JUDGMENT : J.C. Shah, J. A Division Bench of the Punjab High Court referred to a Full Bench the following question :- "How far in the present case the Additional Director, Consolidation, was competent to recall or review his orders on the merits in the absence of any statutory provisions conferring such power? The Full Bench after an elaborate review of the authorities held that the Additional Director was not competent to recall or review his orders on the merits in the case in hand. 2. The same question fell to be determined before this Court in Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and others, 1966 S.C.R. 817. In that case in accordance with a scheme of consolidation of holdings under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, certain parcels of land were reallotted to the appellant and the respondents. Being dissatisfied with the allotments, two of the respondents preferred appeals under Section 23(3) and then under Section 23(4) of the Act. One of the appeals was partially allowed by the Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings. The appellant then moved the State Government under Section 42 of the Act for revision of the Assistant Director's order and in doing so, submitted two applications under Section 42. On the first application, the Director of Consolidation of Holdings passed an order that the application be put up with the record. He, however, proceeded to dismiss the second application. Thereafter the Director heard the parties on the first application and set aside the Assistant Director's order. The first respondent moved a petition in the High Court under Article 226 for a writ to quash the Director's order on the first application. The High Court allowed the petition holding that the Director was not competent to pass the impugned order on the first application after dismissing the second application. This Court confirmed the order of the High Court observing that in the absence of a provision in the Act granting express power of review to the State Government with regard to Section 42 of the Act the Director was incompetent to review his previous order dismissing the appellant's application under Section 42. 3. The decision is binding upon this Court. But counsel for the appellant contends that the Court in deciding in Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and others, (supra), did not notice Section 12 of the Punjab General Clauses Act. 3. The decision is binding upon this Court. But counsel for the appellant contends that the Court in deciding in Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and others, (supra), did not notice Section 12 of the Punjab General Clauses Act. That section provides :- "Where by any Punjab Act any power is conferred, then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires." Counsel says that a statutory power is conferred upon every authority under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act to modify orders passed by it as occasion requires and that power necessarily includes the power of review of judgments previously delivered. If the contention raised by the counsel were true utmost confusion would result in the determination of disputes requiring judicial determination for it would be open to quasi-judicial authorities to go on altering orders passed by them from time to time. Section 12, in our judgment confers no such authority. It only applies to administrative orders and does not apply to quasi judicial orders. And if authority be needed for that proposition it is to be found in a judgment of this Court in Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1966 2 S.C.R. 172. In dealing with the provisions of Section 13 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891, which are in terms identical with Section 12 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, this Court observed : "Reliance is placed on Section 13 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891, whereunder if any power is conferred on the Government that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. But that section cannot apply to an order made in exercise of a quasi-judicial power." Counsel for the appellant contends that section 13 of the Madras General Clauses Act is governed by Section 12 which provides that this Chapter (Chapter 3) shall apply to all matters unless a contrary intention appears from any enactment in force. The only effect of Section 12 is that a contrary intention may be implied having regard to the nature of the order to be passed in the application of Section 13: Section 12, however, does not alter the nature of the orders which may be made by an authority in exercise of the power under Section 13. The only effect of Section 12 is that a contrary intention may be implied having regard to the nature of the order to be passed in the application of Section 13: Section 12, however, does not alter the nature of the orders which may be made by an authority in exercise of the power under Section 13. If the power to pass orders conferred by Section 13 of the Madras General Clauses Act is administrative and quasi-judicial, the existence of restrictions on the exercise of that power by Section 12 has, in our judgment, no bearing in determining whether Section 13 invests a quasi-judicial authority with power to review its judgment. 4. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.