JUDGMENT : Acharya, J. - This revision is directed against the judgment dated 12-9-1966 in G.R. Case No. 550 of 1965 passed by Shri B.K. Patnaik, B.A., L.L.B., Magistrate 1st Class (Judicial). Sambalpur convicting the Petitioners under Section. 447/34 Indian Penal Code, and sentencing them there under to pay fine of Rs. 10/- each, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 days. 2. The prosecution case in short is that on 11-6-1965 at about 6 in the morning, the accused persons trespassed, ploughed and sowed paddy in plot Nos. 746 and 738 of Khunti No. 5 in village Pankimal belonging to and in the possession of the informant, Lochan Kisan. The accused persons did not listen to the intervention of some gentlemen of the village. Lochan Kisan thereafter informed the police who after investigation submitted charge-sheet u/s 447/34, Indian Penal Code against the Petitioners. 3. In the trial the Petitioners totally denied the occurrence. One defence witness was examined on behalf of the Petitioners. 4. At the outset the learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that the impugned judgment is bad in law as the reasons for the Magistrate's decision have not been stated in accordance with law. u/s 367, Code of Criminal Procedure in every judgment it is necessary that not only the points for determination, or the decision thereon should be stated, but the Judge should also state very clearly therein the reasons for such decision. The statement of reasons for the decision being an important ingredient of a judgment, it should be done in such in a manner that it can be known there from that the Judge consciously applied his mind to the evidence on record and the materials before him, and having considered all those things in a judicious manner he arrived at a finding either to convict or to acquit the accused persons. In this regard. I would refer to the decision reported in AIR (Volume 41) 1954 Allahabad, 1041, wherein it has been held that: The third requirement laid down in Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure viz., the reasons for the decision, is an important ingredient of a judgment. Compliance with law in this regard should not be merely formal but substantial and real. I would refer to the decision reported in AIR (Volume 41) 1954 Allahabad, 1041, wherein it has been held that: The third requirement laid down in Section 367, Code of Criminal Procedure viz., the reasons for the decision, is an important ingredient of a judgment. Compliance with law in this regard should not be merely formal but substantial and real. Where the statement of reasons turns out to be mere hollow pretension of a baseless claim of application of mind by the Court, the judgment is robbed of one of its most essential ingredients and forfeits its claim to be termed a judgment in the eye of law. The statement of reasons for the decision in a proper and judicious manner is also of immense importance when a non-appealable sentence is passed against the accused; as otherwise the higher Courts in the exercise of their revisional jurisdiction may feel seriously handicapped in making a proper assessment of the matter. 5. Having gone through the judgment of the learned Magistrate in this case, I find that the Magistrate has acted in a very perfunctory manner in writing out this judgment. The reasons for the decision have not been properly stated, as there is no proper consideration or assessment of the evidence on record, there has been no sifting of the oral evidence with reference to the accused persons, and there is no proper application of the Magistrate's judicial mind to all the materials before him. This is not a desirable state of affairs, specially coming from a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class. The judgment, therefore, cannot be termed as a judgment in the eye of law. 6. Mr. Murty next contended that there is no finding regarding the criminal intention of the accused persons, and as such the conviction cannot be maintained. This being an offence u/s 447, Indian Penal Code the essence of the offence is the intent with which the trespass was committed. To make out a case of criminal trespass it is not enough to show that the accused persons entered into the property in the possession of another, hut it must he shown or found from the evidence on record that the main intention was to commit an offence, or to intimidate insult or annoy any person in possession of the property. In this connection I will refer to a decision reported in Mathuri and Others Vs. State of Punjab. In para 13 of the said decision it has been held that it is legitimate to think also that when Section 441 speaks of entering on property 'with intent to commit an offence, or to intimidate, insult or annoy' any person in possession of the property, it speaks of the main intention in the action and not any subsidiary intention that may also be present." Their Lordships further held in para 18 that "In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the persons entering; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequence would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being the dominant intention which prompted the entry." This being the position of law, it is unfortunate that the Magistrate has not at all directed his attention to this important point for determination in this case, and has not cared even to give any finding whatsoever on this essential ingredient of the offence while convicting the Petitioners u/s 44-7. Indian Penal Code. 7. The impugned judgment being thus of an unsatisfactory nature, and as I consider that at this point of time it would not be desirable to remand this case to the Court below for writing out a fresh judgment in accordance with law, I would better go through the evidence and materials on record in order to ascertain for myself if the conviction and sentence passed against the Petitioner can be maintained or not. 8. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place at about 6 A.M. On 11-6-1965 but the F.I.R. as I find, was lodged on 13-6-1965 at 11 A.M. at the S.I's camp at Kerabandha. 8. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place at about 6 A.M. On 11-6-1965 but the F.I.R. as I find, was lodged on 13-6-1965 at 11 A.M. at the S.I's camp at Kerabandha. Besides the evidence of Lochan, p.w. 1 who lodged the F.I.R., there is the evidence of p.ws. 2 and 3, who are alleged to be the eye witnesses to the occurrence. Regarding the presence of p.ws at the place of occurrence, according to p.w. 1 he called Sudprsan and Michhu (p.ws. 2 and 3) from their houses, and they also came to the place of occurrence, and there was nobody else present besides these three persons. According to p.ws. 2 and 3 there was another person named Gulbadan who was although with the above three persons. The prosecution has no explanation to offer regarding this discrepancy, nor has it been stated any where as to why this Gulbadan, alleged to be an eye witness, could not be examined in this case. Moreover, according to p.w. 2, he along with Gulbadan and Lochan called Michhu (p.w. 3) from his house to accompany them to the place of occurrence but this is not so according to p.w. 3 who states that p.w. 1 informed him (Michhu) first, and then they went to call p.w. 2. Again, according to p.w. 1 he did not go to the spot, and he saw the occurrence from a distance M 20 yards (or 100 cubits in cross examination) out of fear, and he sent only p.w. 2 and p.w. 3 to Bee the occurrence, but according to p. ws 2 and 3 themselves, the four persons named above including p.w. 1 went upon the disputed land at the time of occurrence. I also find that the p.ws. have made discrepant statements regarding the boundaries of the disputed land, and from the prosecution evidence the identity of the land, and also the time of occurrence cannot be ascertained with certainty. It is also interesting to find that while p.w. 1 states that the occurrence took place in the month of Baisakh, p.ws. 2 and 3 state that it took place in the month of Jaistha. Another important thing which is noticeable in the prosecution evidence is that when the p.ws. went to the place of occurrence they did not find any body any where or her than themselves and the accused persons. 2 and 3 state that it took place in the month of Jaistha. Another important thing which is noticeable in the prosecution evidence is that when the p.ws. went to the place of occurrence they did not find any body any where or her than themselves and the accused persons. The appears to be something unnatural, as in the month of Jaistha other persons also would be expected to be carrying on their agricultural operations in their respective lands in the vicinity. Again, from the evidence of p.w. 3, I find that the accused Tirtha was spreading manure on the deputed land while accused Kalia was sowing paddy, and other accused persons were present, and doing earth work. If the Petitioners had been on the land with an illegal intention, I do not understand why they should take the trouble of manuring the said land with an uncertain prospect of reaping benefits in future. This must also be said that the documents exhibited in this case are of no avail. Ext. 2 is an uncertified copy of the parcha on ordinary plain papers without any mark of authentication on the same; and the rent receipts, Exts. 3 to 314 are in the names of Gulbadan and others. Thus, Ext. 2 and the rent receipts do not lend any support to the prosecution case. The prosecution evidence being of such an unsatisfactory nature as discussed above, the participation of the Petitioners in the alleged occurrence, and for their entering on the disputed land with the requisite intention cannot be held to have been proved all reasonable doubts. 9. The Petitioners, therefore, are entitled to the benefit of doubt, and as such are hereby acquitted. The conviction and sentence passed against them are set aside, and the fine, if realised from them, be refunded to them forthwith.