JUDGMENT : R.K. Choudhary, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiff arises out of a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale dated the 17th June, 1959 in respect of 4 kathas 8 dhurs of land, with a house thereon lying in Mahalla Ujjain tola of Bettiah town for a consideration of Rs. 13,400/-. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that Gaya Singh, father of defendant No. 1, was an employee of Bettiah Raj and he acquired the suit land by virtue of a settlement from the Bettiah Raj. He constructed one-storeyed house over 2 kathas and 5 dhurs of the suit land forming its western part, and he used the remaining eastern part as kitchen garden. On the death of Gaya Singh, the land, with the house standing on it, was inherited by defendant No. 1. The house and the land, however, were always in occupation of tenants on rent, but there was no profit to defendant No. 1 from the rents realised. Hence, he wanted to sell the suit property and invest the purchase money in acquisition of some culturable lands for the family and for payment of debts incurred by him. Accordingly he entered into negotiations with the plaintiff who, after making enquiries as to the existence of legal necessity for disposal of the property, agreed to purchase the same for Rs. 13,400/-. On the 17th June, 1959, therefore, defendant No. 1 executed a Moahdunama and accepted Rs. 3,500/- as earnest money. It was further agreed that Rs. 2,000/-was to be kept in deposit with the plaintiff for payment to the zarpeshgidar to whom the house had been mortgaged and the balance of Rs. 7,900/- was to be paid at the time of the registration of the document. It was also agreed that the sale deed would be executed on the 17th December, 1959. Defendant No. 1, however, failed to execute the sale deed, as agreed upon, and hence, the plaintiff had to institute the suit, out. of which this appeal arises, after service of notice on defendant No. 1 on the 21st December, 1959. 3. Originally, the suit was filed against defendant No. 1 alone but, on objection being raised by him in his written statement, his minor sons were added as defendants 2 to 6. of which this appeal arises, after service of notice on defendant No. 1 on the 21st December, 1959. 3. Originally, the suit was filed against defendant No. 1 alone but, on objection being raised by him in his written statement, his minor sons were added as defendants 2 to 6. Defendant No. 1 filed a separate written statement, and a formal written statement was also filed on behalf of the minor defendants through their guardian ad litem. Later on, however, they appeared through their mother guardian and filed a written statement contesting the suit. According to the written statements of all the defendants, their pleas appear to be that defendant No. 1 was not the Karta of the family consisting of himself and his five sons; that there was no legal necessity for the sale of the house and that the rent realised from the tenants of the house benefited the defendants' family. It was also pleaded that there was no necessity to purchase any land nor was any negotiation ever made for purchase of the same. According to defendant No. 1, there was a dispute between him and the District Board to the knowledge of the plaintiff with respect to 1 katha 10 dhurs out of the disputed land and the value of the suit property was Rs. 25,000/-and actually the plaintiff had agreed to pay Rs. 25,000/- as the price of the suit property; but, in ORDER :to save the cost of stamp and registration, a lower amount of price, namely, Rs. 13,400/- was mentioned in the deed of agreement at the request of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had agreed to pay the balance of the consideration money after the dispute with the District Board had been settled, and he also undertook to get the matter settled through his brother, Jwala Prasad, who happened to be the then Vice-Chairman of the District Board. It was also his case that he put his thumb impression and signature on a blank stamped paper which was handed over to the plaintiff. At that time, the plaintiff paid Rs. 3,500/-. Subsequently, however, the plaintiff went back upon the term of paying Rs. It was also his case that he put his thumb impression and signature on a blank stamped paper which was handed over to the plaintiff. At that time, the plaintiff paid Rs. 3,500/-. Subsequently, however, the plaintiff went back upon the term of paying Rs. 25,000/- as the price of the suit property and got the contents of the deed of agreement engrossed on the blank stamped paper that had been handed over to him and the plaintiff also failed to get the dispute settled with the District Board. On behalf of the minor defendants a further plea was taken that the contract was not binding upon them. 4. The Trial Court, on a consideration of the evidence, found as follows: (i) that the deed of agreement (Ext. 1) was genuine and was executed in due course ; (ii) that the sale price of the disputed property was fixed at Rs. 13,400/- only, and not at Rs. 25,000/-; (iii) that defendant No. 1 was the Karta of the family at the time of the execution of the deed of agreement; (iv) that a part of the consideration money, that is, Rs. 2,000/-which had been kept in deposit for payment to the zarpeshgidar was for legal necessity; (v) that a sum of Rs. 1,500/- being a part of the consideration money required to satisfy the loan under Ext. 6, was also for legal necessity; (vi) that defendant No. 1 had no necessity to purchase any land for the benefit of the family; and the plaintiff never made any enquiry, as alleged by him ; (vii) that the deed of agreement, however, was not legal and valid and was not enforceable ; and (viii) that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs. 3,500/- only which had actually been paid by him. On these findings, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed for recovery of Rs. 3,500/- only against defendant No. 1 and it was dismissed so far as the prayer for specific performance of contract was concerned. Being thus aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. 5. Mr. Kailash Roy, appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, has contended that, on the finding that the Moahdanama (Ext. 1) was a genuine document and was executed by defendant No. 1 in due course, a decree for specific performance of contract should have been passed in favour of the plaintiff. Being thus aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. 5. Mr. Kailash Roy, appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, has contended that, on the finding that the Moahdanama (Ext. 1) was a genuine document and was executed by defendant No. 1 in due course, a decree for specific performance of contract should have been passed in favour of the plaintiff. There is no doubt that the execution of the Moahdanama is admitted in this case, because defendant No. 1 has clearly stated in his written statement that there was an agreement between the parties for the sale of the suit property, but for a higher price. Since, however, the Court below has definitely found that the consideration money settled was only Rs. 13,400/- and that finding has not been seriously challenged in this Court, I accept the finding of the Court below on this point as correct. 6. A question then arises, whether this transaction was for the benefit of the family. The family consisted of defendant No. 1 and his five sons; and undisputedly defendant No. 1 was the Karta of that family, although in the written statement his kartaship has been challenged. The court below has definitely come to a finding that the defendant No. 1 was the Karta of the family, and this finding also has not been seriously challenged. Therefore, it can very well be presumed that defendant No. 1 had the power to enter into the agreement and execute the Moahdanama, if it was for the benefit of the family. 7. Mr. Kailash Roy has seriously argued that the sale which was sought to be made was for the benefit of the family of the defendants. The plaintiff had sought to make out a case at the trial that the real object of the sale of the property was to acquire agricultural lands for the benefit of the family out of the usufruct of the purchased lands. In paragraph 6 of the plaint it was stated that the house, with the Kola, was always in occupation of tenants without any benefit to the defendant and the defendant wanted to dispose of the house and to invest the money in purchasing some kasht lands for the maintenance of the family and for the liquidation of the debts incurred by the defendant. In the Moahdanama (Ext. In the Moahdanama (Ext. 1), however, the necessity for the sale stated was that the lands and the house were of no utility to the defendants and, as such, it was necessary to sell the same. Nowhere in the document it was mentioned that the defendant No. 1 intended to purchase agricultural lands out of the sale price of the suit property. It, therefore, appears that the statement in the plaint that the suit property was to be sold for purchase of agricultural lands for the family was an after-thought. In support of the necessity for the sale of the house, our attention has been drawn to the evidence of P. W's 1 to 4, 8 and 12, and to the evidence of D. W. 5, the defendant No. 1 himself. P. W. 1. Brij Bhushan Choubey had, no doubt, stated that the Moahda was executed for the sale of the land and the house of purchasing other lands more profitable than the house. In cross-examination, however, he has stated that the fact that defendant No. 1 wanted to sell the Moahda house for purchasing lands more profitable than the house was not stated to the scribe. P. W. 2. Bishwanath Pandey had also stated that defendant No. 1 wanted to purchase some lands for his sons by the sale of the Bettiah house. In answer to a Court question, he said that that talk took place on a train from Khairapokhar to Bettiah. He thus happened to be a chance witness. P. W. 3 Radhakant Tiwary is an attesting witness on the Moahdanama (Ext. 1). His evidence is that the defendant No. 1 told them that the possession of the house was not profitable and that he wanted to purchase lands instead, and also required some money for cultivation. But it appears from his evidence that the body of the Moahdanama was written out in his presence by the scribe Amanat Hussain and defendant No. 1 signed the same in presence of all the persons, including himself, who attested it. If he was told at that time by defendant No. 1, that the house was sought to be sold because he intended to purchase some other lands, the evidence of P. W. 1 who said that the fact that the house was to be sold for purchasing some lands was not told to the scribe, can not be correct. If he was told at that time by defendant No. 1, that the house was sought to be sold because he intended to purchase some other lands, the evidence of P. W. 1 who said that the fact that the house was to be sold for purchasing some lands was not told to the scribe, can not be correct. P. W. 4, Hira Singh is also an attesting witness, and he also has spoken about the contents of the Moahdanama having been written on the stamped paper in his presence; but he has not claimed to be a witness about the object of the sale of the Bettiah house. He has not said anything about the intention of defendant No. 1 to purchase some other lands out of the sale proceeds of the Bettiah house. P. W. 8 Nandkishore Singh, the plaintiff himself has said that the necessity for the transaction was purchase of lands for the children, payment of rent and debts of creditors. In cross-examination, however, he has stated that the Moahdanama was drafted under instructions of defendant No. 1 in his presence and that defendant No. 1 gave instructions about necessities to Amanat Hussain. But, as already observed, the Moahdanama does not speak of the necessity being the purchase of lands. P. W. 12, Vindeshwari Singh has stated that the plaintiff enquired from him as to whether Lalan Rout, whose Ziratia he was, was to sell any land to the defendant No. 1 and he answered in the affirmative. He also stated that defendant No. 1 told him that he wanted to purchase land after selling his Bettiah land. A suggestion was made to this witness that he was not the servant of Lalan Rout, but he denied the same. He was summoned only a month before he gave his evidence, and thus it appears that he was a witness of necessity as a result of an afterthought. Defendant No. 1 has been examined as D. W. 5. He has denied to have any necessity for selling the suit property. According to his evidence, he has himself got 40-45 bighas of lands. Therefore, there could be no legal necessity for selling the suit property belonging to the joint family. 8. Defendant No. 1 has been examined as D. W. 5. He has denied to have any necessity for selling the suit property. According to his evidence, he has himself got 40-45 bighas of lands. Therefore, there could be no legal necessity for selling the suit property belonging to the joint family. 8. On a consideration of the evidence discussed above, I am not inclined to differ from the view of the learned Subordinate Judge on this point, and I hold that the story about the necessity of purchasing lands for the members of the joint family of the defendants was introduced later as a result of an after-thought. The proposed sale, in my opinion was neither for any legal necessity nor for any benefit to the joint family. That being the position, the specific performance of the contract for sale could not be enforced. 9. Mr. Kailash Roy has, however, submitted an argument that the contract entered into by the father, who was also the Karta of the joint family consisting of himself and his sons, is binding on the sons unless it is tainted with immorality, or unless it is irrational. In other words his submission is that legal necessity and benefit to the estate are not the guiding principle for determining the binding nature of a contract on the sons, and the only question that has to be seen for the purpose of making the contract binding on the sons is that it is not tainted with immorality and it is not irrational. It has been further submitted that it is for the Karta to decide as to what transaction would-be for the benefit of the estates; and if the Karla has decided to enter into a transaction after considering in his own way, the benefit to the estate, it is not open to the Court to interfere with the decision of the Karta on the point. In support of this contention, he has relied on a Single Judge decision of this Court in Jiwanandan Singh v. Sia Ram Prasad Singh 1961 BLJR 273. In support of this contention, he has relied on a Single Judge decision of this Court in Jiwanandan Singh v. Sia Ram Prasad Singh 1961 BLJR 273. The facts of that case were almost similar to the facts of the present case; and Mahapatra, J., following the observation in the case of Niamat Rai v. Din Dayal LR 54 IndAp 211 pointed out that it was a matter to be left to the decision of the managing member of the joint family, and, as such, the defendant in that case, who was the father and Karta of the family, had the discretion to decide as to what would be for the benefit of the family. His Lordships further observed that once it is accepted that the suit agreement was genuine and was executed by the defendant, nothing would turn upon the desirability or otherwise of selling the suit land as that would be a matter within the discretion and prudence of the managing member, of the family, that is, the father in that case. A different view was taken by another learned Single Judge of this Court in Bageshwari Prasad Duivedi v. Deopati Kuer 1961 BLJR 137 in which Tarkeshwar Nath, J. specifically held that the agreement by Karta to execute permanent lease could bind the interest of the minor if it was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate; and the finding being otherwise, the plaintiff could not enforce the agreement against the minor. The matter however, appears to have been set at rest by the Supreme Court in the case of Balmukand v. Kamla Wati [1964]6SCR321 . In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after considering various decisions of the different High Courts, took the view that in each case the Court must be satisfied from the material before it that it (the contract) was, in fact, such as conferred or was reasonably expected to confer benefit on the family at the time it was entered into. A similar view was expressed by a Bench of this Court in Sital Prasad Singh v. Ajablal Mandar in which it was held that in every case the Court of fact will consider prominently and accurately whether the transaction which is sought to be enforced in a particular case was for the benefit of the estate and this must be decided not from any a priori arguments but upon facts of each case. Thus, the contention raised by Mr. Kailash Roy that it is for the Karta to decide as to what, according to him would be for the benefit of the family and it was not open to the Court to differ from his decision on this point, is not correct; and it is open to the Court to find out independently on the evidence before it, whether a particular transaction was for the benefit of the joint family or not. In the instant case it has been found that the contract in question was neither for legal necessity nor for benefit of the members of the joint family; and, as such, it could not be enforceable. Mr. Kailash Roy has also suggested that the Karta is competent to dispose of certain property of the joint family for purchasing lands for the family. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed by him on the case of Ramasray Rai v. Lal Bahadur Rai 5 Bihar Reports 959. It was observed in that case that a Karta of a joint Hindu family, on behalf of the family, is perfectly competent to enter into an agreement for sale of the family property for the benefit of the family and to end a litigation which might become a source of trouble and expense to the family. Here, in the present case, from the evidence it appears that the defendant No. 1 agreed to sell the suit property and the balance of the consideration money was to be paid to him on settlement of a dispute, with respect to a portion of the land proposed to be sold, with the District Board, the Vice-Chairman of which was a near relation of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had undertaken to get the dispute settled, and it is on this ground that, on the basis of the decision just cited, Mr. Kailash Roy has based his argument for enforcing the contract against the defendants. There is no satisfactory evidence on record to prove that there was any dispute between the defendant No. 1 and the District Board with respect to any portion of the suit property. The plaintiff has denied to have agreed to get the dispute settled, and thus it is clear that no steps had been taken towards the settlement of the dispute with the District Board. In view of these matters, the decision cited above has no application to the facts of the present case. 10. In the case of Ram Bilas Singh v. Ramyad Singh AIR 1920 Pat 441 it was held by a Bench of this Court that the mere fact that money is borrowed to enable the manager to purchase immovable property on behalf of the family does not in itself create any presumption that the transaction was beneficial to the family so as to authorise the manager to hypothecate existing family property by way of security for the loan; and that some necessity for the transaction or some benefit resulting to the family therefrom must in all such cases be shown. 11. After considering the facts and circumstances of this case, along with the authorities referred to above, I hold that the contract for sale could not be enforced as against the defendants, here is thus no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. 12. I agree. Appeal Dismissed.