I. D. Dua ( 1 ) RUP Daps (respondent No. 1 in this Court) instituted a suit for rendition of accounts in the Court of a Subordinate Judge. Rohru, against Rattan Chand and Girja Nand. The valuation for the purposes of Court fee and Jurisdiction was fixed at Rs. 110. 00 as is usually in such cases. It appears that the defendents, amongst their pleas, raised a preliminary objection which gave rise to the following, amongst other issues : - "whether the dispute which is the subject-matter of the present suit is pending before arbitrators and as such the suit is not maintainable ?"treating this issue as a preliminary issue, the learned Subordinate Judge decided the same in favour of the defendents and dismissed the suit, holding it to be not maintainable. ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by this decree, the plaintiff took the matter on appeal to the Court of the learned District Judge, Mahasu. The lower Appellate Court disagreed with the view of the learned Subordinate Judge and expressed his opinon thus : - "it is a well settled rule of law that the parties cannot travel outside the pleadings and no evidence can be received on matters which do not form part of the pleadings and issues. It was not the case of the defendants that the suit of the plaintiff was barred as Arbitrators had made the award. On the contrary, the express plea taken by the defendants was that Arbitrators had not made the award. The defendants have not produced the copy of the award that is alleged to have been made by the Arbitrators. For the foregoing reasons, the finding of the trial Jadge that the arbitrators had made an award and the suit of the plaintiff was barred under S 32 of the Arbitration Act, cannot be sustained. "primarily on the basis of these observations the appeal was allowed and the case remitted back to the trial Court for farther proceedings in accordance with law. ( 3 ) SHRI Rattan Chand defendant has approached this Court on the revisional side under paragraph 35 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order read with section 100, Civil P. C. Reference to section 100 of the Code is not understood, and indeed nothing has been urged at the bar on behalf of the appellant justifying the inclusion of this section. Initially, it struck me that in view of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 23 read with Order 43, Rule l (a ). Civil Procedure Code, the aggrieved defendant could have come up to this Court on appeal and in view of the competency of no revision was entertainable by this Court on the express language of the appeal. Paragraph 35 aforesaid Sgri Chhabil Dass has, however, drawn attention to some rule framed under the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order which fixed the minimum value for a second appeal in cases of this type at Rs. l,000. 00. According to the counsel, as the value for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction in the present case has been fixed at Rs. 110. 00, no further appeal was competent There seems to be some kind of a disagreement between the parties about the real valuation in cases like the present, but assuming, without expressing any opinion on the point, that no appeal from the remand order was competent and that the case does fall within paragraph 35 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, I do not consider the present case to be a fit case in which I should, in my discrerion, exercise the revisional power. Paragraph 35 which enables this Court to decided by a civil Court subordinate to it, is identical in terms with those of section 115 of the Code. It is common place that the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code is discretionary and this Court is not bound to interfere, even though there may be a serious technical infirmities disclosed in the order of the Court below, if substantial justice has been done. It was so held as for back as 1902 in Hansa v. Ran Singh. Same consideration would, in my view, apply to the power conferred by paragraph 35 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order. The revisional power conferred by these two provisions on this Court is a kind of a supervisory jurisdiction which is to be invoked only in rare cases where the substantial cause of justice demands interference. Technical defects, however, serious they may be, if they do not disclose substantial or grave injustice, do not justify this Court s interference. The revisional power conferred by these two provisions on this Court is a kind of a supervisory jurisdiction which is to be invoked only in rare cases where the substantial cause of justice demands interference. Technical defects, however, serious they may be, if they do not disclose substantial or grave injustice, do not justify this Court s interference. In the present case, all that has happened is that the trial Court has been directed to deal with the merits of the controversy between the parties and the order non suiting the plaintiff on a highly technical point has been set aside. I am far from satisfied that in this case the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can safely be invoked. ( 4 ) FUR the foregoing reasons, I dismiss this revision, but leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Parties are directed to appear in the trial Court on 27th August; 1968 when a short date would be given for further proceedings in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.