ORDER R.L. Gulati, J. - The petitioner is a partnership firm which runs a tannery at Kanpur in the name and style of Messrs C.H.O. Tanney. 2. At the material time 70 persons Were employed in the petitioners factory. According to the petitioners ease, three of its employees Servasri Devi Dayal, Khelari Lal and Ram Kishore were casual workers and as there was no work for them in the factory, they were-asked by the management of the petitioner firm to sit for three days with effect from 25th January, 1961. Thereupon, three other employees Servasri Puranwasi, Moinuddin and Rahmatullah insisted that work should be provided to the casual workers. namely Devi, Dayal, Khelari Lal and Ram Kishore and on the failure of the management to comply with their demand, 34 employees including Servasri Puranwasi, Moinuddin and Rahmatullah wants on strike. They left- their work and eat in the open land inside the factory beyond the time of the closure of the factory thereby causing interruption of work and harassment to the management. On 27th January, 1961, 26th being a holiday, at the time of the begging of the work in the tannery, Dr. SIC one of the partners of the petition concerned called the 34 striking workers and wanted to give them a charge-sheet in which it was clearly mentioned that they were being suspended under clause 25 of the Standing Orders of the petitioner concern for a period of 4 days pending enquiry against them. According to the averments in the writ petition, the workmen refused to accept the charge-sheet which was then sent to them by registered post. In the charge-sheet dated 27th January, 1961 the workmen ware, required to submit their explanation within three days of the receipt of the charge-sheet On 81st January, 1961 a further order extending the period of suspension was passed and sent to the workers under the signatures of one Max Haecker, the Manager of the petitioner concern and was in the following words: "That for the acts of misconduct committed by you two charge-sheets dated 27-1-1961 have been sent at your address available with the Company and that you were also suspended pending inquiry for four days with effect from 27-1 1961. That in the circumstances it has been eon. That in the circumstances it has been eon. Ordered necessary to extend the period of suspension pending enquiry into the charges with which you stand charged, you are accordingly informed that the period of suspension is hereby extended pending inquiry Mil final orders are passed in your case. Sd/. Max Haeoker, Manager." Before, however, the enquiry could be concluded the Governor in the exercise of powers conferred by S. 4K of the. U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, issued a notification No. 367 (LCJ/XV ill-L a -165 (I. K. R.)-6l dated May 10,1961, whereby the dispute between the petitioner concern and its workers was referred to the Labour Court at Kanpur. According to the notification the following was the matter at dispute: "Whether the employers have kept suspended their workmen, named in the an. assure, with effect from 25.1.1961, legally and/or justifiably? If not, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled"? Thereafter there was some slight amendment in the reference inasmuch as instead of 84 workers the names of 88 workers were substituted, The Labour Court recorded evidence of the parties and finally gave an award dated 21th January, 1963 with the following findings; (i) that Servasri Devi Dayal, Khelari Lal sad Sam Kishore, whose names appear at serial nos. 35, 36 and 37 were casual workers and were not entitled to any relief. (ii) that the worker at serial No. 88 was not mi the employment of the petitioner concern on 25th January 1961 and as such he was not entitled to any relief. (iii) that the workers at serial Nos. 1 to 34 had been suspended by a written order with effect from 27th January 1961 and not by a &verbal order dated 25th January, 1961, as alleged on behalf of the workmen and further that their suspension from 27th January, 1961 did not vitiate the entire trial in respect of those workmen. (iv) that on 31st January, 1961 when the order of suspension was extended, there could not be said to be pending any enquiry es an Enquiry Officer was appointed much later and consequently the Managers order dated 31st January, 1961 suspending the workmen for an indefinite period pending enquiry was defective. (iv) that on 31st January, 1961 when the order of suspension was extended, there could not be said to be pending any enquiry es an Enquiry Officer was appointed much later and consequently the Managers order dated 31st January, 1961 suspending the workmen for an indefinite period pending enquiry was defective. (v) that the order of suspension passed by the Manager violated the principle of natural justice as the game had been issued after taking the prior approval of the management inasmuch as the workmen were deprived of their right to appeal against the order of suspension to the management by reason of the fact that the management bad given its approval to the suspension order. 3. As a result of these findings the Labour Court granted relief to the 34 workers listed at serial Nos. 1 to 34 in the manner and to the extent out at the foot of the award. It is against this part of the award granting relief to the workers that the present writ petition is directed. 4. The only question that falls for determination in the present writ petition is as to whether the order of the Manager dated 31st January, 1961, extending the period of suspension till the final order of enquiry, was in any way bad in law, as has been held by the Labour Court. It is not disputed that the Manager obtained the approval of the partners of the firm before passing the order of suspension. It is also not disputed that an Enquiry Officer was appointed on 15th February, 1961. Clause 25 of the Standing Orders under which the workmen were suspended reads as follows : "25 (a) If misconduct is alleged against an employee and the Manager considers that an enquiry is necessary before awarding punishment in accordance with the Standing Order, he may summarily suspend such employee for a period which shall not exceed four days without sufficient reason : Provided that the Manager if he so considers necessary, may extend the period of suspension pending enquiry into the alleged misconduct. (b) The order of suspension shall be in writing and shall set out the misconduct alleged against the employee and shall take effect immediately on communication thereof to the employee. (b) The order of suspension shall be in writing and shall set out the misconduct alleged against the employee and shall take effect immediately on communication thereof to the employee. (c) If after enquiry the employee is adjudged guilty of misconduct and punishment is awarded under the provisions of the Standing Orders, the employee shall be deemed to be absent from duty for the period of suspension and shall not be entitled to any wages for such period and shall not be permitted to enter the Companys premises. If, however, the order of suspension is rescinded, the employee shall be deemed to be on duty during the period of suspension and shall be entitled to the same wages as he would have received if he had not been suspended." A reading of sub-cl. (a) and its proviso of the above quoted Cl. 25 of the Standing Orders makes it clear that the Manager can suspend a workman summarily for a period not exceeding four days as soon as he considers an enquiry necessary against the workman for the misconduct alleged against him. For this initial suspension it is not necessary that an enquiry should be pending. In fact this suspension precedes the enquiry which is intended to be instituted. The proviso, however, enables the Manager to extend the period of suspension pending enquiry into the alleged misconduct of the workman. Accordingly the initial order of suspension dated 27th January, 1961 is prima facie a valid order and does not suffer from any infirmity, it is the subsequent order dated 31st January, 1961 which the Labour Court has found to be defective and the reason given by the Labour Court is that no enquiry was pending on 31st January 1861 as the Enquiry Officer came to be appointed a fortnight later, on 15th February, 1961. 5. I am of the opinion that the Labour Courts view is manifestly erroneous. An enquiry commences as soon as a charge-sheet is served upon the offending workman requiring him to submit an explanation. It is not necessary that an Enquiry Officer should be appointed in all cases. It is possible in some eases that the dispute may come to an end after the workmen submit their explanation and the management is satisfied with the explanation. It is not necessary that an Enquiry Officer should be appointed in all cases. It is possible in some eases that the dispute may come to an end after the workmen submit their explanation and the management is satisfied with the explanation. It cannot be said in such cases that no enquiry had been instituted or that no enquiry was pending at any stage. Is is 'further possible that the period for the sub-mission of the explanation by the workers is extended beyond four days and the order of suspension is also accordingly extended. It is also possible that the enquiry may be conducted by the management without appointing any Enquiry Officer at all or the appointment of an Enquiry Officer may become necessary at a late stage of the enquiry. The view of the Labour Court that the enquiry in the instant case commenced only on 15th February, 1961 and that there was no enquiry pending on 31st January, 1861 cannot be accepted. 6. In this connection it may be stated that Cl. 25 of the Standing Order does not stipulate for the appointment of an Enquiry Officer which means that the enquiry may be conducted by the manager or the management itself. My attention was drawn by the learned Counsel on the other side to Cl. 28 of the Standing Order which is reproduced below : "28 (a) Any complaints arising out of his employment shall be submitted by an employee concerned to the Manager or Management or such other officer or Officers as may be appointed in this behalf by a notice posted on the notice Board and the Manager or such officer shall personally investigate the complaint at the earliest practicable time in the presence of the complainant: Provided that complaints relating to : - (1) assault or abuse by any person holding a supervisory position; or (2) refusal of an application for urgent leave shall be enquired into without delay. (b) If the enquiry has been carried out by an Officer other than the Manager the record shall be sent to the Manager for recording his order accordingly. (b) If the enquiry has been carried out by an Officer other than the Manager the record shall be sent to the Manager for recording his order accordingly. (c) The result of all enquiries and any order passed thereon shall be recorded and communicated to the complainant employee." This clause, of course, makes a provision in certain circumstances for an enquiry to be instituted by a person other than the Manager; hut a plain reading of this clause shows that the appointment of an Enquiry Officer is not obligatory as is obvious from the subclauses (b) and (e) reproduced above. Moreover, this clause relates to the enquiry into the complaints by the employees and would not apply to enquiries into the misconduct of an employee at the instance of the Manager or the management. 7. In support of its second reason for holding the suspension order to be defective, the Labour Court has relied upon the Standing Order 29(a) which may be reproduced here: - "29 (a) The decision of the Manager upon any question arising out of, in connection with or identical to these orders shall be final, provided that the employee aggrieved by the Managers decision : - (1) shall have the right of appeal within 7 days of Managers decision to the Management, who shall pass orders on the appeal within 14 days of its being made, and (2) shall have the right thereafter to appeal against the order of the Management within two months of the date when the order was made or the date on which the aforesaid period of 14 days expired to the Labour Commissioner." The first question would be as to which are the orders to which Standing Order 29 (a) applies. In other words, it shall favours to be determined as to whether a right of appeal contained in the Standing Order 29 applies to an order of suspension pending an enquiry. I am of opinion that it does not so apply. The material words in the Standing Order 29 (a) are "these orders" which in my opinion refer to final orders of punishment passed against a workman such as penalties, fines, dismissal and suspensions as enumerated in 0. 21 and 26. An order of suspension pending an enquiry passed under 0. 25 is not one of the orders contemplated by 01. The material words in the Standing Order 29 (a) are "these orders" which in my opinion refer to final orders of punishment passed against a workman such as penalties, fines, dismissal and suspensions as enumerated in 0. 21 and 26. An order of suspension pending an enquiry passed under 0. 25 is not one of the orders contemplated by 01. 29 It will be noticed that an order of suspension is appealable only if it is passed by way of punishment. Under 0. 24 (a) any employee who is adjudged by the Manager or the Management on examination of the man, if present, and of the facts, to be guilty of misconduct, he is liable to be summarily dismissed without notice or compensation in lieu of notice, or alternatively to be suspended for a period not extending 4 days. 8. I am farther of the view that assuming that an order of suspension pending an enquiry passed under Cl. 25 (a) is appealable, no principle of natural justice is infringed merely because the Manager obtains the prior approval of the management before passing such an order. It would be convenient at this stage to notice the definitions of words 'Manager' and 'Management as given in the Standing Order. Sub-clause (f) of 0. 3 defines the Management in the following words: - "Management" means the Company s partners or such other nominee or nominees as may be authorised in this behalf and notified by notice on the Companys notice board." Sub.clause (g) of 0 8 defines Manager in the following words: - "Manager means the Companys Manager or Acting Manager so notified under S. 7 (f) of the Factories Act, 1948, for the time being or such other person or persons as may be authorised by the Management by a notice affixed to the Companys notice Board to exercise all the powers of Manager under these Orders." There is no law which requires a person carrying on a business to appoint an outsider as a Manager. If the person concerned happens to be an individual, he can manage the business himself and need not appoint an outsider as Manager on salary. Similarly in the case of a partnership firm, it is open to the firm to appoint one of the partners as its Manager. In either case the Manager would come within the definition of the Management also. Similarly in the case of a partnership firm, it is open to the firm to appoint one of the partners as its Manager. In either case the Manager would come within the definition of the Management also. It cannot be said that in cases like these no order of suspension can be issued because the Manager and the management happen to be the same person. If the view of the Labour Court was to be accepted, the order of suspension passed in cases like these would be bad, because an appeal would lie to the same per- son, who passed the order of suspension. This obviously could not have been the intention. In such oases the aggrieved workman can appeal to the Labour Commissioner straight way, but his right to appeal to the Management would still be there, even though he may not like to appeal to the Management on the assumption that the same would be futile. It is conceivable that the Management may afford the necessary relief to the workman after hearing him, in case the explanation of the workman is found to be satisfactory, but it cannot be said that in such cases no order of suspension can be passed by a Manager or that such an order would violate the principles of natural justice or would infringe any of the rights of the workman concerned. 9. It may also be remembered that a salaried Manager has no direct interest in the business itself and it would be a prudent policy for the proprietors of the business to insist that the Manager should take the prior approval of tho Management before taking action against the workman. Such a procedure would prevent loss to the business at the hands of the Manager, who may like to pass orders of suspension against workmen on flimsy or trivial grounds, thus resulting in serious loss to the business. 10. In the instant case the order of suspension was passed against more than half the strength of the labourers in the factory. This must have caused a considerable loss to the business and must have damaged the relationship between the Management and the labour. There was nothing irregular if the Manager obtained the prior approval of toe management before passing the order of suspension. This must have caused a considerable loss to the business and must have damaged the relationship between the Management and the labour. There was nothing irregular if the Manager obtained the prior approval of toe management before passing the order of suspension. Such a procedure, in my opinion, is highly prudent which must of the big concerns must have laid down for the guidance of their Managers. 11. The finding of the Labour Court, therefore, holding the order of suspension passed on 31st December, 1961 to be defective is in my opinion, patently erroneous and cannot be upheld. 12. Mr. B. K. Garg, learned counsel for the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, contended that since a final order dismissing the workmen concerned, had already been passed, the present writ petition had become infructuons. It may be mentioned here that on the conclusion of the enquiry, the petitioner company passed an order dated 7th August, 1961 dismissing from service the workman concerned on the ground that the charge of misconduct lad been established against them. The effect to this order was, however, not given as the proceedings were pending before the Labour Court. After the award had been given by the Labour Court, a final order of dismissal was passed by the petitioner company on 11th May, 1961 which reads as follows: - "In continuation to the order dated 7-8-1961 issued to you by Registered A/D you are hereby, dismissed from the service of the Tannery with effect from the date of this order. Sd/- Max Haeeker, Manager." It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that in spite of the final orders having been passed by the petitioner company, the Labour Commissioner insisted upon the implementation of the award of the Labour Court and in support of this allegation the learned counsel drew my attention to a letter No. 8478/KR. (LCK.I) 57/61 dated 24th July, 1963, from the Deputy Labour Commissioner, U. P. Kanpur Region, Kanpur addressed to the Manager of the petitioner company in which it was stated that the reasons given by the petitioner company for not implementing the award were not satisfactory and that it was obligatory for the company to have implemented the award. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in this state of affairs it was necessary for this Court to decide the writ petition on merits. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in this state of affairs it was necessary for this Court to decide the writ petition on merits. I agree with this contention of the learned counsel. Since the labour Commissioner is still insisting upon the implementation of the award of the Labour Court in spite of the fact that final orders of termination of the services of the workmen concerned have already been passed, it is necessary to decide the petition after considering the rival contentions of the parties. 13. In view of my findings given above, I hold that the award of the Labour Court dated 29th January, 1963 is manifestly erroneous and has got to be quashed to the extent indicated below. 14. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. A writ of certiorari shall issue quashing that portion of the award dated 29th January, 1961 whereby compensation has been awarded by the Labour Court to the workmen. ,