JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. We very much regret that we ever asked for or made this Reference. The object, which we had in view at the time, has been entirely frustrated, as the Reference has not been answered by the Full Bench and the matter has been remitted back to us under an apparent mistake or misconception or misapprehension as to the Rule of this Court, under which this Reference was made or sent by us. We sought for quick assistance to resolve a deepening judicial crisis which was fast developing. That assistance has been deferred, if not altogether denied. 2. In our order of Reference, no doubt, there was an obvious typographical error in that Rule 2 was mentioned, in place of Rule 3, of Chapter VII of the Appellate Side Rules. But the said order of Reference was sufficiently clear on the point, as it distinctly mentioned that it was a Reference in an appeal from original decree, which, patently, attracted Rule 3 and had connection with Rule 2, which dealt with References in other cases. Even without such mention, it could not have been overlooked that it was a Reference in a pending First Appeal, which came directly under Rule 3 and to which Rule 2 had no application. 3. We were also a little surprised that this simple thing or this obvious typographical error was not detected or pointed out at the hearing before the Full Bench. We were told and Mr. Lala was emphatic on this point that the hearing before the Full Bench proceeded under Rule 3 but the order of the Full Bench indicates otherwise, as it contains no reference at all to Rule 3 and no mention of it, while it quotes Rule 2 in full and relies on and discusses a decision of this Court (1) Kubir Mollo v. Manik Mallik, 65 CWN 420, in a Reference under Rule 2 for assuming jurisdiction to remit the matter to us. 4. Indeed, when this aspect was pointed out by us, Mr. Chakraborty could not explain why he cited that authority and why the reference in the Full Bench's order was at all made to Rule 2. 4. Indeed, when this aspect was pointed out by us, Mr. Chakraborty could not explain why he cited that authority and why the reference in the Full Bench's order was at all made to Rule 2. We were thus placed in a perplexing and embarrassing situation, as the scope and purpose of a Reference under Rule 2 is, obviously, different from and much wider than that under Rule 3, and matters, which would, obviously, be open for examination by the Full Bench in a Reference under Rule 2, would not, plainly, be so open in a Reference under Rule 3. Under Rule 2, as its terms unmistakably indicate, the whole case is before the Full Bench and it is entitled to pass any order for disposing of the same, irrespective of the views of the referring Division Bench. Under Rule 3, on the other hand, the Full Bench's jurisdiction is limited to the point or points of law, referred to it, and it has to answer those points and return the case to the Division Bench for final hearing and "adjudication" and "ultimate decision" in the light of those answers. The Full Bench is not sitting as a court of appeal over the referring Division Bench. That status is available under the law of the land only to the Supreme Court and the Full Bench cannot usurp that status and convert itself into the Supreme Court to give it appellate powers or any extended appellate jurisdiction over the Division Bench. 5. It (the Full Bench) is a Referee Court and its authority is strictly limited by the order of Reference or by the scope of the Reference. Under Rule 2, the whole case, being before the Full Bench, the scope is very wide and the Full Bench has authority to pass any order in the case. Under Rule 3, only the points of law referred are before it and its authority and jurisdiction are limited to a consideration of the same and to answering them for helping ultimate disposal of the case by the Division Bench. It has no jurisdiction to go into any other question not even to examine whether the point or points referred to arise in the case before them. That is a matter entirely and exclusively for the Division Bench and it is not liable to be reexamined or reopened by the Full Bench. 6. It has no jurisdiction to go into any other question not even to examine whether the point or points referred to arise in the case before them. That is a matter entirely and exclusively for the Division Bench and it is not liable to be reexamined or reopened by the Full Bench. 6. Indeed, Rule 6 of Chapter VII of the Appellate Side Rules makes it clear that the binding force of a Full Bench's decision is limited to the points of law or usage and such points cannot, obviously, extend to any beyond the points referred, as otherwise the pronouncement of the Full Bench on points, not referred, may well cover questions on every branch of the law of the land and may become binding on such points too. The absurdity of such a situation was realised by the learned Advocates on both sides and also by the learned Advocate General, who, at our request, appeared with Mr. Sankar Ghose, Counsel as Amicus Curiae, to assist us in finding a satisfactory solution of the problem, created by the Full Bench's order. Indeed, in the context of the preceding Rules, the above Rule 6 and its contents can have no other meaning. 7. In the above state of things, it was not disputed before us that the decision of the Full Bench will be binding on the Division Bench only on the points of law or usage, referred to it. If, then, the Full Bench assumes jurisdiction to go into the question whether the points referred actually arise in the case and refuses to answer the said points upon the view, contrary to the view of the referring Division Bench, that they do not arise, a peculiar situation may develop and a stalemate may ensue, as the Division Bench, not being bound by the said opinion of the Full Bench, may refuse to decide the case without answers to the points referred and the problem cannot be solved and the difficulty cannot be resolved, as this Court has no revisional or appellate power over its Division Bench. 8. 8. Realising this, the learned Advocate General suggested to us that, to avoid precipitating a delicate situation, we should accept the Full Bench's judgment on its face value, namely, that it proceeded under Rule 2, being misled by the accidental typographical error in our order of Reference and its whole judgment (including the ordering portion) was coloured and influenced by that error and he requested us to refer back the matter to the Full Bench with just a clarification that the Reference was and is under Rule 3, and not under Rule 2, and should be dealt with accordingly. 9. Out of respect to our learned brothers (Ray J., Mitra, J. and Bagchi J.), who constituted the Full Bench and for whom we entertain the highest regard, and in deference to the above request or wish of the learned Advocate General, in which he was joined by the learned Advocates, appearing for the parties before us,-Mr. Chakraborty making it clear, after a detailed discussion in Court, that he withdraws his objection that the points referred do not arise in the instant case and does not make any contention to that effect-we deem to expedient, in the interest of judicial dignity and decorum, to adopt the course, suggested above to us. But, before we do so, we would refer to one aspect of the matter in fairness to the learned Advocate General. At one stage of his submission, the learned Advocate General sought to impress upon us that, inspite of the wording of Rule 3, the whole case would be before the Full Bench. We at once pointed out that would be going directly against the language of the written Rule and also obliterate the obvious distinction, so long accepted, between Rules 2 and 3, and render nugatory the purpose of using different languages in the two Rules and also in Rules 4 and 5, which are similar to Rule 2 from this point of view. The learned Advocate General saw the difficulty but he told us that he definitely remembered a decision of the Supreme Court, either under Sec. 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent, holding, inter alia, inspite of similar language on the point in the said particular provision that the Referee Third Judge had jurisdiction to go into the whole case. This appeared to us to be somewhat startling, in view of the language employed, but, at the request of the learned Advocate General we adjourned the hearing to enable him to find out the appropriate reference. When, however the hearing was resumed on the next date the learned Advocate General, with his usual fairness. informed us that he was misled by a wrong recollection of some observations in a recent Supreme Court pronouncement and did not press the matter further but he drew our attention to five decisions, three of this Court (2) Md. Mehdi Hassan Khan v. Sheoshankar Persad Singh, ILR 39 Cal 353, (3) Mahammed Gauhar Ali v. Samiruddin Seikh & Ors., 18 CWN 33 : AIR 1914 Cal 592 and (4) Jnanendra v. Umesh Chandra, AIR 1922 Cal 544, one of the Allahabad High Court (5) Jati Prasad v. Amba Prasad, AIR 1933 All 361 and the other of the Patna High Court (6) Zainuddin Hussain Mirza v. Sohanlal Pachisia, AIR 1958 Pat 290 , taking care to the point, to avoid any misgiving or misunderstanding, that they may not support the view-point, canvassed by him, but may through some light on the scope of Sec. 98 of the Code, which had some resemblance in language with Rule 3 of Chapter VII of the Appellate Side Rules. The learned Advocate General explained that, while the Allahabad and the Patna decisions went directly against his above extreme contention, as to the scope of Section 98 of the Code, the other decisions may well support a wider scope for the said section. 10. We have carefully gone through the above decisions, cited by the learned Advocate General, but, while we find that the Allahabad and the Patna cases definitely restrict the Referee Third Judge's authority to the points of difference between the Referring Judges and preclude him from going into or examining any other point, the Calcutta decisions too, do not lay down, strictly speaking, anything to the contrary. Indeed, no other view in the matter would have been possible in the face of the pre-existing authority of the Judicial Committee in the case of (7) Kumar Partab Singh and Another v. Bhabuti Singh, 17 CWN 1165 at p. 1172 (Col. 2). Indeed, no other view in the matter would have been possible in the face of the pre-existing authority of the Judicial Committee in the case of (7) Kumar Partab Singh and Another v. Bhabuti Singh, 17 CWN 1165 at p. 1172 (Col. 2). The first Calcutta decision only emphasises that, even where the Reference is irregular, the point of difference not having been stated or referred, if the parties agree as to the same, and if it (the point of difference) otherwise appears from the referring order, the Referee Third Judge may deal with the Reference on that footing. The other two Calcutta decisions only deal with a further aspect of the matter, arising under the other parts of the section, in the light of the References before them or under consideration on the said occasion. Thus, Jenkins C.J. in 18 CWN 33 : AIR 1914 Cal 592 who had before him a Reference in the following terms : "In the circumstances of this case does an appeal lie ?" took the view - and, if we may say so with respect, very rightly, - that Sec. 98 required the Referring Judges to come to their conclusion on all the other points, involved in the case before making a Reference, so as to enable the case to be finally disposed of in the light of the majority opinion on the point or points referred. This, indeed, is the accepted position under Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of its main or opening part, which, obviously, implies the consequence that the majority opinion on the point or points referred must be decisive of the case. Rule 3 has no similarity, either in language or in the matter of the above context, and it expressly provides for a return of the case to the Referring Division Bench with an expression of opinion on the points, referred for final adjudication or ultimate decision. Woodroffe J.'s observations Jnanendra v. Umesh Chandra, in AIR 1922 Cal. 544 were also strictly limited to section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure and will be well supported by the section itself in the light of the Reference before him. Woodroffe J.'s observations Jnanendra v. Umesh Chandra, in AIR 1922 Cal. 544 were also strictly limited to section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure and will be well supported by the section itself in the light of the Reference before him. That Reference was in these terms: "On the facts stated in this case, what is the Article of the Limitation Act which is applicable ?", and the learned Judge, having come to the conclusion that none of the provisions of the Limitation Act applied to the case but that it was governed by section 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which was not the view of either of the Referring Judges, found that there would be no majority on the point to enable a final decision of the case. He, accordingly, took the only course, open to him, namely to send the matter back to the learned Referring Judges with his answer that neither of the Articles, suggested by the said learned Judges, was applicable, with the consequence that the matter had to be decided under the main part of section 98, there being no majority for application of the proviso. That decision also would thus have no relevance on the different language or vocabulary of Rule 3 of Chapter VII of the Appellate Side Rules. 11. In the above view of law, we could have by passed the present order of the Full Bench as an order without jurisdiction, treated the offending observations in (8) Punam Chand Daga v. S. Dosani 71 CWN 686, as undeserving of notice in the light of the recent Supreme Court pronouncement in (9) Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. 11. In the above view of law, we could have by passed the present order of the Full Bench as an order without jurisdiction, treated the offending observations in (8) Punam Chand Daga v. S. Dosani 71 CWN 686, as undeserving of notice in the light of the recent Supreme Court pronouncement in (9) Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S.N. Sarma and Anr., AIR 1968 SC 453 and recalled the Reference by withdrawing our request for the same and decided the matter ourselves in the light of the high and binding authorities, (some of which were mentioned in our Original Order of Reference), which may well be regarded as settlers on the points of Reference, but, as such a course might have seriously damaged the massive fabric of exquisite beauty of glorious judicial history and traditions of this Court, so neatly woven, through long ages and sustained efforts, into a smooth and scintillating texture of celestial brilliance and delicacy and might have added to the scars on the sublime walls of this great temple of justice, we refrained from adopting that course and decided to follow the suggestion of the learned Advocate General and the learned Advocates, appearing for the parties. 12. One word more before we make the final order. The instant case has very clearly demonstrated the supreme value of the salutary convention of this Court, murtured through ages, of having the presence of one of the Referring Judges in the Full Bench or Special Bench, as the case may be, as, in such event, remands, like the present, would not have been necessary and this unnecessary chapter and wastage of time would have been avoided. 13. We may add also that what we have said above on the relevant Rules is inherent and implicit in the same and for a remand like the present, under Rule 3, the learned Advocates could not show us any precedent. 14. 13. We may add also that what we have said above on the relevant Rules is inherent and implicit in the same and for a remand like the present, under Rule 3, the learned Advocates could not show us any precedent. 14. Having expressed ourselves sufficiently, as above, on the various legal aspects, which may otherwise have arisen, we have decided, as indicated above, in the light of the suggestion of the learned Advocate General and the learned Advocates of the parties and out of respect and deference to our learned brothers (Ray, J., Mitra, J., and Bagchi, J) who constituted the Full Bench, and for whom, as already said, we entertain the highest regard, to refer back the matter to the Full Bench for a decision or determination, according to law, under Rule 3 of Chapter VII of the Appellate Side Rules, of the points referred and for a return of the case to the Division Bench with its expression of opinion on the same for final adjudication or ultimate decision. We make it clear, as desired by the learned Advocate General, that the instant Reference is under Rule 3 of Chapter VII, and not under Rule 2, as wrongly typed in the original Order of Reference. 15. We also make it clear that this Reference was made on a clear finding that the points referred do arise in the instant case and we reiterate that finding and further record that the learned Advocates, appearing for the parties before us, namely, Mr. Chakrabarti and Mr. Lala, do agree, after full discussion in Court that the said points do arise in this appeal. We do not, in the circumstances, feel called upon to give our reasons for the said finding nor do we feel obliged under the law to state those reasons for purposes of this Reference or for sending the matter back to the Full Bench. 16. The Reference is sent back to the Full Bench as above. 17. Liberty is given to the parties to mention for early hearing. We very much regret that the appeal could not be disposed of expeditiously, as desired us, due to circumstances beyond our control.