- l. The appellant Munnalal on 8-4-65 filed an application under section 10 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act') for fixation of the standard rent in respect of his tenanted premises, viz. house No. 53/2, situate in Lordganj, Jabalpur. After a couple of hearings, when the case was taken up on 7-5-1965, the defendant - respondent tenant was absent. The case was, therefore, proceeded with ex parte against him and fixed for the evidence of the plaintiff-appellant landlord on 5-6-1965. On 5-6-1965, the plaintiff-appellant was examined and the case was fixed for 30-6-1965 for the examination of the plaintiff-landlord's remaining witnesses. later, on that date i.e. on 5-6-1965 after the plaintiff-appellant had been examined, the defendant tenant respondent appeared and prayed for a decision on his application for setting aside the order declaring him ex parte on 7-5-1965. The parties were heard on 16-11-1965 and the application was dismissed on 24-11-1965. The dismissal was later affirmed in appeal. Thereafter, the case dragged on, and ultimately it was fixed for ex parte evidence of the plaintiff-appellant on 14-11-1966. The case was, however, taken up on 15-11-1966 and not on 14-11-1966. On that date, one Mangal Prasad was examined as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff. appellant. After the witness had been examined and the plaintiff-appellant had closed his evidence, the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent tenant appeared and desired to cross-examine the witness. The prayer was not granted. It appears that the Rent Controlling Authority was of opinion that the defendant-respondent tenant could not take part in the proceedings as he had already been declared ex parte on 7-5-1965. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent tenant prayed for permission to argue on the point. After hearing the counsel for both the parties, the Rent Controlling Authority by its order, dated 3-4-1967, held that the defendant-respondent tenant was not entitled to cross-examine the witness for the plaintiff appellant landlord unless and until the order, dated 7-5-1965, declaring him ex parte had been vacated. After hearing the counsel for both the parties, the Rent Controlling Authority by its order, dated 3-4-1967, held that the defendant-respondent tenant was not entitled to cross-examine the witness for the plaintiff appellant landlord unless and until the order, dated 7-5-1965, declaring him ex parte had been vacated. The defendant - respondent tenant appealed to the District Judge who, by his order, dated 11-9-1967, which is the subject matter of this' appeal, held that the defendant respondent tenant had a right to take part in the proceedings from the stage he appeared to contest them and that he could not have been debarred from cross-examining the plaintiff appellant's witness on 15-11-1966. The plaintiff appellant has come up in appeal against the order of the District Judge dated 11-9-1967. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the appeal to the District Judge was incompetent as the order passed by the Rent Controlling Authority on 3-4-1967 was not an appealable order under section 31 of the Act. 3. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention. Under section 31 of the Act, an appeal lies to the District Judge from every order of the Rent Controlling Authority made under the Act. The section makes no distinction between an interlocutory order and a final order, and that consequently the language of the section is wide enough to give a right of appeal against the order in question. 4. It is next contended that the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent tenant could not be permitted to cross-examine the appellant landlord's witness on 15-11-1966 as the witness had, after the close of the case by the plaintiff appellant, left the Court premises. There is nothing on record to show that the witness for the appellant had left the Court premises. On the other hand, a reading of the order-sheet of that date shows that before the proceedings had been concluded the learned counsel for the respondent - tenant had prayed for permission to cross-examine the witness for the appellant saying that the ex parte order did not debar him from doing so. The trend of the order-sheet of 15-11-1966 further shows that but for the fact that the Rent Controlling Authority thought that the defendant-tenant was not entitled to take part in the proceedings, it would have permitted his counsel to cross-examine the witness for the plaintiff. The trend of the order-sheet of 15-11-1966 further shows that but for the fact that the Rent Controlling Authority thought that the defendant-tenant was not entitled to take part in the proceedings, it would have permitted his counsel to cross-examine the witness for the plaintiff. In fact, the contention that the defendant-respondent could not be permitted to recall the witness for cross-examination as he had already left the Court premises was not advanced at the hearing before the Rent Controlling Authority, as the fact finds no mention in the order dated 3-4-1967 passed by it. 5. It is then contended that as the defendant tenant had been declared ex parte on 7- 5-1965, he could not re permitted to take part in the proceedings on 15-11-1966, unless and until the ex parte order had been set aside. 6. This contention also had no force and shall have to be rejected. 7. Under section 29 of the Act. "Rent Controlling Authority shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), in any proceeding before it in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; (d) any other matter which may be prescribed; 8. All the provisions of the Code have thus not been made applicable to proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority. There is no such specific provision in the Act as is contained in rule 6 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure where under the proceedings could have continued ex parte because of the absence of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing; but even here, after the proceedings had continued ex parte on a particular hearing, he would have had two remedies open to him: (a) He may have applied for the setting aside of the ex parte order and thus re-opening of the proceedings even as to the day on which he was absent; or (b) he may have, without getting the ex parte order set aside, taken part in the subsequent proceedings. A look at the provisions of the Code in this behalf would make the point clear. A look at the provisions of the Code in this behalf would make the point clear. Under the Code (rule 6 of Order 9), "Where the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, then – if it is proved that the summons was duly served, the Court may proceed ex parte." Then under rule 7 of Order 9, "Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte, and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance." It has been held that this rule has no application were the defendant merely desires to proceed from the stage at which he appears. It is only when he wants the Court to go back on what has been done, that he must apply under this rule. (See Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah AIR 1955 SC 246. 9. In the instant case, as there is no such rule governing the proceedings under which the defendant could have been declared ex parte for all the proceedings subsequent to 7-5-1965 and thus debarred from taking part in the proceedings at any stage, I do not see how the Rent Controlling Authority could declare him ex parte and thus debar him from taking part in the proceedings from the stage he chose to take part in them. 10. I may here note the provisions of section 30 (1) of the Act under which 'no order which prejudicially affects any person, shall be made by the Rent Controlling Authority under the Act without giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the order proposed to be made and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been considered by the Rent Controlling Authority. Consequently, if the Rent Controlling Authority was intending to permanently debar the defendant from taking part in the proceedings, he ought to have followed the procedure prescribed under section 30 (1) of the Act as the order in question was certainly one which prejudicially affected him. 11. Consequently, if the Rent Controlling Authority was intending to permanently debar the defendant from taking part in the proceedings, he ought to have followed the procedure prescribed under section 30 (1) of the Act as the order in question was certainly one which prejudicially affected him. 11. However, I quite see that even in the absence of the provisions of the Code being made specially applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority the authority could certainly follow the general principles of the Code as they are quite in consonance with the principles of natural justice. It may be that the more technical and strict rules of the Code may not be imported into the Rent Control proceedings; but the rules of the Code could furnish very valuable guide for moulding the procedure before the Rent Controlling Authority on principles of equity, justice and good conscience. 12. But looked at in this way also, there could be no warrant for permanently debarring the defendant from taking part in the subsequent proceedings simply because he was absent on any particular date of hearing and had not been successful In convincing the Court that he had good and sufficient cause for his absence on that date. 13. In the instant case, the defendant respondent did not appear on 7-5-1965 and was proceeded against ex parte. On that date the case was fixed for evidence of the plaintiff appellant's witnesses on 5-6-1965. On 5-6-1965 the plaintiff-appellant was examined and as he wanted a date to produce his remaining witnesses, the case was fixed for 30-6-1965. Thereafter, no witnesses were examined till 15-11-1966 on which date the defendant-respondent appeared through his counsel and prayed for permission to cross-examine the witness for the plaintiff who was examined on that date. If the case had been governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, in view of rule 7 of Order 9, he could not ask the Court to go back on what had been done on 7-5-1965 and 5-6-1965 unless he had obtained an order setting aside the ex parte order dated 7-5-1965. The defendant-respondent had, in fact, applied to set aside the ex parte order; but his prayer in that behalf had been negatived. The defendant-respondent had, in fact, applied to set aside the ex parte order; but his prayer in that behalf had been negatived. The result was that he could not be permitted to re-open the case as from 7-5-65; but there was nothing in the Code which could stop him from participating in the proceedings as from the date he chose to appear to take part in the proceedings. 14. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the Rent Controlling Authority erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction in refusing permission to the defendant's counsel to cross- examine the plaintiff's witness examined on 15-11-1966. The order of the District Judge, Jabalpur, thus needs no interference. 15. It is unfortunate that a simple case for the fixation of 'standard rent' has dragged on for about three years. It may be that this was partly due to the rigid attitude taken by the plaintiff-appellant in the conduct of his case and partly because of the institution of a separate case by the defendant-tenant for the fixation of 'standard rent' of the suit premises, which has been registered as a separate case. But whatever that be, the case should now be decided expeditiously. I, therefore, order- (1) That the Rent Controlling Authority shall permit the defendant to take part in the proceedings as if he had appeared on 15-11-1966. i.e., he shall be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness for the plaintiff examined on that date. (2) That the Rent Controlling Authority shall permit the defendant to file his written statement and tender such witnesses, and oral and documentary evidence as he may be advised. (3) The Rent Controlling Authority shall also permit the plaintiff to tender such further evidence as he may be advised. (4) The Rent Controlling Authority shall dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible. There shall be no order as to costs.