J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Application had originally come for condonation of delay before Sheth J. on 9th August 1968 and my learned brother refused to condone the delay and to that extent it was rejected with costs. The petitioner however was given liberty to show that the C. R. A. was in time and that is how it has been argued before me. ( 2 ) MR. S. H. Sheth vehemently argued that even though under the amended appellate side rules under rule 17 limitation prescribed in 90 days from the date of the decree or order sought to be revised the said provision is wholly ultra vires for the simple reason that it curtails the limitation which is now provided by the Limitation Act 1963 for such residuary applications under Art. 137. The said contention is founded on the assumption that such a revision application did not fall under Article 131 because the residuary Article 137 would apply to any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere. If therefor the present revision application is governed by Article 131 which also prescribed a period of 90 days the said rule 17 could not be contended to be ultra vires. ( 3 ) ARTICLE 131 provides that for an application to any Court for the exercise of its powers of revision under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. . . . . . . . . . the limitation is 90 days from the date of the decree or order sought to be revised. Mr. Sheth argued that the present revision is under sec 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act. Sec. 29 (2) provides that no other appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-sec. (1) but the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that any such decision in appeal is according to law call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such orders with respect thereto as it thinks fit. This amendment was Introduced by the Legislature by Gujarat Act No. 18 of 1965. Before the amendment the revision under the Act was governed only by the provision in sec. This amendment was Introduced by the Legislature by Gujarat Act No. 18 of 1965. Before the amendment the revision under the Act was governed only by the provision in sec. 115 of the C. P. Code as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Abbasbhai v. Gulamnabi A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1341 revision was therefore confined under the Code only to cases of jurisdictional control. That jurisdiction is now widened under the present sec. 29 (23. In view of this change Mr. Sheth argued that now the revision application is not under the Code hut under sec. 29 (2 ). Even though right to avail of these wider powers of revision is now conferred by sec. 29 (2) the procedure which the High Court follows in dealing with such revision applications remains the same. Mr. Sheth confuses the two questions as to grounds on which a revision lies and the procedure regarding the entertainment and disposal of revision applications. The amendment has changed the grounds on which the revisional jurisdiction can be now exercised by widening the scope of such revision; but it has not affected the procedure which is the one contemplated by the Code alone even after the present amendment. ( 4 ) MR. Sheth pointed out that this revision application would not be governed by the procedure prescribed under the Code but by the special law viz. the Act and its rules. Sec. 31 provides that the Courts specified in secs. 28 and 29 shall follow the prescribed procedure in trying and hearing suits Proceedings applications and appeals and in executing orders made by them. In the rules enacted under the Act viz. the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Rules 1948 in cases of such suits and appeal under sec. 29 (1) (a) the practice and procedure as laid down in the Code has to be followed by the Court. Rule 16 is a general provision which provides that in deciding any question relating to the procedure not specifically provided by the rules the Courts shall as far as possible be guided by the provisions contained in the Code. Therefore there can be no doubt that even a revision application under sec. 29 (2) would be regulated by the procedure under the Code. Sec. 122 of the Code enables the High Court to frame rules to regulate its procedure. Therefore there can be no doubt that even a revision application under sec. 29 (2) would be regulated by the procedure under the Code. Sec. 122 of the Code enables the High Court to frame rules to regulate its procedure. The appellate side rules clearly lay down the procedure for civil revision applications under rules 15 to 18 as to how they are to be presented and for the period of limitation. Rule 17 as amended provides a limitation period of 90 days in cases of such revision applications both under sec. 115 of the Code or under special or local law. From these provisions there can be no doubt that even for the revision applications under sec. 29 (2) the procedure is one as contemplated by the Code. ( 5 ) THE expression under the Code in Article 131 has to be interpreted. Mr. Sheth urges a narrow construction in the sense by virtue of the Code while the same expression is capable of a wider meaning in the sense as contemplated by the Code. Their Lordships of the Privy Council interpreted the expression under as meaning no more than as contemplated by in Free Lands Insurance Co. Ltd. v. X. E. Renasingha 1964 A C. 541 at page 543. ( 6 ) EVEN the Supreme Court in Vidyacharan v. Khubchand A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1099 in a similar context while interpreting Article 156 providing for the limitation period of 90 days for appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure interpreted the expression under in the same sense as contemplated by. In that case the appeal was not under any provision in the Civil Procedure Code because It was an appeal under the Representation of the People Act 1951 under sec. 116a (1 ). Ayyangar J. speaking for B. P. Sinha C. J. and for himself observed at page 1103 the appeals under various Indian enactments viz. Indian Succession Act the Probate and Administration Act the Land Acquisition Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act did not provide under those respective statutes any period of limitation. But as Civil Procedure Code governs these appeals the intention of the Legislature was that Art. 156 would furnish the period of limitation for such appeals. Indian Succession Act the Probate and Administration Act the Land Acquisition Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act did not provide under those respective statutes any period of limitation. But as Civil Procedure Code governs these appeals the intention of the Legislature was that Art. 156 would furnish the period of limitation for such appeals. These appeals were governed by the procedure under the Civil Procedure Code even though they wore not under those special Acts and so they were deemed to be under the Civil Procedure Code. Subba Rao J. in the concurring judgment also observed at page 1109 that the expression procedure under the Civil Procedure Code would mean procedure governing such an appeal meaning the manner of receiving an appeal in the Court the preparation of records of the appeal the posting of the appeal and the manner of Its disposal. In view of this settled position of law it is obvious that even though the revision in the Rent Act is on wider grounds under sec. 29 (2) before this Court than one under sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as the procedure governing both the revision applications is the same both the revision applications are revision applications under the Code. ( 7 ) BESIDES this is a case where the expression under is capable of two interpretations. It is well-settled that we must accept that meaning out of these two meanings which would not frustrate the object of the Limitation Act. The Amending Act could not have intended that revision applications should be governed by the residuary limitation of three years and the other interpretation would therefore clearly frustrate the very object of the Limitation Act. That interpretation would also make rule 17 ultra vires and such a construction could never be preferred. The other meaning which we are now giving would not only carry out the object of the Limitation Act by providing uniform limitation for all revisions before this Court but would not render rule 17 of the Appellate Side Rules ultra vires. I therefore hold that the revision application under sec. 29 (2) of the Rent Act is governed by the limitation period provided by Art. 131 and in rule 17. ( 8 ) THIS revision application is therefore time-barred and must be rejected on this short ground. Application dismissed .