M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ARGUING the question of greater hardship which is required to be considered under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (Bombay Act No. LVII of 1947) which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act Mr. M. D. Pandya learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant-defendant has contended and with substance that the learned Judges have not properly applied their mind to the considerations required to be taken into account by the (Court under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 of the Act before a decree of eviction is passed. Now on this question it appears from the discussion of the point by the learned judges in para 8 of the judgment that the learned Judges have first considered the question as to whether the accommodation was available to the defendant-tenant as an industrial worker from the Gujarat Housing Board. On this question the learned judges have found that there was nothing to show that any accommodation was immediately available to the tenant on the date of the decree. They have found that there was no evidence to show that the tenant would get accommodation from the Gujarat Housing Board at some future date. The learned Judges have then found that therefore hardship would certainly be caused to the tenant if a decree for eviction was passed against him. But the learned Judges have then proceeded to consider the case of the plaintiff that if the decree for eviction was refused the plaintiff with his growing family would be compelled to continue to occupy insufficient accommodation. The learned Judges have then considered that the hardship which was likely to be caused to the tenant could be mitigated by giving him time to vacate the suit premises. On this reasoning the learned Judges accepted with approval the approach to the case by the learned trial Judge who had given 2 1/2 years time to the tenant to vacate the suit premises. Thus it was on this latter consideration viz. that time would resolve the question of hardship and would mitigate the hardship that the learned Judges have found that the balance of hardship was in favour of the plaintiff. ( 2 ) NOW sub-sec. (2) of sec. Thus it was on this latter consideration viz. that time would resolve the question of hardship and would mitigate the hardship that the learned Judges have found that the balance of hardship was in favour of the plaintiff. ( 2 ) NOW sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 of the Act provides:- (2) No decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Thus when called upon the Court will have to consider the circumstances of the case relating to greater hardship and before granting a decree It must be satisfied on the point. The hardship to be considered for the purpose would be to either side and this would include the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant. The material consideration which the Court has to take into account In considering the question of greater hardship under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 of the Act is the availability of other reasonable accommodation to the landlord or the tenant. The words is available occurring in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 of the Act mean available for occupation at the time the order of eviction is made or the judgment is given. The premises which are occupied and are not open for occupation cannot be said to be available at the time the judgment is given. It would follow that giving of time to the tenant to vacate the suit premises cannot be-considered as availability to the tenant of other reasonable accommodation at the time of passing of the decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (g ). The availability must be one in present. One cannot predicate with any amount of reasonable certainty that reasonable accommodation will be available at any given point of time in future. There is no guarantee that given some time the tenant will secure him reasonable alternative accommodation. That is why the Legislature has advisedly used the present tense In reference to the availability of other reasonable accommodation to either party in sub-sec. (2 ). There is no guarantee that given some time the tenant will secure him reasonable alternative accommodation. That is why the Legislature has advisedly used the present tense In reference to the availability of other reasonable accommodation to either party in sub-sec. (2 ). The giving of time however long to the tenant to vacate the suit premises is thus not a relevant circumstance to be taken into account for the purpose. Similarly the fact that that alternative accommodation will be made available to the tenant by his employer is no proof of a reasonable accommodation which is available. It cannot be assumed that merely because a local authority employs a tenant it will find reasonable accommodation for him. Thus in my opinion the reasonable accommodation to be considered for the purpose would be the accommodation that is available in presenti and not in future. The finding on the question of greater hardship if it is based on the mere consideration of time being the mitigating factor cannot be accepted as concluding the question of availability of reasonable accommodation. In order to decide the question of balance of hardship the Court must consider all the relevant circumstances required to be considered under the imperative provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 of the Act. In this view of the matter I am fortified by the judgment of Mr. Justice Bakshi delivered in Civil Revision Application No. 372 of 1961 decided on August 21 1962 and in Civil Revision Application No. 646 of 1963 decided on February 23 1967 wherein the learned Judge has taken a similar view. In some three revision applications decided by me earlier I have also taken the same view. The decision of the learned Judges on the question of greater hardship is thus not in accordance with law and cannot be upheld. I accordingly set aside the decree of eviction passed by the lower Appellate Court in Civil Appeal No 191 of 1964 and remit the case to the Appellate Bench for a fresh hearing of the appeal and for arriving at a proper decision on the issue of greater hardship including the question of availability of accommodation having in view the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 13 of the Act. Case remanded. .